
















The Dissertation (or Treatise) Committee for Mark Richard McClish Certifies that 
this is the approved version of the following dissertation (or treatise): 
 
 

























Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of  
The University of Texas at Austin 
in Partial Fulfillment  
of the Requirements 
for the Degree of  
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 


















I would like to acknowledge the generous support, both personal and financial, 
that I have received from the faculty and staff of the Department of Asian Studies at The 
University of Texas at Austin. I am extremely grateful to all of you. I would also like to 
thank the Department of Education for a Fulbright DDRA Fellowship during which 
research on this dissertation was carried out. 
Most importantly, I would like to thank my advisor, Patrick Olivelle, who has 
given so generously of his time and considerable expertise on the legal and political 
literature of classical India. It is not an overstatement to say that this dissertation would 
not have been possible in so many ways without his help and support. I am proud to call 










Mark Richard McClish, Ph.D. 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2009 
 
Supervisor:  Patrick Olivelle 
 
This dissertation is about how to use the Arthaśāstra of Kauilya as a source for 
the study of religion and culture in classical South Asia. The Arthaśāstra is perhaps the 
single most important source for reconstructing the culture of the period and one of the 
most misunderstood. In the following pages, I take two approaches to helping scholars 
produce more and better information from the text. First, I engage in source criticism of 
the extant Arthaśāstra, trying to unlock its various layers and compositional moments. 
Second, I use this material to demonstrate how the ideology of Brahmanism, which 
promotes the political interests of the Brahmanical community, was a later addition to a 
text previously devoid of such concerns. In the conclusion, I apply these findings to the 
current thinking on the history of religions in this period and argue that the redaction of 
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A Note on the Use of Sources and Sanskrit Terminology 
Unless otherwise stated, all translations of the Arthaśāstra are based on Kangle 
(1972), although I have not noted where I deviate from his translation. The same is true 
for translations of the Dharmasūtras and the Manusm
ti, which come from Olivelle 2000 
and Olivelle 2005, respectively. The sources of other translations are noted as they occur. 
I use italics for all Sanskrit terms, such as “adhikaraa” or “adhyāya,” except 
such terms as are typically considered English, such as “Sanskrit” and “Prakrit.” When 
citing a text, I use italics, such as “the Āpastamba Dharmasūtra,” but when citing a genre 
do not use italics, as in “the Dharmasūtras.” Finally, when discussing an area of 
knowledge, as opposed to a genre, I will use lower case italics. Hence, the term 
“Dharmaśāstras” refers to the texts of that genre, while “dharmaśāstra” refers to the 
expert tradition on dharma. Hence, one will find Arthaśāstra, Arthaśāstra, and 
arthaśāstra, referring, respectively, to the text, the genre, and the expert tradition. 
Finally, when identifying passages from a text, I will identify the text itself by 
abbreviation only during the first citation in a given sentence. Hence, you will read, “One 
sees at KAŚ 2.34 a phenomenon quite different from that at 2.33.” 
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INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation is about how to use the Kauilīya Arthaśāstra (Arthaśāstra of 
Kauilya) as a source for the study and writing of South Asian religious history. It 
represents a first attempt on the part of the author to apply the tools of philology and 
textual criticism to this text so that scholars may draw more and better information from 
the societies that contributed to its composition. In doing so, I hope to increase the 
usefulness of this text, which Julius Jolly has called “perhaps the most precious work in 
the whole range of Sanskrit” (1923, 1) and regarding which Moritz Winternitz has said, 
“No other work of Indian literature provides us with so rich amount of information about 
ancient Indian political and social conditions” (1983, 612). 
The Kauilīya Arthaśāstra (hereafter, simply the Arthaśāstra or KAŚ) is a 
relatively recent entrant into the body of textual sources used to reconstruct the history of 
the classical period. Coming to the attention of modern scholars only at the beginning of 
the 20th century, the Arthaśāstra is the only text of its kind to have survived from the 
classical period. It is unique among texts of the period (Sanskrit or otherwise) in its 
purely political orientation. Motivated by the success of the state, the Arthaśāstra goes 
into great detail about the king’s training, his appointment of government officials, the 
operation of the monarchical bureaucracy, civil and criminal law, public safety, police 
activity, court intrigue, diplomacy, foreign policy, espionage, war, treaties, siege tactics, 
useful magic, and so forth. While many of these topics are discussed in other texts of the 
period briefly or in digest form, the Arthaśāstra distinguishes itself both through its 
breadth of topics and its single-minded focus on the state. 
With so many aspects of social life and culture treated in detail, the Arthaśāstra 
promises the historian critical information not otherwise available for the reconstruction 
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of certain eras of South Asian history. And so we find the text invoked frequently for the 
reconstruction of religious, political, and social life over an exceedingly broad period (4th 
century BCEÐ3rd century CE).1 Whereas historians, in particular political and economic 
historians, have been quick to make use of the unique kinds of information provided by 
the extant Arthaśāstra, firm conclusions on the text’s historical context based on textual 
criticism have lagged by comparison. Aspects of the text’s composition have received 
attention in a number of excellent monographs and studies2 as well as in a few major 
works of great importance,3 but the Arthaśāstra still lacks a comprehensive study of its 
form and structure aimed at uncovering the production of the text in detail, much less a 
critical mass of such studies sufficient to produce durable and useful hypotheses 
regarding its authorship, date, and composition. Hence, histories informed by the 
Arthaśāstra have all suffered from the collectively provisional character of the 
information provided by textual criticism. This dissertation is intended to begin the 
process of filling this gap by advancing a detailed theory of the text’s composition.4 
0.1 TEXTUAL CRITICISM AND HISTORIOGRAPHY 
The first manuscript of the Arthaśāstra to be recovered in modern times was 
given in 1905 by an anonymous pundit to R. Shamasastry, then librarian at the Mysore 
                                                 
1 For a pointed example of the direct use of the Arthaśāstra as a source for reconstruction of the Mauryan 
period, (ca. 4th Ð3rd century BCE) see F.R. Allchin (1995, 189ff.). For a more nuanced view of the text’s 
composition with yet just such a broad application of its data, see Thapar 2002. 
2 Edgerton (1923), Nag (1923), Breloer (1927Ð1934), Kosambi (1958), Wilhelm (1960), Renou (1961), 
Sternbach (1968), Konow (1975), to name a few of the more important. 
3 Kangle (1965), Trautmann (1971), and Scharfe (1993 revised English ed.; 1968 1st German ed.) 
4 Although the words of A.L. Basham, as quoted in Mabbet (1964, 169) seem now to me to be undoubtedly 
true: “Before further precision can be reached [in the dating of the text] we require a thorough critical and 
comparative analysis of the whole text and the minute study of every phrase from all aspects and points of 
view.” I see the present work as a first step in this direction. 
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Government Oriental Library.5 Shamasastry published the editio princeps in 1909, 
followed by a full English translation in 1915.6 The text was received with great fanfare, 
particularly as South Asian intellectual culture was thought to have lacked an indigenous 
tradition of political science in the early period. The absence of such expertise reinforced 
stereotypes that the “Indian mind” was dominated by “otherworldly” concerns. But, as 
Trautmann has noted, “[t]he rediscovery of the Arthaśāstra proved a corrective to this 
notion, and within decades over a dozen Indian scholars, and a few Western, had written 
books on ancient Indian political theories and institutions” (1971, 2). The text was, for 
obvious reasons, co-opted by the nationalist movement as evidence of a pragmatic and 
virile tradition of self-rule in India’s past, a position that served well to negate colonial 
aspersions of effeminacy and unfitness for self-rule: “[n]ationalist aspirations seemed 
somehow fortified when the existence of strongly centralized empires and native schools 
of political theory was shown” (1971, 3). 
What is more, the Arthaśāstra not only provided the emergent nationalist identity 
with evidence of an indigenous expert tradition in politics, it also provided the incipient 
nation with a link to the most powerful dynasty in South Asian antiquity: the Mauryan 
Empire (c. 321Ð185 BCE). For, the text ascribes itself to a figure named Kauilya, who is 
identified in medieval sources with the brilliant political tactician Cā	akya, the legendary 
prime minister of the first Mauryan emperor, Candragupta, and who engineered the 
usurpation of the previous dynasty and installed Candragupta on the throne.7 Although 
the ascription of the text to Kauilya is not supported by any firm evidence (nor even is 
                                                 
5 Trautmann 1971, 1 
6 Successive editions were published by Jolly and Schmidt (Lahore, 1923) and T. Ganapati Sastri 
(Trivandrum, 1924). The text has attained its most reliable form, however, only with Kangle’s critical 
edition (Bombay, 1960), with a second edition in 1972. 
7 Scharfe 1993, 75; Trautmann has an exhaustive consideration of the later Cā	akya legends (1971, 10Ð67). 
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the existence of a Kauilya/Cā	akya), the attractiveness of the possibility that the 
Arthaśāstra issued from South Asia’s greatest political genius seems to have exerted a 
great influence on scholarly interpretations of the text’s composition. 
From the beginning, therefore, the debate over the composition of the Arthaśāstra  
has been heavily influenced by its traditional ascription to Kauilya. The importance of 
this ascription to the issue of composition lies in the conclusion that, if the text is to fit 
the traditional narrative leading up to the reign of Candragupta (c. 321Ð297 BCE),8 then 
the extant version of the Arthaśāstra must represent the unitary composition of a single 
author (i.e., Kauilya/Cā	akya). Given the absolute paucity of sources for this most 
intriguing era, many scholars seem unable to resist using the Arthaśāstra as a source for 
the period, despite a decided lack of supporting evidence.9 Although this motive cannot 
be ascribed to all of those who favor the traditional account of the text’s origins, the 
desire on the part of Indologists to possess just such a source seems to have exerted, in 
general, a strong influence on conclusions about the compositional history of the text.10 
However, since shortly after the editio princeps was published by Shamasastry, 
many philologists and text critics have argued that certain features of the Arthaśāstra 
suggest for it composition through successive redactions or by an individual much later 
than the legendary Kauilya.11 Specific features, such as the text’s dual division into 
                                                 
8 There is some discrepancy on these dates. These are taken from Thapar 2002, 174Ð177. 
9 Even among historians such as Romila Thapar, who, despite claiming that “[t]he present form of the text 
is the work of Vishnugupta in about the third century AD” and “[e]ven if some sections are likely to be 
dated to the Mauryan period, such as Book II, they should not be taken as descriptive since, as a theoretical 
treatise, it is only a pointer to what were regarded as essential matters pertaining to governance…” 
nevertheless goes on to use the text liberally as as source for the period (2002, 184Ð5ff.) 
10 Shamasastry (1915), Fleet (1915), Jacobi (1911), Meyer (1925), Breloer (1927Ð1934), Kangle (1965). 
etc. Scharfe (1993, 1) reports, however, that Jacobi later changed his mind on this matter. 
11 Winternitz (1998 [1963 trans.; 1920 German ed.]), Stein (1921), Jolly (1923), Nag (1923), Keith (1996 
[1928]), Scharfe (1993 2nd ed.; 1968 German ed.]), Trautmann (1971), Witzel (2006), etc. 
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prakaraas and adhyāyas, the logical disjunction generated by the occurrence of 
Kauilya’s direct speech in his own text, shifts in style, and the general breadth of the 
work suggested a more complex compositional process (these are all examined below). 
As any theory of composition other than unitary authorship would mean that the present 
text could not be used uncritically as a source for the Mauryan period, the vicissitudes 
and politics of historiography have remained wedded to the study of the text’s 
composition.12 It is my intention, therefore, to look at the composition of the text entirely 
in isolation from specific theses about the historical context of its origins. 
Aside from the theory of unitary authorship, which finds relatively less support 
now among text critics than in previous generations, two major theories of composition 
have emerged. The first, argued most recently and fully by Hartmut Scharfe (196813), is 
that the extant Arthaśāstra is the prose expansion of an earlier verse original. To the 
contrary, Thomas Trautmann (1971) has argued that the text is not only prose in origin, 
but ultimately an aggregation of disparate prose sources. While both of these theories 
have their adherents, neither has been explicated with rigor sufficient to make them 
particularly useful to the historiographical issues that surround the text. Given that, of the 
major recent studies, Kangle produced his in 1965, Scharfe in 1968, and Trautmann in 
1971, little, if any, major work has been done on the composition of the Arthaśāstra in 
nearly forty years.  
                                                 
12 An example of the passions incited in this case can be read in the work of the esteemed scholar of 
Dharmaśāstra, P.V. Kane (see, for example, 1974, 189f.). 
13 The theory itself dates to the 1968 publication of his text Untersuchungen zur Staatsrechtslehre des 
Kaualya (Wiesbaden: Harrasowitz). This is availabe in a revised English edition, the 1993 Investigations 
in Kaualya’s Manual of Political Science (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag). I refer to the older in order to 
accurately reflect the age of these arguments. 
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This dissertation aims to resuscitate the conversation by presenting as detailed a 
compositional theory as presently possible. This project is carried out in Part One, with 
my conclusions coming in Chapter 7 and arguments for the date of the text coming in the 
Conclusion.  
0.2 BRAHMANISM AND THE ARTHAŚĀSTRA 
Rendering the Arthaśāstra a more useful source for students of South Asian 
history and religions also requires examining other aspects pertaining to its composition. 
In particular, we are unable to appreciate the content of the Arthaśāstra as a historical 
source until it has been rescued from its ideological subordination to another and more 
well-attested genre, that of dharmaśāstra. At stake in this matter is one of the pressing 
issues in the history of South Asian religion and politics: the influence of classical South 
Asia’s sacerdotal and intellectual elite, the Brahmins, on state policy and governance. 
In most scholarly circles, the Arthaśāstra has generally failed to distinguish itself 
as different in kind from the much better represented genre of dharmaśāstra. Important 
differences are to be found between the two, however. While the dharma literature of the 
period demonstrates an interest in statecraft and jurisprudence, it remains focused 
primarily on the customs, education, rituals, penances, and, most importantly for this 
study, the political interests of the orthodox Brahmanical community, the hereditary class 
of religious and intellectual elites in classical South Asia. The Arthaśāstra, with its 
exclusive interest in statecraft, overlaps with the subjects of the dharma literature in the 
areas of jurisprudence and statecraft, without, however, showing much concern for 
Brahmanical custom itself. 
The discrete points of contact between the two traditions are provided, on one 
hand, by a mutual interest in statecraft (and jurisprudence) and, on the other hand, by the 
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mutual promotion of the political interests of the Brahmanical community. But the 
relationship between the two is not usually rendered as one between two parallel genres. 
Kane has enunciated this clearly: “Arthaśāstra is really a branch of Dharmaśāstra, as the 
former deals with the responsibilities of kings for whom rules are laid down in many 
treatises on dharma” (1974, 158). This statement reveals the logic of the relationship 
posited between the two genres: arthaśāstra is a subsidiary of dharmaśāstra because it 
deals in greater detail with a subset of the interests found in the dharma texts. But, this 
relationship does not merely result from an analysis of areas of interest. Kane’s opinion 
reveals also the ideological implications at stake: the rules laid down for the king in the 
Arthaśāstra are, therefore, theoretically subordinate to a much broader mandate of 
dharma. As such, Kane is following the logic of a hermeneutical convention expressed 
by dharmaśāstra exegetes themselves, when they claim that a rule from dharmaśāstra 
always overrides a rule from arthaśāstra.14 In other words, the corpus of injunctions and 
proscriptions in the dharma texts, inculcating the political interests of the Brahmanical 
community, represent a more complete framework into which the prescriptions of the 
Arthaśāstra must fit. 
Now, it must be noted that the extant Arthaśāstra does, in fact, agree in many 
places with the subordination of the king’s authority to the greater order of dharma. And, 
there can also be little doubt that among Sanskrit texts the Arthaśāstra is most closely 
related to the Dharmaśāstras. But, the relationship posited above, drawn from 
Brahmanical exegetics and reinforced through the mutual promotion of political 
Brahmanism, obscures important differences suggesting widely divergent origins for the 
two. The Dharmaśāstras as a genre have their origin among experts in the customary 
                                                 
14 Lingat (1998 [1973], 145Ð147) 
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traditions of the orthodox Brahmanical community and the education of young Brahmin 
males. Traditionally, these texts cover the topics of education (svādhyāya), ritual 
observances (sa	skāra), proper conduct (ācāra), penances (prayaścitta), and, to a lesser 
extent, statecraft (rājadharma) and dispute resolution (vyavahāra). The Arthaśāstra is 
thoroughly grounded in the urban reality of kingship and statecraft, and, despite 
proclamations theoretically undermining the authority of the king in the extant treatise, is 
fully concerned with promoting the interests of the state in areas such as public works, 
regulation, law and order, dispute resolution, espionage, war, and so forth. Over time, the 
dharmaśāstra literature evolves a far greater interest in statecraft and, in particular, 
dispute resolution. Hence, by the time of the Dharmaśāstra par excellence, the 
Manusm
ti, a complete abridged discussion of statecraft, including a fully-developed 
discussion of vyavahāra has become a standard feature of the literature.  
But this should properly be viewed more as a historical convergence than an 
implicit relationship revealed. For, it has been convincingly argued by Vigasin and 
Samozvantsev that, regarding the areas in which the two genres are most similar, 
jurisprudence, it is the Dharmaśāstras that have borrowed historically from the 
arthaśāstra genre (1985, 26Ð27).15 Hence, while the Dharmaśāstras may provide a 
convincing and convenient hermeneutical appropriation of arthaśāstra, in point of 
historical origin, it is the tradition of arthaśāstra that appears to have precedence in the 
substantive areas in which they show close contact.16 This, in turn, suggests a difference 
in their original contexts of production. 
                                                 
15 See also Samozvantsev 1980. Cf. Kangle 1965, 12ff., 78 
16 It should also be noted that the disappearance of the genre of Arthaśāstra for many centuries after the 
Kauilīya Arthaśāstra, during which time statecraft was discussed entirely within the dharma literature, has 
also contributed to the sense that arthaśāstra was merely a subgenre of Dharamśāstra. See Samozvantsev 
1980, 363 on the loss of the legal authority of arthaśāstra. 
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The most important result of the acceptance of the hermeneutical subordination of 
arthaśāstra to dharmaśāstra for the present study has been the tacit acceptance that the 
two genres must agree quite naturally on specific points of religious and political 
ideology, primarily the integration of special privileges for the Brahmanical community 
into the policies and practices of the state or what I have called “political Brahmanism.” 
That the exemplary text on statecraft from the classical period, the Arthaśāstra, agrees 
that the state should institute the hierarchical precedence of Brahmins lends support to 
those who wish to see in the expression of this religious ideology an accurate description 
of lived relations within the greater political order of the classical period. 
This dissertation will challenge the assertion that Brahmanical interests were 
always part of the Arthaśāstra and demonstrate that, in fact, this ideology of Brahmanical 
privilege was written into the Arthaśāstra at a relatively late period and probably in one 
stroke. By demonstrating this, I hope to articulate the distinctions between these two 
genres. The ultimate goal of this study is to retrieve the ideological background of the 
Arthaśāstra and to thereby promote it as an independent voice in the study of the history 
of South Asian religions. 
0.3 THE COMPOSITIONAL HISTORY OF THE ARTHAŚĀSTRA  
As outlined above, the problems attending the use of the Arthaśāstra as a source 
for the reconstruction of Indian history are rooted in an imperfect understanding of the 
manner in which the text was composed and evolved over time. This makes it extremely 
difficult not only to date the various passages of the text, but also to understand how the 
ideology of and concepts within the text may have evolved over time and, therefore, how 
the text is related to other sources from the period.  
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Proceeding from the belief that the usefulness of the Arthaśāstra as a historical 
source is determined by the extent to which we can understand its compositional history, 
the present study analyzes the influence of Brahmanical ideology on the Arthaśāstra in 
two phases. The first phase (Part One) carries out a philological analysis of the history of 
the text for the purpose of developing a clear model of its composition and evolution, 
while the second phase (Part Two) takes the information gained thereby and attempts to 
chart the gradual exertion of Brahmanical influence on the Arthaśāstra, a heretofore 
unrecognized phenomenon of great importance to the history of politics and religion in 
the classical period.  
The first of these two analyses, carried out in Part One of the dissertation, 
examines how the Arthaśāstra evolved into the form found in the extant manuscripts. 
Because the Arthaśāstra is a large and heterogeneous text, establishing its compositional 
history is a complex matter. The project of Part One is carried out over seven chapters. In 
Chapter One, I introduce the reader to the major features of the Arthaśāstra as a text, 
including its manuscript history, style, formal and informal structures, and whether it has 
lost any appreciable amount of material over time. After establishing the basic 
characteristics of the extant text, I proceed in Chapter Two to scrutinize the major 
theories forwarded by previous scholars to explain the composition and evolution of the 
text. In Chapters Three through Six, I argue that the form of the extant Arthaśāstra has 
resulted from a major redaction of an earlier recension of the text and that the extent of 
this redaction can be discerned through a number of discrete studies, each of which is 
carried out in its own chapter. Finally, in Chapter Seven, I bring together the results of 
these individual studies, charting the extent of hypothesized redaction and confirming the 
accuracy of that hypothesis with reference to another text, the Manusm
ti, which seems to 
have used this earlier, pre-redaction recension of the Arthaśāstra as a source for its own 
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discussion of statecraft. In Chapter Seven, I also demonstrate how this earlier recension 
of the Arthaśāstra was itself composed partly by compiling preexisting sources and partly 
by adding new material. Overall, Part One gives us a much clearer, more articulate, and 
better supported model of how the Arthaśāstra was composed over time, a model that 
enables us to chart clearly in Part Two how Brahmanical ideology emerges only in the 
later parts of the text. 
The second part of this dissertation, Part Two, takes the model of the 
Arthaśāstra’s textual evolution from Part One and uses it to examine the growth of 
Brahmanical ideology in the text. It was mentioned above that the Arthaśāstra has 
generally been considered to have originated in a social context similar to that of the 
dharma literature due to the putative agreement of the extant Arthaśāstra with the 
dharma texts in the matter of Brahmanical ideology. The compositional history of the 
text presented in Part One, however, allows me to demonstrate clearly that the passages 
of the Arthaśāstra that reflect this Brahmanical ideology date to the period of its 
redaction, meaning that the earlier recension of the Arthaśāstra was devoid of this 
ideology. The fact that the earlier recension was free of such pro-Brahmanical proclivities 
has many important implications for the history of statecraft in the classical period. The 
most important of these implications, however, is that we find no evidence in the 
Arthaśāstra that the state recognized claims of Brahmanical exceptionalism, which is a 
central assumption in the standard model of classical Indian kingship in modern 
scholarship. 
Using the compositional model from Part One, I demonstrate in Part Two the 
relative lateness of Brahmanical ideology in the Arthaśāstra over the course five chapters 
(Chapters Eight through Twelve). In the first of these, Chapter 8, I explore the sentiment 
of “Brahmanical exceptionalism,” which is the belief that Brahmins were deserving of 
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special rights and privileges within the greater political order of the period. In that 
chapter, I discuss how this sentiment is expressed in ideological terms through the rubric 
of varadharma, or the theory that society was originally (and still ought to be) divided 
into four classes arranged hierarchically, and that an individual’s rights were based on 
their class. I argue that we can, therefore, track the emergence of the Brahmanical 
exceptionalism or “political Brahmanism” in the text partly by looking at references to 
the ideology of varadharma. 
The subsequent chapters of Part Two (Chapters Nine through Twelve) look at 
various concepts tied into the ideology of varadharma, such as vara, dharma, and 
svadharma, as well as outright claims to exceptional treatment for Brahmins found in the 
text. Through the studies in these four chapters, I demonstrate that the sentiment of 
Brahmanical exceptionalism is clearly linked in all cases to material interpolated during 
the redaction of the earlier recension of the Arthaśāstra.  
In the Conclusion, I explore some of the implications of my findings for our 
understanding of religion and politics in classical South Asia and connect the emergence 
of Brahmanical ideology in the Arthaśāstra to political shifts reflected in other sources 
from the period. Above all, I hope in this dissertation to demonstrate the interdependence 
of philological inquiry and cultural studies in addressing some of the most vexing and 
basic issues in the political and religious history of the classical period. I hope to show 
that it is only because of the detailed study in Part One that the findings made in Part Two 




PART I: THE COMPOSITION OF THE TEXT 
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Arthaśāstra 
In this chapter, the reader is introduced to the Kauilīya Arthaśāstra as a text, 
including the manuscript history, the stylistic features of the text, and its formal and 
informal structural elements. This chapter is intended to serve as a reference to which the 
reader may return when necessary for detailed information about specific aspects of the 
text. This chapter should be read initially to gain sufficient familiarity with the major 
structural elements of the text to follow the arguments in the remainder of Part One. 
1.1 THE EXTANT ARTHAŚĀSTRA: GENRE AND STYLE 
The Arthaśāstra suffers from a poverty of known manuscripts. The critical edition 
of the text (Kangle 1969) used only 6 complete manuscripts and 1 fragment. The 
complete manuscripts were all traced by Kangle back to only 2 originals (G1 and M1),17 
and the fragmentary manuscript (D), while providing generally superior readings (1969, 
x), runs from KAŚ 1.1.4Ð2.7.29; 2.11.21Ð39: only about 20% of the text. In addition to 
these manuscripts, Kangle made use of 6 fragmentary commentaries.18 Several 
manuscripts not used in Kangle’s critical edition have either emerged or been lost over 
the years, although it is not clear whether any originated from a source different than G1 
                                                 
17 Manuscript sigla are taken from Kangle 1969. 
18 On the length of each of these fragmentary commentaries see Kangle 1969, xvÐxvii. Scharfe (1993, 7) 
has noted, however, that Kangle did not actually use the most important commentary, the Old Malayalam 
Bhāāvyākhyānam (Cb), in the preparation of his edition, but, when citing it, actually provides the text of 
T. Ganapati Sāstrī’s 1924Ð25 edition of the text (which had been provided as a root text in the printed 
editions of the commentary). Sāstrī himself made use of the Old Malayalam commentary for both his 
edition as well as his own commentary, Śrīmūla (Cs), but his own editorial emendations cannot be taken as 
readings from the commentary, which does not contain a root text at all. 
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or M1.19 The earliest dateable manuscripts take the form of the text back to about the 12
th 
century CE.20 
Kangle’s is presently the authoritative edition, as he has best represented the 
known manuscripts and has alone made use of the important manuscript D, which came 
to light only after the other editions were published.21 His estimation is that “[t]here are 
no versions, much less recensions, of the text of the Arthaśāstra” (1969, xv). Given the 
state of the manuscript tradition, we have little choice but to accept the extant text of 
Kangle’s edition as sufficiently representative of the text as it existed in the classical 
period.22 
The text of Kangle’s critical edition of the Arthaśāstra numbers some 5,397 
passages.23 By comparison, it is nearly twice as long as the Manusm
ti24 and a little less 
                                                 
19 Kangle records that he was unable to trace the manuscipt (ka) used in Ganapati Sāstrī’s edition as well as 
another manuscript from the Government Mss. Library, Cochin to which Ganapati had access but found to 
be extremely worn. Winternitz (ZII 6, 14Ð27) has reviewed a manuscript in Chennamangalam, Cochin, but, 
found it to support the readings of the Punjab (Jolly and Schmidt) and Trivandrum (Ganapati Sāstrī) 
editions. I was able to locate a manuscript (I have called M4) in Trivandrum (Kerala University, Oriental 
Research Institute 18195), which does not appear to have been used in previous editions of the text. It 
appears to support the better readings of Kangle’s edition. 
20 The “Patan fragment” (D) has been dated to the 12th century by Jina Vijay (Kosambi 1959, 1). The 
Malayalam commentary, which runs only through adhikaraa 7, has been dated to about the same period 
by K.N. Ezhuthachan (1960). Thus, while we have no complete manuscript dating to an early period, we 
have concurrence between two widely-dispersed manuscripts (Gujurat and Kerala, respectively) from this 
time on a substantial portion of the existing text. It is not unlikely, therefore, the Kangle’s edition more or 
less reflects the extent of the text in that period. 
21 Edited by Jina Vijay 1959 in the Singhi Jain Series. 
22 Unfortunately, no texts from the period are known to cite the Arthaśāstra in sufficient detail or length to 
confirm or refute the readings and general shape of the critical edition (see Scharfe 1993, 1Ð5). It may turn 
out, however, that we can find some confirmation of the general order of topics discussed in the Manusm
ti 
(see §7.6.2 below). 
23 This figure is my tabulation of the number of sūtras and verses in Kangle’s second edition (1969) and 
does not include the colophons, prakaraa headers, nor the spurious final verse in the edition (*15.1.74). 
Considering that formal sūtra boundaries are often absent in manuscripts and find their place in our 
editions based on the decisions of modern editors, such a number provides less fixity than it might seem. In 
support of this we find that Jolly and Schmidt’s edition of the Arthaśāstra (1923) possesses about 6,880 
sūtras and verses (Kangle 1965, 21). The discrepancy between the two editions is largely accounted for by 
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than 5 times as long as the Yāj–avalkyasm
ti.25 The extant text is composed in a 
combination of prose and verse in a ratio of about 13:1.  
The Arthaśāstra’s discursive style is characterized by lengthy prose 
disquisitions26 regularly punctuated or concluded by one or more stanzas of verse.27 
Irrupting irregularly into this general format are prose debates on specific doctrinal 
positions with a variety of “teachers” typically proffering the erroneous or prior position 
(pūrvapaka) and Kauilya offering the correct or final position (uttarapaka). Kauilya’s 
frequent rebuttal of an offered position echoes throughout the text: neti kauilya: “‘Not 
so,’ says Kauilya.” 
Jolly (among others28) sees in the style of the Arthaśāstra a kinship with Sūtra 
literature:29 “[i]n point of style, the Arthaśāstra exhibits that mixture of prose and verse 
                                                                                                                                                 
the placement of sūtra boundaries and not by disagreement over the inclusion of additional material. A 
sūtra near the beginning of the Arthaśāstra (KAŚ 1.1.18) calculates the extent of the text at 6,000 ślokas. 
Unfortunately, the meaning of the term “śloka” in this passage is unclear. It could pertain only to verses in 
the śloka meter, to all syntactically-finite passages in general, or to the 32-syllable unit used by copyists to 
tabulate the extent of their labor. None of these options, however, generates a number close to 6,000. This 
passage has generated a great deal of disagreement among modern scholars, and is discussed below as 
relevant to Kosambi’s theory that a substantial amount of material has been lost from the text (§2.4). 
24 Using Kangle’s estimate of 4800 32-syllable śloka units in the text (1965, 21), his edition of the 
Arthaśāstra is about 500 ślokas shy of being twice the length of the Manusmti, based on the 2,680 ślokas 
in Olivelle’s critical edition (2005). 
25 Based on the same calculation used in the previous footnote, Kangle’s edition of the Arthaśāstra is about 
200 ślokas less than 5 times the length of the Yāj–avalkyasmti. The latter is complete in 1009 ślokas in 
Acharya’s edition (1949).  
26 This progression of (semi-) independent discussions follows the division of the text into segments known 
as prakaraas (see §1.4.2.1). 
27 These are overwhelming composed in the anuubh śloka meter. This pattern of prose and verse 
alternation defines the segments of the text known as adhyāyas (see §1.4.2.2). 
28 Kangle: “The style of the work is that of the early sūtra works (1965, 37); R. Shamasastry: “the style of 
the author follows that of Āpastamba, Baudhāyana and other Sūtra writers…in a few places it approaches 
the diction of the Upanishads and later Brāhma	as” (1924, xxii). 
29 I refer here to the genres of śrautasūtra, g
hyasūtra, dharmasūtra, and śulbasūtra. These texts are 
written in a highly compressed and characteristically pithy prose style with verses typically cited in support 
of prose statements. See Gonda 1977. 
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which is so common in sūtra-works, e.g., in the Dharmasūtras” (1923, 5). But, the 
Arthaśāstra cannot match the works referred to in brevity and concision,30 the hallmarks 
of the Sūtra style.31 Instead, the grammar of its prose is for the most part fully expressed, 
and the text does not tend to rely heavily on implied elements borrowed from previous 
passages (anuv
tti), nor does it frequently suppress finite verbs. Moreover, despite a 
similarity in the pattern of stanza dispersal within the prose, the manner in which these 
verses occur in the Arthaśāstra is altogether different from their occurrence in Sūtra 
literature. Most of the verses (80%) in the Arthaśāstra are used to conclude textual 
segments, which stands in contrast to the practice typical of Sūtra literature of citing 
verses within discussions, typically to lend authority to a point just made.32 Still, the 
Sūtras may provide the closest texts in point of style, although Shamasastry’s suggestion 
that “in a few places it approaches the diction of the Upanishads and later Brāhma	as” 
(1924, xxii) certainly merits further inquiry. 
While admitting to the presence of a variety of prose styles,33 the Arthaśāstra’s 
prose is typically straightforward in composition and workmanlike in tone, neither 
                                                 
30 Edgerton agrees, although he may be overstating the case to some extent when he says that “[i]t is not 
exactly sūtra style, but approaches it in brevity and compression” (1928, 293).  
31 On sūtra style see Gonda 1977, 465Ð466. 629ff. There are, of course, passages in the Arthaśāstra 
conforming more closely to the sūtra style. In this regard, we might look at the key passages of the 
discussions of vidyāsamuddeśa (“Enumeration of the Sciences”), v
ddhasa	yoga (“Association with 
Elders”), and indriyajaya (“Conquering the Senses”) (KAŚ 1.2Ð1.7). These are discussed in this context at 
§7.3.7. 
32 On the Śrauta- and Ghyasūtras, see Gonda 1977, 640; on the Dharmasūtras, see Olivelle (2000, 6Ð7), 
who notes, however, that “In Baudhāyana and Vasiha[, which he reckons as representing a later evolution 
within the Dharmasūtras], however, there is an increasing use of verse not merely as quotations but as 
integral parts of the composition, reflecting the genre of the later Smtis.” Neither of these, however, 
approach the consistent pattern of verse usage seen in the Arthaśāstra. 
33 Perhaps owing to the stylistic diversity of the text, we find markedly different descriptions of the writing. 
Kangle is in general agreement with my assessment of the straightfoward character of the prose: “The 
sūtras are mostly simple in construction and free from obscurity caused by long compounds or involved 
expressions” (1965, 37). Edgerton, however, has a very different view of the language of the Arthaśāstra: 
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excessively parsimonious nor overly embellished.34 It tends toward a certain economy, 
without, however, risking incompleteness.35 Where the text becomes difficult, it is most 
frequently owing to obscure terminology or disjointed passages, although a minority of 
difficult passages results from inherent syntactic ambiguity or confusion.36 The frequency 
of shifts in style along with the prevalence of disjointed passages generates the initial 
suspicion of the presence of more than one hand in the text. 
The verses in the text are mostly composed in the anuubh śloka meter, although 
a few verses in the indravrajā or upajāti meters are also encountered.37 About 80% of all 
verses in the text fall at the end of text segments called adhyāyas (see §1.3.2), the 
presence of verses within adhyāyas is both irregular and infrequent.38 Regarding their 
                                                                                                                                                 
“The style is crabbed and difficult…In general it is anything but lucid, and frequently abrupt and harsh” 
(1928, 293).  
34 Mabbet states that “[t]he standard for judgment is not clearly objective, but the Arthaśāstra appears to 
lack both the calculated pithiness of the sūtra literature and the abstraction and dense syntax of the later 
commentaries. It is natural to place it with the earlier smtis” (1968, 164). This, despite the fact that it is 
composed overwhelmingly in prose. 
35 Kangle: “Its terseness is not that of the philosophical or other similar sūtras” (1965, 37). The relative 
fullness of the Arthaśāstras prose style, in contrast especially to the philosophical sūtras, might suggest that 
it was not written in an intensely scholasticized environment where sūtras served as mnemonic devices for 
traditional expansion in a didactic context. 
36 As Kangle points out, “If the text is found difficult, it is mainly because of the technical nature of its 
contents and the many technical words it has used. The claim made on its behalf [KAŚ 1.1.19] that it is 
easy to understand and grasp is not unjustified, provided the technical nature of its contents is born in 
mind”(1965, 37). Edgerton is in general agreement with this assessment, although he finds the resulting 
situation somewhat more intractable: “The text is at best so difficult that an interpreter cannot afford to 
neglect any possible source of aid. Problems galore will remain in spite of everything. The vocabulary is 
peculiar; it contains many words which do not occur, or are not used in the same senses, in the more 
familiar Sanskrit literature…The subject-matter, too, is exceptionally remote from our point of view, which 
adds to the difficulty of understanding what is meant” (1928, 293). Fleet finds that “the text is by no means 
a simple one; it is laconic and difficult to a degree” (Introduction to Shamasastry 1923, vi.). 
37 Kane (1968, 198) finds two classical Upajātis at KAŚ 2.9.32Ð35, five Upajātis in KAŚ 2.10, and one 
Pupitāgrā (2.12.10). Verses in these meters never fall at the end of an adhyāya (Sternbach 1968, 495). 
38 On the relationship between the verses and prose, see Sternbach 1968. The verses are examined in detail 
in Chapter 5, and the adhyāya-internal verses are examined at §5.1Ð2. 
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content, Sternbach relates that “[a] great part of the verses in the KA. are gnomic verses 
but also a great part of them are verses dealing with rāja-nīti” (1968, 495). These 
categories, however, are not mutually exclusive and one finds that, regardless of topic, 
many of the verses in the text (particularly those at the end of adhyāyas) seem to have 
been composed for their current location (see Chapter 5). 
There is some debate over whether the Arthaśāstra’s sūtras and verses display 
differences in point of style. Specifically, scholars have questioned whether the tendency 
of the latter to be rather more florid, abstract, and simply constructed is merely endemic 
to the verse medium or evidence of separate authorship.39 There is a similar debate 
regarding whether the style of the prose itself shifts throughout the text.40  
The language of the Arthaśāstra is a mixture of relatively archaic and more recent 
usages of both syntax and vocabulary. Among its syntactic archaisms are the use of the 
Ðtvā ending with gerunds possessing preverbs,41 rendering non-neuter, two-member 
copulative (dvandva) compounds in the dual (as opposed to the later practice of rendering 
such compounds in the neuter singular),42 the use of the potential passive participle in the 
                                                 
39 Breloer finds that “the style of verses deviates from that the sūtra style of the prose and that in the prose 
itself various types of style and a certain variation in terminology are found” (1934, 8; quotation is Kangle 
1965, 37). Kangle dismisses this as natural to the media: “It is true that the stanzas appear to be much 
simpler in style than the prose. But simplicity is natural to the Anuubh śloka metre. If the prose, in some 
places, appears more difficult, that is due to the technical nature of the subject rather than to any essential 
difference in style. There is, no doubt, a certain variation in terminology, which seems to be due to the 
difference in the source from which the material is derived…The general impression is one of uniformity 
throughout the work”(1965, 37).  
40 Trautmann’s work (1971) stands as the most robust defense of heterogeneous style in the text. Nag also 
finds that the discussion of foreign policy in adhikaraas 6 and 7 “es plus homogène qu’ailleurs” (1923, 
114). Kangle argues, on the contrary, that “[t]here can…be no distinction made in the different adhikaraas 
from the point of view of homogeneity or orderliness in the treatment of topics” (1965, 31). 
41 This is found primarily with causatives and generally only in the latter half of the text (3 examples 
aside). It does appear that this usage was retained in some of the Prakrits and may rather be a sign of their 
influence rather than an indication of high antiquity. See Jacobi 1911, 966n; Scharfe 1993, 97; Kangle 
1965, 38. 
42 The Pā	inean rule (A2.4.2Ð17), however, is not exclusively observed. See Scharfe 1993, 95Ð96. 
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active sense, and failure to use the Ðtva ending to form abstract nouns in a few cases.43 In 
counterpoint, Scharfe has found what appear to be syntactical proclivities adhering to 
later usages (1993, 96Ð97). Scholarly opinion remains divided on the provenance and 
import of such constructions, and, given the likelihood of a composite origin for the text, 
resolution of the contradictory character of the text’s language may lie in a better 
understanding of its compositional history. 
The treatise also contains a relatively high number of technical terms not found 
elsewhere in Sanskrit literature44 and even more frequently relies on idiosyncratic 
definitions of well-attested terms (Kangle 1965, 38Ð39). Additionally, we find a number 
of terms in the Arthaśāstra otherwise found during this period only in Prakrit sources.45 
As with the syntax, a number of lexical items have also been adduced as archaic, 
specifically owing to perceived similarities with the vocabulary of the Aśokan edicts, 
although Mabbet has concluded that “[i]n general the…words listed [by Thapar as early] 
are found also in later sources with the same meanings as in the AŚ” (1968, 164). On the 
whole, arguments for attributing the language of the Arthaśāstra to a particular historical 
period remain inconclusive. 
1.2 INFORMAL STRUCTURE OF THE TEXT 
Although such a division is nowhere recognized in the text itself, the material of 
the Arthaśāstra falls cleary into front matter (KAŚ 1.1), the main text (KAŚ 1.2Ð14.4), 
and back matter (KAŚ 15.1). The front matter is represented by the first lesson (adhyāya) 
                                                 
43 See Kangle 1965, 38, where the he argues for several less conclusive examples of archaisms in the text. 
44 Shamasastry styles these peculiarities “obsolete” (1923, xxii). See also Kangle (1965, 38), as well as his 
glossary of special terms and usages at the end of his second edition (1969, 285Ð343). For a discussion, see 
Scharfe 1993, 90Ð95. On the peculiarities of the Arthaśāstra’s vocabulary see Konow 1975, 52Ð65; Jolly 
1912Ð13, 204Ð210; Jolly 1914, 345Ð359 and 1915, 169Ð378. 
45 On this point, see Kangle 1965, 39 and Scharfe 1993, 79Ð90. 
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at KAŚ 1.1, which consists primarily of a table of contents that lists 180 topics 
(prakaraas) and 15 books (adhikaraas) of the text (KAŚ 1.1.3Ð17). I will hereafter refer 
to this list of topics and books as either the “prakaraa list” or the “table of contents.” 
The prakaraa list does not mention the material comprising the first lesson itself.  
The main text stretches from the beginning of the second lesson (KAŚ 1.2.1) to the 
end of the 14th book (KAŚ 14.4.14), representing the vast majority of the treatise. This 
material is entirely given to topics germane to statecraft.  
The back matter is represented by the final and 150th lesson of the text (KAŚ 15.1). 
It is, like the first lesson, not directly concerned with statecraft. Instead, it is a purely 
technical compendium of 32 rhetorical elements (tantrayuktis)46 employed within the 
treatise, each of which is illustrated by a citation from the preceding text. This 
appendectical lesson also comprises the 15th book of the treatise, called tantrayukti (“The 
Method of the Treatise”). Such tantrayukti appendices are not unique to the Arthaśāstra: 
concluding chapters of the same kind can be found at the end of several other texts.47 
They appear to represent an independent subgenre.48 
Renou has commented that such introductory and concluding lessons are 
generally not found among ancient Sanskrit works and reveal, to him, the presence of an 
individual intelligence guiding the organization of the text (1961, 184). The value of 
identifying these informal structural elements lies in their ability to speak to whether the 
                                                 
46 Kangle describes this section as follows: “[the tantrayuktis] constitute the various methods in which the 
śāstra is treated. Some of them are concerned with the contents of the text; for example upadeśa ‘advice or 
instruction’, apadeśa ‘quotation’ of some one’s opinion and so on. But the majority refer to stylistic 
peculiarities natural to the work. Thus we have upamāna ‘analogy’, nidarśana ‘illustration’, arthāpatti 
‘implication’…These yuktis show an awareness of the various devices which the author of an expository 
work will find himself bound to use if he is to make it systematic as well as interesting” (1965, 30). 
47 Tantrayukti sections can also be found at the end of the Suśrutasa	hitā and Carakasa	hitā. 
48 Kangle (1965, 30Ð31) states: “It seems rather that yuktis were formulated independent of any particular 
śāstra.” 
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extant Arthaśāstra betrays evidence of having been purposely composed in such a 
fashion, which is to say, whether it shows evidence of a planned effort by a single 
individual. 
Looking more closely at the main text, one sees that it falls into two major 
divisions: tantra (internal administration) and āvāpa (foreign policy). Like the division of 
the text into front matter, main text, and back matter, the division into tantra and āvāpa is 
not recognized anywhere within the text, but has been noted only by later writers on 
political science (Kangle 1965, 19). Applying their hermeneutical categories to the extant 
text, we are able to see a clear division in the text between topics pertaining to internal 
administration (tantra: 1.2Ð5.6) and foreign policy (āvāpa: 6.2Ð13.5): 
 
Fig. 1: The Arthaśāstra as Divided into Tantra and Āvāpa 
Despite the absence of any overt reference to this organization in the text itself, 
the division is sufficiently unambiguous to recognize that it is the result of an intentional 
compositional plan.49 As such, it provides us with our most fundamental sense of how the 
extant Arthaśāstra was composed. The full implications of this division are discussed in 
Chapter 7.  
An important thing to note about this division is that it leaves out certain parts of 
the text.50 In particular, we have the introductory lesson at KAŚ 1.1 (denoted by the 
                                                 
49 This is reinforced by certain formal elements discussed in Chapter 7. 
50 Given that this is an informal division with boundaries set (in this case) by my own reading of the text, 
there may be some small measure of disagreement as whether, for example, 6.1 or adhikaraa 14 should be 
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shaded area at the left edge of the bar) and two concluding passages at KAŚ 14 and 15 (at 
the right end). These passages are left out of this reckoning into tantra and āvāpa because 
they deal neither with domestic nor foreign politics. While the two extremities (KAŚ 1.1 
and KAS 15) do not deal with statecraft at all, the first of the appendices (KAŚ 14) is a 
collection of magical spells and recipes and not linked to statecraft per se. Finally, KAŚ 
6.1, which stands between the two halves, outlines a sevenfold (saptāga) theory of the 
state that includes both domestic and foreign elements. As such, it appears to embrace 
both domestic (tantra) and foreign policy (āvāpa) and cannot be easily assigned to 
either.51 
The segments excluded from this division of the text into two halves become 
significant at §3.3 when we revisit the plan of the text. We note here only that these 
passages, with their appendectical character, possess a certain logical posteriority to the 
fundamental division into tantra and āvāpa. Whether or not they represent secondary 
additions to an earlier text is left to formal analysis below. 
1.3 FORMAL STRUCTURE OF THE TEXT 
More important to the present study is an understanding of the formal 
arrangement of the Arthaśāstra. This discussion focuses on the textual segments by 
which the extant text is formally subdivided: 15 adhikaraas (“subjects”) divided over 
both 180 prakaraas (“topics”) as well as 150 adhyāyas (“lessons”). Each is discussed 
here in detail in order to give the reader a sense of how they relate the material of the text. 
                                                                                                                                                 
included in the āvāpa section. These do not change the arguments I am about to make and will be 
addressed below in Chapter 7. 




The text of the Arthaśāstra is divided into 15 adhikaraas (“Subjects” or 
“Books”). These adhikaraas comprise the largest formal divisions of the text. The 
extent of each is unambiguous, owing to the presence of terminal colophons. No 
prakaraa or adhyāya, the smaller subdivisions of the text, appears to cross an 
adhikaraa boundary. 
The adhikaraa is conceived both as a segment of text as well as a bounded 
subject area.52 As such, each adhikaraa is identified both by a serial number (i.e., as 
adhikaraas 1Ð15) as well as a unique name identifying its subject matter (e.g. 
adhikaraa 1 = vinayādhikārikam, “On the Topic of Training”).53  
The fifteen adhikaraas vary widely in length and do not display uniform internal 
structure. The smallest adhikaraa represents only 1% of the total work, while the largest 
accounts for almost 25% of the text. The disparity in adhikaraa length is depicted in the 
following illustration:54 
 
Fig. 2: The Arthaśāstra as Segmented by Adhikaraa 
                                                 
52 The term adhikaraa is common in the Arthaśāstra and typically means “appointment,” “office,” or 
“official.” We do, however, find the term adhikaraa used in the text both in reference to the textual units 
under discussion (KAŚ 1.1.3Ð18; adhikaraa colophons) as well as in a reference to a subject (artha) (KAŚ 
15.1.4). Importantly, all such uses of the term adhikaraa are confined entirely to the prakaraa list and 
colophons.  
53 Both the unique names and serial numbers of the adhikaraas are provided by the prakaraa list at KAŚ 
1.1.3Ð17 and repeated in the colophons.  
54 The percentage ascribed to each adhikaraa represents the number of passages in each adhikaraa 
divided by the overall number in the text. The length of individual passages are not taken into account. It is 
not expected that the integration of such information would alter the numbers given here substantially. 
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Although adhikaraa boundaries are discretely marked in the text, the content of 
a given adhikaraa does not always represent a cohesive “subject.” In several cases, the 
boundary marked by the conclusion of one adhikaraa and the beginning of the next is 
only weakly reflected in the content of the text.55 Thus, while some adhikaraas show 
strong internal organization (e.g., the 8th), there is not always a discrete relationship 
between a given subject area and recognized adhikaraa boundaries. 
It is this general condition that raises the suspicion that either some adhikaraas 
have been superimposed on underlying prose or the addition of material to existing 
adhikaraas has muddled their original semantic integrity. We note in this regard that the 
adhikaraas in the text are defined primarily by the prakaraa list and colophons, and 
are only weakly recognized in the text proper, if at all. 
We note, finally, a few patterns in the length of the 15 adhikaraas. First, the 
adhikaraas of the first half tend to be much longer than those in the second half, with 
the first four adhikaraas comprising almost half of the text. Second, each half of the text 
is dominated by an adhikaraa that is substantially longer than the rest. So, the first half 
of the text is dominated by the 2nd adhikaraa and the second half by the 7th 
adhikaraa.56  
Attestation of adhikaraa nomenclature can tell us something about their place in 
the compositional history of the text. The use of the term “adhikaraa” in a technical 
                                                 
55 This is noted particularly in the transition between adhikaraas 4/5 and 6/7. We note also outright 
disagreement on the beginning of the fourth adhikaraa, which would seem to find a more suitable start at 
KAŚ 4.4.1 than it does, according to the colophons, at KAŚ 4.1.1. These issues become important in the 
analysis of the prakaraa-text in Chapter 7. 
56 These patterns become important in our examination of the structure of the text in Chapter 7, where the 
2nd and 7th adhikaraas appear to have been nuclei around which their respective halves were composed. 
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sense is limited to the the front matter, colophons, and back matter.57 Thus, we find no 
recognition of “adhikaraas,” whether referring to textual segments or subject areas, 
within the parts of the text actually dealing with statecraft.  
Moreover, the unique adhikaraa names are also derived from the prakaraa list 
at KAŚ 1.1.3Ð17 and in the adhikaraa colophons: 
 
1. vinayādhikārikam “On the Subject of Training”  
2. adhyakapracāra “The Duties of State Employees”  
3. dharmasthīyam “The Judiciary” 
4. kaakaśodhanam “The Clearing of Thorns”  
5. yogav
ttam “Practical Matters”  
6. maalayoni “The Basis of the Circle of Kings”  
7. āguyam “The Six Measures [of Foreign Policy]”  
8. vyasanādhikārikam “On the Subject of Calamities”  
9. abhiyāsyatkarma “The Work of a King Preparing to March”  
10. sā	grāmikam “On War”  
11. sa	ghavttam “Procedure against Republics”  
12. ābalīyasam “On the Weaker King”  
13. durgalambhopāya “Strategy for Taking a Fortress”  
14. aupaniadikam “On Secret Practices”  
15. tantrayukti “The Technique of the Treatise”  
Of these specific adhikaraa names, only the fourth appears to be directly named 
in the text proper: kaakaśodhana, “The Clearing of Thorns.” This term refers to the 
removal of troublesome elements from the kingdom and is variously applied to criminals, 
natural disasters, traitors, dishonest administrators, and so forth. It may also refer, in a 
more specific sense, to the governmental body charged with remediating some or all of 
these “thorns.”58 So we find two passages that appear to refer to the fourth adhikaraa: 
 
                                                 
57 It does not always demonstrate the meaning with which it is used here, but also seems to refer more 
broadly to “a matter” or “a subject” not necessarily co-extensive with the subject of one of the 15 
adhikaraas. See KAŚ 15.1.4Ð5. 
58 Evidence for this comes in the form of references to the appointment of ministers to positions within 
kaakaśodhana, to the attestation that prade
s, the functionaries of kaakaśodhana, assessed fines, and 
to mention of evidence being brought before officials in the investigations of kaakaśodhana. 
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KAŚ 1.12.17 ka	akaśodhanoktāś cāpasarpā pareu ktavetanā vaseyur asampātinaś 
cārārtham 
 
 And spies mentioned in “The Clearing of Thorns” shall, for the purpose 
of spying, dwell separately among the enemies and draw their 
sustenance from them. 
 
KAŚ 13.3.50 eta evāavīnām apasarpā ka	akaśodhanoktāś ca 
 
 These same are for forest tribes as well as the spies mentioned in “The 
Clearing of Thorns.” 
These two references, drawn from opposite ends of the text, not only appear to 
cite the same adhikaraa, but also likely refer to the same sūtra: KAŚ 4.4.3. Neither 
passage (KAŚ 1.12.17; 13.3.50) is particularly well-protected in their respective contexts.59 
What is more, it is not entirely clear that they must be referring to the adhikaraa called 
kaakaśodhana per se. For, the discussion of kaakaśodhana appears to be inaugurated 
in two different verses in the extant text: KAŚ 4.1.1 and 4.4.1. As the sūtra referred to falls 
in the latter, the two passages could be referring to the adhikaraa, but they might 
equally be referring to the unified and more limited discussion of kaakaśodhana at KAŚ 
4.4Ð4.8.60 Hence, the only unambiguous uses of an adhikaraa name turn out to be quite 
problematic. 
                                                 
59 Both passages appear to inaugurate extensions to foregoing passages that seem to have just concluded. 
So at KAŚ 1.12, the discussion of “Rules for Secret Agents” would seem to be complete at 1.12.16, where 
the rules for the two kinds of spies mentioned in the previous passages, sa	sthās and sa	caras, concludes. 
Moreover, the point of this activity in KAŚ 1.11Ð12 is domestic espionage, and the extension of this at 
1.12.17 to spying on enemies is out of place, particularly considering that domestic espionage is again the 
topic of KAŚ 1.13. Finally, 1.12.17Ð18 clearly introduces the end verse cluster at KAŚ 1.12.18Ð25. The 
disconnection of 13.3.50 is even more clear, for it falls immediately after a minor colophon (iti 
rājāpasarpā, “These are the Secret Agents to Use Against the King”) appears to have concluded the 
discussion at KAŚ 13.3 on apasarpapaidhi, which means, in its extended context, “The Use of Secret 
Agents [to Take a Fort].” Like KAŚ 1.12.17, 13.3.50 is tightly linked with its adhyāya end verse (see 
§1.3.4). Both passages, then, not only appear to be united by a common function (introducing subsequent 
novel passages), but are also linked to the end verses of their respective adhyāyas. On the significance of 
this relationship, see §5.6.3. 
60 See KAŚ 1.10.13; 4.9.18. 
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One finds, more generally, the use of adhikaraa names without any discrete 
indication that they are referring to text segments rather than concepts after which those 
segments are named.61 The seemingly titular use of adhikaraa names, however, occurs 
within the prose at the beginning or end of a given adhikaraa.62 But, again, it cannot 
easily be determined whether these are intentional references to textual segments, or 
whether the textual segments have drawn their names from iconic concepts already found 
within the text (or both).  
We can conclude this consideration of adhikaraa form by noting that, while the 
prakaraa list and colophons are certainly aware of both adhikaraa names and 
boundaries, the same awareness is not so clearly demonstrated within the text itself. 
Those passages that do seem to possess some awareness may prove important to our 
compositional history. 
Generally, each of the 15 adhikaraas deals with an independent aspect of 
statecraft. The exception to this is the 15th adhikaraa, which, as the back matter of the 
text, deals only with the discursive strategies of the text itself. But, among the remaining 
adhikaraas, their cohesiveness as independent “subjects” is just as variable as their 
length.  
                                                 
61 Following are uses of the same terms as those found in the adhikaraa titles that seem to refer to 
something other than the adhikaraa itself: adhyakapracāra (2nd adhikaraa): 8.1.13; dharmasthīyam 
(3rd): 1.10.13; 2.5.5; 4.9.21; kaakaśodhanam (4th): KAŚ 1.10.13; 2.14.13; 3.19.15; 4.1.1; 4.4.2; 5.1.1; 
13.1.2; āguyam (7th) 6.2.4; 7.1.1; 7.1.2; 7.1.4; 7.1.5; 7.3.1; 7.3.20; 7.18.43; 8.1.62; sāmgrāmikam (10th): 
2.18.1; 2.30.42; 2.31.1; 2.32.4; 2.32.15; 2.33.5; ābalīyasyam (11th): 7.3.5; 7.3.35; 7.3.36; 7.14.28; 
aupaniadikam (14th): 2.18.19; 4.3.13; 14.1.1; tantrayukti (15th): 15.1.71.  
62 Adhikaraa names are used in a conspicuously titular fashion at the beginning or end of a given 
adhikaraa at KAŚ 4.1.1; 5.1.1Ð2; 7.1.1; 14.1.1; and 15.1.71. To this we might add the reference at KAŚ 
4.4.1. The extent to which these uses are informally titular is not clear. We should note that two of them are 
drawn from the clearly appendectical adhikaraas 14 and 15 and two others from the same adhikaraa, 
kaakaśodhana, cited at KAŚ 1.12.17 and 13.3.50. For a number of reasons discussed in the following 
chapters and summarized in Chapter 7, it seems that these passages appear to come from later textual 
layers. 
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Most adhikaraas possess an identifiable subject area, if not a cohesive subject. 
The only adhikaraa that fails completely in this regard is the fifth, yogav
ttam, 
“Practical Matters,” which covers a hodge-podge of topics and reads like a set of 
appendices to the first half of the text. Among the remainder, we find varying degrees of 
topical cohesion. The most generally cohesive are the eighth (on calamities), the third (on 
civil law), the fourteenth (on secret practices), and the fifteenth (on discursive elements). 
Several adhikaraas display notable cohesion, but only in part, such as the second, ninth, 
and thirteenth. Among the rest, the first, fourth, seventh, eighth, tenth, and twelfth, a 
general subject area prevails, although significant disjunctures can be found. The brief 
sixth and eleventh, while not strongly integrated, are too short to achieve major 
disjuncture. 
Can we say anything, then, about the general relationship between the adhikaraa 
boundaries and their subjects? Generally speaking, the wide disparity in their respective 
lengths strongly suggests that the subject matter of the adhikaraas has exerted a 
profound influence on the form of at least some of them. But, given the variability in the 
cohesiveness of adhikaraa subjects and the inconsistency of their organizational 
structure, it seems that other factors may have influenced the final “shape” of each 
adhikaraa.63  
                                                 
63 That is to say, the subject matter of such adhikaraas does not seem to necessitate their composition into 
a single adhikaraa qua “subject.” It is possible, therefore that the adhikaraa division postdates the 
inclusion of such material in the text and that the more strongly integrated adhikaraas could be among the 
later portions of the text. It is also possible, however, that the most heterogeneous adhikaraas are also late, 
representing the aggregation of disparate addenda within the format of the “proper” adhikaraa. Detailed 
consideration is left to the Chapter 7. 
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1.3.2 Redundant Segmentation: Prakaraas and Adhyāyas 
These fifteen adhikaraas are further subdivided by two overlapping and 
redundant segmentation schemes. The first of these schemes parcels out the text into 180 
prakaraas or “topics,” while the second divides the same material into 150 adhyāyas or 
“lessons.” The manner in which these two segmentation schemes divide the text is 
characterized by both coincidence and divergence. 
This dual division is most easily illustrated by examining the organization of the 
text over its first ten prakaraas and fourteen adhyāyas:64 
 
 
Fig. 3: The Beginning of the Arthaśāstra by Prakaraa and Adhyāya 
Quite often in the Arthaśāstra a single prakaraa will be coextensive with a 
single adhyāya (85 times).65 Just as often, however, they will diverge: either a long 
prakaraa will be divided into more than one adhyāya (13 times) or, more, frequently 
several short prakaraas are brought together into a longer adhyāya (82 times).66 
Although it is characteristic of the relationship between the adhyāyas and prakaraas that 
                                                 
64 The prakaraa and adhyāya boundaries given here conform to those in Kangle’s second edition. My 
own emendation to these are pointed out below (§3.5). 
65 This number is given notwithstanding instances wherein an “coextensive” prakaraa and adhyāya 
disagree to a small degree on the precise location of one of their boundaries. Such cases are very important 
to understanding the historical relationship between the prakaraas and adhyāyas and are discussed at 
§3.5. 
66 Theoretically, we might reverse the perspective here and say that 13 times short adhyāyas are brought 
together into a longer prakaraa and 82 times a long adhyāya is divided into more than one prakaraa. In 
fact, the choice of perspective is not arbitrary, for the most consistent element of the mutual subdivision 
and aggregation of these segments is that the adhyāyas remain much more homogeneous in length than the 
prakaraas through this process. Moreover, we will adduce evidence below sufficient to demonstrate that 
the adhyāyas are chronologically later than the prakaraas. See Chapter 3, particularly §3.5. 
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they subdivide one another evenly without leaving any dismembered adhyāya or 
prakaraa subsections to be absorbed into another whole adhyāya or prakaraa, this 
does occur in a few instances (5 times) that prove very consequential to our analysis.67 
And, despite the frequent divergence in the manner of segmentation effected by each of 
these two schemes, it should be noted that there are no examples of either a prakaraa or 
an adhyāya spreading across an adhikaraa boundary. 
Of the two segments, the prakaraas are defined primarily by their relation to 
their subject matter rather than by formally marked boundaries. Independent of instances 
of isomorphism with a single adhyāya, the marking of prakaraa boundaries is neither 
standardized nor regular. Put differently, the prakaraas appear more properly as topics 
of discussion than segments of text, the boundaries between many prakaraas being 
poorly marked (if marked at all) and a minority of prakaraa boundaries being difficult 
or impossible to locate.68 The close connection between the discussions of text and the 
prakaraas is primarily responsible for the suspicion that the prakaraas are the earlier 
of the two redundant segmentation schemes. 
The adhyāyas, in contrast to the prakaraas, are characterized by firmly marked 
boundaries: each adhyāya ends with at least one verse in the anuubh śloka meter69 and a 
colophon. Because these firm boundary markers serve as strong and unambiguous points 
                                                 
67 For example, the 61st prakaraa, vāstukam, comprises the entirety of adhyāyas 3.8 and 3.9, but only the 
first 35 sūtras of adhyāya 3.10. The 12 remaining passages of adhyāya 3.10 cover the next prakaraa, 
samayasyānapākarma. Typically, the text divides long prakaraas like vāstukam into an even number of 
adhyāyas without remainder. The cases of irregular subdivision are discussed at §3.3. 
68 Thus, in some cases, a title from the prakaraa list cannot be correlated with a discrete segment of text. 
In contrast to the opinion given above, Scharfe concludes that on the whole, the prakaraas are “well 
marked in the text” (1993, 35). My reasons for diverging from his considered opinion are detailed in the 
following chapters. 
69 Adhyāya 14.1 is an exception to this. It is likely, however, that the mantra following the final śloka in 
that adhyāya (14.1.39Ð40) is an interpolation meant to provide the agnimantra mentioned in the original 
end verse at 14.1.38. This has been argued by Jacobi (1918, 192n). 
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of reference, the adhyāyas dominate the prakaraas in the text: individual passages are 
predominantly cited in the secondary literature by adhikaraa, adhyāya, and sūtra 
number (e.g. KAŚ 4.2.13). In contrast to the prakaraas, however, topical unity is of 
secondary importance to the structure of an adhyāya. In fact, topical unity within an 
adhyāya is typically found only in such cases as an adhyāya happens to overlap exactly 
with a single prakaraa. The looser adherence of the adhyāyas to the subject matter is the 
major element prompting suspicion of the posteriority of the adhyāyas, redundant 
segmentation (especially one showing such notable differences on the division of the 
text) unlikely to have been produced by a single composer. 
The manner in which this redundant segmentation is carried out in the Arthaśāstra 
will provide a point of departure for our analysis of the compositional history of the text 
(Chapter 3). Because of the importance of this feature, the following sections look at both 
the prakaraas and adhyāyas in greater detail. 
1.3.3 Prakaraas 
A prakaraa almost always represents the independent discussion of a single 
subtopic of its adhikaraa’s subject area.70 As such, prakaraas are, as a group, defined 
by their topic matter and distinguished from one another by the transition between 
subtopics and not necessarily by formally-marked boundaries (such as end verses or 
colophons).  
As an example of the relationship between the adhikaraas and the prakaraas, 
we can look to the 13th adhikaraa, entitled durgalambhopāya, “The Means of Taking a 
                                                 
70 Some prakaraas relate more directly to the subject of their adhikaraa than others. Typically this is a 
reflection of the cohesiveness of the adhikaraa’s subject. It should also be noted that the 15th adhikaraa 
possesses a single prakaraa that cannot, therefore, be thought of as a constituent “subtopic” of the 
adhikaraa. Both prakaraa and adhikaraa are titled tantrayukti (“Method of the Treatise”). 
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Fortress.” This adhikaraa comprises six prakaraas. They are presented as follows in 
the table of contents:  
 
KAŚ 1.1.15 upajāpa | yogavāmanam | upasarpapra	idhi | paryupāsanakarma | 
avamarda | labdhapraśamanam | iti durgalambhopāyas trayodaśam 
adhikara	am  
 
 Instigation to Sedition, Drawing Out by Means of Stratagems, 
Employment of Secret Agents, The Work of Laying Siege, Storming, 
Pacification of the Conquered Territory: these constitute the 13th 
adhikaraa, “Means of Taking a Fort.”  
As this citation illustrates, it is the prakaraa that represents the unit of 
meaningful discourse in the Arthaśāstra. The adhikaraas, as semantic units, generally 
only reflect (or attempt to manufacture) thematic linkages between the prakaraas; little 
discourse in the Arthaśāstra takes place at the level of the adhikaraa.71  
Like the adhikaraas, the prakaraas of the text vary widely in length, stretching 
in length from less than one sentence long up to a maximum of 167 sūtras.72 Prakaraas 
are identified in the Arthaśāstra by the name given to each in the prakaraa list, although 
modern convention also enumerates them serially from the beginning of the text (i.e., 
§1Ð180). 
It is not always the case, however, that the text proceeds in a series of independent 
discussions that match the profile of most prakaraas. Parts of the latter half of the 
Arthaśāstra are sufficiently confused so as not to submit to a clear division into such 
(semi-)independent discussions. Moreover, the 180 names provided by the table of 
contents (KAŚ 1.1.3Ð17) are, in a few cases, difficult to identify with any certainty in the 
text. These represent two different issues. First, the prakaraa structure of the text, while 
                                                 
71 Although we do see a few instances of this, such as in the 9th adhikaraa, as well as, to a more limited 
extent, here in the 13th adhikaraa. 
72 Prakaraas 167 and 116, respectively. The average length a prakaraa is 29.88 passages. 
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clear in most places, breaks down at points. Second, it is not clear whether the prakaraa 
names on the list might not, in part, represent a superimposition of a formal structure over 
earlier discussions that were not formally or consistently marked (and, in some cases, 
don’t proceed in autonomous discussions). This raises the important distinction between 
the notion of the prakaraa as one of 180 similar segments in the Arthaśāstra as opposed 
to an identifiable, though not necessarily discretely bounded, topic through which the 
discussion of the text proceeds. 
1.3.4 Adhyāyas 
At the same time that the adhikaraas of the Arthaśāstra are divided into 
prakaraas, they are also divided independently into adhyāyas (“teachings” or 
“lessons”). Whereas a prakaraa is nearly always a unified, hermetic discussion, 
adhyāyas do not always reflect independent, stand-alone discussions. Frequently, an 
adhyāya will combine several short prakaraas or subdivide one long prakaraa. When 
combining short prakaraas or dismembered prakaraa segments, the adhyāyas never 
demonstrate a novel integration of their constituent prakaraas superseding that provided 
by the prakaraas (see §3.2).  
Here is an example taken from the second adhikaraa, in which a single adhyāya 
(KAŚ 2.34) comprehends two prakaraas: “The Superintendent of Passports” (52) & 
“The Superintendent of Pastures” (53) (the adhyāya end verse is given in italics): 
 
KAŚ 2.34.1Ð12 The Superintendent of Passports (mudrādhyaka) should issue a sealed 
pass for one māaka. Only a person with a sealed pass shall be 
entitled to enter or leave the countryside. A native of the land, 
without a sealed pass, shall pay twelve paas. One bearing a forged 
pass shall pay the lowest fine for violence. One not of the country 
shall pay the highest fine for violence. 
 
 The Superintendent of Pastures (vivītādhyaka) should ask for a sealed 
pass. And he should establish pasture land in regions between 
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villages. He should clear lowlands and forests of robbers and wild 
animals. In waterless regions, he should establish wells, waterworks 
and springs, also flower and fruit enclosures. Fowlers and hunters 
should go round in the forest. At the approach of robbers or enemies, 
they should produce a sound with conch shells or drums, not 
allowing themselves to be caught by climbing mountains or trees or 
by riding in swift vehicles. And he should convey to the king 
movements of enemies and forest tribes by means of domesticated 
pigeons carrying sealed letters or by a series of smokes and fires. 
 He should insure the livelihood of those in produce forests and 
elephant forests and secure the road cess, protect against robbers, 
escort caravans, and protect cattle and trade. 
Here we see that, aside from the connection between the two prakaraas in the 
issuance and inspection of the passport, the adhyāya segment does not display the kind of 
holistic semantic integration found in each prakaraa.73 Moreover, the final end verse of 
the adhyāya refers back only to the second of the two prakaraas. 
Instead of adherence to independent discussions, the adhyāyas are established in 
the text by formally-marked boundaries: each adhyāya concludes with at least one verse 
and a colophon. The formal manner in which the colophons unambiguously conclude an 
adhyāya is mirrored within the text proper by the operation of the ślokas to bring each 
adhyāya to a rhythmic and substantive conclusion. What follows is a relatively standard 
example of how the end verse and colophon work in concert within the text (the end 
verse, KAŚ 4.1.65, is given in italics): 
 
KAŚ 4.1.58Ð65 Actors shall live in one place during the rainy season. They shall avoid 
excessive gifts of love by one person and excessive praise of one. For 
transgression of that, the fine is twelve paas. They may, at will, 
entertain by making fun of countries, castes, families, schools, and 
love affairs. 
 By actors are explained wandering minstrels and mendicants. For them 
the punishment shall be as many lashes with the whip as the number 
of paas the [judges] may pronounce as the fine, to be inflicted with 
an iron rod. 
                                                 
73 For more detailed discussion, see §3.3. 
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 In the case of the remaining kinds of work, he shall lay down wages for 
artists in accordance with what they produce. 
  In this manner, he should prevent thieves who are not known as thieves 
such as traders, artisans, actors, mendicants, jugglers, and others 
from oppressing the country. 
 
 Here ends the first adhyāya, (comprising the prakaraa) “Protecting 
Against Artisans,” in the fourth adhikaraa, “The Clearing of 
Thorns.” 
Most frequently, the end verses conclude an adhyāya by providing a conclusion to 
or summary of a foregoing topic or topics. These conclusions can provide either a generic 
summary of the foregoing prose74 or a final element integral to the prose discussion.75 In 
some cases, the end verse will pick up on some aspect of the foregoing subject and 
provide a related gnomic verse on the topic,76 in the manner of the usage of sm
ti verses 
in the earlier Dharmasūtras (see §1.1). In other cases, an end verse will extend,77 inflect,78 
or amend79 the foregoing prose into new areas or applications. Thus, while all end verses 
share the function of rhythmically concluding an adhyāya, their relationship to the 
content of that adhyāya can follow several models. We will look at these models more 
closely when we consider the nuances of individual end verses at §5.3Ð5. 
101 of 150 adhyāyas conclude with a single end verse, 23 in couplets; 7 end in 
three verses, and 19 adhyāyas possess four or more verses at their conclusion. The largest 
number of verses to end an adhyāya is 15 (KAŚ 7.3). Hence, we see a divergent tendency: 
                                                 
74 E.g. KAŚ 3.20.34 
75 E.g. KAŚ 7.6.34Ð41, especially 7.6.40Ð41 
76 E.g. KAŚ 2.29.48 
77 E.g. KAŚ 1.12.19Ð25 
78 E.g. KAŚ 3.19.30 
79 E.g. KAŚ 1.10.16Ð20 
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most adhyāyas end in a single verse, but those that do not typically end in much longer 
and more substantive verse clusters. 
The manuscripts of the Arthaśāstra are virtually unanimous in the placement of 
the adhyāya colophons, and witness thereby a consistent profile to the extent and 
boundaries of the adhyāya segments in the Arthaśāstra.80 And, although the adhyāya 
colophons in the manuscripts are inconsistent in the amount of information they give 
(variances are found both within a single manuscript as well as between different 
manuscripts), they can all be seen as variations on one or two archetypal forms, deviating 
only in the omission and/or arrangement of certain standard elements.81  
                                                 
80 Some minor discrepancies are recorded among the manuscripts, however. The Malayalam commentary 
(Cb) considers adhyāya 1.8 to begin after 1.7.7. There is, moreover, some discrepancy among the mss. over 
the distribution of prakaraas 162Ð163 over adhyāyas 12.1Ð12.3, although the adhyāya boundaries are 
firm. 
81 At a minimum, an adhyāya colophon will identify the adhyāya by number relative to its adhikaraa 
(these colophons are taken from the manuscript M4):  
[KAŚ 1.3]  iti vināyadhikārike t
tīyo Õdhyāya  
Here ends the third adhyāya in [the adhikaraa] “On the Topic of Training.”  
Typically, a colophon also identifies the prakaraas or prakaraa subsections comprehended by a given 
adhyāya, although the form of this can be somewhat variable:  
[KAŚ 1.2]  iti vinayādhikārike samuddeśe ānvīkikīsthāpanā dvitīyo Õdhyāya  
Here ends the second adhyāya, [discussing] “The Establishment of Philosophy” 
in [the prakaraa] “The Enumeration of the Sciences” in [the adhikaraa] 
“On the Topic of Training”  
or  
[KAŚ 1.16]  iti vinayādhikarike oaśo Õdhyāya | dūtapraidhi 
Here ends the twelfth adhyāya in [the adhikaraa] “On the Topic of Training” 
[comprised of the prakaraa] “The Job of the Envoy.”  
Finally, in adhyāyas beyond the first adhikaraa, the colophons will usually record the absolute position of 
the adhyāya from the beginning of the text:  
[KAŚ 2.32] dvāti	śa | hastipracāra | āditas tripa–cāśa 
The thirty-second [adhyāya in the second adhikaraa], [comprised of the 
prakaraa] “The Behavior of Elephants,” fifty-third [adhyāya] from the 
beginning.  
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Despite the fact that Kangle fails to present variae lectiones for the entirety of 
each colophon, he does provide alternate readings for the names of prakaraas and 
prakaraa subsections, thereby demonstrating the consistency with which the colophons 
cite the names of the prakaraas and their subsections. 
The adhyāyas always display a relatively greater degree of standardization, 
possessing a minimum length of 9 sentences and exhibiting a moderately greater 
uniformity in length (between 9 and 117 passages82), than the prakaraas. This feature, 
along with the noted proclivity of an adhyāya to aggregate short prakaraas83 or 
subdivide long ones,84 lends to them a clear redactorial character (Kangle 1965, 25).  
1.4 SCHOLASTIC EXCHANGES 
The final distinguishing compositional feature of the Arthaśāstra is the frequent 
but irregular irruptions into the text (83 times) of direct speech attributed to earlier 
teachers on political science, Kauilya himself, or, most frequently, both.85 These 
scholastic exchanges generally take the form of the pūrvapaka/uttarapaka exchange 
                                                                                                                                                 
Kangle’s edition standardizes all adhyāya colophons into a maximal, archetypal format: 
[KAŚ 7.38] iti āguye saptame Õdhikarae āguysamuddeśa 
kayasthānav
ddhiniścayaś ca prathamo Õdhyāya | ādito navanavatitama 
 Here ends the first adhyāya in the seventh adhikaraa, “The Six-fold Policy,” 
[comprehending the prakaraas] “Enumeration of the Six-fold Policy” and 
“Determinations in Loss, Stability, and Growth,” ninety-ninth [adhyāya] from 
the beginning. 
82 Adhyāya 1.7 is the shortest at 9 passages; adhyāya 2.11 is the longest at 117. The average adhyāya length 
in the text is 35.98 passages. 
83 E.g. KAŚ 7.4 
84 E.g. KAŚ 7.9Ð12 
85 The 15th adhikaraa, tantrayukti, refers to these exchanges, or more precisely to the citation of the 
opinions of both the earlier teachers and Kauilya, as apadeśa: evam asāv āhety apadeśa (15.1.21). 
Applicable in a more general sense to references from both Kauilya and the teachers is the yukti called 
upadea or “advice.” Cf. 15.1.19Ð20. 
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common to Sanskrit dialogics, with generic or eponymous teachers or schools providing 
the pūrvapaka (prima facie view) and Kauilya the uttarapaka (final or proper view). It 
is not uncommon in these cases for Kauilya’s initially succinct response to stretch into a 
long explanatory passage marked by the enclitic particle hi, “For,…” and frequently (but 
not always) concluding with the quotative particle iti. It is also possible that subsequent 
passages not so introduced by hi are meant to be read in the voice of Kauilya.86 On at 
least one occasion, an exchange between earlier teachers is given without any response 
from Kauilya.87 These, as well as other attributes, mark the presentation of the direct 
speech of Kauilya and earlier teachers in the Arthaśāstra as highly variable.88  
A Kauilya dialogue, as I will refer to these exchanges, will generally (but not 
invariably) open with the presentation of an erroneous viewpoint (pūrvapaka).89 
Sometimes a chain of pūrvapakas is presented as a series of proclamations and/or 
digressions from various eponymous teachers (i.e., Manu, Bhaspati, Uśanas, etc.) or 
their adherents (i.e., the Mā	avas, Bārhaspatyas, Auśanasas, etc.). In either case 
Kauilya’s correct view (uttarapaka) concludes the dialogue: 
 
KAŚ 1.15.47Ð50 mantripariada dvādaśāmātyān kurvīteti mānavā 
 oaśeti bārhaspatyā 
 viśatim ity auśanasā 
 yathāsāmarthyam iti kauilya 
 
                                                 
86 E.g. KAŚ 7.1.31ff. discussed at §6.5.2.1 
87 KAŚ 10.6.1Ð2. It is referred to in tantrayukti (15.1.41Ð42) as paravākyam apratiiddham anumatam, 
“The statement of another, not contradicted, is ‘agreement.’” 
88 The vast majority of these cases, however, conform to the structure of the pūrvapaka/uttarapaka 
exchange, and I will therefore refer to all of these instances of direct speech in the text as “Kauilya 
dialogues.” 
89 Several times the dialogues are prompted by the presentation of a statement, which is disagreed with by 
the pūrvapakins but ultimately endorsed in Kauilya’s own uttarapaka. See, e.g., KAŚ 1.2.1Ð10. 
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 “The King should appoint a Councilor’s Assembly consisting of 12 
Councilors,” say the followers of Manu. 
 “Sixteen,” say the followers of Bhaspati. 
 “Twenty,” say the followers of Uśanas. 
 “As is suitable to conditions,” says Kauilya. 
A variation of this format is found in a few debates wherein Kauilya responds 
individually to a series of pūrvapakas presented by different teachers or schools. It 
should be noted, as above, that the uttarapaka is sometimes followed by a longer 
explanation in Kauilya’s voice. 
Most frequently, however, only a single pūrvapaka is given. Generally, this will 
be attributed generically to “the teachers” (iti ācāryā), although in some cases it is 
ascribed to a specific teacher/school.  
 
KAŚ 3.14.6Ð8 upasthitam akārayata ktam eva vidyād ity ācāryā  
 neti kauilya  
 ktasya vetana nāktasyāsti  
 
 “When someone fails to employ an individual who has arrived [for 
contracted labor], the works should be considered as completed,” say 
the teachers. 
 “No,” says Kauilya. 
 “Pay is for work that is done, not for work that is not done.”  
Such one-to-one exchanges are sometimes united into a long chain of 
uttarapakas and pūrvapakas between “the teachers” and Kauilya. The attribution of a 
pūrvapaka to specific teachers and schools is found most frequently in the earlier 
adhikaraas, while the generic attribution of pūrvapakas of “the ācāryas” (teachers) are 
generally found in the latter half of the text. It is not clear whether this pattern is 
meaningful to the reconstruction of the composition of the text. 
The dispersal of the Kauilya dialogues in the KAŚ is irregular, and a handful of 
adhyāyas are characterized by the very heavy, if not exclusive, presence of Kauilya 
dialogues (KAŚ 1.8, 1.15, 7.9Ð12, 8.1Ð4); these four passages represent the greater part of 
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the Kauilya dialogues in the Arthaśāstra. Several scholars have seen in these dialogues 
the oldest portions of the Arthaśāstra90 or concrete evidence of an earlier expert tradition 
on artha (Kangle 1965, 34Ð35). It may be that differences in the style of these polemical 
dialogues bears on the ultimate composition of the text. They are discussed in detail at 
Chapter 6.  
1.5 INTEGRATED COMMENTARY?  
Based on a verse falling after the concluding colophon of the text, it has been 
suggested that extant Arthaśāstra is divided somehow into sūtra and bhāya; i.e., 
statement and commentary: 
 
KAŚ *15.1.74 dvā vipratipatti bahudhā śāstreu bhāyakārā	ām  
 svayam eva vi	uguptaś cakāra sūtra ca bhāya ca  
 
 Having seen the many inconsistencies of the commentators on śāstras, 
 Vi	ugupta himself composed both the sūtra and the bhāya. 
Despite the fact that the source of this distinction is clearly a spurious verse, the 
image of a text divided somehow into sūtra and bhāya has been endorsed.91 
We can state with complete confidence that, as a consistent feature evident 
throughout the treatise, no clear relationship between different elements of the text 
readily suggests itself as the referent to the sūtra/bhāya distinction. The explanations 
offered by various scholars in defense of the fundamental veracity of the claims of this 
spurious verse fail to illustrate any such unambiguous referent.92 As such, based on a 
simple analysis of the composition of the Arthaśāstra, we can dispense with the 
                                                 
90 Hillebrandt 1908; Bruce 2001 
91 Jacobi 1918, 190 
92 Jacobi’s argument that the division between sūtra and bhāya can be found in the alternation of brief 
passages with longer, more complete discussions. Although such a representation of the text may come 
close to describing certain passages (i.e., KAŚ 1.2Ð17; see Chapter 7),  it is not well supported generally. 
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suggestion that distinction between sūtra and bhāya is a major feature, on par with those 
discussed here, of the extant text of the Arthaśāstra.93 
1.6 CONCLUSION 
Thus, we have a mixed prose/verse text divided into 15 adhikaraas. These 15 
adhikaraas are then sub-divided by two dissimilar second-order segmentation systems 
into 180 prakaraas and 150 adhyāyas. Colophons conclude each adhikaraa and 
adhyāya, but not the prakaraas. A broad division of the text’s contents prevails between 
discussions on internal administration (tantra) and foreign policy (āvāpa). Finally, the 
text possesses two framing adhyāyas, the former of which mostly comprises of a table of 
contents listing the adhikaraas and prakaraas, but not the adhyāyas. By all indications 
the extant Arthaśāstra possesses no major lacunae (See §2.4).  
                                                 
93 This observation may have been made in reference to a more esoteric dimension of the text, but not one 
easily apprehended by simple familiarity with the source. 
 43 
Chapter 2: Theories of Composition 
This chapter presents the various theories forwarded by scholars to account for the 
state of the extant Arthaśāstra. This discussion is designed not only to familiarize the 
reader with the current theories in the field, but also to highlight which textual elements 
have emerged as central to a determination of the origin of the text. By the end of this 
chapter, the reader should have a clear understanding of why, in particular, the 
relationship between the adhyāyas and the prakaraas is so important to unlocking the 
history of the text. 
2.1 UNITARY AUTHORSHIP AND ITS DIFFICULTIES 
Scholarly opinion is notably unsettled regarding how the Arthaśāstra came into 
its present form. The most straightforward and conservative theories derive from the 
“traditional” view94 of the text’s origins and claim that the present text faithfully95 
reflects the original composition of a single author, usually Cā	akya or Kauilya. We find 
                                                 
94 As enunciated by Kangle: “[t]he traditional view in this matter is that Kauilya, also known as Cā	akya 
or Vi	ugupta, who destroyed the power of the Nandas and placed Candragupta Maurya on the throne of 
Magadha, is the author of the work. And as Candragupta is known to have come to the throne in 321 B.C. 
or thereabouts, the date of the composition of the work is assumed to be the end of the fourth century B.C.” 
(1965, 61). Direct internal attributions of the Arthaśāstra to “Kauilya” come at 1.1.19 and 2.10.63 and to 
“him, who, in resentment, quickly regenerated the science and the weapon and the earth that was under the 
control of the Nanda kings” at 15.1.73, all adhyāya end verses and the last being the final verse of the text 
proper; the attribution of the text to “Vi	ugupta” after the final colophon (i.e., *15.1.74) is clearly an 
interpolation. Potential attributions of lesser certitude are the 83 direct citations of Kauilya in the text. 
Whether these, however, are Kauilya quoting himself or being quoted by another remains a matter of 
controversy. We are concerned in this chapter only with the aspect of the traditional view that attributes the 
entire extant Arthaśāstra to a single author, whether that author is Cā	akya or another. The issues of date 
and authorship are taken up in the Conclusion. For a discussion of the traditional view as it pertains to date 
and author, see Kangle 1965, 61Ð115. For a detailed treatment of the story cycles concerning the legendary 
Kauilya (the so-called Cāakya-Candragupta-Kathās) see Trautmann 1971, 10Ð67. 
95 Less, of course, minor losses and accretions common to the manner of South Asian textual transmission. 
Kangle: “Most manuscripts no doubt show here and there a sūtra missing or a line” (1965, 21). 
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such a theory of unitary authorship supported by J. F. Fleet96, H. Jacobi97 and such 
learned translators and editors of the text as R. Shamasastry98 and R. P. Kangle.99  
For many such scholars, the issue of compositional history is not considered 
separately from the identity of the author. Thus, most of the proponents of this view 
spend a great part of their energy trying to fit the content of the text to the Mauryan 
period (thereby reinforcing their historical model), while dismissing idiosyncratic 
structural elements as peculiarities of the author’s style.100 Whatever the merits of such 
diverse attempts to ascribe the extant Arthaśāstra to the legendary prime minister of 
Candragupta Maurya, all theories of unitary authorship retain in common the goal of 
discrediting whatever evidence and arguments be adduced in favor of the view that the 
present Arthaśāstra is in any manner the product of substantive, volitional redaction. 
                                                 
96 “And it seems to be agreed by competent judges that, though the existing text is, perhaps, not absolutely 
word for word that which was written by Kauilya, still we have essentially a work that he did compose in 
[321Ð296 B.C.]” (Introduction to Shamasastry 1923, v-vi). 
97 Kangle 1965, 27: “Jacobi…believed that this text, like the Nirukta and Mahābhāya, was held in high 
esteem and therefore was ‘saved also from the hand of the meddlesome interpolator.’”  
98 Shamasastry: “I trust the foregoing pages [of the Preface to his translation] contain overwhelming 
evidence in favour of the genuineness of the Arthaśāstra as I have published it, and of Kauilya’s authorship 
thereof” (1923, xxiii).  
99 Kangle: “considering the extent of the work, the interpolations do not appear to be either extensive or 
significant. Of a wholesale incorporation of later material there does not appear to be any indication at all.” 
This list on names, of course, leaves out a number of scholars (Meyer, Hillebrandt et al) who do attribute 
some portion of the present text of the Arthaśāstra to Kauilya, but not all. 
100 This is my interpretation, but is supported by the proclivities of both Shamasastry’s preface (1923) and 
Kangle’s study of the text (1965). We witness this, for example, in Kangle’s cursory treatment of the 
disjuncture between the prakaraa and adhyāya segmentation schemes: “it is not altogether unlikely that 
the two-fold division stems from the author himself, who may be supposed to have intended that his work, 
besides being suitably divided into sections, should also be the object of study by others” (1965, 26); and, 
on the first adhyāya, which is not counted among any prakaraa: “Perhaps the first Chapter giving the 
table of contents was regarded [by the author] as suitable for constituting a separate chapter, though it 
contained no section dealing with the actual śāstra” (1965, 25). Cf. Shamasastry on Kauilya quoting 
himself: “this is a common practice with all Indian writers” (1923, xxiv). 
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The primary difficulty for the theory of unitary authorship lies in accounting for 
the redundant segmentation of the text: why would an author have re-divided his own text 
with a second system that frequently conflicts with the first? Among those scholars who 
subscribe to a theory of unitary authorship and are willing to acknowledge sufficient 
grounds to suspect a secondary redaction into adhyāyas, Kangle gives the only defense of 
which I am aware. In a study of the text accompanying his critical edition and translation 
of the Arthaśāstra, Kangle admits that the prakaraa division “appears more natural, 
being germane to the science” and allows that “[i]t may be argued that the former 
division [i.e., the prakaraas] being natural is original and that the division into chapters 
[i.e., adhyāyas] was imposed on it later” (1965, 25Ð26). But having recognized the 
fecund ground for this assumption, Kangle resists the conclusion, without openly 
rejecting it, that the adhyāyas must be the work of a second hand: “it is not altogether 
unlikely that the two-fold division stems from the author himself, who may be supposed 
to have intended that his work, besides being suitably divided into sections [i.e., 
prakaraas], should also be the object of study [in the form of adhyāyas] by others” 
(1965, 26). This possibility, that the author did not combine his priorities of composition 
and presentation and used so clumsy a method to accomplish these divergent goals, is far 
less likely than the occurrence of some kind of redaction to the text.101 Because any 
possibility of redaction diminishes the likelihood of the traditional account, one can only 
imagine that the motive behind promoting such an improbable theory is to defend 
Kauilya’s supposed authorship. 
                                                 
101 This is not to say that there are not signs of integration within the greater text, but only that the 
prakaraa/adhyāya issue is enormously problematic to the theory of unitary authorship. 
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It remains, however, that the redundant division of the text into prakaraas and 
adhyāyas gives immediate cause to suspect a redaction to the text, a suspicion borne out 
in a discrete comparison of the two systems (see Chapter 3).  
2.2 ADHYĀYA REDACTION 
Over and against the compositional theory of unitary authorship, a substantial 
number of theories have been forwarded to explain the apparent disjuncture between the 
prakaraas and adhyāyas through one or more instances of extensive redaction.102  
2.2.1 Addition of Colophons Only 
One theory, proposed soon after the publication of the editio princeps and which 
continues to attract a great deal of support is the now commonly held view that the 
division of the text into adhyāyas represents the secondary segmentation of a text 
originally divided only into prakaraas (the hypothetical “prakaraa-text”). The specific 
evidence pertaining to this proposed redaction is discussed in the next four chapters. 
Despite its broad acceptance, however, the widespread acknowledgement of this 
redaction has not resulted in concomitant accord over the precise character and extent of 
proposed editorial transformations. 
But to what extent might the text have been altered during its redaction into 
adhyāyas? Kangle, who seems to feel the pressure of this problem more acutely than his 
cohort, would limit any secondary adhyāya redaction to the addition of the adhyāya 
colophons: he directly rules out any “significant” interpolations or the “wholesale 
                                                 
102 In many of these theories, the term “redaction” may be insufficient to describe the extensive renovation 
or rewriting that earlier “versions” of the text are posited to have undergone. I use the term here 1) because 
I wish to examine all of the various transformations suggested in the different compositional theories as a 
group; and 2) to highlight the continuity between earlier “versions” of the Arthaśāstra and its present form 
proposed in the different theories. 
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incorporation of later material” in the present text (1965, 30).103 Such a redaction would 
merely have formalized the efforts of the composer, who had already functionally divided 
the text into adhyāya segments by including the present adhyāya end verses at 
appropriate intervals.104 And even as he admits in places to the possibility of an adhyāya 
redaction, the implicit position to which Kangle continually returns in his writing is that 
the present Arthaśāstra reflects almost exactly the original work of a single author. So, 
even as he fails to address directly the origin of the adhyāya colophons, Kangle’s implicit 
position is that they are original to the text. Shamasastry, for his part, does not hesitate at 
all in attributing the colophons to the composer of the original treatise (1923, ix).105  
Scharfe has, in my opinion, most convincingly demonstrated that the adhyāya 
segmentation is, in fact, “an early addition” to the work brought about by a redactor who 
could not have been the composer of the prakaraa-text (1993, 29Ð40, 67).106 The 
adhyāyas, in Scharfe’s model, would have been generated out of the prakaraa-text 
solely by the introduction of the present adhyāya colophons at intervals suggested by pre-
existing verses (1993, 40Ð41).107 In his view this redaction into adhyāyas was a 
“secondary mechanical division” suggested by the verses scattered throughout the text 
                                                 
103 This is made clear when Kangle relates that “[a]lthough quite a number of ślokas appear to be borrowed 
from earlier sources…[m]any of them are obviously by the author himself” (1965, 34).  
104 I.e., at the present adhyāya intervals. That whoever introduced them must have done so with the 
intention of producing a second organizational scheme is admitted by Kangle (1965, 25). 
105 The different approaches of these two editors of the text might be due to the fact that Kangle, writing 
more than 40 years later than Shamasastry, was presenting his work in a climate in which the theory of an 
adhyāya redaction was generally enjoying greater support. 
106 Scharfe demonstrates this based on certain erroneous interpretations of prakaraa boundaries by the 
producer of the adhyāya segments. I disagree, however, with his assessment that the adhyāya redaction was 
limited to the introduction of the adhyāya colophons. 
107 It should be noted, however, that Scharfe (among others) does not believe that the version of the 
prakaraa-text recovered by purging the adhyāya colophons is, in fact, the original version of the 
Arthaśāstra. See below, this chapter. 
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and carried out in imitation of the secondary subdivision found in many Vedic works 
(1993, 41). Just as in Kangle’s model, Scharfe posits that the location of the present 
adhyāya end verses was governed by processes inherent in the composition of the 
prakaraa-text and amounted to little more than the formalization of an incipient division 
into adhyāyas already being carried out by the composer of the prakaraa-text.  
The significance of any position that limits the adhyāya redaction to the addition 
of the colophons alone lies in the implication that the adhyāya end verses that everywhere 
precede these colophons in the extant text pre-date the formal adhyāya redaction itself. 
As a result, both of the above theories must account for the fact that the prakaraa-text of 
the Arthaśāstra would already have been de facto divided into the present adhyāya 
segments by the same concluding verses that (along with the colophons) form the 
boundary of each adhyāya in the present text. This would mean, of course, that the 
composer of the prakaraa-text divided his work according to two frequently 
contradictory schemes. In both theories, as we shall see, Scharfe and Kangle are each 
beholden to larger theoretical conclusions that rule out the possibility that the present 
adhyāya end verses were introduced by an adhyāya redactor along with the colophons.  
2.2.2 Addition of Verses and Colophons 
A model that avoids the particular difficulty of accounting for a text functionally 
divided into adhyāyas (by the verses) before its formal redaction into adhyāyas (by the 
colophons) has been proffered by A. B. Keith (1941, 452) and supported by T. 
Trautmann (1971, 75Ð76). In such a model the adhyāya redaction consisted of the 
introduction of the present adhyāya end verses as well as the adhyāya colophons. The 
theory is based generally on the fact that such verses in the Arthaśāstra invariably operate 
in tandem with the colophons in marking adhyāya boundaries, that they are in many 
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cases clearly conclusive, and that some of the resulting boundaries seem to produce 
strange disjunctures in the text.108 There is a good deal of evidence to support this theory, 
and I will be arguing in favor of this position in the following chapters of this study. 
The adhyāya redaction, in this model, would represent a much more extensive 
transformation of the text than the “cosmetic” addition of colophons. Not only would the 
redaction have added a minimum of 8% to the overall length of the earlier prakaraa-text 
in the form of appended adhyāya end verses, but the character of the new material and its 
re-segmentation of the text would also have inflected and/or changed the presentation of 
material in the Arthaśāstra both locally and globally.109 Moreover, the addition of 
substantive material (as opposed simply to metadiscursive colophons) increases the 
possibility that the adhyāya redaction was a more invasive and extensive transformation 
of the text than previously suspected. For the present, however, it is sufficient to note that 
this model suggests that the adhyāya redaction was potentially a more important moment 
in the compositional history than has previously been admitted. 
These models suffice to outline the general shape of the debate regarding a 
potential adhyāya redaction. Even if we support the occurrence of a maximally 
transformative adhyāya redaction, however, it would remain that the vast majority of the 
present Arthaśāstra must pre-date this adhyāya redaction (this is the so-called 
“prakaraa-text”). Thus, whether, on one hand, one dismisses the possibility of an 
adhyāya redaction altogether or, on the other hand, believes that it was an extensive, 
                                                 
108 See below at §3.1Ð6. 
109 E.g., the only direct ascriptions of the text to Kauilya (outside the less certain Kauilya dialogues) are 
all found in adhyāya end verses. Thus, the work of ascribing the present text to that author might be seen, at 
least in part, to have been undertaken by the adhyāya redactor. 
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global transformation of the text, we are still faced with the issue of the provenance and 
development of the greater portion of the extant text. 
2.3 THE ORIGIN OF THE PRAKARAA-TEXT 
Clearly, for those scholars who subscribe to a theory of unitary composition for 
the present Arthaśāstra, there existed no prior “prakaraa-text” to speak of; rather, the 
present Arthaśāstra is the “prakaraa-text.” Even for those theories holding that the 
adhyāya redaction did occur, but consisted solely of the addition of the present adhyāya 
colophons, the prakaraa-text that preceded it would have been substantially identical to 
the present editions of the Arthaśāstra. And, as mentioned above, any such model would, 
from our perspective, need to explain how the adhyāya end verses in the extant text, 
which fall precisely at the end of the present adhyāyas, could exist before the formal 
division of the prakaraa-text into such adhyāya segments had been made. 
2.3.1 Unitary Prakaraa Authorship 
Kangle does not address this problem directly in the volume accompanying his 
edition and translation, but he does maintain that the author of the prakaraa-text is 
responsible for the adhyāya end verses (1965, 34). As to the purpose of these verses, he 
admits that the adhyāya division “has a practical aim, namely, to present the text in more 
or less equal divisions convenient for the purpose of study” (1965, 25). According to 
Kangle, therefore, the author of the prakaraa-text studded his own prose work with 
verses (both pre-existing as well as his own compositions) at the present adhyāya 
intervals, presumably for the purpose of creating the present adhyāyas as a second 
divisional scheme to supersede his own prakaraas. 
Thus, Kangle ultimately endorses the position that the “prakaraa-text” is 
fundamentally identical to the present edition, with only the provenance of the colophons 
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left to question.110 This, the first of the two models, is required if one wishes to keep 
intact the present Arthaśāstra as the work of a single composer without major changes in 
its compositional history. But, as this theory attributes both divisional schema, the 
prakaraas and the adhyāyas, to the same original composer of the text, it fails to address 
serious discrepancies between the adhyāya division and the prakaraa division that 
strongly suggest that both cannot be the work of a single author (see §3.4). Ultimately, 
this model is distinguished from theories that completely rule out any changes 
whatsoever to the text over time (such as Shamasastry’s) only in allowing for the 
possibility that the composer’s adhyāya divisions were formalized later by another hand 
through the secondary addition of colophons.111 
2.3.2 Verse-Original Theory 
For Scharfe, the present adhyāya end verses are also original to the prakaraa-
text. But, Scharfe’s explanation for their existence is linked to the much more ambitious 
theory, suggested first by Bhandarkar (1926, 65ff.) and supported variously by Wilhelm 
(1960, 147Ð148) and Nath (1931b) that the prakaraa-text of the Arthaśāstra is itself the 
prose expansion of an original verse-form Arthaśāstra, from which the present adhyāya 
end verses have been retained.112 Put differently, the dispersal of verses in the text can be 
explained as verses retained from the original Arthaśāstra when it was converted into 
prose. According to Scharfe, the reasons why the present adhyāya end verses were 
                                                 
110 But, as we have seen, Kangle makes no real allowance in his work for the occurrence of any adhyāya 
redaction. 
111 A modified version of this compositional history would have the present adhyāya end verses finding 
their present location by a purely accidental process, an argument for which I can find no serious 
proponents. 
112 It should be noted that a great deal of disagreement is to be found in the espousal of this general theory 
by the aforementioned scholars. I present Scharfe’s as the fullest, most recent, and most persuasive 
articulation of this theory.  
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retained from this original verse text are manifold: because they provided important 
additional data (1993, 53Ð55), “to mark divisions” (ibid.), “to articulate [an] excessively 
long…topic” (56,) and so forth.  
In this, the second model, the global and regular pattern of adhyāya end verses in 
the Arthaśāstra is the result of a number of disparate exigencies arising from the process 
through which a verse text was expanded into a prose text. The adhyāya end verses, 
therefore, would not be the collective result of a specific and directed effort to divide the 
text into adhyāya segments. Rather, the adhyāya division would merely have lain 
dormant in the unguided distribution of retained verses left over from the production of 
the prakaraaÐtext113 until an opportunistic redactor exploited it to create the formal 
adhyāya division through the introduction of colophons at points suggested by these 
verses.114 This ingenious solution allows that the composer of the prakaraa-text is 
functionally responsible for the adhyāya redaction, without, however, having been fully 
aware of or intending it.  
Scharfe cites several pieces of evidence supposedly reflecting the process by 
which the text was turned from verse to prose. Nevertheless, the better evidence adduced 
in favor of this ambitious theory is, as we shall see, rather meager, consisting of 1) only a 
                                                 
113 As one of the reasons Scharfe gives for the retention of original verses is “to articulate an excessively 
long topic.” we can posit a specific, if not holistic, volitional tendency toward the re-division of the text in 
new segmentary units. Interestingly, Scharfe does not include as one of the reasons for the retention of the 
verses another result they seem to produce: the combination of very short prakaraas into longer 
segmentary units. It remains, however, that, for Scharfe, the retention of original verses was not guided by 
an unambiguous, global desire to produce formal textual segments, although that desire may have have 
emerged in more local contexts. 
114 “The redactor had two options if he wanted to replace the loose articulation of the text with clear-cut 
divisions. He could try to match the list of topics found in the introduction with the text; the result would be 
sections of very uneven length, and some topics would be difficult to disentangle; or he could use the 
verses that often summarize or complement the preceding proseÑand some obvious changes in 
contentÑto achieve sections of comparable length. That is the procedure the redactor chose…” (1993, 
40Ð41). 
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handful of instances where the prose immediately preceding an adhyāya end verse seems 
to be an expansion of that verse; and 2) a few other cases in which other prose segments 
of the text can be identified as expansions of verses known from other contexts.115 I will 
argue that the instances identified by Scharfe as occurrences of verse turned to prose have 
different explanations and that an underlying verse-form text identical in its topics and 
their order is extremely unlikely (see §5.6).116  
2.3.3 Built around Kauilya Axioms 
A similar compositional history, representing a third position, argues that the 
present text is also based on earlier material, but that this material is to be found not in 
verses retained from a hypothetical verse original, but in the citations of Kauilya himself. 
Arguments have been variously forwarded by A. Hillebrandt (1923) and E. B. Brooks 
(2001) that the 83 instances of direct speech in the Arthaśāstra attributed to Kauilya (in 
the polemical dialogues) form the oldest layer or “core” of the text. The prose 
surrounding them (i.e., the overwhelming majority of the present text) would represent a 
                                                 
115 Scharfe would also point to suggested discrepancies between the prakaraa list at KAŚ 1.1.3Ð17, which 
he sees as having been based on the verse text, and the actual treatment of topics in the prose text as an 
indication that the prakaraa list refers to a different but nearly topically identical version of the present 
Arthaśāstra (1993, 67Ð70). 
116 This existence of an underlying verse text is rejected by Kangle both for specific textual reasons as well 
as on the more general grounds that “there does not appear to be any valid motive for the supposed 
transformation of a metrical work into prose” (1965, 32). Although I agree with Kangle on many of his 
more specific reasons why such a transformation is unlikely (e.g. that despite Scharfe’s explanations it 
remains “difficult to see why some three hundred and eighty ślokas which are found in the present text 
should have been retained in the prose” [ibid.]), that we cannot perceive a motive for such a transformation 
does not rule out just such an idiosyncratic occurrence. The most persuasive argument against an original 
verse text of the Arthaśāstra comes from evidence forwarded by Breloer (1934) and Nag (1924) and the 
research of Trautmann (1971) suggesting that the present Arthaśāstra displays unevenness in composition 
and style and is itself very likely a composite work. That sizeable segments of the Arthaśāstra display a 
wide divergence in style and form would seem to indicate that they represent in themselves originally 
distinct prose sources. This would rule out the possibility that of a single “verse Arthaśāstra” source for the 
present adhyāya ending verses resembling the present text closely enough in the discussion of its topics 
(particularly in its adherence to the prakaraa list) to deserve identification as a previous “version” of the 
present text. Although the use of some verse sources in the construction of the text is possible. 
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later expansion by the followers of Kauilya.117 Such a theory is suggested, of course, by 
the logical disjuncture repeatedly generated in the text by the sporadic quotation of 
Kauilya in a work elsewhere attributed to him in its entirety.118 As a common-sense 
response to this compositional oddity, scholars have suggested that the present text is the 
result of the gradual expansion of Kauilya’s original “maxims.”119 While this theory 
finds some superficial support in the text’s own tendency to cite pre-existing authors and 
present Kauilya’s judgment on their opinions, there is, unfortunately, little philological 
evidence to support the historical priority of the Kauilya citations and/or dialogues. This 
study will present evidence that argues, on the contrary, that these dialogues are in all 
likelihood not an early but a late feature of the Arthaśāstra’s compositional history.120 
                                                 
117 As in the case of the theories of a verse original, there is a great divergence of opinion over the details 
of how this expansion occurred.  
118 This is my own interpretation. Brooks states that “[t]he chief fact on which the present argument is 
based is that the Kauilya maxims do not occur evenly distributed within the ArS, but are confined to 
certain books and chapters. It can then be verified that the linguistic features which have often been pointed 
out as signs of late date of the ArS as a whole are clustered in the ArS books and chapters which do not 
contain Kauilya maxims. The implication is that the Kauilya maxims comprise a linguistically early 
stratum within ArS, and that the rest of ArS represents an expansion (perhaps in several instalments [sic]) 
beyond that original stratum” (2001). They argue that Scharfe’s dating of the text to ca. 150 CE applies 
only to books which do not contain many or any Kauilya quotes. The determination of “early” and “late” 
linguistic features by different scholars, however, remains inconclusive. Moreover, it can be argued that at 
least some of the Kauilya dialogues show “later” features than the rest of the text. See §6.5. 
119 Bruce and Brooks (2001) argue out that “the group of [Kauilya] citations did not exist as a text prior to 
its use by the early ArS. It then seems likely that the early ArS compiler himself did the assembling and 
rephrasing of these pre-Kautilyan maxims, and structured them so as to maximize the force of the 
Kautilyan maxims themselves.” Accordingly, the composition of this compiler formed the “core” of the 
present Arthaśāstra: “[t]hat early layer must then comprise approximately the chapters containing 
significant numbers of Kauilya citations. But even these chapters do not wholly consist of those citations; 
they normally continue with statements further developing the position attributed to Kauilya, or else they 
precede the Kauilya citations by other material on the same general topic. These more developed 
statements are presumably the original voice of the Arthashāstra compiler, as distinct from the quoted 
voice of Kauilya.” 
120 See Chapter 6. 
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2.3.4 Composite Text 
Finally, Trautmann (1971) has attempted to scientifically prove the theory, 
favored in different respects by Nag (1920, 114) and Hillebrandt (1923, 156), that the 
Arthaśāstra (or, more properly, the prakaraa-text) is a composite text assembled from 
disparate sources.121 He has done so by undertaking a rigorous statistical analysis of 
patterns of word usage in the three longest adhikaraas of the text. He argues that these 
patterns demonstrate that the second, third, and seventh adhikaraas must ultimately 
have each had a different author. To his statistical approach can be added the research of 
Nag (1920) and Breloer (1927Ð1934), who have argued that the text displays unevenness 
in composition both between and within adhikaraas as well as between the prose and 
the verses. I will argue in the following chapters that a great deal of evidence can be 
adduced in favor of this theory, that it is almost certainly accurate to state that the 
Arthaśāstra is a composite text and, what is more, that it may have been assembled in 
successive stages by different hands. 
2.4 LOSS TO THE TEXT? 
A theory forwarded by D. D. Kosambi, in his preface to the publication of the text 
of the “Patan fragment” (Kangle’s ms. D).122 There, Kosambi asserts, based on the 
testimony of a verse in the first adhyāya (KAŚ 1.1.18) that puts the extent of the text at 
“6,000 ślokas,” that the present text has suffered the loss of about 1/5 of its original 
material.  
                                                 
121 See, for example, Sternbach 1982; Scharfe 1989, 21n 
122 Preface to Muni Jina Vijaya, ed. (1959). A Fragment of the Koutalya’s Arthaśāstra alias Rajāsiddānta. 
Bombay: Bhāratīya Vidyā Bhavana, pp. 1Ð8. 
 56 
Kosambi’s detailed arguments in favor of specific areas of the text in which some 
of the loss may have occurred are, however, unconvincing.123 The same may be said for 
his erroneous reading of the prakaraa list, in which he identifies some 4 prakaraas 
“missing” in the extant manuscripts.124 Moreover, as Kangle has argued, it is impossible 
after reading the text to imagine that every prakaraa of the present text is missing, on 
average, 20% of its original material.125  
Clearly, the problem in this matter lies in the manner in which the term “śloka” 
should be understood in KAŚ 1.1.18. Interpreted as the 32-syllable unit used by copyists 
to tabulate the extent of their labor (Kangle 1965, 20), it is true that the text records closer 
to 4,640 ślokas.126 But, if śloka refers to sentences, reckoned both as complete syntactical 
sūtras and verses, then we get a wide range, from around 5,370 in Kangle’s second 
edition to 6,880 in Jolly and Schmidt’s edition. Nevertheless, the referent of the term 
remains unclear.127 Moreover, the prefatory adhyāya is likely younger than the remainder 
of the text128 and (aside from the prakaraa list) can be demonstrated to date in all 
                                                 
123 Scharfe: “In no way would [Kosambi’s arguments] allow the expansion of the traditional text by the 
twenty-five percent that would necessary to reach Kosambi’s goal of six thousand śloka-s” (1993, 8). 
124 Cf. Kangle 1965, 22Ð23. 
125 Kangle 1965, 22: “it seems quite unlikely that originally there was twenty-five percent more [of Book 
7] in the text. The same can be said of most of the other Books.” 
126 Kosambi’s estimate (1959, 5). 
127 It cannot, of course, refer to the 370 or so actual śloka verses in the present text. As a reference to units 
of 32 syllables, which “is how copyists usually calculate the extent of a work,” Kangle has tabulated the 
text at about 4800 ślokas (1965, 20Ð21). It is not unlikely that “the statement about six thousand ślokas is 
an extremely rough guess” (Kangle 1965, 23), but, if the calculations of 1.1.18 are accurate, then the 6000 
ślokas must refer to the sum of sūtras and verses in the text, substantial loss of material in the text (which 
does not seem to have occurred, see below) notwithstanding. This need not concern us unduly here, 
however, as it bears more on the issues of the provenance of sūtra 1.1.18 (discussed below) and whether a 
substantial amount of material has been dropped from the text over time (also discussed below). On 
criticism of sūtra 1.1.18 and the length of the text, see Kangle 1965, 20Ð25. 
128 See §3.4. 
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likelihood to the adhyāya redaction, meaning that this verse is not well protected in the 
text. Even among this potentially late adhyāya, the sūtra KAŚ 1.1.18 is corrupt and, for 
various reasons, considered problematic.129 
Scharfe has examined instances of discrete cross-referencing in the Arthaśāstra 
and determined from that that the present text possesses no major lacunae (1993, 8Ð10). 
This is the opinion also held by Kangle (1965, 30Ð31) and myself. In short, the situation 
remains that KAŚ 1.1.18 represents on its own insufficient evidence to suggest that the 
text has endured substantial loss; other evidence adduced in favor of such loss has been 
entirely unconvincing. Thus, while the text may have suffered some “normal” loss (as 
well as accretion), we have little reason to accept Kosambi’s claim. 
2.5 CONCLUSION  
After a century a number of mutually-opposed theories remain in popular 
circulation regarding the composition of the Arthaśāstra. The outstanding issue with 
which each must contend, however, is the presence in the text of redundant segmentation. 
All issues pertaining to the origin of the prakaraa-text depend on the outcome of that 
investigation, which is taken up in the next chapter. From the results of that inquiry, we 
will be able to move on to consideration of the origin of the prakaraa-text. 
                                                 
129 Kangle 1965, 25; Scharfe 1993, 28 
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Chapter 3: Redundant Segmentation 
As should be apparent from the previous chapter, the relationship between the 
Arthaśāstra’s two segmentary systems, prakaraas and adhyāyas, is of great importance 
to the compositional history of the text. As the compositional feature most clearly 
implying a redaction of the entire text, determining the chronological relationship 
between these two competing segmentary schemes promises to provide a discrete 
editorial moment around which to construct a greater compositional history of the text. 
The present chapter compares the two segmentation systems in the Arthaśāstra 
holistically. This enables us to look broadly at how the two systems interrelate, which, in 
turn, provides evidence pertaining to their relative chronology. I will, in this chapter, 
demonstrate that the adhyāya division post-dates the division of the text into prakaraas, 
that it occurred in a single compositional moment, and that it must have been the work of 
someone different from the composer of  the underlying text. 
My analysis of the composition of the Kauilīya Arthaśāstra begins with the most 
prominent compositional feature of the text: its redundant division into both prakaraas 
and adhyāyas (see §1.3.2). The redundancy prevailing between these two systems 
suggests that one of the two likely resulted from a global redaction of the Arthaśāstra, 
when the content of the existing text was completely re-apportioned into novel segments. 
The logic for this is based on the conviction that a single author would not produce 
redundant segmentary schemes, particularly two schemes that disagree with frequency on 
the manner in which they divide the text (§3.4) 
The present chapter develops its comparison of these two segmentary schemes 
through four lines of inquiry. First, I compare the redundant segmentation in the 
Arthaśāstra with examples of redundant segmentation found in other Sanskrit texts 
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(§3.1). Second, I consider the manner in which the adhyāya segments are frequently 
divorced from the material they bound (§3.2). Third, I establish that the present adhyāya 
redaction can only have arisen as the result of a single organizational plan and that it 
comprehends material not included in the text as reckoned into prakaraas (§3.3). 
Finally, having established not only the posteriority of the adhyāyas, but also that they 
were produced according to a logical plan, I demonstrate that the individual who 
produced the adhyāya redaction cannot have been the same individual who composed the 
prakaraa text (§3.4). My conclusions are presented at §3.5. 
3.1 REDUNDANT SEGMENTATION IN SANSKRIT LITERATURE 
The phenomenon I refer to as “redundant segmentation” indicates the presence in 
a text of more than one system for apportioning its material, each of which is capable of 
providing an independent indexing of the passages of the text, carried out in such a 
manner that one segmentation would suffice to fulfill that role and the others are 
superfluous. Because such redundancy is unlikely to have resulted from the efforts of a 
single composer, its presence strongly implies editorial activity or redaction in the 
compositional history of a text.130  
This phenomenon is not uncommon in extant Sanskrit texts from the Vedic and 
classical periods. From the Vedic corpus, triple segmentation is found in the gveda 
                                                 
130 At a minimum, redundancy implies two different logics of textual presentation. This, in turn, almost 
certainly implies two distinct compositional moments, if not also two composers. It is possible, however 
unlikely, to imagine that a single individual composed a redundantly segmented text all at once. More 
likely, but still highly improbable is that a single author re-apportioned his own text in a second 
compositional “moment.” This is precisely what Kangle (1965, 26) has argued in favor of to explain the 
redundant segmentation of the Arthaśāstra, namely that its composer chose to re-apportion his own text 
after its composition (this argument is refuted below). But, both proposals suggest at least two different 
compositional “moments”: one in which the text was composed and one in which the text was re-
apportioned. They simply assign both of these moments to the same broad “moment” in which the text was 
composed. The purpose of the present chapter is to demonstrate that these two moments cannot have both 
come from the same individual.  
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Sahitā (Gonda 1975, 9), as well as double segmentation in certain recensions of the 
Yajurveda Sahitā and Sāmaveda Sahitā (1975, 314ff.). To this we can add the double 
segmentation of the Aitareya Brāhmaa (Gonda 1975, 344n), the Taittirīya Brāhmaa 
(1975, 350), and the Śatapatha Brāhmaa (1975, 352). Among the Dharmasūtras we find 
redundant segmentation in the Āpastamba Dharmasūtra, Gautama Dharmasūtra, and 
Baudhāyana Dharmasūtra (Olivelle, 2000). We note also the double segmentation of the 
Manusm
ti (Olivelle 2005, 7ff.). These do not exhaust the examples of redundant 
segmentation available in the ancient and classical literature. Thus, that the Arthaśāstra 
should be doubly-divided in this manner is not as “unusual” as Kangle (1965, 25) asserts. 
 A useful example of redundant segmentation comes from the gveda, which is 
divided by multiple segmentary schemes. The first of these, which is considered 
“original” to the composition of the text (in its present form131), is the content-based 
division of the text’s hymns into 10 maalas (“books”). A secondary division, based 
purely on the production of units of similar size and carried out without regard for the 
content so divided, is the purely numeric division of the text into 8 aakas (“eighths”). 
The example provided by the gveda is extremely instructive in understanding the 
redundant segmentation of the Arthaśāstra. 
In the gveda, as elsewhere, we are able to identify one of the redundant 
segmentary systems as “secondary” because it displays a subdivisional logic “external” to 
the content of the text, such as the generation of segments of a standard length.132 This is 
clearly the case with the aaka (“eighths”) system of the gveda, which ignores the 
                                                 
131 The Kuru rescension of the hymns. See Witzel 1997, 264Ð266. 
132 This is in contradistinction to texts possessed of multiple segmentary systems wherein one system 
provides a unique and useful articulation of another system or in texts where neither system can be 
demonstrated to adhere to the material of the text better than the other. 
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boundaries of the hymns themselves when it divides the text into 8 aakas, each 
comprises 8 adhyāyas, which, in turn, comprise a number of 5Ð6 stanza vargas or 
“groups” (Gonda 1975, 9). 
The impetus for the redivision of a text lies in pressures exerted on it by the 
context(s) of its transmission. A demonstrable secondary division implies that the earlier 
segmentation of the text (if any) was not well suited to the needs of a text’s transmitters. 
In classical South Asia, the redundant division of a text is most often assumed to have 
occurred when a text was adapted to a form more amenable to its study,133 broadly 
understood.134 Prevalent among the pressures exerted by the pedagogical environment 
were the time constraints of the daily educational curriculum or other regular practice, 
which prompted the novel segmentation of a text into portions of a standard length more 
suitable to the structure of the curriculum. We can identify, in brief, the presence of a 
subdivisional logic in secondary segmentations that is “external” to the content of the text 
being divided. 
3.2 FAILURE OF THE ADHYĀYAS TO INTEGRATE CONTENT 
Comparing the redundant segmentation in the Arthaśāstra to that of the gveda  
provides a clear correlation: the prakaraas tend to follow the logic of the text quite 
closely (§1.3.3), while the adhyāyas frequently diverge from the structure of its 
discourses (§1.3.4). This fact has been observed frequently in studies of the text.135 The 
divergence between the adhyāyas and the content of the text, when compared with the 
                                                 
133 This is certainly the assumption of many scholars (Gonda 1975, 9; Kangle 1965, 25; Scharfe 1993, 
40Ð41; Trautmann 1971, 71Ð72) and is implied in the pedagogical nomenclature of many secondary 
segments as “lessons” (adhyāya) or “lectures” (prapāhaka). 
134 Understanding the concept of “study” here to include both rote memorization as well as more active 
“teaching” of the text through the commentarial exegesis of an expert in the tradition. 
135 Kangle 1965, 25; Trautmann 1971, 71Ð72 
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intimate connection between prakaraa and content, strongly suggests that the adhyāyas 
demonstrate a subdivisional logic external to the composition.  
We can find some confirmation of this external logic in a comparison of the 
relative distribution of the length of adhyāya segments over and against prakaraa 
segments (see §1.3.2). Moreover, we see that more than half of the text’s prakaraas are 
either subdivided (when long) or aggregated (when short) by an adhyāya. Hence, the 
presentation of the material of the prakaraas in relatively more uniform segments helps 
to explain the logic governing the divergence of the adhyāyas from the content of the 
text. This provides the most conclusive evidence for general posteriority of the adhyāyas 
and the occurrence of an “adhyāya redaction” to an underlying “prakaraa-text,” 
although both terms require greater articulation. 
An illustration of the adhyāyas’ failure to integrate their own content can be taken 
from adhyāya 2.34, at which we looked above and which contains two prakaraas, “The 
Superintendent of Passports” and “The Superintendent of Pastures” (end verse is given in 
italics): 
 
KAŚ 2.34.1Ð12 The Superintendent of Passports (mudrādhyaka) should issue a sealed 
pass for one māaka. Only a person with a sealed pass shall be 
entitled to enter or leave the countryside. A native of the land, 
without a sealed pass, shall pay twelve paas. One bearing a forged 
pass shall pay the lowest fine for violence. One not of the country 
shall pay the highest fine for violence. 
 
 The Superintendent of Pastures (vivītādhyaka) should ask for a sealed 
pass. And he should establish pasture land in regions between 
villages. He should clear lowlands and forests of robbers and wild 
animals. In waterless regions, he should establish wells, waterworks, 
and springs, also flower and fruit enclosures. Fowlers and hunters 
should go round in the forest. At the approach of robbers or enemies, 
they should produce a sound with conch shells or drums, not 
allowing themselves to be caught by climbing mountains or trees or 
by riding in swift vehicles. And he should convey to the king 
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movements of enemies and forest tribes by means of domesticated 
pigeons carrying sealed letters or by a series of smokes and fires. 
 
 He should insure the livelihood of those in produce forests and 
elephant forests and secure the road cess, protect against robbers, 
escort caravans, and protect cattle and trade.  
Here the prakaraas closely reflect the organizational logic of the text itself: each 
represents a complete discussion of one adhyaka. The adhyāya, for its part, is little more 
than an aggregation of the two prakaraas. Even though two prakaraas are linked by 
the issuance and inspection of the passport (mudrā: 2.34.1, 6), respectively, the internal 
unity of the adhyāya does not rival that of the prakaraas, which remain autonomous 
disquisitions.  
This failure of the adhyāyas to integrate constituent prakaraas where possible is 
a thoroughgoing feature of the text. Of the text’s 150 adhyāyas, some 39 contain parts of 
more than one prakaraa, and in none of these do we witness a greater level of content 
integration at the level of the adhyāya than at the level of the prakaraa.136 It is clear, 
then, that of the two, the subdivisional logic of the adhyāyas follows some principal or 
principals external to the logic of the text’s composition. 
Thus, the demonstrably more intimate connection to material of the text 
demonstrated by the prakaraas over against the traces of subdivisional logic external to 
the composition seen in the adhyāyas supports the anteriority of the former. Although 
such a conclusion does not speak to the ultimate origins of the text, the failure of the 
adhyāyas to integrate their contents to a greater degree than their constituent prakaraas 
demonstrates that the convention of composing and/or identifying segments of text as 
prakaraas predates the convention of composing and/or identifying segments of texts as 
                                                 
136 Although the relevance of both prakaraa and adhyāya to a given topic is, in a few situations, unclear 
(§4.3). What is more, I am certainly not implying by this that the adhyāyas are, in every case, later than the 
material that they subdivide. 
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adhyāyas. If the adhyāyas were the earlier of the two, one would have to imagine that the 
text was not simply resegmented into prakaraas, but entirely recomposed in prakaraas 
even as the strongly articulated adhyāya boundaries (marked both by end verse and 
colophon) were left in the text. Moreover, it is shown below that the prakaraas and 
adhyāyas disagree on the conclusion of certain topical boundaries (§3.4). This would be 
impossible if the strongly marked adhyāyas preexisted a putative prakaraa redaction. 
While we can confidently state that the text was composed in prakaraas before it 
was resegmented into adhyāyas, we cannot concomitantly claim that in every case a 
given adhyāya is younger than its constituent prakaraa(s). The redivision of the text into 
adhyāyas also involved the interpolation of significant segments of text that continued the 
pattern of dual segmentation. So, even though a few prakaraas will be found to date to 
the time of the adhyāya redaction, it is nevertheless possible safely to posit that in the 
compositional history of the Arthaśāstra a “prakaraa-text” underwent an “adhyāya 
redaction.”137  
The foregoing should not imply that the re-division of the Arthaśāstra into 
adhyāyas, in comparison with that of the gveda, was a mechanical or automatic process. 
The adhyāyas are not so mathematically regular in their division of the Arthaśāstra that 
we can, through uncovering some kind of clear subdivisional logic, lay bare the pattern 
and extent of the adhyāya redaction. The passage cited above illustrates this point well: 
the connection between the two prakaraas found in the issuance and inspection of the 
                                                 
137 The use of scare quotes is meant to indicate the titular rather than attributional character of these 
phrases. We can surmise that the division of the text into “adhyāyas” post-dates the comprehension of the 
text as composed in “prakaraas.” What we do not yet know is the extent of the earlier text, whether it was 
thought of as composed of prakaraas, and, even then, whether “prakaraas” has always refered to 
discrete segments of text as opposed to relatively more amorphous “subjects.” Moreover, given the obvious 
convention of composing in prakaraas and dividing in adhyāyas, there is good reason to suspect that any 
later additions to the text would have reproduced this program anachronistically. See §4.3. 
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passport demonstrates that, while the division of the Arthaśāstra into adhyāyas was 
governed by a desire to present segments of relatively more uniform length, the division 
was also carried out with regard for the content being redivided. In short, the adhyāya 
redaction, although clearly later, also bears important relationships with the content of the 
text, and these relationships may help to reveal the extent of the adhyāya redaction 
itself.138 
3.3 THE PLAN OF THE ADHYĀYA REDACTION 
That the Arthaśāstra underwent some kind of redaction into adhyāyas is clear: the 
best scholarship on the point has long supported this theory.139 It is necessary now to see 
if we can refine our understanding of this redaction. By looking more closely at the 
adhyāyas as a group, we can demonstrate that this redaction did not occur in a haphazard 
or gradual fashion, but was carried out according to a single plan that recast the entire 
treatise into its current form, more or less. If we can demonstrate that the present adhyāya 
boundaries emerged from a single, planned effort, then details about the entire adhyāya 
redaction can be adduced from individual adhyāyas.  
The first indication that all of the adhyāyas in the extant Arthaśāstra found their 
present form during a single adhyāya redaction comes from the fact that in redividing the 
entire text they number exactly 150, as recognized in a passage near the beginning of the 
text:140 
 
KAŚ 1.1.18 śāstrasamuddeśa pa–cadaśādhikara	āni sāśīti prakara	aśata 
sapa–cāśad adhyāyaśata a ślokasahasrā	īti 
                                                 
138 See, especially, §3.5, 4.2, 5.4 and 6.3, as well as Chapter 7 
139 See Chapter 2. 
140 Although the provenance of this passage has been called into question (Scharfe 1993, 28; Kangle 1965, 
20Ð21) it accurately reflects the number of adhikaraas, prakaraas and adhyāyas that are generated by 
the colophons of the text. 
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 Contents of the śāstra: 15 adhikaraas, 180 prakaraas, 150 adhyāyas, 
6000 ślokas. 
What makes the number 150 significant is that it is unlikely to be accidental, 
particularly when one considers how these 150 adhyāyas are marked within the text by 
exactly 150 colophons. Moreover, these 150 colophons record, with varying degrees of 
precision, exactly the 180 prakaraas attested in the passage above. Hence, the 
subdivision of the text into exactly 150 adhyāyas and 180 prakaraas is carried out 
through a distributed network of colophons and is not merely resident in an external list 
ascribing these divisions from outside the text. These numbers, therefore, testify to the 
fact that the present dispersal of adhyāyas resulted from a planned editorial intervention. 
Reinforcement of this conclusion comes from a few key features of the adhyāya 
segmentation. Importantly, we find that the adhyāya text is slightly larger than the 
prakaraa-text:141 the first adhyāya (KAŚ 1.1) is not included in the prakaraa-text, 
which begins only at the second adhyāya (KAŚ 1.2). Because the first adhyāya is not part 
of the prakaraa-text, we actually have 180 prakaraas divided over 149 adhyāyas, with 
the non-prakaraa material in KAŚ 1.1 comprising the 150th adhyāya. When we consider 
that the numbers 150 and 180 are certainly intentional, we recognize that the adhyāya 
redactor must have purposely apportioned the text into 180 prakaraas over exactly 149 
adhyāyas142 so that the inclusion of the apocryphal non-prakaraa material in KAŚ 1.1 
could represent the 150th adhyāya.  
                                                 
141 As discussed below at §3.4.2 
142 It is to the adhyāya redactor that the existence of exactly 180 prakaraas should be attributed, not to the 
theoretical composer of the prakaraa-text. What remains significant, however, is that, regardless of the 
number of prakaraas ultimately adduced by the adhyāya redactor, the beginning of the prakaraa text 
was clearly established, and the non-prakaraa material falling before it necessitated a novel adhyāya. 
Hence, the division of the “complete” prakaraa text (i.e., “complete” in 180 prakaraas), is carried out by 
the “complete” adhyāya text less one adhyāya. Hence, the distinction between the length of the two texts 
reveals the careful apportioning of the text  by the adhyāya redactor. 
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One can look also in this regard at the presence of the two “framing” passages 
discussed above: KAŚ 1.1 and KAŚ 15.1. These are the 1st and 150th adhyāyas. They work 
in tandem to “close” the text to substantial future emendation by explicitly opening (KAŚ 
1.1.1) and concluding (KAŚ 15.1.71Ð73) the work. If these can be demonstrated to share an 
origin, they will provide good evidence that the adhyāya redaction was carried out in a 
single compositional moment. 
The best evidence in this regard comes from the unique use of shared tropes in the 
opening and closing passages of each of these framing adhyāyas: 
 
KAŚ 1.1.1 pthivyā lābhe pālane ca yāvanty arthaśāstrā	i pūrvācāryai 
prasthāpitāni prāyaśas tāni sahtyaikam idam arthaśāstram ktam 
 
 This single arthaśāstra was composed by bringing together most of 
arthaśāstras that have been composed by previous teachers for the 
purpose of acquiring and protecting the world. 
 
KAŚ 1.1.19 sukhagraha	avij–eya tattvārthapadaniścitam 
 kauilyena kta śāstra vimuktagranthavistaram 
 
 Easy to grasp and understand, harmonious between reality, meaning, 
and word, this śāstra was composed by Kauilya, free of excess 
verbiage. 
 
KAŚ 15.1.1Ð2 manuyā	ā vttir artha manuyavatī bhūmir ity artha 
 tasyā pthivyā lābhapālanopāya śāstram arthaśāstram iti  
 
 Artha is the livelihood of mortals, which is to say that the earth itself, 
possessed of mortals, is artha;  
 The śāstra that is the strategy for acquiring and protecting this earth is 
arthaśāstra. 
 
KAŚ 15.1.71Ð73  evam śāstram ida yuktam etābhis tantrayuktibhi  
 avāptau pālane coktam lokasyāsya parasya ca 
 dharmam artha ca kāma ca pravartayati pāti ca  
 adharmānarthavidveśān idam śāstra nihanti ca 
 yena śāstra ca śastra ca nandarājagatā ca bhū  
 amare	oddhtāny āsu tena śāstram ida ktam 
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 Thus this śāstra, expounded with these tantrayuktis, has been 
composed for the acquisition and protection of this world and the 
next. 
 This śāstra brings into being and preserves dharma, artha, and kāma 
and destroys adharma, anartha and hatred. 
 This śāstra has been composed by him [i.e., Kauilya], who in 
resentment, quickly regenerated the science and the weapon and the 
earth that was under the control of the Nanda kings. 
These passages are the only ones in the text143 to use the archetypal idioms 
p
thivyā lābhapālana (“the acquisition and protection of the earth”) and [ida	] śāstra	 
k
tam (“[this] śāstra was composed”).144 These passages, written in the same unique 
idiom, are furthermore clearly aware of their inaugural and conclusive functions, and do 
so using overt characterizations of the text’s form and purpose that can be found only 
here.145 Finally, each pair frames an internal technical discourse, the table of contents 
(KAŚ 1.1.3Ð17) and the tantrayuktis (KAŚ 15.1.3Ð70), respectively. We see, therefore, in 
these adhyāyas a concurrence in language, function, and form. In this way, these framing 
elements collectively bear witness to the plan according to which the adhyāya redaction 
appears to have been carried out.  
Renou states of this arrangement that  
 
[t]his frame confirms the suspicion that the Kauilīya was composed as a single coherent 
work, closed to all additions, well removed all in all from the ancient works that 
                                                 
143 Despite the unique manner in which it distills the essence of arthaśāstra, the archetypal phrase p
thivyā 
lābhapālana (“the acquisition and protection of the world”) occurs only here, while the term p
thivī is itself 
restricted to end verses and two other adhyāyas (KAŚ 9.1 and 13.4). The archetypal formula [ida	] 
śāstram k
tam, which runs through these verses and provides the context for the only direct attributions of 
the text to Kauilya himself, also occurs only here (with echoes at KAŚ 1.6.3 and 2.10.63). 
144 KAŚ 1.1.1: p
thivyā lābhe pālane ca; KAŚ 15.1.1: p
thivyā lābhapālana-; KAŚ 1.1.1 ida	 śāstra	 
k
tam/KAŚ 1.1.19 kauilyena k
ta	 śāstram; KAŚ 15.1.1 śāstram arthaśāstram iti; KAŚ 15.1.71 śāstram 
ida	 yuktam; KAŚ 15.1.72 ida	 śāstram; KAŚ yena śāstram…tena śāstram ida	 k
tam 
145 With a related example, in which a single adhyāya is ascribed to Kauilya in an end verse at KAŚ 
2.10.63, which also linked to the adhyāya redaction (see §6.1). 
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generally possess neither introduction nor conclusion and appear to have been composed 
in successive layers. In brief, they confirm the presence of an author.146  
Indeed, the organization of the Arthaśāstra into 150 adhyāyas gives us every 
reason to expect that it resulted from a single coherent plan. But, we can recognize, in 
light of the previous argument, that this plan should be attributed not to the composer of 
the prakaraas, but the creator of the present division into adhyāyas.147  
The above discussion has implicated the first and last adhyāyas (KAŚ 1.1 and 
15.1) in the adhyāya redaction. This is the first indication that some additional material 
found its way into the text during the adhyāya redaction. I look now briefly at the 
anatomy of these two sections and their interrelationship in order to understand more 
about the kind of material that can be attributed to the adhyāya redactor. 
The first adhyāya (KAŚ 1.1), representing the front matter of the text, consists of 
the first 19 passages of the extant Arthaśāstra (KAŚ 1.1.1Ð19), itself a small but 
consequential portion of the greater text. The greater part of this passage is taken up by 
the long prakaraa list (KAŚ 1.1.3Ð17), which relates that the text starts at the beginning 
                                                 
146 “Cet encadrement atteste le souci qu’a eu Kau. de composer une oeuvre cohérente, fermée à tous 
addenda, bien à éloignée en somme des Traités anciens qui ne possédaient en général ni introduction ni 
conclusion et semblaient s’être formés par voie de couches successives. Bref, ils confirment la présence 
d’un auteur” (1961, 184). 
147 That the present shape of the adhyāya redaction is the result of a single coherent plan is clear. The only 
question remaining is whether that plan can also be linked to the individual who first effected the adhyāya 
division or whether the plan is the perfection of an earlier division of adhyāyas. The construction of 
alternate compositional routes through which the present plan might have been achieved in steps requires 
examination of complex evidence for the purpose of an unlikely hypothesis. And, yet, one thing that all 
such alternatives bear in common is that none of them are able to demonstrate or defend any potential 
changes to the extant adhyāya boundaries in the text. Hence, we can deduce that the present adhyāya 
boundaries are those created by the initial adhyāya redactor. The indications of a single plan evident in the 
present dispersal of adhyāyas, including the likelihood of a common origin for key passages in the first and 
last adhyāyas, recommend without reservation that the present shape of the adhyāya redaction is that 
effected during the initial re-division of the text into adhyāyas. That the first and final adhyāyas were part 
of the adhyāya redaction is endorsed by Trautmann (1971, 75). 
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of the following adhyāya (KAŚ 1.2).148 Hence, the majority of the disputed segment is 
made up of a list that testifies to its own exclusion (and the exclusion of its adhyāya) 
from the text as divided into 180 prakaraas. The divergence between the two 




Fig. 4: The Disagreement over KAŚ 1.1 
That the adhyāya-text encompasses the entire prakaraa-text as well as material 
“external” to the prakaraa-text lends even more support to the notion that the adhyāya 
redaction comprehended and subsumed the pre-existing prakaraa-text.  
Upon examination we see that KAŚ 1.1 is constituted mainly of the long 
prakaraa list at KAŚ 1.1.3Ð17, which accounts for 15 of the 19 passages in KAŚ 1.1. An 
analysis of the first adhyāya reveals that it has been crafted simply by adding four 
passages (KAŚ 1.1.1Ð2, 18Ð19) to the prakaraa list. Our analysis of KAŚ 1.1.1 and 1.1.19 
above demonstrates features linking them directly to the plan of the adhyāya redaction. 
                                                 
148 That the prakaraa-text begins here is incontrovertible, as there is no way to integrate the contents of 
the first adhyāya under the rubric vidyāsamuddeśa. Even the colophons agree on this point by omitting 
any proper prakaraa name for the first adhyāya. In ms. M4 the adhyāya is called [tantrasamuddeśa] as a 
sort of 181st prakaraa, which is not, however, reflected in the table of contents. KAŚ 1.2.1 also seems to 
be recognized as the beginning of the text proper in the manuscripts, the better of which introduce KAŚ 
1.2.1 with the term rājav
tti, meaning “The Conduct of the King.” This is either a reference to the first 
adhikaraa, vinayādhikārikam, “On the Subject of [the King’s] Training” or to the entire text, which can be 
seen, being a śāstra on statecraft generally, as comprising the basic teaching for a king. Whether rājav
tti 
reflects an older marker or became necessary when the addition of the material at KAŚ 1.1.1Ð19 displaced 
1.2.1 from the actual beginning of the text, the manuscripts appear to recognize KAŚ 1.2.1 as the beginning 
of the text proper. 
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The other two passages in the adhyāya (KAŚ 1.1.2, 18) are wholly dependent on the 
prakaraa list.149  
The prakaraa list, in its original form, must post-date some version of the 
prakaraa-text, which it takes as its subject. The manner of the framing of the prakaraa 
list in this adhyāya by material dateable to the adhyāya redaction, the failure of the list to 
mention the adhyāya segments in the text, and its failure to include the material of the 
first adhyāya in the prakaraa-text tell us that the prakaraa list preexisted the adhyāya 
redaction. The origin of this segment, then, is relatively clear: an apocryphal prakaraa 
list had been appended to the beginning of the text (by whom we do not yet know). 
During the adhyāya redaction, this material was formally integrated into the text by 
constructing out of it a new adhyāya, accomplished by the addition of only a few 
passages (including, crucially, an end verse). 
The final adhyāya and back matter of the text (KAŚ 15.1) has also been linked 
above to the adhyāya redaction by virtue of the role it plays as the 150th and concluding 
adhyāya. One finds, moreover, that these two adhyāyas share a parallel structure. 
Comparing the structure of KAŚ 15.1 to that of 1.1 (discussed above), one recognizes that 
the final adhyāya (KAŚ 15.1) is constructed in the same manner as the first adhyāya (KAŚ 
1.1): a long technical list (the discussion of the 32 tantrayuktis, or rhetorical elements, at 
KAŚ 15.1; the prakaraa list at KAŚ 1.1) is introduced and concluded by passages that use 
the same key tropes in both adhyāyas.  
The difference between these two adhyāyas however, is that, unlike the 
prakaraa list, which appears to predate the adhyāya redaction, the technical discourse 
framed in KAŚ 15.1, called tantrayukti, clearly depends on the adhyāya redaction. Two 
                                                 
149 This is even clear in KAŚ 1.1.18, whose reference to 150 adhyāyas is probably spurious (Scharfe 1993, 
28). 
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passages in the discussion of tantrayukti (KAŚ 15.1.5 and 15.1.7) directly cite passages 
from the first adhyāya (KAŚ 1.1.1 and 1.1.3, respectively), demonstrating the dependence 
of the former on the latter.150 What is more, the tantrayukti section cites many other 
passages in the text that we will come to associate with the adhyāya redaction.151 
We have strong indication, then, from the above analysis that significant elements 
of the framing chapters, KAŚ 1.1Ð2, 18Ð19 and all of 15.1, date to the adhyāya redaction. 
This is significant, as the ability to assign certain elements of the text to the adhyāya 
redaction begins to give us a substantive sense of the character of that transformation. A 
further implication of this lies in our recognition that the adhyāya redactor added (and 
likely composed) the end verses of these segments himself. This establishes, at least, the 
fact that the adhyāya composer did add some of the adhyāya end verses during the 
adhyāya redaction. This is taken up in more detail in Chapter 5. 
3.4 THE MISCONSTRUAL OF PRAKARAA BOUNDARIES 
It has been shown above that an original prakaraa-text of unknown extent was 
transformed by an adhyāya redaction of unknown extent. It has also been shown that the 
adhyāya segments in the extant Arthaśāstra were produced according to a single plan that 
was carried out at one time. It is not possible to identify clear examples in which the 
                                                 
150 Because of the internal consistency with which the tantrayuktis, “methods used in the treatise,” are 
treated, these two citations, which illustrate the first two and two of the most elementary tantrayuktis, must 
be integral to the passage. We can say, at a minimum, that all of KAŚ 15.1.3Ð70 is aware of KAŚ 1.1.1 and 
1.1.3. 
151 It remains possible that the material in the final adhyāya predated the adhyāya redaction if the 
following conditions are true: a) KAŚ 1.1.1 had been added to the prakaraa list before the adhyāya 
redaction; b) all of the passages cited by the discussion of the tantrayuktis belonged to the prakaraa-text; 
and, c) the composer of the tantrayukti section felt that the apocryphal material before the prakaraa-text 
was part of the greater Arthaśāstra. The first is difficult to establish, while the last is very unlikely. But, it 
is the second that prevents this theory from finding purchase: the tantrayuktis cite the adhyāya end verse at 
KAŚ 1.14.16 and Kauilya dialogues at KAŚ 1.7.7; 1.7.3; 1.15.47Ð50; 7.5.12; 8.1.9; 10.6.1; 8.1.7; 
8.1.17Ð18; and 1.17.33, all of which a generally linked to the adhyāya redaction (§5.8; 6.5). 
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placement of the adhyāya colophons indicates that the adhyāya redactor has 
misconstrued (intentionally or otherwise) the transition between prakaraas. These 
misconstruals are of such a nature that they could not have been produced by the 
composer of the underlying prose, who would have been aware of the change in topics. 
Because we know that the adhyāyas were created in a single editorial moment, these 
misconstruals consign the adhyāya redaction to a second hand.  
Even though prakaraa boundaries are sometimes not formally marked, the 
division between different prakaraas is clearly articulated in many cases (including 
those discussed here). Thus, one is typically able to identify the commencement of a new 
prakaraa simply by reading the text. The prakaraa boundaries that emerge are 
something of which the composer of these prakaraas would have been aware. It is, 
therefore, extremely significant that adhyāya colophons appear in several places to 
misconstrue a prakaraa boundary that they are attempting to mark. 
Prakaraa 1: Vidyāsamuddeśa 
The first prakaraa of the text, vidyāsamuddeśa, appears to conclude not at KAŚ 
1.4.15 (or with the end verse at 1.4.16) as the adhyāya colophon indicates, but at KAŚ 
1.5.1. For, KAŚ 1.5.1 belongs properly to the topic of vidyāsamuddeśa, “Enumeration of 
the Sciences,” and not at all to the next prakaraa, v
ddhasa	yoga, “Association with 
Elders.” The passage under dispute reads: 
 
 
KAŚ 1.5.1 tasmād da	amulās tisro vidyā 
 
 Therefore, the three sciences have their root in [the fourth science], the 
Staff. 
The discussion of “Association with Elders,” which is a euphemism for education 
(vinaya), clearly picks up at KAŚ 1.5.2: 
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KAŚ 1.5.2 vinayamūlo da	a prā	abhtā yogakemāvaha 
 
 The Staff, rooted in training, conveys welfare to living creatures. 
Absent the adhyāya colophon (and end verse), the division between the first and 
second prakaraas clearly falls between KAŚ 1.5.1 and 1.5.2.  
Moreover, KAŚ 1.5.1 represents the conclusion of a discussion begun earlier in the 
first prakaraa at KAŚ 1.4.3: 
 
KAŚ 1.4.3a ānvīkikītrayīvārttānā yogakemasādhano da	a tasya nītir 
da	anīti  
 
 The Staff ensures the welfare of [the three sciences of] Philosophy, the 
Veda, and Economics; its proper use (nīti) constitutes Political 
Science (daanīti),  
The phrase “therefore, the three sciences have their root in the Staff” forms the 
logical conclusion to this statement. Thus, KAŚ 1.5.1 is doubly connected to the previous 
prakaraa.152 
Thus, whoever generated the adhyāya colophon (in concert with the adhyāya end 
verse) before KAŚ 1.5.1 misconstrued, purposefully or accidentally, the transitional point 
between the prakaraas. Regardless of motive, it is unlikely that the composer of those 
prakaraas would not have placed a colophon there.153 
Prakaraa 4: Amātyotpatti 
The colophon at the end of KAŚ 1.8 purports to conclude the prakaraa called 
amātyotpatti, “The Appointment of Ministers.” In fact, this prakaraa ends some 8 
                                                 
152 It is triply connected if we consider also the fact that no prakaraa that begins an adhyāya does so with 
connective syntax (see §4.2). 
153 We note also how the placement of the adhyāya colophon in concert with the adhyāya end verse 
diminishes the conclusion of the first adhyāya, namely that all of the other sciences depend on the Staff. 
This otherwise forceful conclusion is almost an afterthought by virtue of being relegated to the introduction 
of the next adhyāya. Perhaps this misconstrual was not accidental.  
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sentences later, after KAŚ 1.9.8 with the minor colophon iti amātyakarma (“Here ends the 
work [of appointing] ministers”).154 It is expliciatly indicated (at KAŚ 1.9.1 and 1.9.8) that 
the truncated passage at KAŚ 1.9.1Ð8 is discussing ministers (amātyas) and their work and 
has nothing at all to do with the subsequent prakaraa mantripurohitotpatti, “The 
Appointment of the Councilors and Chaplain/of the Prime Minister.” There can be no 
doubt, therefore, that the prakaraa amātyotpatti ends at KAŚ 1.9.8 and not at 1.8.29 as 
indicated by the adhyāya colophon.155 
Prakaraa 99: āguyasamuddeśa 
The final example comes in the 99th prakaraa, kayasthānav
ddhiniścaya 
(“Deciding [among the Six Measures of Foreign Policy] in Decline, Stability, and 
Growth”). This prakaraa begins at KAŚ 7.1.20, but does not appear to conclude until 
after the adhyāya colophon, at 7.2.5. As with the above example, the truncated passage at 
KAŚ 7.2.1Ð5 explicitly continues the topic of the 99th prakaraa: 
 
                                                 
154 This adhyāya colophon identifies KAŚ 1.9 as dealing with mantripurohitotpatti (“Appointment of the 
Councillors and Chaplain [or Prime-Minister]”). This creates a certain problem because, although the 
appointment of the purohita (Chaplain) is clearly discussed at KAŚ 1.9.9Ð10, we find no previous 
discussion on the appointment of councilors (mantrin). Thus, I would argue that the adhyāya redactor 
assumed that the discussion at KAŚ 1.9.1Ð8 on the appointment of ministers (amātya) must have been what 
was refered to in the prakaraa title as mantrin (councilors). And, it will be argued, adding a new section 
in KAŚ 1.8 to account for the (now missing) discussion of the fourth prakaraa, amātyopatti (“The 
Appointment of Ministers”). In other words, the adhyāya redactor appears to have converted the fourth 
prakaraa into the first half of the fifth prakaraa and generated an entirely new fourth prakaraa to fill 
the gap. This is discussed in detail in Chapter 7. It should be noted that the amātyas and mantrins are two 
entirely distinct types of official in the Arthaśāstra. 
155 The confusion on display here, as between mantrins and amātyas dogs the first adhikaraa of the text 
generally. And, I think it is because the text originally spoke not of an official called the purohita 
(“Chaplain”), but of an official called the mantripurohita (“Councilor-Chaplain,” i.e., “prime minister”). 
For some reason, this title made no sense to the adhyāya redactor, who was forced to tweak the text in 
order to “find” a discussion of the appointment of independent mantrins in addition to the appointment of 
the purohita. Needless to say, no such discussion exists. This theory has the advantage of clearing up the 
infamous confusion between amātyas and mantrins that prevails in the current text. It is discussed below in 
Chapter 7. 
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KAŚ 7.2.1Ð5 If there is equal advancement in peace or war, he should resort to 
peace. For, in war there are losses, expenses, marches away from 
home, and hindrances. By that is explained staying quiet, as between 
staying quiet and marching. 
 As between dual policy and seeking shelter, he should resort to dual 
policy. For, he who resorts to dual policy, giving prominence to his 
own undertakings, serves only his own interests, while he who takes 
shelter serves the interests of the other, not his own. 
As is evident here, the discussion of deciding between the Six Measures does not 
conclude until KAŚ 7.2.5, six passages after the adhyāya colophon marking the 
conclusion of the prakaraa.156  
These three cases157 demonstrate that the adhyāya redactor cannot have been the 
composer of the underlying prakaraa-text. We note also that it is not only the adhyāya 
colophons that erroneously mark these boundaries: the accompanying adhyāya end verses 
also help to mark them. Hence, we have further evidence that verses marking adhyāya 
boundaries in the extant text were added during the adhyāya redaction (and do not 
predate it). 
3.5 CONCLUSION 
Although I have presented the evidence for an adhyāya redaction serially, each of 
the areas discussed reinforce one another. Hence, the adhyāyas demonstrate a logic 
somewhat “external” to the discussion of topics in the text. The adhyāyas also invariably 
fail to integrate their material beyond the semantic integration found in the prakaraas. 
Importantly, the adhyāya text appears to have been produced at one time according to a 
                                                 
156 It may well be that the dismemberment of prakaraa 99 was intentional and designed to generate a 
“stub” from which to hang the following prakaraa, sa	śrayav
tti (“Conduct When Seeking Shelter”). If 
this had been the wish of the composer, however, he could have easily penned a brief transitional 
introduction to the latter. 
157 That so few cases of this are found should not trouble us: prakaraa boundaries are typically easy to 
identify, and the adhyāya redactor must certainly have been reading the text very closely. We should also 
remember that these misconstruals may not be oversights, but purposeful inflections of the text. 
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single plan, actually comprehends the slightly smaller prakaraa text. Finally, the 
adhyāya boundaries in a few cases erroneously mark the prakaraa boundaries. From 
this it is most likely that the occurrence of an adhyāya redaction carried out by a second 
hand. 
To conclude this analysis of redundant segmentation in the Arthaśāstra, I would 
like to venture a preliminary thesis on the composition of the text based on the evidence 
adduced above. 
We have, on the eve of the adhyāya redaction, a text composed in prakaraas, 
which I have been referring to as the “prakaraa-text.” The extent, origin, and 
compositional history of this text is as yet unknown, and we cannot be certain whether it 
was properly divided into segments called prakaraas or more loosely composed of a 
series of topics, sometimes lacking discrete boundaries. Some time after the completion 
of the earliest prakaraa-text, a list of “topics” (prakaraas) was appended to the 
beginning. Aside from this, it is not yet clear where the prakaraa list fits into the 
composition of the prakaraa-text.  
Eventually, the transmission of the Arthaśāstra into a didactic context exerted 
editorial pressure upon it, and it was reapportioned by someone other than its original 
composer(s) into “lessons” (adhyāyas) of a more standardized length. It was at this time 
that the prakaraa list was formally integrated “within” the text by constructing out of it 
the first of 150 adhyāyas (KAŚ 1.1). Also at this time, the adhyāya colophons were placed 
in the text (and at least some adhyāya end verses) and the final adhyāya (KAŚ 15.1) was 
added. While it is clear that at least some new material was added to the text at this time, 
we do not yet know the extent of the adhyāya redaction. I will begin to consider this 
question in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 4: Adhyāya Redaction I Ð Adhyāya Segments 
I have just argued that the Arthaśāstra did indeed undergo an adhyāya redaction 
and that it occurred at one time according to a coherent plan and was carried out by an 
individual other than the composer(s) of the prakaraa-text. I have also argued that at 
least two adhyāyas, KAŚ 1.1 and 15.1, the first and last, were added at that time. It 
remains now to determine the total extent of that adhyāya redaction. That task is 
undertaken in the present chapter by examining the manner in which the adhyāya 
colophons divide the text. This analysis will demonstrate that the adhyāya redaction 
transformed the underlying text to a much greater extent than simply reapportioning its 
material. Evidence will be presented here to demonstrate that it also involved the 
interpolation of significant tracts of text. 
4.1 EVIDENCE OF MORE EXTENSIVE ADHYĀYA REDACTION 
We have reason to suspect, based on the additions of KAŚ 1.1 and 15.1, that the 
adhyāya redactor may have added substantial segments to the text. One way to use the 
adhyāya segments to search for other potential interpolations is to try to identify cases in 
which segments of text betray some kind of awareness of the adhyāya redaction. The 
term “adhyāya” occurs only once in the text, in the disputed passage KAŚ 1.1.18 found 
within the front matter and dated above to the adhyāya redaction itself. Moreover, since 
the adhyāyas aren’t given independent names in either the main text or the colophons, but 
are identified in the colophons only by number and their constituent prakaraas, one 
doesn’t find direct references to them in the text. As such, we must resort to different 
methods. 
The opportunity to look for such indications comes in adhyāyas that comprehend 
parts of more than one prakaraa. In the same way that these adhyāyas demonstrate the 
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lack of topical integration within adhyāyas generally (§1.3.4; 3.2), so do such passages 
provide an opportunity to determine whether their constituent prakaraas might be aware 
of their inclusion in a greater textual segment, i.e., in an adhyāya.  
The adhyāyas invariably conclude, as mentioned above (§1.3.4), with at least one 
end verse and a colophon. Of the two, the colophons formally “create” an adhyāya, while 
the end verses do so in a less formal manner (see Chapter 5). Because it has not yet been 
demonstrated that the adhyāya end verses must all date the adhyāya redaction, the present 
chapter will look at the adhyāya segments as generated only by the colophons in order to 
refine our understanding of the extent of the adhyāya redaction. 
In all, we find in the Arthaśāstra 36 cases wherein an adhyāya contains parts of 
more than one prakaraa.158 In all of these cases, as discussed above (§3.2), the adhyāya 
fails to demonstrate greater topical integration than its constituent prakaraas. In many 
of these cases (13 of 36) the adhyāya fails utterly to demonstrate any synthesis 
whatsoever of its constituent prakaraas. These passages are found at KAŚ 1.12, 2.34, 3.1, 
3.10, 3.14, 7.1, 7.3, 7.6, 7.15, 8.5, 10.4, 10.5, and 13.4.  
In a number of these adhyāyas (10 of 36), however, non-initial prakaraas, that 
is, the second or third prakaraas of an adhyāya, express a minor but significant 
syntactic connection (using such connective syntax as tu, ca, evam, teām, etc.) to a 
previous prakaraa in the same adhyāya. An example of this comes in KAŚ 3.20, which 
comprehends the prakaraas dyūtādhyaka (74) and prakīrakam (75): 
 
KAŚ 3.20.1Ð2 dyūtādhyako dyūtam ekamukham kārayet 
 
 The Director of Gambling (dyūtādhaka) should cause gambling to be 
carried out in one place 
  
                                                 
158 This is if we do not include the three misconstrued boundaries discussed above at §3.5. 
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KAŚ 3.20.14 prakīr	aka tu yācitakāvakrītakāhitakanikepakā	ā… 
 
 As to miscellaneous, howeverÑfor one not returning at the proper 
place and time a thing borrowed, hired, pledged, or entrusted… 
Here, the initial prakaraa opens with a syntactically independent sentenceÑno 
element depends directly on any foregoing passageÑwhile the latter prakaraa possesses 
an enclitic tu (“but”), indicating the presence of and dependence upon some preceding 
passage. 
A yet finer illustration of this comes in KAŚ 2.33, which comprehends the 
prakaraas rathādhyaka (“Director of Chariots”; 49), pattyadhyaka (“Director of 
Foot Soldiers”; 50), and senāpatipracāra (“Duties of the Army Commander”; 51): 
 
KAŚ 2.34.1Ð11 The Director of Chariots is explained with reference to the Director of 
Horses (aśvādhyakea rathādhyako vyākhyāta). He should 
establish factories for chariots. One with ten puruas and twelve 
interior is a chariot. Less than that by one interior space up to six 
interior spaces; thus, there are seven chariots. He should cause to be 
made chariots: temple chariot, festive chariot, war chariot, travelling 
carriage, chariot for marching against an enemy’s city, and chariot 
for training. He should be conversant with arrangement of bows, 
striking weapons, armor and accoutrements, and the employment of 
charioteers, chariot attendants, and chariot horses in various work, 
also food and wages till the conclusion of the work of servants hired 
and not hired, giving practice to and protecting them, as well as 
making gifts and showing honor to them. 
 By this is explained the Director of Foot Soldiers (etena pattyadhyako 
vyākhyāta). He should be conversant with the strength or weakness 
of hereditary, hired, banded, allied, alien, and forest troops, with 
military operations in water or on high ground, with open or tactical 
fighting, in trenches or in the open, by day or by night, and with the 
employment or absence of employment in work. 
 In the same way, the Head of the Army (tad eva senāpati), trained in 
the science of all fights and weapons, renowned for riding on 
elephants, horses, or in chariots, should be conversant with the 
direction of the work carried out by the four-fold troops. He should 
look out for suitable ground for one’s side, season for fighting, 
arraying a force against, breaking unbroken ranks, re-forming broken 
ranks, breaking compact ranks, destroying broken ranks, destroying 
the fort and the season for an expedition. 
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 Being devoted to the training of the troops, he should arrange signals 
for the arrays by means of musical instruments, banners, and flags, 
when halting, marching, or attacking. 
In this adhyāya, we see a logical connection in the opening words of the initial 
prakaraa: aśvādhyakea rathādhyako vyākhyāta, “The Director of Chariots is 
explained with reference to the Director of Horses.” The difference between this and 
discrete syntactic connection in the following prakaraas is illustrated by the beginning 
of the second prakaraa: etena pattyadhyako vyākhyāta, “The Director of Footsoldiers 
is explained with reference to this.” Unlike in the first prakaraa, the term etena in the 
second prakaraa directly presupposes a foregoing referent that does not need 
independent identification. We see the same in the third prakaraa, which is introduced 
with the phrase tad eva, “Just like that.” Both the second and third prakaraas depend on 
preceding prose.  
These instances are significant because in the Arthaśāstra connective syntax, such 
as that indicated above, only occurs at the beginning of a prakaraa when that prakaraa 
is the second or third in a given adhyāya. Put differently, no prakaraa that begins an 
adhyāya opens with connective syntax.159 Aside from these 13 examples, prakaraas in 
the Arthaśāstra do not, as a rule, begin with connective syntax. 
                                                 
159 This can be cited as a rule in the text, although it is quite typical for such prakaraas to begin with an 
emblematic phrase continued from the previous prakaraa. Two potential exceptions, at KAŚ 12.2.1 and 
12.4.1, come consipicuously in the most confused passages in the entire text, wherein the prakaraas are so 
undefined that it is not possible to locate their boundaries. Thus, in both cases, the apparent beginning of 
the prakaraa is purely determined by the location of the adhyāya boundary. The apparent exception at 
1.5.1 (tasmād daamūlās tisro vidyā) comes rather from the misreading of the prakaraa boundary by 
the adhyāya redactor (see above §3.5). A second apparent violation of this at 7.14.1 (sāmavāiykair evam 
abhiyukto vijigīur yas teā	 pradhānasta	 bruyāt) is mistranslated by Kangle: “When attacked by the 
confederates in this manner…” In fact, the preceding discussions do not discuss this. Instead, a parallel 
passages at 5.6.1 and usages of evam at 7.6.1 and 7.7.1 (the only such introductory uses of evam) make 
clear that this should be translated, “The king attacked by confederates, should speak thus to he who is 
foremost among them.” 
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Concomitantly, the adhyāyas in which such instances can be found demonstrate at 
least that minor degree of semantic integration among their constituent prakaraas as is 
indicated by the connective syntax. Examples include:160 KAŚ 1.18.13 (aparaddha	 tu…), 
KAŚ 2.33.7; 2.33.9 (etena pattyadhyako vyākhyāta; tad eva senāpati…), KAŚ 2.35.11 
(samāhart
pradiāś ca…), KAŚ 3.16.10; 3.16.29 (asvāmivikrayas tu…; 
svasvāmisa	bandhas tu…), KAŚ 3.20.14 (prakīraka	 tu…), KAŚ 5.6.23 (evam 
ekaiśvaryam amātya kārayed iti kauilya),161 KAŚ 8.4.49 (tābhyā	 pīanair yathoktaiś 
ca pīdita…),162  KAŚ 9.7.67 (tāsām siddhi), KAŚ 10.6.42 (teā	 pradara	 d
hakena 
ghātayet…),163 and KAŚ 11.1.31 (sa	ghamukhyaputram ātmasambhāvita	 vā…).164  
Given that no adhyāya-initial prakaraa in the entire Arthaśāstra begins with 
connective syntax, we can only conclude that the connective syntax in these prakaraas 
indicates that they (wholly or in part) are aware that they fall in adhyāyas and, therefore, 
must be contemporaneous with or post-date the adhyāya redaction.165 But, rather than 
                                                 
160 We could add to these KAŚ 9.2, which demonstrates clear connective syntax, but it also shows 
underlying structure and, as such, is discussed below at §4.3. 
161 The boundary here is quite indistinct. The second prakaraa here, ekaiśvaryam is introduced in the 
passage cited above (KAŚ 5.6.23), but the topic itself is set up at KAŚ 5.6.21. Despite this hazy transition, 
however, the topics are distinct. We note also the presence here of a Kauilya dialogue. 
162 In this case, the second of the three prakaraas in KAŚ 8.5 is not connected to the first. But, the third 
connects all of them together with tābhyām pīdanāir yathoktaiś ca pīdita… (“Afflicted by these two 
[hindrances, in prakaraa 131] and the afflictions [described in prakaraa 130]…). Thus, the third 
prakaraa (132), must have been written in awareness of its inclusion in an adhyāya with 130 and 131. 
This does not say anything about the connection between 130 and 131, but does demonstrate an integration 
at the level of the adhyāya (as does the end verse at 8.5.50). 
163 The verses at 10.6.48Ð51 are really part of neither prakaraa. It is possible that all four verses are part 
of the “end verse,” or only the final (10.6.51). Either way, the passages fall rather clearly outside of the last 
prakaraa. 
164 This vā is clearly a connective to the preceding passage and not an option to the first two compounds, 
which stand in apposition. 
165 It might also indicate, in certain cases, that the adhyāya redactor created a new prakaraa division 
where one does not seem to have existed in the underlying text, which might, but does not necessarily, 
imply the introduction of new material.  
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suggesting that all of the prakaraas presuppose adhyāyas, what these examples tell us, I 
would argue, is that some substantial passages in the text were added during the time of 
the adhyāya redaction. Significantly, they also tell us that even when the adhyāya 
redactor was composing or integrating new material, he felt compelled to compose it in 
prakaraas. This would further indicate that the adhyāya redaction was carried out by a 
second hand who felt certain limitations on the manner in which he could modify the text. 
What is not clear is whether it is only the syntactically connected, non-initial prakaraas 
that are interpolations, or entire adhyāyas. This will certainly have to be decided on an 
individual basis and will be undertaken in Chapter 7.  
To claim that these examples indicate the work of the adhyāya redactor might 
appear to be denying evidence for the posteriority of the adhyāyas. But, the balance of 
evidence unambiguously supports that the adhyāyas are a secondary addition to the text. 
Moreover, the examples given above betray a stylistic proclivity (the use of connective 
syntax to begin a prakaraa) not found elsewhere in the text. I might finally add that 
these passages are found exclusively in adhyāyas falling near or at the end of their 
respective adhikaraas, conforming to the frequently noted pattern which commonly 
finds interpolated passages at the end of their respective segments.166 Far from being a 
loose pattern, this practice is confined to the final adhyāyas of a given adhikaraa.  
The above analysis strongly suggests that these examples mark loci where 
additions were made to the text during the adhyāya redaction. It will be demonstrated 
                                                 
166 The first adhikaraa, comprising 21 adhyāyas, shows prakaraa-initial connective syntax in KAŚ 1.18, 
while the second (comprising 36 adhyāyas) at KAŚ 2.33 and 2.35, the third (comprising 20 adhyāyas) at 
KAŚ 3.16 and 3.20, the fifth (comprising 6 adhyāyas) at KAŚ 5.6, the eighth (comprising 5 adhyāyas) at 
KAŚ 8.4, the ninth (comprising 7 adhyāyas) at KAŚ 9.7, the tenth (comprising 6 adhyāyas) at KAŚ 10.6, 
and the eleventh (comprising a single adhyāya) at KAŚ 11.1. 
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below that these passages also fit into other patterns within the text linking them to the 
adhyāya redaction. 
4.2 A MORE FUNDAMENTAL STRUCTURE IN THE TEXT? 
In a few very consequential passages (12 of 36), neither the prakaraas nor the 
adhyāyas fit the logic of the relevant passage particularly well. In these cases both 
prakaraa and adhyāya seem to be superimpositions on an underlying source: KAŚ 
7.4,167 7.5,168 7.8,169 9.1, 9.2, 9.3,170 10.2,171 10.3,172 12.2, 12.3, 12.4, and 12.5.173 This 
phenomenon is limited entirely to the second half of the text, and 11 of the 12 instances 
occur in four “runs” of adhyāyas: KAŚ 7.4Ð7.5; 9.1Ð9.3; 10.2Ð10.3; 12.2Ð12.5. 
These passages present a special set of conditions, one wherein the fundamental 
“logic” of a given passage defies both its prakaraa and adhyāya segmentation. This is 
                                                 
167 The adhyāya comprehends 4 of the 5 prakaraas. 
168 The third prakaraa shows syntactic connection, but connects not to the previous prakaraa, but one 
preceding it in another adhyāya. 
169 The adhyāya has a well-defined prakaraa at 7.8.1Ð4. But 7.8.5Ð10 seems to go better with preceding 
prakaraas.7.8.11Ð33 is not necessarily well defined either. Thus, we see poor cohesion prevailing 
generally, with neither the prakaraas nor the adhyāyas lending much to its clarity.  
170 These three adhyāyas represent a passage with a logic more fundamental than its division into 
prakaraas or adhyāyas. See below. 
171 Something is amiss in this section, with the first prakaraa (10.2.1Ð16) relatively well-defined, the 
second (10.2.17) comprising a single long sentence, and the remainder of the adhyāya (10.2.18Ð19) not 
fitting well with either. It may be construed with the first prakaraa of the following adhyāya (10.3.1Ð25), 
but this is not clear, particularly as the opening of sentence of that prakaraa (KAŚ 10.3.1) has every 
appearance of beginning a new discussion. 
172 As in KAŚ 10.2, there is no syntactic or semantic cohesion prevailing at the level of the adhyāya, but 
the division into prakaraa is also unhappy. The first prakaraa (KAŚ 10.3.1Ð25) is relatively unified, but 
the second (10.3.26Ð47) falls into two seemingly redundant segments (10.3. 27Ð37 and 10.3.38Ð47). The 
third is clear (10.3.48Ð53), but, as in 10.2, the adhyāya concludes with a passage (10.3.54-56) pertinent to 
none of these three prakaraas, nor to the first prakaraa of the following adhyāya. Again, this suggests a 
more fundamental structure being obscured. We note this occurs, to a lesser extent, at 10.4 also. 
173 The discussion at KAŚ 12.2Ð4 bears no clear relationship to either the prakaraa titles nor to the 
adhyāya division.  
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significant to the present analysis because it does not allow for us to identify the 
underlying text discretely with the prakaraa segmentation. Unable to link the text 
directly to the prakaraa division, a determination of the chronological relationship 
between the two segmentary systems becomes much more complex. For, rather than 
finding and comparing only a prakaraa-text and an adhyāya redaction, we seem in these 
places to find three elements: the underlying text, the prakaraas, and the adhyāyas.174 
Firm conclusions regarding the relationship of these three elements in the relevant 
passages depends on a thoroughgoing analysis of their contexts, a project reserved for the 
detailed examination of the prakaraa-text in Chapter 7. Our present purpose is simply to 
analyze the segments of text generated by the adhyāya colophons in order to elucidate the 
place of the adhyāyas in the compositional history of the text. We must, then, find a way 
to speak generally about these 12 adhyāyas in a way that uncovers the information that 
we seek. 
Among the 12 adhyāyas featuring poorly-suited prakaraas and adhyāyas, we 
can make a few general claims that pertain to most of them. In 10 of these adhyāyas175 
the prakaraa and adhikaraa segmentations are unconvincing because the underlying 
text shows glimpses of a structure that these segments do not recognize. A prime example 
of this is KAŚ 7.4, which possess five prakaraas.176 There we read:  
 
KAŚ 7.4.1 Staying quiet (āsanam) and marching (yānam) in peace (sa	dhi) and 
war (vigraha) are now explained. 
                                                 
174 Or, perhaps, the extant confusion has resulted from redactions to the prakaraa-text so extensive that its 
relationship to the text has been lost.  
175 KAŚ 7.4Ð7.5, 7.8, 9.1Ð9.3, 12.2Ð12.5. 
176 vig
hyāsanam (103); sa	dhāyāsanam (104); vig
hyayānam (105); sa	dhāyayānam (106); 
sa	bhūyapryāam (107) 
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Its first passage, KAŚ 7.4.1, introduces the first four prakaraas (KAŚ 7.4.2Ð18): 
“Staying Quiet after Making War” (vig
hyāsanam; 103), “Staying Quiet after Making 
Peace” (sa	dhāyāsanam; 104), “Marching after Making War” (vig
hyayānam; 105), and 
“Marching after Making Peace” (sa	dhāyayānam; 106). It does not, however, make 
reference to the fifth prakaraa, “Marching after Making an Alliance” (sa	bhūyayānam; 
107). 
Hence, the adhyāya appears to reveal an underlying structure that departs from 
both the prakaraa segments and the adhyāya segments. To begin with, the initial 
passage (KAŚ 7.4.1) introduces the next four prakaraas as a single segment, excluding 
the fifth. Moreover, these four prakaraas show a clear internal structure (see §6.4.1). 
Hence, we have indication of an organizational structure more fundamental than its 
(secondary) division into prakaraas (which do not account for the introductory passage 
itself) as well as its segmentation into an adhyāya, which includes a fifth topic not 
referred to by the opening sentence. Likely, then, we are looking at the remnant of a more 
fundamental source that discussed “Staying Quiet and Marching in Peace and War,” 
which was partitioned into four prakaraas and to which was added a discussion of 
alliances as a fifth prakaraa. Such a model, however, does not tell us if the prakaraa 
designations were applied by the adhyāya redactor or earlier.177  
                                                 
177 It could argued that the fifth prakaraa is really an extension of the fourth prakaraa, i.e., that the 
discussion of “alliances” in the fifth is a subtopic of the discussion of “making peace” or “signing treaties” 
in the fourth.  This would mean that the adhyāya division actually did, in this case, show a greater semantic 
integration than the prakaraas. But, this is belied by the demonstration of a single internal structure 
uniting the preceding passage (§6.5.1). Moreover, the discussion of marching after making alliances is 
resumed at KAŚ 7.5.38, after an interruption by two divergent prakaraas (108 and 109).  
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The prevailing conditions in most of the remaining examples178 are too complex 
to submit to any brief analysis. But, in one group of adhyāyas, KAŚ 9.1Ð9.3, the 
underlying structure of the entire 9th adhikaraa is revealed in the opening passage: 
 
KAŚ 9.1.1 vijigīur ātmana parasya ca balābala śaktideśakālayātrākāla-
balasamuddhānakālapaścātkopakayavyayalābhāpadām j–ātvā 
viśiabalo yāyāt anyathā Õsīta 
 
 After ascertaining the [relative] strength or weakness of powers, place, 
time, seasons for marching, time for raising armies, revolts in the 
rear, losses, expenses, gains, and troubles of himself and of the 
enemy, the Conqueror should march if superior in strength; 
otherwise, he should stay quiet. 
This passage tells us that the king must compare his strength to that of the enemy 
in 8 areas: 1) power; 2) place; 3) time; 4) seasons for marching; 5) occasions to raise 
troops; 6) revolts in the rear; 7) losses, expenses, and gains; and, 8) troubles. We find that 
these 8 topics present the organizational logic of the following passage, which is to say 
that they show us the plan by which the 9th adhikaraa was composed. We can compare 
the organizational logic of KAŚ 9.1.1 with its division into prakaraas and adhyāyas: 
 
KAŚ 9.1.1 prakaraa adhyāya 
1. Power śaktideśakālabalābalaj–ānam [9.1.2Ð16 
2. Place  17Ð21 
3. Time  22Ð24 
4. Seasons for Marching yātrākālā 25Ð9.1.52] 










7. Loss, Expenses, and Gains kayavyayalābhaviparimarśa [9.4.1Ð27] 






tāsām upāyivikalpajā 67Ð9.7.84]  
   
                                                 
178 This is certainly the case with KAŚ 7.5, 7.8, 10.2Ð10.3, 12.2Ð12.5. 
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The segmentation into prakaraas demonstrates a few irregularities, the most 
important of these being the aggregation of the first three topics into a single prakaraa, 
śaktideśakālabalābalaj–ānam. The reason for doing so is unclear, but it indicates, at any 
rate, that the prakaraas depend on the logic of the underlying passage without following 
it closely enough to suggest that the passage was composed in prakaraas,179 particularly 
since the first sentence, KAŚ 9.1.1, stands outside of any prakaraa. For, it is in the nature 
of composition in prakaraas (i.e., individual “topics”) to disallow statements lending 
overt structure to tracts of text larger than the prakaraa:  no “topic” in a series of like 
discussions could rise semantically above its own level.180 
With the adhyāyas we see that they independently follow the logic of the 
underlying source as well as the organization of the prakaraas. So, for example, 
although the prakaraas divide the topic of “Occasions for Raising Troops” into three 
prakaraas (balopādānakālā, sa	nāhaguā, and pratibalakarma), the adhyāya KAŚ 
9.2 reunites them into a single unit. But the division into prakaraas is only apparently 
“beneath” the level of the adhyāya: the actual topic of raising troops is concluded in the 
first prakaraa, while connective syntax in the second and third prakaraas reveals that 
the articulation of the topic into three prakaraas can only have been the work of the 
adhyāya redactor.181 Confusion between prakaraa divisions in KAŚ 9.3 likewise renders 
                                                 
179 For, the prakaraas archetypally represent the only level of independent discussion in the text, and we 
should therefore, expect them to follow the divisional logic of KAŚ 9.1.1. 
180 Particularly since the first sentence, KAŚ 9.1.1 stands properly “outside” any of the prakaraas. 
181 Which is to say that the composer of the “original” tract completed his discussion in the first prakaraa 
of 9.2, therefore the awareness of the subsequent prakaraas that they are occuring within a greater 
segment can only be explained within the context of the adhyāya redaction. So, at KAŚ 9.2.12, pūrva	 
pūrva	 caiā	 śreya sa	nāhayitum, “And it is better to equip for war each earlier one among these than 
each later one”; and, at 9.2.25, tasmād eva	 bala para tasyaitat pratibalam iti balasamuddāna	 kuryāt , 
“Therefore, he should raise troops keeping in mind, “the enemy has these troops; for them these would be 
counter-troops.” 
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its aggregation of two prakaraas according to the original structure problematic (Kangle 
1972, 413n.).  
What makes the adhyāya division clearly posterior to the underlying structure of 
the ninth adhikaraa, however, is its adumbration of the final topic, bāhyābhyantarāś 
cāpada, “Dangers from the Outer Regions and the Interior” into two additional 
adhyāyas, KAŚ 9.6Ð7, the latter of which (KAŚ 9.7) also demonstrates connective syntax 
in a non-initial prakaraa.  
Thus, in this case we can see that despite the apparent presence of an underlying 
structure, the prakaraas follow the the logic of KAŚ 9.1.1 more closely than the adhyāya 
segments. Ultimately, however, these apparently more fundamental structures must be 
accounted for in the theory of the prakaraa-text. 
4.3 CONCLUSION 
The foregoing analysis has demonstrated several important features of the 
relationship between the prakaraas and the adhyāyas in the Arthaśāstra. First, we found 
that some adhyāyas do display small but significant occasions of connective syntax at the 
beginning of non-initial prakaraas, suggesting that these prakaraas (if not the whole 
adhyāya) were composed in awareness of, and therefore contemporaneous with or after, 
the adhyāya redaction. Not only does this result indicate that the adhyāya redaction likely 
involved a substantial enlargement of the text, but it also gives a sense of the pattern 
according to which such additions may have been made (i.e., largely at the end of 
adhikaraas). Moreover, it suggests that the adhyāya redactor felt compelled to compose 
his own new material in prakaraas, a phenomenon that can only be explained if the 
adhyāya redactor felt that the prakaraa division was sufficiently well established as to 
require adherence in novel compositions. 
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Second, the latter half of the Arthaśāstra exhibits several passages in which 
neither the prakaraa nor adhyāya division is particularly well suited to the text. We 
found that each one of these passages requires a fuller explication than is possible in this 
chapter, but that where evidence was adducible, it continued to favor the logical 
posteriority of the adhyāyas over against the earlier prakaraas, as demonstrated 
generally in Chapter 3. Moreover, these passages suggest the existence in the latter half 
of the text of underlying autonomous source texts over which both prakaraa and 
adhyāya divisions had been superimposed. This stands as an important warning that in 
parts of the Arthaśāstra we may be dealing with a textual history significantly more 
complex and convoluted than a simple interaction between a “prakaraa-text” and an 
“adhyāya redaction.”  
The foregoing analysis cautions us against facile comparisons between 
prakaraa-text and adhyāya redaction, indicating for at least certain parts of the 
Arthaśāstra demonstrate a much more complex textual history. Although the adducible 
evidence in this analysis has consistently supported the anteriority of the prakaraas and 
ruled out the possibility that the same individual was also responsible for the adhyāya 
redaction, we remain aware that many of the questions raised here will remain undecided 
until we can look more closely at the prakaraa-text in Chapter 7.  
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Chapter 5: Adhyāya Redaction II Ð End Verses 
The foregoing analysis of the adhyāya redaction has demonstrated that it was 
carried out a single time by and individual other than the composer(s) of the prakaraa-
text and suggested that certain substantial tracts of the extant Arthaśāstra were composed 
in awareness of (and possibly as part of) that editorial intervention. I turn now to address 
one of the most pressing issues that remains to be examined: whether the adhyāya end 
verses were introduced along with the colophons during this redaction or are, as Scharfe 
has argued, artifacts of the prakaraa-text itself.182 
It was noted above that every adhyāya concludes with both a colophon and at 
least one verse (§1.3.4). While this intimate relationship between end verse and colophon 
does not of itself necessarily establish a common origin, it does arouse a strong suspicion 
that that the end verses must have been introduced as part of the adhyāya redaction.183 
Trautmann has summarized Renou’s position as follows:  
 
Renou, sensible to the implication that if the division into chapters [adhyāyas] was a 
secondary development, the verses terminal to the chapters [i.e., the adhyāya end verses] 
must be regarded “as a foreign corpus adjoined to a received text”, found that “ordinarily 
they are of no use to the argumentation and certain formal indices show that the end of 
the prose coincides with the end of the reasoning. Nevertheless certain compact groups of 
verses have their utility in perfecting a doctrine; and, what is more telling, there are 
several signs indicating that there is a continuity in sense between the prose and the 
verse.” He concluded, “The question cannot be resolved without nuances.”184 
                                                 
182 As discussed above (§2.3.2), the only way the composer of the prakaraa-text could be responsible for 
the present adhyāya end verses is if he was influenced in their placement (or retention) by another force, 
such as the subdivisional logic of an early (verse) version of the text. This thesis is refuted below at §5.6.3. 
183 Keith 1941, 452; Trautmann 1969, 75.  
184 Trautmann 1965, 75 interpolating Renou 1961, 185-186. 
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Renou’s observations here provide us with an excellent basis from which to 
approach the question of the origin of the adhyāya end verses. We will look at the two 
major points made in this passage in turn. 
The first point made in the above quotation is that the present adhyāya end verses 
cannot predate the division of the text into adhyāyas. Presumably, the reasoning for this 
is that their punctuation of the prose text along with their generally conclusive character 
produce a de facto secondary division of the text into its present adhyāyas (the same that 
is indicated formally by the colophons in the extent text). Hence, whoever composed (or 
retained) the end verses was responsible for the adhyāya division, and, as we have seen 
above, this cannot have been the composer of the prakaraa-text.185 Trautmann reaches a 
similar conclusion. 
The strength of this argument, and I do believe it is a strong one, depends on 
demonstrating two features of the adhyāya end verses: 1) that they are, properly 
speaking, end verses in the sense that they mark boundaries; and 2) that they uniquely 
fulfill this role in the Arthaśāstra (i.e., that there are not other examples of other 
boundary-marking verses in the Arthaśāstra aside from the adhyāya end verses). The 
                                                 
185 Scharfe’s theory of a verse-text original provides an ingeneous, if (in my opinion erroneous) 
workaround to this problem. He claims that the composer of the prakaraa-text, producing that prose text 
from a verse original, retained certain concluding verses from that original text. These verses implied their 
own subdivisional logic (represented by the present adhyāyas), even though the composer of the prose text 
worked the material into prakaraa segments. According to Scharfe the the composer of the prakaraa-
text retained these verses for several disparate reasons, but only formally divided the text into prakaraas. 
Hence, a later redactor, recognizing the incipient adhyāya division lying latent in the pattern of retained 
verses, marked them with colophons. Hence, for Scharfe, the composer of the prakaraa-text did and 
didn’t also divide the text into adhyāyas. On the face of it, this argument suffers from the same problem as 
other arguments of unitary authorship: a single author would not compose a text with two subdivisional 
segmentation schemes. Scharfe is relying on a vaguely invoked sense of non-intentionality to explain the 
second division of the text into adhyāyas.  On these merits, this argument must be considered insufficient. 
Scharfe, however, supports the larger theory by trying to demonstrate passages in the text wherein he says 
we can see that the prose has been generated from verse originals. If true, this would lend strong support to 
his otherwise unlikely theory. As it is though, he has misread the evidence of verse-to-prose 
transformations in the text. This theory is examined in detail below at §5.6.3. 
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extent to which these features can be assigned to the end verses will determine the extent 
to which the end verses can safely be assigned as a group to the adhyāya redaction.186 
In his second point, however, Renou invokes cases in the text wherein certain end 
verses demonstrate an apparent continuity with the prose. The appearance of such an 
integral relationship casts doubt upon the ascription of the end verses to the adhyāya 
redactor. By invoking “nuances,” Renou is claiming that countervailing local conditions 
may preclude the assignation of the end verses to the adhyāya redaction as a group.  
The criterion prompting his pessimistic assessment of our ability to determine the 
fate of the end verses as a whole lies in the variability with which end verses are 
integrated or disjointed from the foregoing prose. Renou has correctly observed an 
important heterogeneity among the end verses: in some cases (e.g., KAŚ 1.10187) the logic 
of a given passage is complete within the prose and the end verses are clearly 
appendectical, while in other cases (e.g. KAŚ 7.6) the end verses are necessary to the 
logic of the greater passage. As we have seen, however, there is reason to suspect that it 
is not only the end verses that may have been added during the adhyāya redaction: certain 
prose passages also seem to presuppose the adhyāya redaction. Hence, examples of 
disjuncture and integration must be considered as individual cases in the context of a 
potentially larger adhyāya redaction. 
We will look first to determine whether we can find evidence that the end verses 
have a common group origin. I will, to this end, query their function (§5.1). I will then 
examine whether the end verses possess any formal characteristics isolating them as a 
                                                 
186 This is, properly speaking, a functional approach, one which seeks to find the origins of the end verses 
by analyzing their function. 
187 The examples cited are entirely my own, used only to illustrate Renou’s point. They are not taken from 
his work. 
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distinct body within the text (§5.2). Finally, I will examine the nuances of individual end 
verse passages in order to understand the frequency with which individual end verses can 
be linked to the adhyāya redaction and whether any local examples provide sufficient 
evidence to preclude the assignation of the corpus of end verses to the adhyāya redaction 
(§5.3Ð5). My conclusions are given at §5.6.  
5.1 THE UNIQUE FUNCTION OF THE END VERSES 
One of the best ways to attempt to isolate the present adhyāya end verses as a 
discrete compositional element is to examine them in the context of all of the verses 
within the extant Arthaśāstra. This allows us to determine whether the end verses are 
unique in fulfilling the function of dividing topics, or whether they are in this regard 
simply part of a more general phenomenon. 
Kangle’s edition of the Arthaśāstra possesses 378 verses in total. Of that number, 
303 (80%) are found at the end of an adhyāya. Thus, the overwhelming pattern of verse 
dispersal in the extant text follows the adhyāya division. The strong correlation of end 
verse dispersal with the pattern of colophon placement reinforces the sense that these 
verses, as a group, exist to serve their present function of dividing the text into adhyāyas. 
The dispersal of the 75 verses not found at the end of adhyāya is, in contrast to the 
end verses, not only far less frequent,188 but also remarkable irregular. Some 91% (68 of 
75) of these “adhyāya-internal” verses fall in only three adhikaraas (the 2nd, 7th, and 
14th). Looking more closely, one notes that a remarkable 75% (55 of 73) fall in only four 
adhyāyas (KAŚ 2.10, 7.5, 7.9, 14.3) and 84% fall in just six adhyāyas (including, with the 
previous, 2.24, 14.2). In total, all 75 adhyāya-internal verses occur in only 15 adhyāyas, 
                                                 
188 Adhyāya-internal verse passages occur at the rate of 1 per 68.4 prose sūtras, while end verse passages 
occur at the rate of 1 passage per 16.4 prose sūtras. 
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leaving 135 of 150 adhyāyas without any adhyāya-internal verses. The following chart 
summarizes the location of these verses: 
 
adhikaraa adhyāya passage #(s) adhyāya total adhikaraa total 
1 
 
8 9 (1) (3) 




10   5, 23Ð24, 38Ð46 (12) (17) 
 
 
12   10 (1) 
24   9Ð10, 26Ð27 (4) 









6   15 (1) 
9   38Ð49 (12) 
13   24Ð25 (2) 
10 3  30Ð31 (2) (2) 










2   10, 28Ð29, 39 (4) 
3   
 
3, 19Ð24, 34Ð35, 





Thus, we can see that the occurrence of adhyāya-internal verses is, generally 
speaking, a highly localized phenomenon complemented by the sporadic occurrence of 
singlets and couplets.  
If we look at the content and placement of the adhyāya-internal verses a little 
more closely, we can see that many occur in long verse passages: KAŚ 2.10.38Ð46, 
7.5.19Ð27, and 7.9.38Ð49. These three passages account 30 of the 75 adhyāya- internal 
verses in the text, with another 16 falling in three additional clusters in KAŚ 14.3: 
14.3.19Ð24, 43Ð46, and 73Ð78. The remaining adhyāya-internal verses fall in singlets (15) 
or couplets (14). 
Of the longer verse clusters, all represent semi-autonomous discussions: of types 
of documents (KAŚ 2.10.38Ð46); of causes of decline, disaffection, and greed among the 
king’s subjects (7.5.19Ð27); and of different kinds of allies (7.9.38Ð49). We find this too 
with the middle-length verse clusters in KAŚ 14.3, two of which are verse portions of 
 96 
incantations (14.3.19Ð24, 43Ð46) and the third a discussion of malevolent talismans 
(14.3.73Ð78). Of the couplets, one lists the uses to which royal decrees may be put (and is 
expanded in a subsequent prose section),189 two are the verse portion of an incantation,190 
and five are cited as offering additional information after the manner of sm
ti verses.191 
Of the singlets, eleven are clearly cited as sm
ti verses,192 one gives the verse portion of 
an incantation,193 and one, possibly also a sm
ti verse, gives an alternative to a foregoing 
passage.194 Four of the singlets, all from the first and fifth adhikaraas, are cited in the 
pūrvapaka of a Kauilya dialogue.195 
What this analysis tells us is that adhyāyaÐinternal verse clusters are only of a few 
kinds: autonomous passages (5); verse incantations (5); alternatives to foregoing prose 
(1); or sm
ti-style verses (16).196 Without needing to examine them in any greater detail, 
we can see that none of the adhyāya-internal verses in the Arthaśāstra function to 
conclude or divide either prakaraas or any other subtopic. This means that of the 177 
                                                 
189 KAŚ 2.10.23Ð24 
190 KAŚ 14.3.34Ð35; 14.3.37Ð38 
191 KAŚ 2.24.9Ð10; 2.24.26Ð27; 7.13.24Ð25; 10.3.30Ð31; 14.2.28Ð29 
192 KAŚ 1.8.9; 1.15.17; 1.15.22; 2.10.5; 2.12.10; 5.6.31; 7.6.15; 13.4.7; 14.2.9; 14.2.39; 14.3.3 
193 KAŚ 14.3.51 
194 KAŚ 14.1.5 
195 KAŚ 1.8.9; 1.15.17; 1.15.22; and 5.6.3. 
196 The only adhyāyaÐinternal verse passage that requires further explication is the couplet at KAŚ 
2.10.23Ð24. This couplet, uniquely, provides new information that is commented upon and expanded by the 
following prose passage 2.10.25Ð37. It appears, in this case, that an external verse has been used and then 
commented upon by the prose text, as though we have a sm
ti verse with commentary. The uniqueness of 
the usage does not affect the conclusions drawn above. Moreover, it will be shown that all of KAŚ 2.10, 
from which this verse is drawn, is an addition of the adhyāya redactor. 
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verse passages in the Arthaśāstra, exactly 150 serve to mark a boundary between 
prakaraas or prakaraa subtopics,197 and all of these represent adhyāya end verses. 
Not only does this strengthen the relationship between the end verses and the 
adhyāya division by demonstrating that the end verses have a monopoly on the work of 
marking topical boundaries, it also tells us that at least some of the present verses must 
have been added by the adhyāya redactor. The above analysis shows us that the 
Arthaśāstra is not abundantly endowed with verses providing convenient topic 
boundaries: the present adhyāya end verses exhaust all such possible examples. Hence, 
the adhyāya redactor did not simply choose 150 existing verses out of a larger pool of 
topic-bounding verses. It also cannot be the case that the composer of the prakaraa-text 
is responsible for all of these precisely 150 end verse passages, as this would be 
tantamount to having introduced a rival re-segmentation to his own prakaraas. We are 
left, then, with only two possibilities. 
It could be that the adhyāya redactor is responsible for introducing all of the 
adhyāya end verses. But, it is also possible that some of the extant adhyāya end verses 
were present as more or less randomly dispersed verses in the prakaraa-text and the 
adhyāya redactor only added enough to produce his 150 relatively uniform segments. 
Two considerations influence our estimation. First, we note that the extant adhyāya 
division adheres to a minimum adhyāya length of 9 sentences. That no two existing end 
verses fall any closer than that suggests that the phenomenon, if original to the 
prakaraa-text, must have been infrequent. Otherwise, we would as easily expect 
                                                 
197 A possible exception to this is the verse at KAŚ 13.4.7, which seems to conclude the discussion of 
weakening an enemy before a seige, itself a subtopic of the prakaraa paryupāsankarma, “The Work of 
Laying Seige.” It is clearly a versification of the preceding prose sūtra. As such, it would seem to serve 
little purpose but as to mark this prakaraa subtopic, unless its purpose is to integrate the concept of the 
prak
tis into the passage. The reference to the prak
tis, however, links this verse to the younger layers of 
the text (Chapter 7). An ambiguous case, it merits further investigation. See below at §6.5.3. 
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examples of end verses falling closer together than the currently observed minimum 
adhyāya length of eight prose sūtras. Second, we must determine the upper threshold of 
possible adhyāya end verses. How many pre-existing adhyāya end verses would have to 
have existed before they began to constitute some kind of secondary division? 
Consideration of these questions quickly leads to conjecture. I believe, however, 
we possess sufficient evidence at present to assert that the use of verses to bound 
prakaraas and subtopics cannot have been too widespread in the prakaraaÐtext, which 
gives no indication of a preference for formally marking boundaries. Even a single end 
verse (much less a random smattering) would have disrupted the more subtle boundary 
markers found among the prakaraas. Moreover, even a relatively meager number of end 
verses (with their ability to create strong boundaries) per adhikaraa would begin to have 
had the effect of suggesting a secondary division of the text, even if in broader segments 
than represented by the present adhyāyas. Finally, many of the adhyāya-internal verses 
seem to be interpolations, suggesting that, the end verse passages aside, the prakaraa-
text may have been composed entirely in prose (see below). This highlights the bounding 
functions of the end verses, and we can assert thereby that the verses in the text have 
always been intended as boundary markers. That this is restricted only to the present 
adhyāyas suggests that the prakaraas were likely never, in fact, marked by end verses. 
Hence, the end verses appear even more likely to be later additions. It is strongly 
possible, therefore, that all of the adhyāya end verses date to the adhyāya redaction. We 
can say with great certainty, however, that not many, and possibly no, end verses existed 
before the adhyāya redaction. 
We have just seen that the present adhyāya end verses are the only verses in the 
text that conclude a prakaraa or a prakaraa subtopic. From this, we have derived that 
the present end verses cannot be thought to have been “selected” as the subset of a larger 
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body of pre-existing boundary-marking verses. By implication, then, the adhyāya 
redactor must be responsible for the addition of some verses, and, given the proclivity of 
even a few end verses to begin to create a secondary subdivision of the text, probably the 
greater part of them. 
But, if we are able to demonstrate that the adhyāya-internal verses are 
interpolations, we can then further isolate the end verse phenomenon in the text. More 
modestly: the extent to which we can demonstrate interpolation among the body of 
adhyāya-internal verses increases the appearance that the verses in the present text are 
confined to the adhyāya end verses. If, in fact, the prakaraa-text is, outside of the 
present end verses, composed entirely in prose, then we will have strong indication that 
the end verses, as a group, are secondary additions to the text dating, no doubt, to the 
adhyāya redaction. 
It has been noted already that large tracts of the extant text possess no adhyāya-
internal verses (i.e., adhikaraas 3, 4, 6, 8, 9, 11, and 12). Thus, we note that many parts 
of the text (135 of 150 adhyāyas) do not possess any internal verses. This takes us 
already a long way to demonstrating the prose character of the prakaraa-text. Because 
such an inquiry is potentially vitiated by a desired outcome, we will look first at the 
adhyāya-internal verses that have been marked as likely interpolations by other scholars.  
Of the 27 verses/verse clusters in the text, Kangle identifies two (KAŚ 7.6.15; 
10.3.30Ð31) as likely interpolations based on their manner of citation within the text.198 
These have been identified based on prose introductions (tatraitad bhavati; apīha ślokau 
bhavata, respectively). We note also this standard marker (tatraitad bhavati; KAŚ 
7.9.37) of interpolated material introducing the verse cluster at KAŚ 7.9.38Ð49, which is 
                                                 
198 1972, 339n.; 1972, 440n. 
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also semantically disjointed from the foregoing discussion.  Of the remainder, we must 
look at their relationship to other elements suspected to belong to the adhyāya redaction 
and discussed below. 
Thus, the citation of sm
ti verses at KAŚ 1.8.9, 1.15.17, 1.15.22, and 5.6.31 all come 
in the pūrvapaka of Kauilya dialogues, which are linked below (Chapter 6) to the 
adhyāya redaction. The verse clusters at KAŚ 2.10.5, 23Ð24, and 38Ð46 all fall in an 
adhyāya (KAŚ 2.10) which is also linked to the adhyāya redaction (see Chapter 7). If 
these elements are indeed linked to the adhyāya redaction (and there is strong evidence 
for this), we can assert that, outside of the present adhyāya end verses, the first half of the 
prakaraa-text was composed entirely in prose. 
In the latter half of the text, most of our verses and verse clusters (10 of 16) fall in 
the 14th adhyāya, which is an addendum appended to the prakaraa-text during the 
adhyāya redaction (see Chapter 7). Likely, it is composed of independent sources; so its 
own peculiar habits of verse citation can be ascribed either to its origins or to the hand of 
the adhyāya redactor. Of the remaining six verses/verse clusters in the second half, three 
are independently suspected to be interpolations (see above). Another, at KAŚ 7.5.19Ð27 
disrupts, along with the other segments of its adhyāya (7.5.1Ð18; 7.5.28Ð37), the 
underlying logic of the text by separating what appears to have been a unified discussion 
of confederated allies starting at KAŚ 7.4.19Ð21 and concluding, in the extant text, at 
7.5.38Ð44. The remaining two passages, KAŚ 7.13.24Ð25 and 13.4.7, do not give specific 
evidence to suggest they are interpolations. But, of the 27 passages examined, they are 
the only ones not bearing at least moderately good indication of interpolation. 
The upshot of this is that, while it is not possible to prove beyond a doubt that all 
of the adhyāya-internal verses in the text are interpolations, we see good and distributed 
evidence indicating just that for nearly all, while a few are certainly interpolations. The 
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net effect is to bring the number of adhyāya-internal verses potentially native to the 
prakaraa-text even lower, so that, aside from the present adhyāya end verses, the 
prakaraa-text appears to have been very nearly, if not entirely, a prose composition. 
Effectively, this further isolates the present adhyāya end verses. Not only are they 
unique in their function,199 they may be unique altogether, as the prakaraa-text looks 
likely to have been a prose composition. Together, these two pieces of evidence further 
diminish the likelihood that the adhyāya redactor had many pre-existing verses to choose 
from in creating his adhyāya redaction, which would have raised the profile of any 
preexisting verses, thereby rendering them even more effective at providing potential 
boundary markers. Hence, the number of pre-existing end verses cannot have been very 
great at all.  
Given the limits of our evidence at present it is not possible to say much more 
about the origin of the end verses based on function. We can deduce that most of the 
present end verses must have been added by the adhyāya redactor, and some evidence 
suggests they must all have been added by him. If we allow, however, that the evidence 
still affords for the possibility that some end verses may have pre-existed the adhyāya 
redaction, then such a group analysis based on function does little to identify which are 
more likely and which are less likely to belong the adhyāya redaction. 
We turn, then, to the formal analysis of the verses, an analysis based on shared 
features of vocabulary, style, and so forth. It is possible that analyzing these 
characteristics among the group of verses can tell us something about their collective 
origin. 
                                                 
199 With the possible exception of KAŚ 13.4.7; see above. 
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5.2 END VERSES AS A BODY OF WRITING 
The search for such formal unifying elements is frustrated at the outset by the 
suspicion, already encountered above (§4.1Ð3), that the adhyāya redactor was also 
responsible for the introduction of substantive prose passages into the text. If true (and 
this will be well borne out below), it should not be expected that the end verses share 
many elements isolatable from the prose by an analysis of shared formal characteristics. 
To further complicate matters, it is not unlikely that at least some of the extant end verses 
were appropriated from circulating gnomic stanzas or other textual sources,200 potentially 
diminishing the possibility of ascertaining unified formal characteristics.  
It may, however, still be worthwhile to look at the end verses for some kind of 
shared features, as long as we recognize that they, as a compositional layer, form a subset 
of a larger, indefinite corpus within the text represented by the collective additions of the 
adhyāya redactor. The expextation at the outset is that even this subset may demonstrate 
some common minor characteristics, but that the most telling features may have, as the 
major ideational contributions of the adhyāya redactor, also found a more considered and 
lengthier expression in adjacent prose segments. 
The end verses, like nearly all of the verses in the Arthaśāstra, are written in the 
relatively simple śloka meter. They are thereby composed after the fashion of the epics or 
verse sm
tis, and it is difficult, if not impossible, to identify shared points of style among 
these verses over against the stark contrast between the end verses and the prose. Breloer 
argues for stylistic differences between the verses and the prose of the text,201 to which 
Kangle has responded that “[i]t is true that the stanzas appear to be much simpler in style 
than the prose. But simplicity is natural to the Anuubh śloka metre” (1965, 37). Thus, 
                                                 
200 Sternbach 1968, 495 
201 1934, 8f. 
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given the differences in medium between verse and prose (as also prevailing between 
different prose disquisitions), the demonstrable likelihood of a larger adhyāya redaction, 
and the probability that many stanzas were drawn from older circulating bodies of verse, 
we should not be disappointed that we are unable to identify many common elements of 
style setting the end verses off as a body from the rest of the text. A prime example of 
this is the restriction of the use of the terms mata and sm
ta (“is known/remembered as”) 
to the verses in the text. These terms occur in the Arthaśāstra only at the end of even 
śloka padas and undoubtedly reflect not a stylistic proclivity of the verses’ composer, but 
a feature common to śloka composition more generally, where these terms provide the 
equative sense of the verb “to be” in form amenable to the metrical conclusion of the 
verse medium. 
The search for lexica unique to a posited end verse “layer,” which would seem 
such a promising avenue for demonstrating a unique and common origin, is the element 
most negatively affected by the above considerations. For, as stated above, the most 
interesting and important innovations of the end verses are those most likely to have 
found their way into prose discussions. Without knowing the extent of the redaction, 
therefore, many of the most telling lexical or conceptual features of the adhyāya 
redaction will not appear unique to the end verses. The full fruit of this analysis must 
await a more complete understanding of the adhyāya redaction. Nevertheless, the end 
verses do demonstrate knowledge of a few interesting terms and concepts not found 
elsewhere in the text. 
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Foremost among these, of course, is the direct ascription of the text to Kauilya, 
found only at KAŚ 1.1.19, 2.10.63, and, indirectly, at 15.1.73, all end verses.202 While the 
manifold Kauilya dialogues scattered throughout the text speak in the voice of Kauilya, 
the phrase iti Kauilya (“according to Kauilya”) falls short of a direct ascription of the 
entire treatise to the legendary statesman. It is, therefore, significant that it is only in the 
verses that the entire text is attributed to the man himself, and, in particular, in the verses 
concluding the first and last adhyāyas. 
We find also that the end verses frequently take the king as their subject, even in 
prose contexts where another subject has been used exclusively.203  
Among the remaining notable concepts unique to the end verses, we find only 
minor examples: śramaa (KAŚ 1.12.23); certain geographical areas or peoples such as 
prācya (“the east”), Cedi, Karua, Dāśara, Saurāra, and Pā–canada (KAŚ 2.3.15Ð16); 
new (śukla-) and full moon observances (k
asa	dhi: KAŚ 2.30.50; 2.32.21; 7.3.32Ð33); 
and two terms commonly used to conclude half-verses, mata204 and sm
ta,205 both 
roughly translated as “is/are known as.”206  Aside from the last example, none of these 
are sufficiently well-distributed to act as a characteristic of the end verses as a “layer” of 
the text. 
There are, to be certain, many terms unique to the end verses. Unfortunately, just 
as with the concepts mentioned above, most occur only once or twice in the entire text: 
                                                 
202 This excludes the interpolated verse falling after the final colophon, which attributes the text to 
“Vi	ugupta,” purportedly Kauilya’s personal name (Kangle 1965, 59), but also taken sometimes as the 
name of a later editor of the text (Thapar 2002, 184Ð5). 
203 See, e.g. KAŚ 3.1.38; 3.1.43; 4.9.28. 
204 KAŚ 1.2.12; 1.7.9; 1.15.22; 2.19.45; 2.21.15; 7.3.23; 7.8.34; 8.3.65;14.1.5 
205 KAŚ 2.2.16; 2.13.61; 3.17.16;4.11.26; 4.13.41 
206 These are precisely the kind of feature that may have more to do with the exigencies of metrical 
composition than a distinctive feature of style or thought. 
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not nearly enough to unite the end verses as a group. Some of the more interesting 
include śaśvad, vyavasthita, pretya, nanda, vartman, saciva, bheaja, pūjita, prakīrtita, 
paaka, kiti, vaidya, traividya, sa	caya, salīla, kha, bhāaka, jīra, abda, paita, 
dama, and kamāvat. 
As suspected, analysis of the end verses in isolation from other elements of the 
adhyāya redaction demonstrates no key lexica or concepts that would conclusively set 
them off from the prose text as a group. If we allow for the possibility that some key 
concepts might appear primarily in the end verses, while occurring in a few prose 
sections, then a number of more important terms can be identified: trivarga, varāśrama, 
prithivī, mahī, and svarga. It is not unlikely that a better knowledge of the adhyāya 
redaction will reveal these as characteristic elements of that editorial moment. 
Ultimately, the analysis of formal elements among the end verses adds nothing at 
this point to our understanding of their place in the compositional history of the text. 
Aside from the ascription of the text to Kauilya, it is difficult at the present time, if not 
impossible, to determine whether the minor features demonstrated above help in any way 
to unify the end verses into a compositional layer or place them in relation to other 
compositional layers.  
5.3 BALANCE OF EVIDENCE: INDIVIDUAL STUDIES  
Pursuant to the initial remarks of this chapter, we have good reason to believe that 
most, if not all, of the adhyāya end verses were integrated by the adhyāya redactor. Given 
the unique role they play in bounding discussions, scholars such as Renou (1961) and 
Trautmann (1971) have posited that, should they be connected with the adhyāya 
redaction, they must be considered interpolations. We look now at representative 
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examples of the relationships between prose and verse to determine whether we can 
deduce anything more specific about their origin as a group.  
But here we encounter the same problem: if we suspect certain sections of prose 
to date to the adhyāya redaction as well, then we should as easily expect to find examples 
of end verses that are integral to the foregoing prose as to find end verses revealing a 
different origin from the prose. Nevertheless, we can demonstrate based on individual 
analyses that specific end verses can frequently be shown to have a different origin from 
the prose, whether misconstruing prakaraa boundaries (§5.4.1), demonstrating 
awareness of the adhyāya redaction (§5.4.2), emending the preceding prose (§5.4.3), 
breaking the logic of a prose passage (§5.4.4), or appearing generally disconnected from 
the prose itself (§5.4.5). On the contrary, a minority of end verses demonstrate a 
connection with the foregoing prose (§5.5), whether through syntactic integration (§5.5.1), 
acting as the logically necessary conclusion to a prose segment (§5.5.2), or matching 
preceding prose very closely (§5.5.3). By demonstrating the frequent disjuncture between 
prose and verse, on one hand, and the paucity of evidence demonstrating their integration, 
on the other hand, the end verses come to look even more alien to the prakaraa-text. 
5.4 END VERSES LINKED TO THE ADHYĀYA REDACTION 
A great number of end verses display some kind of relationship with their prose 
contexts that link them to the adhyāya redaction. All of these represent conditions 
sprecluding mutual authorship of prose and verse by one individual 
5.4.1 Boundary Disputes: KAŚ 1.4.16, 1.8.29, and 7.1.38 
As discussed previously (§3.2), divergences on the marking of boundaries provide 
strong evidence for both the posteriority of the adhyāyas (as defined by the colophons) as 
well as their issuance from a second hand. In all three of the cases cited there 
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(prakaraas 1, 4, and 99), it is not only the colophon that has misconstrued the prakaraa 
boundary, but also its attendant adhyāya end verse. Thus, for same reasons cited 
regarding the colophons, we can surmise that the end verses at KAŚ 1.4.16, 1.8.29, 7.1.38 
cannot originate from the composer of the prakaraa text.  
5.4.2 End Verses “Aware” of Adhyāyas:  
A number of end verses appear to demonstrate some awareness of the adhyāya 
redaction. This awareness manifests itself in a few different ways. 
KAŚ 1.8.29 and 1.9.11 
Two end verses are implicated in the adhyāya redaction by virtue of their content. 
We see this clearly, for example, at KAŚ 1.8.29 and 1.9.11, which are the two end verses 
involved in the misconstrual of the prakaraa boundary discussed above. The adjoining 
prakaraas at issue are entitled amātyotpatti, “The Appointment of Ministers 
(amātya),” and mantripurohitotpatti, “The Appointment of the Prime Minister 
(mantripurohita).” Instead of falling between these two prakaraas, the end verse at KAŚ 
1.8.29 actually falls in the middle of the discussion of amātyotpatti, severing the last 8 
sūtras of the prakaraa and relegating them to the next adhyāya (KAŚ 1.9). 
The reason for this misconstrual, it would seem, is that the adhyāya redactor must 
have read the title of the second prakaraa, mantripurohitotpatti, not as “The 
Appointment (utpatti) of the Prime Minister (mantripurohita),” but as, “The Appointment 
(utpatti) of the Councilors (mantrin) and Chaplain (purohita).”207 The problem, of course, 
is that there is no discussion of the appointment of ministers (mantrin) to be found here in 
the text, which passes directly from discussing the appointment of ministers (amātya; 
                                                 
207 This is my theory of the term mantripurohita. This theory has the benefit not only of explaining this 
apparent disjuncture in the text, but also the problem between the identity of the mantrins (“councilors”) 
and amātyas (“ministers”) prevailing more generally in the text. Cf. Scharfe 1993, 127ff.) 
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KAŚ 1.8.1Ð1.9.8) to the appointment of the mantripurohita (KAŚ 1.9.9Ð10). Because the 
adhyāya redactor could not find a discussion of the appointment of councilors (mantri), 
he created one by severing the discussion of the appointment of ministers (amātya) into 
two parts. The only problem is that nowhere in either of the dismembered discussions of 
“The Appointment of Ministers (amātya)” does the text ever speak of councilors 
(mantrin). 
The end verses at KAŚ 1.8.29 and 1.9.11 both seem to take part in the project of 
recasting the truncated dicussion of amātyas as actually pertaining to mantrins. The first, 
which actually carries out the division of amātyotpatti, appears very much to be trying 
to create the effect of a transition between the discussion of ministers (amātya) and the 
discussion of councilors (mantrin): 
 
KAŚ 1.8.29 sāmarthyataś caÑ 
 vibhajyāmātyavibhava deśakālau ca karma ca 
 amātyā sarva etaite kāryā syur na tu mantri	a 
 
 And, in accordance with their abilityÑ 
 by [suitably] distributing rank among ministers (amātya) and assigning 
place, time and work (to them), he should appoint all of these as 
ministers (amātya), not, however, as councilors (mantrin) 
This verse represents the first use of the term mantrin in the body of the 
Arthaśāstra (the second comes in the next end verse, KAŚ 1.9.11), and seems to reflect 
the logic implicit in the creation of a novel discussion of mantrins (councilors). 
The end verse of of the subsequent adhyāya (KAŚ 1.9) takes part in the process of 
recasting the truncated discussion of ministers (amātya) at KAŚ 1.9.1Ð8 into a discussion 
of councilors (mantrin): 
 
KAŚ 1.9.11 brāhma	enaidhita katra mantrimantrābhimantritam  
 jayaty ajitam atyanta śāstrānugamaśastritam 
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 Katriya power, made to prosper by the Brahmin [i.e., the purohita], 
sanctified by spells in the form of the counsel of councilors 
(mantrin), possessed of arms in the form of compliance with the 
science [of politics], triumphs, remaining ever unconquered. 
In the first line of this verse, we read that the king’s lordly might (katra) is enhanced 
both by the purohita and the mantrin. In taking the two as separate, it seems to be 
indicating that the foregoing adhyāya possess a discussion of both mantrins and the 
purohita, recasting the truncated section not as a discussion of amātyas (which it clearly 
is) into a discussion of mantrins.  
We find awareness of the adhyāya redaction also in the verses at KAŚ 1.2.12, 
1.3.16Ð17, and 1.4.16 discussed below (§6.4.1). 
KAŚ 2.35.15 
The end verse at KAŚ 2.35.15 demonstrates awareness of the adhyāya redaction by 
clearly combining both prakaraas falling within its adhyāya. We have in the first 
prakaraa a discussion of the duties of the official called the samāhart
 (administrator) 
and in the second directions on his use of secret agents known as sa	sthās (stationary 
agents). The end verse clearly brings the two prakaraas together: 
 
KAŚ 2.35.15 samāhartā janapada cintayed evam utthita 
 cintayeyuś ca sasthās tā sasthāś cānyā svayonaya 
 
 Thus the samāhart
, being ever diligent, should look after the 
countryside; and those sa	sthās should also look after [it], as also 
other sa	sthās having their own origin. 
 Further examples of this can be found at KAŚ 7.1.38, 9.2.30, and 10.5.57Ð58, all of 
which refer discretely to elements of the multiple prakaraas of which their adhyāyas are 
constituted.208 
                                                 
208 These, it may be argued, are not references to adhyāya divisions per se, but only look back over a 
general segment that happens to coincide with adhyāya boundaries. That is unlikely in both cases, because 
of the use of specific terminology that links the verse to the opening line of the adhyāya. So at 9.2.30, the 
verse reads eva	 balasamuddāna	 (“Thus, the raising of troops), which directly invokes the formula with 
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KAŚ 1.1.19 
At least one end verse is linked to the adhyāya redaction by virtue of concluding 
material not included in the prakaraa-text. This example comes from the end of the first 
adhyāya, where we read: 
 
KAŚ 1.1.19 sukhagraha	avij–eya tattvārthapadaniścitam 
 kauilyena kta śāstra vimuktagranthavistaram 
 
 Easy to learn and understand, precise in doctrine, sense, and word, free 
from prolixity of text, thus has this śāstra been composed by 
Kauilya. 
This end verse cannot have come from the composer of the prakaraa-text 
precisely because it summarizes a passage (KAŚ 1.1.1Ð18) that is not part of the 
prakaraa-text. That it is consciously bounding and concluding this adhyāya segment is 
clear from the manner in which it echoes the opening of the passage: compare the phrase 
kauilyena k
ta	 śāstram (“[this] śāstra was composed by Kauilya”) from the end verse 
with the phrase idam ekam arthaśāstram k
tam (“this single arthaśāstra was composed”) 
from KAŚ 1.1.1, which opens the adhyāya. 
The foregoing applies also to the end verses of the final adhyāya, KAŚ 15.1.71Ð73, 
which must also date to the adhyāya redaction, as discussed above at §3.3. 
5.4.3 End Verses Emend Preceding Prose  
A number of end verses serve to emend the foregoing discussion (see below). 
This is very much against the logic of single authorship and stands as some of the 
strongest examples of adhyāya end verses that must have been composed 
contemporaneously with or after the preceding prose. The clearest instances of 
                                                                                                                                                 
which the adhyāya opens: …balānā	 samuddānakālā (“The time for the raising of troops…” KAŚ 9.2.1). 
At 10.5.57 we find the use of the terms vyūha (“battle array”) and yugman (“odd”), both concepts central to 
the opening prakaraa, as well as vibhava (“strength”), in reference to the middle prakaraa, and aga 
(“division”), in reference to the third prakaraa. 
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disjuncture in the text come from situations in which the adhyāya end verses directly 
contradict the foregoing prose text.209 
KAŚ 1.10.16Ð20 
The clearest example of the verses emending the foregoing prose comes in 
adhyāya 1.10, comprising the prakaraa titled “Knowing the Honesty and Dishonesty of 
the Officials through Secret Tests” (upadhābhi śaucāśaucaj–ānam amātyānām). This 
passage is the source of the famous “secret tests” by which the king ascertains the loyalty 
of his ministers to determine the positions they are suitable to fill. The progression of the 
chapter is logical and orderly. It begins by saying “Attended by his prime minister, [the 
king] should appoint ministers to common offices and test their integrity by means of 
secret tests” (KAŚ 1.10.1). We then read of the “test of dharma” (KAŚ 1.10.2Ð4), the “test 
of artha” (1.10.5Ð6), the “test of kāma” (1.10.7Ð8), and the “test of fear” (1.10.9Ð12). The 
prose concludes with a passage detailing the offices to which those who have passed the 
different tests should be appointed, stating finally that “[t]hose proved honest by all tests, 
he should make councilors; those dishonest by every test, he should employ in mines, in 
forests for material produce, in elephant-forests, and in factories” (KAŚ 1.10.14Ð15).  
The tactics used in all of these tests involve convincing the minister either that the 
king has acted improperly or that the queen is in love with him. The ministers response to 
this information is meant to demonstrate their loyalty or lack thereof. The five end verses 
of the adhyāya, however, directly contradict these strategies laid out in the prose in great 
detail: 
 
                                                 
209 This is not a phenomenon, i.e., the purposeful redaction of earlier rules by later rules, that we find in the 
prose. It occurs only between verses and prose and is unidirectional in the emendation of the latter by the 
former. 
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KAŚ 1.10.16Ð20 “Thoroughly purified by the group of three and fear, he should appoint 
ministers, in his own works according to their purity,” say the 
teachers. 
 “But, never should the Lord make himself or his queen, a target for 
determining the honesty of the ministers”: this is the view of 
Kauilya.  
 “The fouling of one unfouled, as water with poison, should not be 
carried out. For, the antidote may never arrive for one so fouled. And 
a mind tainted by the fourfold tests, returns not to its original state, 
remaining under the power of the willful. Therefore, he should make 
an outsider to stand in for the fourfold task. The king should 
ascertain the honesty and dishonesty of the ministers through secret 
agents.”  
Here, the verses completely reject the tactics carefully laid out in the prose. It is 
unlikely that a single author would not only emend his own writing in such a clumsy 
fashion, but also fail to outline discrete alternatives. Moreover, the tests, as given in the 
prose, are purposely designed to judge a minister’s loyalty to the king himself. The 
substitution of another official for the king or queen would render the tests pointless. 
Although they clearly depend on the preceding prose, they cannot have been produced by 
the author of that prose.  
We find similar examples of textual emendation at KAŚ 2.7.41,210 KAŚ 
2.9.32Ð36,211 KAŚ 2.14.55,212 and KAŚ 3.3.32.213 
                                                 
210 Lesser emendations to the text occur at KAŚ 2.7.41, where, after a detailed discussion of the different 
offenses and attendant penalties for clerical offenses and misappropriation of funds by government 
employees, the verse states “He should put up with a minor offense and should be content even when the 
revenue is small; and he should honor with favours the officer who confers great benefit.” Is this meant to 
waive the smaller penalties just enumerated in the prose? Or does it refer to whether those guilty should be 
released from service? As a matter of disjuncture, we note that the prose does not speak as does the verse to 
the performance of officers per se, but only to their shortcomings and offenses. 
211 So, in adhyāya 2.9, which is coextensive with the 27th prakaraa, upayuktaparīkā (Examining the 
Work of Appointees), the final prose sūtra instructs bahumukhyam anitya	 cādhikaraa	 sthāpayet, “He 
should establish each appointment with many impermanent leadership positions” (2.9.31). The point of this 
sūtra is to limit corruption by prohibiting the permanent tenure of single individuals in government 
appointments. Following this final prose sūtra occur five verses: the first three warn against malfeasance 
among government officials. The fourth operates as bridge between this sentiment and that of the the final 
verse which represents the end verse proper and contraverts the instruction at 2.9.31 na bhakyanti ye tv 
arthān nyāyato vardhayanti ca nityādhikārā kāryās te rāj–a priyahite ratā, “But those who do not 
consume his wealth and grow it lawfully. These should be made permanent in their appointment, devoted 
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5.4.4 End Verses Disrupting the Logic of the Prose 
A number of verses produce logical disjunctions with the foregoing prose. We see 
this at KAŚ 2.4.31, where the prose of KAŚ 2.4 is entirely concerned with the construction 
and establishment of the fortified city (durga) and concludes in the final prose sūtra with, 
“By this is explained the making of frontier forts” (KAŚ 2.4.31). Yet, an adhyāya end 
verse follows this conclusion with a verse pertaining to the administration of the fortified 
city: 
 
KAŚ 2.4.32 And he should not allow in the city “outsiders” who cause harm to the 
country. He should cast them out in the country-side or make them 
pay all the taxes. 
 Not only does the preceding prose have nothing to do with the administration of 
the city, but the topic has shifted to the construction of frontier forts. The verse is out of 
place.  
                                                                                                                                                 
to what is dear and beneficial to the King.” This verse is obviously aware of the fact that it is emending the 
preceding prose, the term nityādhikārā a clear reference to anityam adhikaraam. It is not in the style of 
the Arthaśāstra to use such clumsy emendations of preceding rules. Other aspects of the final two verses 
mark them as out of phase with the prose of the section, as well. We are justified, then, in seeing this end 
verse as a willful emendation standing outside of the prose and not a continuation thereof. Moreover, this 
verse is out of tune with the sentiment of the prakaraa, which discusses proper and improper behavior for 
appointees. The prakaraa, in fact, generates an expectation that ministers “who consume his wealth” are 
to be dispensed with anyway. By the time that the instruction to establish appointments with many heads 
and impermanent tenure, the prakaraa seems already to have dealt with bad appointees. Thus, verse KAŚ 
2.9.36 seems even more out of place. As a final note, the final prose sūtra at 2.9.31 does seem to hang a bit 
loosely with the preceding prose. 
212 KAŚ 2.14.55, for its part, refers to the duty of an unnamed official (the Sauvarika by context) to 
“impose penalties on the (artisans) as prescribed.” No penalties are given in this chapter. It is possible, as 
Kangle points out, that this is reference to KAŚ 4.1.26ff. It is noted, however, that those verses break the 
formal structure of adhyāya 4.1 and that the adhyāya, as we have it, appears to assign the right to punish 
directly to the official called prade
 (KAŚ 4.1.1). It is easiest to posit that the end verse is contradicting 
the prose in assigning a punitive capacity to an office that did not previously possess it. 
213 KAŚ 3.3.32 asserts that misconduct (aticāra) on the part of woman leads to the loss of her strīdhana. 
The prose prescribes no such penalty for aticāra. 
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We see the logic of a prose passage disrupted in the end verse also at KAŚ 
2.8.32,214 KAŚ 2.18.20,215 KAŚ 2.19.46,216 KAŚ 4.1.65,217 and KAŚ 7.16.33.218 
5.4.5 General Disjuncture 
A number of other verses produce a variety of quizzical disjunctures with the 
foregoing prose. Examine, in this regard: KAŚ 1.16.33Ð34,219 KAS 2.1.39,220 KAŚ 2.5.22,221 
KAŚ 2.11.116Ð117,222 KAŚ 2.27.30, KAŚ 3.1.38,223 KAŚ 3.13.37,224 and KAŚ 3.20.24.225 
                                                 
214 This rule should have come after KAŚ 2.8.29 rather than after 2.8.31. 
215 KAŚ 2.18.20 is awkwardly linked to the preceding prose in several respects. But, it is its mention of 
“forest produce” that is most odd. This has not been discussed at all in this adhyāya. Moreover, the sūtra 
stub that introduces the verse “And concerning the factories…” is very out of place. Was the adhyāya 
redactor striving to link a poorly-fitted verse to an alien context? Presumably the Superintendent of the 
Armory controlled factories to create his implements of war, but the prose is silent on them. This renders 
the prose tag suspicious as well. 
216 This verse and its preceding prose sūtra should have come after KAŚ 2.19.33, as noted by Kangle 
(1972, 137n). 
217 The verse possesses a singular optative verb without a subject. But, the only subject from the forgoing 
prose is the plural pradeāra. It could be that the subject is the king, but this produces another 
disjuncture, as the king has not been discussed for quite some time. It is likely, however, that the end verses 
run, in a sense, “parallel” to the prose and reflect a slightly different idiom in which the king is an assumed 
subject.  
218 This should have come after KAŚ 7.16.29. 
219 KAŚ 1.16.33Ð34 lists the “work of an emissary” (dūtasya karma), but include several functions not 
covered in the prose: conveying secret agents and troops, kidnapping the enemy’s kinsmen, stealing 
treasure, and secret practices. Given the Arthaśāstra’s proclivity for detailed topical expositions, the 
omission of such practices from the prose produces a noteworthy disjuncture. The verses also mention an 
agent called a “counter-emissary” (pratidūta) that is not mentioned anywhere else in the text. Also the 
advice to guard against an enemy’s dūtas is found in this final verse, which is is out of keeping with the 
prose. 
220 At KAŚ 2.1.39 we read, “Thus, the king should protect produce forests, elephant-forests, irrigation 
works and mines that were made in ancient times and should start new ones.” The problem is that 
instructions regarding produce-forests and elephant-forests are discussed in detail only in the following 
adhyāya (KAŚ 2.2.5 and 2.2.6Ð12, respectively). The king is instructed to establish produce and elephant-
forests “thus” before the instructions on how to do so have been given. In fact, it seems as though KAŚ 2.1 
and 2.2 form a unity, and one wonders whether they have been secondarily divided (possibly even in the 
prakaraa division).  
221 KAŚ 2.5 deals with the duties of the powerful Samnidhāt
, “the Depositor.” Discussed is his overseeing 
construction (2KAŚ .5.2Ð7), the receipt of goods into his stores (2.5.8Ð15), and the penalties for theft from 
these storehouses by his subordinates (2.5.16Ð20). The prose concludes: “Therefore, with trustworthy men 
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5.5 INTEGRATION BETWEEN END VERSE AND PROSE 
Just as we find numerous examples of disjuncture, so too do we find cases where 
the end verse displays some kind of connection with the preceding prose. These are 
important because they might indicate end verses that are original to the prakaraa-text; 
equally, they might indicate prose dating to the adhyāya redaction. We look below at 
examples wherein the prose shows syntactic connection to the following verse, the verse 
completes the argument structure of the prose, and adjacent prose and verse are nearly 
identical.  
5.5.1 Syntactic Integration  
In a limited number of passages (6), we find adhyāya end verses forming a single 
syntactic unit with the preceding prose. In each of these cases, the preceding segment of 
continuous prose is represented by a brief sūtra fragment:226 samārthyaś ca (KAŚ 1.8.29); 
                                                                                                                                                 
under him, the Collector should bring the stores into being” (2.5.21). Following upon this, an end verse 
seems to dangle uncomfortably: “He should be conversant with receipts from outside and inside even after 
a hundred years, so that when asked he would not falter in respect of expenditure, balance and collections.” 
The acceptance of goods into the stores has already been discussed and concluded at KAŚ 2.5.8Ð15. 
Moreover, the keeping of records is not mentioned anywhere in the chapter, being assigned in KAŚ 2.7 to 
the adhyaka. Additionally, the hyperbolic language of the verse (“even after a hundred years”) is most 
foreign to the style of the prose. Together, all of these factors render this verse an odd ending to the prose.  
222 Breloer, according to Kangle, “thinks that as the verses [KAŚ 2.11.116Ð117] deal with the guarding of 
goods while the chapter is concerned with their inspection, they are probably from a different source’ 
(1969, 120n). This is not entirely clear. 
223 One of the most interesting disjunctures in the end verses is the attribution of judicial duty to the king at 
KAŚ 3.1.38. For, nowhere in the prose of the Arthaśāstra is the king characterized as the chief judge of the 
state. This is a conceit only found in the adhyāya end verses. The rest of the verses in KAŚ 3.1.38Ð47 show 
a variety of disjunctures from the conception of jurisprudence in the prose. 
224 The sudden discussion of prostitutes at KAŚ 3.13.37 is “not in keeping with the rest of the Chapter and 
seems derived from a different context” (Kangle 1971, 289n). 
225 This verse, along with the preceding sūtras, clearly intends to conclude the entire adhikaraa. 
226 Not included here is the phrase tatra prativiśeā introducing the longest adhyāya end cluster in the text 
(7.3.22Ð36). The sūtra is not syntactically continuous with the following verses, and seems to indicate 
discretely that they are a citation. Importantly, this cluster with its preceding sūtra fragment also represents 
its own prakaraa (102). Also used twice in adhikaraa 7 is the similar phrase tatraitad bhavati (7.6.14 
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kurvataś ca (1.15.60Ð61); karmāntānā	 ca (2.18.20); deśakālāntaritānā	 tu payānā	 
(4.2.36); tatra tu prativiśea (7.3.21); kāryasiddhi (7.5.45); eva	 upalabhya (9.3.42).227  
Such examples do demonstrate cases where the prose depends on the verse. But, I 
must disagree with Scharfe’s implication that these examples prove that these verses must 
be older than their greater prose contexts.228 Not only has one of these, KAŚ 1.8.29, 
already been linked to the adhyāya redaction, we can see that it would have been little 
more difficult for a redactor to have added a bit of preceding text along with a verse as it 
would have been to add the verse itself. Indeed, this might have been quite necessary if 
the verse was not well adapted to its prose context. These examples might be convincing 
if the verse were grammatically incomplete, but that is not the case: in all of the passages 
cited above the following verse is complete unto itself.  
For similar reasons connective syntax within adhyāya end verses demonstrates 
only the dependence of the verse on the preceding prose and not any integral connection 
between the two. It would be a trifling matter for a redactor to have placed connective 
syntax, such as vā, hi, ca, tasmāt, and so forth, in a verse in order to produce a 
conjunction between pre-existing prose and a novel verse. The same is true for any such 
language in a verse that looks back to the prose. Neither discrete use of a demonstrative 
pronoun (etā),229 proper name (sa	sthā),230 emblematic language (evam svaviśaye 
                                                                                                                                                 
introducing 7.6.15; 7.9.37 introducing 38Ð49), pointing to a prevailing tendency toward verse citation 
found only in the 7th adhikaraa. 
227 Also not included here are the verses referred to as “mantras” in preceding or following sūtras (all 
syntactically complete whether enumerated with the verse as single unit in Kangle’s edition) or and 
instructed to be recited (2.24.27 and in the 14th adhikaraa). These examples, like those discussed in the 
preceding note, show that the text was aware of the verses. But, in both cases, it marks them as quotations. 
Like the preceding examples then, conscious verse citation provides not evidence for and may actually 
argue against the kind of casual verse usage argued to underlie the adhyāya end verses.   
228 1993, 50 
229 KAŚ 1.11.22 
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ktyān aktyā	ś ca)231 nor even direct references to the foregoing subject matter (iti etā 
pa–ca sa	sthā prakīrtitā)232 are, of themselves, sufficient evidence for adducing an 
integral relationship between the prose and the adhyāya end verses (much less the 
anteriority of the latter!).233  
5.5.2 Argument Structure Integration 
The only manner in which an integral relationship might be proven between the 
prose and the adhyāya end verses is in cases that the end verse is required to complete an 
argument whose structure has been enunciated in the prose.234 The only passages that can 
possibly be included in this category are few in the text: KAŚ 1.14.11Ð12, 7.6.40Ð41, and 
13.1.21.235 Because the demonstration of an integral relationship suggests the dependence 
of the prose on the verse, thereby indicating the possibility that the verse may have been 
original to the prakaraa-text, we will look at each of these examples individually. 
                                                                                                                                                 
230 Ibid. 
231 KAŚ 1.13.26 
232 KAŚ 1.11.22 
233 Again, to the contrary, such strategies would make obscuring the novelty of added verses a simple 
matter. 
234 We should note at the outset, however, that if we imagine that the adhyāya redactor may not only have 
added verses, but may also have converted, in some cases, the original prose conclusions into verse form, 
then even this type of analysis becomes much less useful. This model is not less possible than Scharfe’s, 
wherein the composer of the prose text leaves verses scattered throughout the text at adhyāya junctions. 
235 An exception to this is the end verse at KAŚ 1.8.19, which, however is clearly linked to the adhyāya 
redactor and will be discussed again below in connection with the Kauilya dialogues (§6.3.2). A number of 
lesser examples demonstrate a particularly strong continuity between the end verses and the foregoing 
prose, although not rising to the level of the two examples given above. Among these, we might site kaŚ 
1.10.16Ð20; 1.11.22; 1.18.16; 1.19.8; 2.3.34Ð35; 2.19.65Ð66; 4.2.36; 5.6.45; 7.8.34; 7.12.29Ð31; 
13.2.45Ð50; 13.3.58; and 13.4.63. Clearly constituting connected but separate discussions are 1.12.19Ð25; 
6.1.15Ð18; 7.1.25; 7.5.45Ð49; and 7.6.34Ð41. I deem all of these however to be ambiguous and to lack a 
sufficient sense of “necessary connection.” This does not mean that more detailed examination of some 
examples might not yield interesting information, but only that we cannot identify among them firm 
examples of ‘integral and necessary’ connection with the prose.  
 118 
Interestingly, two of these end verses, KAŚ 1.14.11Ð12 and 13.1.21, are intimately 
related, despite occuring at opposite ends of the text. The former, KAŚ 1.14.11Ð22, 
concludes the prakaraa, “The Winning Over of Seducible and Non-Seducible Parties in 
the Enemy’s Realm.” This passage first describes four groups of people who are liable to 
be seduced away from the enemy: people who are enraged, frightened, greedy, and proud 
(KAŚ 1.14.2Ð5). The passage then advises that the king should “cause them to be 
instigated” (upajāpayet) by secret agents (KAŚ 1.14.6) and goes on to detail what the 
secret agent should say to each group, concluding the prescribed incitements with iti [x] 
upajāpayet, “thus should he instigate [x].” After the passage has given different 
instructions for the instigation of each of the four groups, the end verse concludes: 
 
KAŚ 1.14.11 tatheti pratipannāms tān sahitān pa	akarma	ā  
 yojayet yathāśakti sāpasarpā	 svakarmasu  
  
 Those who assent with “yes,” bonded with a reward, he should employ 
according to their power in his own labors, watched by spies. 
So it would appear that the end verse is integrated with the prose by means of 
providing the sought response from the instigated party: tathā-iti, “yes.” It then goes on 
to advise the king to employ them in a generic fashion. 
The next example at KAŚ 13.1.21, concludes a prakaraa called “Instigation.” 
This prakaraa is concerned with tactics for besieging an enemy’s fortress and discusses 
the demoralization of the enemy prior to the siege (KAŚ 13.1.10) and instigating the 
enemy’s chiefs to sedition (KAŚ 13.1.11Ð20). So we see immediately a congruence in 
topic between this and the previous example. 
The instigation to sedition occurs in three passages, but only in the final do we 
find the reported speech of the instigator. Then, as with the previous example, we read in 
the end verse:  
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KAŚ 13.1.21 tatheti pratipanneu dravyadhānyaparigrahai 
 sācivya kāryam ity etad upajāpād bhuta mahat  
 
 When they assent with “yes,” aid should be rendered with wares and 
grains; this is the great miracle arising from instigation. 
In neither case is it immediately clear that a response is expected or required. A 
comparison between the verses allows us to cast more broadly through the text for 
parallel examples. 
We note first that both verses possess nearly identical language in their first pada 
(KAŚ 1.14.11a: tatheti pratipannān; KAŚ 1.13.21a: tatheti pratipanneu). The phrase 
“tathā-iti” is used in other places in the Arthaśāstra: KAŚ 1.17.39, 5.6.36, 9.3.41, and 
13.2.8.236 The term pratipanna is even better attested, and almost always occurs in the 
context of agreeing to instigation.237 Both of these indicate that these end verses are 
drawing on a more common trope.  
If we look more broadly for the practice of rendering responses to instigation 
(upa+jap), we find that some passages detailing instigations discuss either the acceptance 
(pratipanna)238 or refusal (pratyākhyāna)239 of the instigated party, while others say 
nothing at all about the response of the instigated party,240 presumably assuming the 
acquiescence to the instigation.  
                                                 
236 We note that all of these citations occur in parts of the text dealing with some form of instigation. 
237 Again, however, its use is uneven. In the first four books it is only found at KAŚ 1.14.11. Examples of 
its use in the latter half of the text, however, are voluminous: KAŚ 5.1.16; 5.1.34, 5.1.51, 5.2.60, 7.8.3, 
9.3.29, 9.3.30. 9.3.39, 11.1.23, 11.1.32, 11.1.43, 12.3.13, 12.5.24, 13.1.17, 13.1.21, 13.2.4, 13.2.10, 
13.2.19, 13.2.34, 13.2.40, 13.2.43, 13.3.18, 13.3.27, 13.4.31, 13.4.36, 13.4.40, and 13.4.43. The divergence 
in usage may be important. It is possible that context can explain much, if not all, of this divergence.  
238 These examples, as also at KAŚ 11.1.22, etc. 
239 KAŚ 1.10.4, 1.10.6, 1.10.8, 1.10.12, etc 
240 KAŚ 1.11.3; 9.6.45; 9.6.47 (not with upa+jap); 12.3.15; 12.3.16 (not with upa+jap) 
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Ultimately, we find that verbal instigation sometimes warrants a response and at 
other times does not. Concomitantly, we are left with little sense whether a response to 
the instigation should be expected in these cases. While they demonstrate a clear 
connection, it is not entirely clear that they are integral to their greater passages.  
The final potential example comes at KAŚ 7.6.40Ð41. It concludes an adhyāya 
comprising two prakaraas: “Concerning the March of Two Kings Who Have Entered an 
Alliance”; and “Treaties with Stipulations, Without Stipulations, and With Deserters.” 
The first prakaraa is covered in KAŚ 7.6.1Ð3. The second is covered in several sections: 
treaties with stipulations are covered at KAŚ 7.6.4Ð12; treaties without stipulations are 
covered in a single sentence at KAŚ 7.6.13. After a brief interpolation, the passage 
continues: 
 
KAŚ 7.6.16 sadher aktacikīrā ktaślea	a ktavidūa	am avaśīr	akriyā ca 
KAŚ 7.6.17 vikramasya prakāśayuddha kūayuddha tū	īyuddham 
KAŚ 7.6.18 iti sadhivikramau 
 
 Of a treaty, there is a desire for one not made, clinging to one made, 
spoiling one made, and repairing what is broken. 
 Of war, there is open war, concealed war, and secret war. 
 Thus, treaty and war. 
The passage continues on to discuss at KAŚ 7.6.19-22 the four kinds of treaty 
mentioned at 7.6.16. This leads into a discussion of whom, among those who have broken 
a treaty, should be accepted back (KAŚ 7.23Ð39), which runs into the end verses. Finally, 
in the final end verse couplet, we read: 
 
KAŚ 7.6.40Ð41 Open war is fighting at the place and time indicated; creating fright, 
sudden assault, striking when there is error or calamity, giving way 
and striking in one place, are types of concealed warfare; that which 
concerns secret practices and instigations through secret agents is the 
mark of silent war. 
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Thus, a topic opened in the prose (KAŚ 7.6.16Ð18) is apparently concluded in the 
end verse. The prakaraa is clearly only concerned with treaties, the mention of war in 
the prose at KAŚ 7.6.17Ð18 being topically out of place. This opens the possibility that 
mention of the four kinds of treaties at 7.6.16 attracted a discussion of the three kinds of 
war at 7.6.17, the interpolation of which is indicated by the iti clause in 7.6.18. 
Nevertheless, an integral connection between prose and verse is evident, if also somewhat 
weak. Finally, the two verses referring to the kinds of war come at the end of a long 
cluster of end verses (KAŚ 7.6.34Ð41), which may indicate that they are themselves later 
additions. While it is possible that such a verse may have been added in recognition of 
the absence of any discussion of the three kinds of war in the text, it is equally likely that 
it reveals some kind of integral relationship between prose and verse. 
We must, therefore, reserve these three examples as evidence of places where the 
prose and verse might show a degree of rhetorical integration. Ultimately, however, we 
can only conclude that evidence in favor of strong integration between end verse and 
prose is lacking. These three examples do not rise to the level of clear evidence. 
5.5.3 Verses Extending the Prose 
We find many examples in the text of end verses that extend the purview of the 
prose into new areas, subtopics, or applications. These, like the examples of syntactic 
integration examined above, do not indicate any necessary relationship between prose 
and verse other than the dependence of the latter on the former. Many examples of this 
can be found and do not require explication: KAŚ 1.18.16, 2.3.34Ð35, 2.20.65Ð66, 4.7.23Ð28, 
6.1.15, 7.6.33Ð34, 7.11.45, 7.18.43Ð44, 13.4.63, and 15.1.71. 
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5.5.4 Redundancy between Prose and Verse 
We come, then, to the most important evidence adduced by Scharfe to prove his 
theory of a verse original for the extant Arthaśāstra. He points out several places in the 
text where an adhyāya end verse corresponds very closely to the preceding prose: “in 
several chapters the last prose sentence corresponds to the concluding stanza, almost to 
the point of duplicating it; if there are several concluding stanzas, the prose corresponds 
to the first of them” (1993, 49). As an example of this we can cite KAŚ 4.12.36Ð37 
4.12.38Ð40: 
 
KAŚ 4.12.36Ð37 paracakrāavīhtām oghapravyūhām ara	yeu durbhike vā tyaktā 
pretabhāvotsā vā parastriya nistārayitvā yathāsabhāita 
samupabhu–jīta 
 jātiviśiām akāmām apatyavatī nikraye	a dadhyāt 
 
 After rescuing a stranger woman, who was being carried off by enemy 
troops or foresters, or carried away by a current, or was abandoned in 
a forest or during a famine, or was left under the impression of being 
dead, a man may enjoy her as agreed upon. 
 If she is superior in caste, unwilling, or has children, he shall give her 
back for a ransom. 
 
KAŚ 4.12.38Ð40 corahastā	 nadīvegād durbhikād deśavibhramāt 
 nistārayitvā kāntārān naā tyaktā bhteti vā 
 bhu–jīta striyam anyeā yathāsabhāita nara 
 na tu rājapratāpena pramuktā svajanena vā 
 na cottamā na cākāmā pūrvāpatyavatī na ca 
 īdśī tv anurūpe	a nikraye	āpavāhayet 
 
 After having rescued a woman belong to others from the hands of 
robbers, from the current of a river, from a famine, from a 
disturbance in the country, from a forest, or when she is lost or left 
for dead, a man may enjoy her as agreed, but not one who is saved 
through the power of the king or by her kinsmen, nor one higher [in 
caste] nor one unwilling, nor again one who already has children; 




He compares this phenomenon in the Arthaśāstra “to the śloka-vārttika-s which 
often underlie discussion in the Mahābhāya, in that parts of the stanzas are quoted, 
turned into prose and explained; at the end of the discussion the stanzas are quoted once 
more, completely and without interruption” (1993, 49).  
There are several problems, however, with Scharfe’s comparison to the 
Mahābhāya. To begin with, discrete correspondence between prose and ending verse in 
the Arthaśāstra is far from the norm. Scharfe only adduces 8 examples in 150 adhyāyas. 
If he has identified an underlying structural pattern akin to that of the Mahābhāya, then 
we find that it has been remarkably well obscured in most of the text. Moreover, we 
nowhere see the discrete unpacking of a verse in the prose. As in the example above, the 
only evidence of such a phenomenon comes a verse merely restating the preceding prose: 
nowhere is a vārttikā observed, nor do any end verses seem to provide a kind of “root” 
text upon which the prose comments. As we have seen above, most verses are either 
purposeful conclusions or extensions of the prose. Whatever is going on in the 
Arthaśāstra, it is not occuring on the model of the ślokavārttikas.  
If we look at the passages Scharfe has adduced in favor of his theory, we see that 
it is by no means clear that the prose is a repetition of the verse. In many cases, there is 
simply no evidence of which might have had priority or whether both are borrowing from 
a third source.241 In a number of cases, however, we actually have strong evidence that 
the verses have taken the prose as their model rather than vice versa.  
If we revisit the example cited above, we note that the verses contain several 
pieces of information not replicated in the prose, including the important rule that a 
woman saved through the power of the king or a kinsman is also saved from “being 
                                                 
241 We cite, in this regard KAŚ 1.6.51.6.11; 3.20.223.20.24; 9.7.82-83  9.7.84. The only way 
to see in these the priority of the verse is to assume it. 
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enjoyed” (KAŚ 4.12.39). If the prose were later, then this omission is significant and 
difficult to explain; if the verse is later, we can see it simply as an addition. 
If we compare the language of the prose and verse we note that, while some of the 
same lexical items are used (durbhika, nistārayitvā, etc.), we also find the use of 
synonyms (nadī in the verse for ogha in the prose [river/current]; kāntāra for araya 
[forest]). It is difficult to understand why, if the verse was the source, the prose would 
have chosen different terms. Conversely, if the prose were the source, the selection of 
different terms is easier to explain: the original terms did not fit well to the metrical needs 
of the verse composer. In this regard we also note that the terms that are identical 
between prose and verse tend to fall in the first half of the the śloka’s padas (feet), where 
the metrical requirements are much looser: 
 
KAŚ 4.12.38Ð40 corahastā	 nadīvegād   |  durbhikād deśavibhramāt 
 nistārayitvā kāntārān  |  naā tyaktā bhteti vā 
 bhu–jīta striyam anyeā  | yathāsabhāita nara 
 na tu rājapratāpena  |  pramuktā svajanena vā 
 na cottamā na cākāmā  |  pūrvāpatyavatī na ca 
 īdśī tv anurūpe	a  | nikraye	āpavāhayet 
By these indications, the prose appears to be earlier than the verse. We note 
similar indications of the anteriority of the prose at KAŚ 6.1.127.9.38, 
7.16.29(31)7.16.33, and 13.4.613.4.7. The connection between KAŚ 10.3.56 and 
10.3.57 is too weak to demonstrate any such dependency, and the latter being very close 
to a verse at MBh 12.100.13, is likely a free gnomic citation that may have been attracted 
to thematic similarities to the prose.  
Ultimately, the balance of evidence in cases where any relationship can be 
determined clearly favors that the prose appears to be the source of the verse. But, 
another consideration that emerges in these cases is the frequency with which passages 
like this, both prose and verse, are disconnected from the preceding prose discussions. 
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So, at KAŚ 3.20.14Ð20, the final prakaraa lists miscellaneous crimes and 
punishments (prakīraka), until, at 3.20.21, the topic suddenly shifts to jurisprudence 
more generally, and at 3.20.22 we read that “[t]he judges themselves shall look into the 
affairs of gods, Brahmins, ascetics…,” which is the sentiment repeated in the end verse: 
“In this way judges should look into affairs…” (KAŚ 3.20.24). Hence, both prose and 
verse demonstrate a disconnection from the foregoing. 
This is repeated at KAŚ 4.12.36Ð40, given above, where adhyāya 4.12 has 
discussed different sexual crimes. The topic repeated in prose and verse, the right of a 
man to “enjoy” a rescued woman, is wholly out of place. Even more emblematic of this 
tendency, the repeating prose and verse at KAŚ 9.7.82Ð84 are completely disconnected 
with the preceding prose and fall after the colophon concluding the final prakaraa of the 
adhyāya: iti siddhaya (“These are the Means of Overcoming [Dangers]”).  
These examples, which show the prevalence with which the pattern of repeated 
prose and verse are disconnected from the foregoing prose, suggest a common origin for 
both. I would argue that, in these cases, the adhyāya redactor needed to forge a link 
between the prose and the sentiment he wished to express in verse. And, to that end, he 
composed the prose passages and then turned it into a verse.242  
We must conclude, then, that the available evidence supports the notion that the 
verses in these cases depend on the prose. This, of course, rules out the possibility that 
these passages demonstrate the remnants of a process by which a verse composition was 
converted into a prose text. Hence, we can conclude that Scharfe’s theory of the verse 
original stands on insufficient evidence. 
                                                 
242 We note, in this regard, other examples in the text where a shift in topic occurs in the last one or two 
prose sūtras of an adhyāya that is nevertheless in agreement with the verse itself: KAŚ 2.19.45Ð46, 
2.23.17Ð19, etc. 
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5.6 CONCLUSION: END VERSES IMPLICATED 
Because the colophons and end verses operate in tandem throughout the text, they 
appear to have a common origin. It is precisely because of this intimacy, however, that 
proof of that supposition is so difficult to ascertain. 
If we put together what we have learned from the available evidence, a very 
strong case can be made that nearly all (if not all) of the adhyāya end verses are 
interpolations made by the adhyāya redactor. We note first that it is firmly established 
that this adhyāya redaction did take place and was effected on the body of the prakaraa-
text. We have surmised that this redaction must, at a minimum, have been represented by 
the insertion of colophons at the present adhyāya boundaries. I would also argue that bare 
colophons would not have established the adhyāyas so preeminently, and that the verses 
would have granted to the new adhyāya segments a discrete textual shape. The 
authoritative resonance of their verse form and their frequently conclusive tone would 
have helped to enunciate the adhyāya divisions and generate stable new segments. 
The second thing to note is that an examination of the internal verses in the text 
demonstrates that the use of verses outside of the present adhyāya conclusions is 
infrequent, limited to specific places in the text, and poorly protected from suspicions of 
interpolation. This shows that the present adhyāya end verses can scarcely be viewed as 
continuous with the use of verse in the text more generally. They are a distinct 
phenomenon. As such, the prakaraa-text takes on even more the characteristic of a 
purely prose text.  
The verses that presently end adhyāyas are not, therefore, drawn from a scattering 
of random verses throughout the text, but are built of verses that happen to fall 
specifically at the present adhyāya junctures. This means that the present adhyāya end 
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verses have always served the purpose that they serve now: the subdivision of the text. 
Their frequently conclusive sentiment reinforces this view. 
Despite the fact that this is something that must be judged subjectively, the 
evidence of widespread disjuncture between prose and verse argues against a common 
authorship for the two. Scharfe has faulted the prose author for deviating from the 
dictates of the putative verse Ur-text. This theory is not only counterintuitive, but rests on 
discredited evidence. The simple truth is that, for the most part, the prose does not need 
the verses, but the verses need the prose. Evidence of integration between the two is 
ambiguous.243 
From this, I would argue that the end verses in the text can generally be attributed 
to the adhyāya redaction. We find little support for the use of verse outside of the 
adhyāya boundaries and evidence of integration between verse and prose is very weak. 
For the most part, then, we can consider the Arthaśāstra’s end verses to be “a foreign 
corpus adjoined to a received text.” 
                                                 
243 Most end verses, certainly, are unremarkable in this regard, which is to say that they betray neither a 
necessary connection nor any obvious disjunction with the preceding prose.243 From these examples we 
can draw no conclusions, other than that we do not find evidence of disjuncture between prose and verse in 
these passages. Aggregating, with these, the adhyāyas that possess inverses themselves integrated with the 
prose (§5.6.2), we can recognize that adhikaraas 6, 8, 11, 12, 13, 14 and 15 show no clear disjuncture 
between verse and prose. On the contrary, clear examples of disjuncture are found only in adhikaraas 1, 2, 
3, 4, and 7. 
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Chapter 6: Adhyāya Redaction III Ð Scholastic Exchanges 
The inclusion of the end verses in the adhyāya redaction gives us a firm body of 
textual material strongly associated with the adhyāya redaction that can be analyzed for 
content. This moves our analysis of the adhyāya redaction from the logic of segmentation 
to the ideational content of its interpolations. In this chapter, we look at the most 
prominent feature of the Arthaśāstra to be implicated in the adhyāya redaction: the 
scholastic exchanges, which I refer to as Kauilya dialogues. An analysis of these 
dialogues not only shows a direct connection with the adhyāya end verses, but also 
reveals various other ways in which these dialogues betray their own role in the local 
interpolation and transformation of various passages.  
We find the opinion of Kauilya directly quoted 88 times in the text.244 They are 
concentrated most heavily in adhikaraas 1 (9 times), 3 (10), 7 (29), and 8 (28). These 
Kauilya dialogues, for their part, make no such claims about the authorship of the whole 
treatise, but only the uttarapakas given in Kauilya’s voice.245 Nevertheless, we do see a 
common function between the direct attributions from elements dating to the adhyāya 
redaction and the dialogues: both seek to put the words of the text in the mouth of a 
legendary statesman, a Brahmin no less, who is credited with establishing the greatest 
South Asian dynasty of antiquity. 
The traditional ascription of the entire text to Kauilya seems to have come more 
from the end verses (discussed below) than from the Kauilya dialogues, which can as 
                                                 
244 Not including citations of the same among the tantrayuktis in KAŚ 15.1. 
245 Although the extent of these uttarapakas is at times unclear, for they do not always begin with the 
explanatory particle hi or conclude with the quotative particle iti. A prime example of this occurs in the 
Kauilya dialogue at KAŚ 1.17.30ff., where it is not clear if Kauilya has concluded at 1.17.33 or whether 
his response continues onward, as the next passage (1.17.34) features the connective particle tu. These 
kinds of “voice problems” are common in the Arthaśāstra.  
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easily be interpreted to demonstrate that Kauilya did not write the greater treatise. On 
this point, we note that the text itself is identified in the adhikaraa colophons as the 
kaualīyārthaśāstra, which name has two possible translations. The term “Kaualīya” is a 
nominal derivative (taddhita) of the clan (gotra) name Kauilya.246 Hence, it submits to 
two translations: “The Arthaśāstra of Kauilya” or “The Arthaśāstra of the Followers of 
Kauilya.” The latter would be more in line with the notion of a prose text into which the 
voice of the followers’ teacher occasionally irrupts. Not only do the dialogues themselves 
speak of him in the third person (a not wholly conclusive fact), but the manner of the 
irruption of these dialogues into the text mimics the manner in which a teacher might 
interject or be invoked by his followers to settle the occasional thorny issue on which 
other teachers have offered erroneous or conflicting opinions. At any rate, the name of 
the text is not attested before the addition of the adhikaraa colophons (of uncertain 
origin), so it tells us little about the origins of the treatise. It does, however, leave open 
the possibility that the early composers and editors may not have thought that Kauilya 
composed the whole treatise.  
The following sections look at the evidence that suggests the Kauilya material in 
the Arthaśāstra can be linked to the adhyāya redaction. As with the adhyāya end verses, 
we will not be able to implicate all of the Kauilya quotations in the text at a stroke. But, 
as also with those verses, we can find a sufficient concurrence of evidence that many of 
the passages under consideration are linked to the adhyāya redaction and many more 
cannot have been written by the composer of the prakaraa-text. And, as with the end 
verses, we can see that the Kauilya quotes possess unique tendencies and functions that 
                                                 
246 I do not here go into the debate regarding the spelling Kauilya vs. Kaualya. For more on this, see 
Berger 1955, Jolly 1927, Kangle 1965, 111ff. 
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suggest they can be isolated as a discrete compositional element, the work of a single 
composer and introduced into the text at a single moment.  
6.1 DIRECT ATTRIBUTION OF THE ARTHAŚĀSTRA TO KAUŢILYA 
As mentioned above, all of the direct ascriptions of the Arthaśāstra to Kauilya 
fall in adhyāya end verses (KAŚ 1.1.19, 2.10.63, and 15.1.71Ð73). Because of their 
connection with the adhyāya redaction,247 these must not only be rejected as providing 
evidence of the authorship of the text, but must be admitted as potential evidence of the 
relatively late attribution of the work to Kauilya.  
The first passage (KAŚ 1.1.19) is the end verse of the first adhyāya. As noted 
above, this adhyāya falls “outside” of the prakaraa-text itself. As such, this verse cannot 
have its origin with the composer of the prakaraa-text and was almost certainly added 
by the adhyāya redactor to transform the material of the first adhyāya into a uniform 
segment within the text (the first of 150): 
 
KAŚ 1.1.19 sukhagraha	avij–eya tattvārthapadaniścitam 
 kauilyena kta śāstra vimuktagranthavistaram 
 
 Easy to grasp and understand, harmonious among reality, meaning, and 
word, this śāstra was composed by Kauilya, free of excess verbiage. 
Clearly, this verse, looking back at the long list of prakaraas and adhikaraas at 
KAŚ 1.1.3Ð17, attributes the entire text to Kauilya. Moreover, it echoes the opening line 
of the first adhyāya (and hence, the opening line of the text): 
 
KAŚ 1.1.1 pthivyā lābhe pālane ca yāvanty arthaśāstrā	i pūrvācāryai 
prasthāpitāni prāyaśas tāni sahtyaikam idam arthaśāstram ktam 
 
                                                 
247 It should be noted that each of these bears an independent relationship with the adhyāya redaction 
beyond their simply being adhyāya end verses. The connection of the first and last adhyāyas has been 
discussed above (§3.4). The connection of KAŚ 2.10 to the adhyāya redaction is discussed in Chapter 7. 
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  This single arthaśāstra was composed by bringing together most of 
arthaśāstras that have been composed by previous teachers for the 
purpose of acquiring and protecting the world. 
 
The repetition of the [idam] [artha]śāstra	 k
tam formula links these two 
passages and reveals how both are primarily concerned with describing the composition 
of the text itself. They are hardly incidental, but purposeful testaments to the text as a 
whole. 
The second attribution of the entire treatise to Kauilya comes at the end of the 
final adhyāya (KAŚ 15.1), also dated to the adhyāya redaction. We note also that this end 
verse passage concludes the text:  
 
KAŚ 15.1.71Ð73  evam śāstram ida yuktam etābhis tantrayuktibhi  
 avāptau pālane coktam lokasyāsya parasya ca 
 dharmam artha ca kāma ca pravartayati pāti ca  
 adharmānarthavidveśān idam śāstra nihanti ca 
 yena śāstra ca śastra ca nandarājagatā ca bhū  
 amare	oddhtāny āsu tena śāstram ida ktam 
 
 Thus this śāstra, expounded with these tantrayuktis, has been 
composed for the acquisition and protection of this world and the 
next. 
 This śāstra brings into being and preserves dharma, artha, and kāma 
and destroys adharma, anartha and hatred. 
 This śāstra has been composed by him [i.e., Kauilya], who in 
resentment, quickly regenerated the science and the weapon and the 
earth that was under the control of the Nanda kings. 
The verbal formula and concepts at work here weave KAŚ 1.1.1, 1.1.19, and 
15.1.71Ð73 into a comprehensive set of attributions. The verse at KAŚ 15.1.73, with its 
reference to the acquisition (avāpti) and protection (pālana) of the earth (loka) concludes 
its adhyāya with a restatement of the opening phrase of 1.1.1 (prithivyā [:lokasya] lābhe 
[:avaptau] pālane [:pālane]), while maintaining the ida	 śāstram k
tam (:uktam) formula 
from there. The final verse, KAŚ 15.1.73, like 1.1.1, 1.1.19, and 15.1.71 deals with the 
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composition of the text, and identifies Kauilya as the composer in all but name as the 
vanquisher of the Nanda kings. Note again the formula tena śāstram idam k
tam, a direct 
echo of idam arthaśāstra	 k
tam in KAŚ 1.1.1, kauīlyena śāstram k
tam in 1.1.19, and 
śāstram idam…uktam in 15.1.73. 
Hence we find that our direct attributions of the authorship of the text to Kauilya 
fall at key points in the text: the beginning and end of the first adhyāya and the end of the 
last adhyāya, all positions that link them directly to the adhyāya redaction. Moreover, 
their uniquely direct discussion of the composition, utilizing an archetypal formula of 
*kauilyena idam śāstram k
tam links them stylistically to one another. This illustrates 
that the adhyāya redactor is responsible for the direct attribution of the entire text to 
Kauilya. 
The only other direct attribution of any part of the text to Kauilya comes in the 
end verse of adhyāya 2.10, an infamously difficult passage on edicts. Scharfe has ably 
demonstrated that this adhyāya has been culled from several different sources (1993, 
60Ð66). It is also one of the adhyāyas richest in adhyāya-internal verses. Perhaps in 
awareness of the transparency of its constructed and novel character (or perhaps because 
the introduction of a new adhyāya provided more freedom in the construction of a novel 
end verse), its concluding verse hastens to tell us: 
 
KAŚ 2.10.63 sarvaśāstrā	y anukramya prayogam upalabhya ca 
 kauilyena narendrārthe śāsanasya vidhi kta 
 
 After going through all the śāstras in detail and after observing the 
practice, Kauilya has made these rules about edicts for the sake of 
kings. 
This end verse in particular among all others is strongly linked to the adhyāya 
redactor (see Chapter 7). Moreover, it is stylistically linked to the verbiage of the KAŚ 
1.1.1 as well as the citation formula of the other verses directly attributing the text to 
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Kauilya. Hence we recognize sarvaśāśtrāy anukramya (“After going through all the 
śāstras in detail”) as a paraphrase of yāvanty arthaśāstrāi pūrvācāryai prasthāpitāni 
prāyaśas tāni sa	h
tya (“Having brought together most part of the Arthaśāstras that were 
composed by previous teachers”) from KAŚ 1.1.1. Note also the presence of the citation 
formula, *kauilyena ida	 śāstra	 k
tam in the verse’s kauilyena…vidhi k
ta. 
6.1.1 Are the Dialogues Linked to These Passages? 
It follows that the only direct ascriptions of the text to Kauilya are both strongly 
linked to the adhyāya redaction and strongly linked to one another in point of style and 
phraseology. In these verses, we can identify a concerted effort on the part of the adhyāya 
redactor to demonstrate not only Kauilya’s authorship of the Arthaśāstra, but also the 
manner of the text’s construction (by pulling together previous texts). The recognition of 
these efforts begins to cast doubt on the origin of the Kauilya dialogues, for it is in those 
places that other “texts” or, at least, “previous teachers,” are directly cited in the text. 
While the precise compositional process referred to in these passages is not entirely clear, 
it is highly possible that the reference to collating the works of previous teachers is meant 
to refer to the citation of other teachers in the pūrvapakas of the Kauilya dialogues.248  
Let us look again more closely at the opening line of the extant text: 
 
KAŚ 1.1.1 pthivyā lābhe pālane ca yāvanty arthaśāstrā	i pūrvācāryai 
prasthāpitāni prāyaśas tāni sahtyaikam idam arthaśāstra ktam 
 
 This single arthaśāstra was composed by bringing together most of 
arthaśāstras that have been composed by previous teachers for the 
purpose of acquiring and protecting the world. 
 
                                                 
248 It is no less likely that the reference to collecting earlier sources refers to the aggregation and editing of 
larger tracts, perhaps, as Trautmann has argued, comparable to the present adhikaraas of the text (1971). 
My sense, however, is that the reference in KAŚ 1.1.1 is almost certain made regarding the Kauilya 
dialogues. 
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The key phrase in this regard is yāvanty arthaśāstrāi pūrvācāryai prasthāpitāni 
prāyaśas tāni sa	h
tya, which, while being somewhat obscure, is best translated as 
“having drawn together most of the Arthaśāstras produced by earlier teachers.”249 In this, 
we are told that the Kauilīya Arthaśāstra was composed after the author had brought 
together (sa	 + √h
) most of the arthaśāstras produced by pūrvācāryas, “previous 
teachers.” 
The intention of this passage is not only to recognize the generally composite 
(sa	 + √h
) nature of the Kauilīya Arthaśāstra, but also to highlight the role of the 
productions (prasthāpita) of previous teachers (pūrvācārya). And some of these 
pūrvācāryas must indeed appear in our present text, generally providing the pūrvapakas 
in the Kauilya dialogues. They are often mentioned by name (Bhāradvāja, Viśālāka, 
Parāśara, Piśuna, Kauapadanta, Vātavyādhi, Bāhudantīputra, and so on) or by school 
(Mānava [i.e., Manu], Bārhaspatya [Bhaspati], Auśanasa [Uśanas], etc.). Frequently (56 
times), however, they are cited collectively as the ācāryas.250 The reference at KAS 1.1.1 
and the citations in the pūrvapakas are not to the specifically religious ācārya of 
orthodox Vedic education, who is invoked less frequently in the text (13 times)251 and is 
defined by his sacral character and personal, lifelong relationship with the pupil, but 
rather experts in various fields to whom one resorts as needed for expertise in specific 
                                                 
249 Translations follows Olivelle (forthcoming). 
250 Note the predominance of the generic reference to ācāryas in the latter half of the text; the earlier half 
tends, instead, to cite individual teachers. KAŚ 1.4.6; 1.10.16; 2.9.11; 3.4.9; 3.5.23; 3.7.1; 3.14.6; 3.17.10; 
3.19.17; 3.19.19; 3.20.24; 7.1.2; 7.1.30; 7.4.8; 7.5.3; 7.5.12; 7.6.30; 7.9.9; 7.9.13; 7.9.18; 7.9.22; 7.9.26; 
7.9.31; 7.9.50; 7.10.12; 7.11.13; 7.11.37; 7.12.9; 7.12.14; 7.12.19; 7.12.22; 7.13.31; 7.15.15; 7.17.3; 8.1.5; 
8.2.5; 8.2.29; 8.2.13; 8.2.21; 8.4.2; 8.4.5; 8.4.9; 8.4.13; 8.4.16; 8.4.21; 8.4.25; 8.4.27; 8.4.31; 8.4.34; 8.4.38; 
8.4.41; 9.1.5; 9.1.12; 9.1.26; 9.1.42; 9.2.21. 
251 KAŚ 1.3.10; 1.9.10; 1.19.23; 1.19.31; 2.1.7; 2.4.8; 3.6.23; 3.16.37; 3.20.18; 4.11.13; 4.13.30; 5.3.3. 
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areas, as attested at KAŚ 1.5.6, 2.30.42, and 5.3.18.252 It is clearly to such specialists, 
particularly teachers of arthaśāstra, that KAŚ 1.1.1 refers. 
Hence, the ācāryas of the Kauilya dialogues are the same kinds of individuals 
from whose works KAŚ 1.1.1 tells us that the Kauilīya Arthaśāstra was composed. While 
it is not entirely clear that the adhyāya redactor is referring in this passage specifically to 
the Kauilya dialogues themselves, the dialogues do, nevertheless, stand as the most 
representative examples in the text of the manner in which the adhyāya redactor states 
that the extant Arthaśāstra was composed. I would argue, moreover, that this connection 
would have been extremely clear to the adhyāya redactor, who places the collation of 
previous teachers’ pronouncements at the heart of the text’s composition (according to 
KAŚ 1.1.1). Hence, I would argue that we find a possible connection between the way that 
the adhyāya redactor characterized the fundamental process by which the text was 
composed and the dialogues themselves. 
6.2 OVERLAP BETWEEN END VERSES AND DIALOGUES 
Despite the apparent connection discussed above between the Kauilya dialogues 
and direct ascription of the Arthaśāstra to Kauilya, we have other indications that the 
adhyāya redactor was responsible for the inclusion of some of the Kauilya dialogues. 
The best evidence of this comes in two passages wherein a Kauilya dialogue is carried 
out wholly or in part within an adhyāya end verse.  
KAŚ 1.10.16Ð20 
The most important of these comes in the end verse of adhyāya 1.10 (discussed 
already at §5.4.3), where not only the entire Kauilya dialogue occurs in the end verses, 
                                                 
252 Note in particular, KAŚ 1.5.6: “But training and discipline in the sciences [are acquired] by [accepting] 
the authoritativeness of the teachers in the respective sciences (yathāsvam ācāryaprāmāyāt).”  
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but the end verses actually cast the preceding prose text as the opinion of “the teachers” 
(ācārya) before going on to give Kauilya’s.  
The context is the discussion of the four tests by which the king may ascertain the 
loyalty (śuddha) of his ministers (amātya). The prose discussion describes four tests, each 
of which involve deceiving a minister by giving the appearance that the king is impious, 
wicked, or dangerous or that the queen is in love with the targeted minister. In all of the 
cases the king or queen is the “object” of the ruse. The prose discussion is unambiguous 
in advising these tests and, what is more, complete unto itself (KAŚ 1.10.1Ð15). 
The prose is followed by four integrated end verses. The first summarizes the 
conclusion of the prose (KAŚ 1.10.13Ð15) and crucially presents the entire foregoing 
passage as the pūrvapaka (erroneous view) of the “teachers” (ācārya): 
 
KAŚ 1.10.16 “He should appoint ministers, who have been cleared by [the four 
tests], to duties appropriate to them and in accordance with their 
integrity”: this has been laid down by the teachers (ācārya). 
Having thus recast the entire prose prakaraa as the erroneous view, the verses go 
on to give the uttarapaka (“correct view”) in the voice of Kauilya: 
 
KAŚ 1.10.17Ð20 “However, under no circumstance must the king make himself or the 
queen the target for the sake of ascertaining the probity of ministers”; 
this is the opinion of Kauilya (etat kauilyadarśanam). 
 “He should not effect the corruption of the uncorrupted as of water by 
poison; for, it may well happen that a cure may not be found for one 
corrupted.” 
 “And the mind, perverted by the fourfold secret tests, may not turn 
back without going to the end, remaining fixed in the will of spirited 
persons. Therefore, the king should make an outsider the object of 
reference in the fourfold work [of testing] and [thus] investigate 
through secret agents the integrity or otherwise of ministers.” 
In effect, the verses have invalidated all four of the tests that comprise the bulk of 
the prose prakaraa. There can be little doubt not only that these end verses could not 
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have been written by the composer of the prose, but also that the adhyāya redactor here 
uses a Kauilya dialogue to emend the prakaraa-text.253  
Now, the possibility must be admitted that this may represent an isolated case, 
that the adhyāya redactor may simply have been imitating pre-existing dialogues within 
the text, and therefore, the greater body of Kauilya dialogues is not implicated. As such, 
we will have to look more broadly at the dialogues. 
KAŚ 1.8.29 
Another crucial example of the connection between the dialogues and the end 
verses comes at the end of adhyāya 1.8. The particular importance of this example is that 
Kauilya’s uttarapaka is written in a combination of prose and verse. After a long series 
of opinions from specific teachers on the appropriate protocol for selecting ministers 
(amātya) that comprises the entirety of the preceding prose in adhyāya 1.8, we read: 
 
KAŚ 1.8.27Ð29 “All [of the opinions stated above] are justifiable,” says Kauilya. “For, 
from the capacity (sāmarthya) for doing work is the ability 
(sāmarthya) of a person judged. And in accordance with that ability 
(sāmarthyataś ca), Ñ 
  
 he should appoint all these as ministers, by suitably distributing rank 
among ministers and assigning place, time, and work [to them]; he 
should not, however, appoint them as councilors.” 
The verse forms a seamless continuation of the opinion of Kauilya given in the 
prose. Here, the possibility must also be admitted that the adhyāya redactor has simply 
extended a pre-existing Kauilya dialogue into a new end verse of his own composition. 
We witness, however, a very nice string of logic to close the discussion of amātyotpatti 
(“The Appointment of Ministers”): sāmarthya in work determines the sāmarthya of an 
                                                 
253 This example demonstrates two key elements found within the Kauilya dialogues: authorship by the 
adhyāya redactor and their use to emend the prakaraa-text. 
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individual, and according to that individual’s sāmarthya should he be assigned a 
ministership.254 More to the point, the end verse is required if Kauilya’s uttarapaka is to 
conform to the pūrvapakas of this dialogue, all of which give their response to the 
previous position, justify that response, and directly enjoin the appointment of persons to 
the office of minister.255 Thus, the prose and verse almost certainly have the same author: 
the adhyāya redactor. Of this we can be certain because this end verse, KAŚ 1.8.29, is the 
same that is implicated above in the misconstrual of the boundary of the amātyotpatti 
prakaraa (§5.4.2). 
 
Hence, we can see not only that the adhyāya redactor composed Kauilya 
dialogues in his end verses (KAŚ 1.10.16Ð20), but also that he composed them in the prose 
of the text as well (KAŚ 1.18.1Ð19). Although these are the only dialogues that are linked 
directly with the adhyāya end verses, we find indication of other links between the 
Kauilya dialogues and the adhyāya redaction. 
6.3 DIALOGUES OTHERWISE LINKED TO THE ADHYĀYA REDACTION 
Having seen, to this point, a direct connection between the adhyāya redaction and 
certain dialogues, we should look more closely at other dialogues that may be involved 
with the adhyāya redaction in less obvious ways. 
                                                 
254 The likelihood that the adhyāya redactor composed this entire dialogue is further increased by the 
manner in which its fundamental premise (that one should choose ministers based on factors of heredity, 
friendship, capacity, and so forth) is immediately contradicted by the premise of the next discussion of 
appointming ministers at KAŚ 1.9.1Ð8) Which identifies the best candidates for ministership not based on 
such abstract qualities, but on a lengthy and diverse series of qualifying attributes. 
255 The pattern in the pūrvapakas in KAŚ 1.9 is even more discrete. Except for the first, which is different 
because it must lay out the initial position in its opening line, the next 5 pūrvapakas all follow the 
following format: 1) agreeing or disagreeing with the previous position; 2) giving the major reason for their 
disagreement; and, 3) enjoining the appointment of certain individuals to ministerships. Without the end 
verse, Kauilya’s uttarapaka lacks the third element. Formally, therefore, it is likely that the same 
individual is responsible for both end verse and prose. 
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The most evident of these are passages in which Kauilya dialogues provide 
needed “bulk” to fill out prakaraa segments dismembered by the adhyāya redaction. In 
these cases, a prakaraa appears to have been cut into pieces too small to make sufficient 
adhyāyas. It appears that Kauilya dialogues were then introduced to provide the 
necessary verbiage. 
KAŚ 1.2, 1.4 
The first example comes from the first prakaraa, vidyāsamuddeśa (“The 
Enumeration of the Sciences”). In the extant text this prakaraa is spread over adhyāyas 
1.2, 1.3, 1.4, and the first sūtra of 1.5. The division of the prakaraa into adhyāyas is 
irregular. This can be demonstrated if we first look only at the arrangement of the 
prakaraa as evident in the sūtras giving its subtopics: 
 
I. 
Philosophy, the Veda, Economics, and Political Science 
(daanīti) are the Sciences. 
    A. Sākhya, Yoga, and Lokāyata constitute Philosophy. 
    B. The three Vedas, Sāma, g, and Yajur, constitute the Veda. 
    C. Agriculture, Animal Husbandry, and Trade constitute Economics. 
    D. The means of ensuring the welfare of Philosophy, the Veda, and 
Economics is the Staff (daa), and its use (nīti) constitutes 
Political Science (daanīti). 
II. Therefore, the three Sciences are rooted in the Staff (daa). 





Philosophy, the Veda, Economics, and Political Science 
(daanīti) are the Sciences. 
KAŚ 1.2.10 Sākhya, Yoga, and Lokāyata constitute Philosophy. 
KAŚ 1.3.1 The three Vedas, Sāma, g, and Yajur, constitute the Veda 
KAŚ 1.4.1a Agriculture, Animal Husbandry, and Trade constitute Economics. 
KAŚ 1.4.6a The means of ensuring the welfare of Philosophy, the Veda, and 
Economics is the Staff (daa), and its use (nīti) constitutes 
Political Science (daanīti). 
KAŚ 1.5.1 Therefore, the three Sciences are rooted in the Staff (daa). 
 140 
The outstanding feature of the adhyāya division is the isolation of the second 
science, the Triple Veda, into its own adhyāya (KAŚ 1.3). This has generated two 
truncated prakaraa segments with no internal cohesion.  
Now, each of the sciences is followed by an explanation of why it is useful.256 If 




Philosophy, the Veda, Economics, and Political Science 
(daanīti) are the Sciences. 
KAŚ 1.2.10 Sākhya, Yoga, and Lokāyata constitute Philosophy. 
KAŚ 1.2.11 [usefulness of Philosophy] 
KAŚ 1.3.1 The three Vedas, Sāma, g, and Yajur, constitute the Veda 
KAŚ 1.3.4 [usefulness of the Veda duties of the classes and ways of life] 
KAŚ 1.3.5 [duties of the classes and ways of life] 
KAŚ 1.3.6 [duties of the classes and ways of life] 
KAŚ 1.3.7 [duties of the classes and ways of life] 
KAŚ 1.3.8 [duties of the classes and ways of life] 
KAŚ 1.3.9 [duties of the classes and ways of life] 
KAŚ 1.3.10 [duties of the classes and ways of life] 
KAŚ 1.3.11 [duties of the classes and ways of life] 
KAŚ 1.3.12 [duties of the classes and ways of life] 
KAŚ 1.3.13 [duties of the classes and ways of life] 
KAŚ 1.4.1a Agriculture, Animal Husbandry, and Trade constitute Economics. 
KAŚ 1.4.1b [usefulness of Economics] 
KAŚ 1.4.6a The means of ensuring the welfare of Philosophy, the Veda, and 
Economics is the Staff (daa), and its use (nīti) constitutes 
Political Science (daanīti). 
KAŚ 1.4.6b [practical definition of Political Science] 
KAŚ 1.5.1 Therefore, the three Sciences are rooted in the Staff  
(daa). 
The addition of these explanations of the usefulness of the sciences (KAŚ 1.2.11, 
1.3.4Ð13, 1.4.1b, and 1.4.6b) results in a strange situation. KAŚ 1.3, the only adhyāya to 
retain any topical integrity (i.e., it is not composed of a truncated subdivision), has been 
dramatically expanded by an integrated discussion of “the duties of the classes and ways 
of life” (varāśramadharma), while the the other sciences have been expanded by only a 
                                                 
256 In the case of the first three sciences, these explanations all use the verb upa + √k
, “to benefit.” The 
description of daanīti, however, does not follow this format. I think that these three initial “explanations” 
were added during the adhyāya redaction. 
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single sūtra or half sūtra. This is because the explanation of the Veda discretely 
introduces a new passage: 
 
KAŚ 1.3.4 ea trayīdharmaś catur	ā var	ānām āśramā	ā ca 
svadharmasthāpanād aupkārika 
 
 This Vedic dharma is useful because it establishes the Individual Duty 
(svadharma) of the four classes (vara) and ways of life (āśramas). 
This passage is clearly intended to introduce the following extended discussion on 
the svadharma of the four varas and āśramas, which begins in the next passage with: 
 
KAŚ 1.3.5 The svadharma of a Brahmin is education, teaching, sacrificing for 
oneself, sacrificing for others, giving gifts, and receiving gifts. 
This is followed by the presentation of the svadharma of each of the four varas 
and āśramas (KAŚ 1.3.6Ð12) as well as the svadharma common to all (1.3.13).  
We can see, therefore, that the first iteration from the main structure of the 
prakaraa, involving passages explaining the usefulness or purpose of each of the 
sciences, results in the inclusion of a long passage on varāśramadharma in adhyāya 1.3. 
The special consideration given to the Veda (and varāśramadhama) over against the 
other sciences is in agreement with the purpose of the adhyāya division, which appears to 
have been to segregate the discussion of the Veda from the discussion of the other 
sciences at KAŚ 1.3. This confluence of form and function renders it likely, therefore, that 
this first iteration from the main structure of the prakaraa explains the specific manner 
in which the passage was divided into adhyāyas.257  
                                                 
257 It could be argued, however, that the explanations of usefulness were already part of the prakaraa and 
that the adhyāya redactor was only formalizing an already distorted passage. This is very unlikely, both 
because the discussion of varāśramadharma disrupts the structure of the prakaraa and also because the 
intention of the prakaraa is clearly to highlight daanīti and not the Veda. We can add to these reasons 
perhaps the most compelling evidence, namely that the passages cited above as the root passages in the 
prakaraa are all written in the pithy sūtra style: short and lacking any verbs. In this, it seems to parallel 
the passage which may have originally began the second half of the text, in KAŚ 7.1. The language of the 
prakaraa and its relationship with the opening of the seventh adhikaraa is discussed below. 
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But this division has resulted in two prakaraa segments that do not meet the 
observed minimum length for adhyāyas (8 sūtras). We see how dialogues have been used 




Philosophy, the Veda, Economics, and Political Science 
(daanīti) are the Sciences. 
KAŚ 1.2.2 [Kauilya dialogue] 
KAŚ 1.2.3 [Kauilya dialogue] 
KAŚ 1.2.4 [Kauilya dialogue] 
KAŚ 1.2.5 [Kauilya dialogue] 
KAŚ 1.2.6 [Kauilya dialogue] 
KAŚ 1.2.7 [Kauilya dialogue] 
KAŚ 1.2.8 [Kauilya dialogue] 
KAŚ 1.2.9 [Kauilya dialogue] 
KAŚ 1.2.10 Sākhya, Yoga, and Lokāyata constitute Philosophy. 
KAŚ 1.2.11 [usefulness of Philosophy] 
KAŚ 1.3.1 The three Vedas, Sāma, g, and Yajur, constitute the Veda. 
KAŚ 1.3.4 [usefulness of the Veda duties of the classes and ways of life] 
KAŚ 1.3.5 [duties of the classes and ways of life] 
KAŚ 1.3.6 [duties of the classes and ways of life] 
KAŚ 1.3.7 [duties of the classes and ways of life] 
KAŚ 1.3.8 [duties of the classes and ways of life] 
KAŚ 1.3.9 [duties of the classes and ways of life] 
KAŚ 1.3.10 [duties of the classes and ways of life] 
KAŚ 1.3.11 [duties of the classes and ways of life] 
KAŚ 1.3.12 [duties of the classes and ways of life] 
KAŚ 1.3.13 [duties of the classes and ways of life] 
KAŚ 1.4.1a Agriculture, Animal Husbandry, and Trade constitute Economics. 
KAŚ 1.4.1b [usefulness of Economics] 
KAŚ 1.4.3a The means of ensuring the welfare of Philosophy, the Veda, and 
Economics is the Staff (daa), and its use (nīti) constitutes 
Political Science (daanīti). 
KAŚ 1.4.3b [practical definition of Political Science] 
KAS 1.4.4 [Kauilya dialogue] 
KAS 1.4.5 [Kauilya dialogue] 
KAS 1.4.6 [Kauilya dialogue] 
KAS 1.4.7 [Kauilya dialogue] 
KAS 1.4.8 [Kauilya dialogue] 
KAS 1.4.9 [Kauilya dialogue] 
KAS 1.4.10 [Kauilya dialogue] 
KAS 1.4.11 [Kauilya dialogue] 
KAS 1.4.12 [Kauilya dialogue] 
KAS 1.4.13 [Kauilya dialogue] 
KAS 1.4.14 [Kauilya dialogue] 
KAS 1.4.15 [Kauilya dialogue] 
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KAŚ 1.5.1 Therefore, the three Sciences are rooted in the Staff  
(daa). 
Thus, we can see that the Kauilya dialogues have provided the required bulk to 
turn the truncated prakaraa subsections into adhyāyas. By examining the basic structure 
of the prakaraa and then the manner in which it has been expanded through successive 
iterations, we find a confluence between the form and placement of the Kauilya 
dialogues with the function of the adhyāya division.258 
That this transformation occurred during the adhyāya redaction is further 
reinforced by the character of the verses placed at the end of the newly formed adhyāyas, 
each of which speak directly either of “all dharmas” (KAŚ 1.2.12) or directly of 
svadharma and the dharma of the four varas and āśramas (KAŚ 1.3.16Ð17; 1.4.16). I take 
the mention of these concepts in the end verse as further revealing the intention of the 
adhyāya redactor, as each links the newly-created adhyāyas to the discussion of 
varāśramadharma, the inclusion of which has distorted the structure of the prakaraa in 
the first place and necessitated the inclusion of the two Kauilya dialogues.  
KAŚ 1.7 
A similar situation occurs in prakaraa 3, indriyajaya (“Control Over the 
Senses”), which has been divided over two adhyāyas. Inserted within the discussion of 
indriyajaya is a discussion of the ariavarga, (“the group of six enemies;” i.e., lust, 
anger, greed, pride, arrogance, and foolhardiness). Each of these “enemies” is illustrated 
                                                 
258 Alternate explanations for the form of the prakaraa in the extent text do not change this conclusion. 
For, if the tract on varāśramadharma was original to the prakaraa-text, then the adhyāya redactor would 
still have needed to add length to the sections after he segmented off the discussion of the Veda. That the 
composer of this segment of the prakaraa-text cannot have written the Kauilya dialogues is clear, in that, 
in the first Kauilya dialogue he dismisses the actual position of the text in one of the pūrvapakas. We read 
at KAŚ 1.2.6 that the followers of Uśanas believe that “The science of politics is the only science…for in it 
are bound up undertakings connected with all the sciences.” In his uttarapaka, Kauilya denies this 
position, even though it is almost identical to the opinion of the text itself at both KAŚ 1.4.3 and 1.5.1. 
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with reference to the fate of a mythical king who succumbed to one of the enemies (KAŚ 
1.6.4Ð1.7.1). The addition of this material and the division of the prakaraa resulted in a 
deficient segment after 1.7.1. It seems that here, too, a Kauilya dialogue (KAŚ 1.7.3Ð7) 
was added to provide sufficient bulk to the new segment. 
KAŚ 5.6.23 
For the final clear example of the involvement of Kauilya dialogues in the 
adhyāya redaction we return to a verse mentioned above in my examination of 
connective syntax in certain prakaraas (§4.1). There, we noted that the only prakaraas 
in the text that began with connective syntax were always the second or subsequent 
prakaraa in a given adhyāya. From this, we can deduce that these prakaraas must 
have known they were in an adhyāya (as no other prakaraas ever do this). Thus, these 
prakaraas must have been written by the adhyāya redactor or later. KAŚ 5.6.23 is a 
Kauilya dialogue that also happens to be the first line of a prakaraa demonstrating 
connective syntax. 
The adhyāya in question (KAŚ 5.6) possesses two prakaraas, 
rājyapratisa	dhānam (“Continuance of the Kingdom”; 94) and ekaiśvaryam 
(“Continuous Sovereignty”; 95). The second prakaraa is introduced at KAŚ 5.6.23: 
 
KAŚ 5.6.23 evam ekaiśvaryam amātya kārayed iti kauilya 
 
 “In this way, a minister should insure continuous sovereignty,” says 
Kauilya. 
Thus, despite the manner in which evam (“in this way”) links the passage to the 
preceding prakaraa, the conversation about ekaiśvaryam actually begins here.259 This 
                                                 
259 I disagree, in this regard, with Kangle’s claim that the prakaraa starts at the previous line. There is 
nothing to indicate that. 
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use of connective syntax demonstrates, in the context of the evidence adduced above, that 
this Kauilya dialogue dates to the adhyāya redaction.260  
These examples reinforce what we have begun to deduce from the analysis at 
§6.2, namely that the Kauilya dialogues show in many places and in a variety of ways a 
close connection with the adhyāya redaction. 
6.4 DIALOGUES AND INTERPOLATION 
Having linked some six Kauilya dialogues to the adhyāya redaction, we have a 
good reason to suspect that the rest of the dialogues belong also to that editorial moment. 
It remains now to determine other methods for connecting them to the adhyāya redaction 
as a group. 
The Kauilya dialogues resist being identified with the adhyāya redaction through 
formal analysis for the same reasons as do the end verses: they are likely part of a much 
larger body of interpolated material. With the Kauilya dialogues, however, we find an 
additional problem, as some dialogues seem to have cast parts of the prakaraa-text as 
the opinions of previous teachers. In other cases, Kauilya himself seems to speak in the 
voice of the prakaraa-text.261 Unlike the end verses, therefore, it is difficult even to 
decide what parts of the text should be considered parts of a dialogue. Hence, looking for 
stylistic, lexical, or topical attributes to unify and isolate the dialogues as a body of 
                                                 
260 The remainder of the prakaraa is carried out as a Kauilya dialogue, although a problem in the voice 
of the text arises (as it does frequently with Kauilya dialogues; see §6.5.2). The pūrvapaka of Bhāradvāha 
clearly runs from KAŚ 5.6.24Ð31, and the uttarapaka of Kauilya clearly begins at 5.6.32 with, “‘This 
[suggestion] incites the subjects to revolt, is unrighteous, and is uncertainas to result,’ says Kauilya.” It 
would appear, then, that the subsequent directions (KAŚ 5.6.33Ð36) are part of Kauilya’s uttarapaka, as 
the plan sketched out addresses the deficiencies he sees in Bhāradvāja’s position. Kangle suggests as much 
in his edition, although we have no formal marker that directly attributes the passage to Kauilya (e.g. hi or 
iti). The problem is that, if we take this as Kautilya’s uttarapaka, then presumably we must take the rest of 
the prakaraa, or at least KAŚ 5.6.37Ð39, which really forms a continuation of that passage. 
261 These are discussed below at §6.5.2. 
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material is nearly impossible. Here, as with the end verses, such study promises to yield 
better results once the extent of the adhyāya redaction is better known. 
But, if we can demonstrate that the dialogues regularly interpolate new material 
(§6.4.1Ð2) or amend an underlying prose source (§6.4. 3) we will be able to assign them 
confidently to the adhyāya redaction based on the discrete connections that we have 
drawn above, because they show such consistent indication of having been appended. 
The Kauilya dialogues appear to alter the underlying text in two ways. First, we 
see examples wherein a whole dialogue, both the pūrvapaka(s) and the uttarapaka, 
appear to have been inserted into a passage. In some examples, these are quite small 
passages, while in certain places, the added material is substantial. These will be 
examined below at §6.4.1 and 6.4.2. In other cases, the dialogues appear to have taken an 
underlying prose source and converted it either into a pūrvapaka, an uttarapaka, or 
both. These are examined at §6.4.3. 
6.4.1 Dialogues Interpolating MaterialÐ2 
Quite frequently an entire Kauilya dialogue appears to interject itself into an 
otherwise continuous conversation. A clear example of this occurs in KAŚ 7.4. 
This passage discusses the conditions under which the king should march or stay 
quiet after having made war or peace. It proceeds in a clear formula. The topic of staying 
quiet (i.e., not threatening the adversary) after war and peace is discussed at KAŚ 
7.4.4Ð13, while the topic of marching (i.e., threatening the adversary) is introduced at 
7.4.14Ð18. These two passages have parallel constructions: the topic is introduced (KAŚ 
7.4.4; 7.4.14); three alternative considerations are presented with the formula yadā vā 
paśyet (“Or if he should see…”, 7.4.5Ð7; 7.4.15Ð17); and finally, a declaration prescribing 
the opposite choice under reverse circumstances is given (7.4.8; 7.4.18). The geometry of 
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the two passages is, in a word, perfect. It is this clear pattern that allows us to identify 
that the Kauilya passage is an interpolation. 




The enemy and conqueror, desirous of overmastering the other but unable to harm each 
other, should stay quiet after making war or peace.  
KAŚ 7.4.5 Or, when he should see [yadā vā paśyet]…, he should make war and then stay quiet. 
KAŚ 7.4.6 Or, when he should see…, he should make war and then stay quiet. 
KAŚ 7.4.7 Or, when he should see…, he should make war and then stay quiet.  
KAŚ 7.4.13 
 
In case the reverse of the motives for staying quiet after making war, he should make 
peace and stay quiet.  
KAŚ 7.4.14 
 
When grown in power on the occasions for staying quiet after making war, he should 
make war and march, except when the enemy has mobilized all troops.  
KAŚ 7.4.15 Or, when he should see…, he should make war and march. 
KAŚ 7.4.16 Or, when he should see…, he should make war and march. 
KAŚ 7.4.17 Or, when he should see…, he should make war…and march. 
KAŚ 7.4.18 In the reverse cases, he should make peace and march. 





The enemy and conqueror, desirous of overmastering the other but unable to harm each 
other, should stay quiet after making war or peace.  
KAŚ 7.4.5 Or, when he should see [yadā vā paśyet]…, he should make war and then stay quiet. 
KAŚ 7.4.6 Or, when he should see…, he should make war and then stay quiet. 
KAŚ 7.4.7 Or, when he should see…, he should make war and then stay quiet.  
                                                 
262 Kauilya’s point is very difficult to divine out here. In this case, his exact point of disagreement is not 
entirely clear, for Kauilya ends up endorsing the position previously rendered at KAŚ 7.4.7. It appears, as 
Kangle points out, that the point in question is “Or, if he should see [among many other things, that] 
‘wishing to march with all troops mobilized in disregard of me, he must not somehow be allowed to 
march,’ then, in order to impede the growth of the enemy and to affirm his valor, he should make war and 
stay quiet” (KAŚ 7.4.7). The text clearly argues that he should make war and stay quiet, the position that 
Kauilya also endorses. It appears, as an interesting side note, that Kauilya’s logic is very close to that 
found at 7.5.2. The situation is far from happy, however, and that KAŚ 7.4.8 should be interpreted as a 
disagreement is not overtly marked. That the teachers and Kauilya are commenting only on the last of the 
many conditions given in KAŚ 7.4.7 produces a suspicious rupture. For, if the teachers’ objection was 
original to the prakaraa-text, we should have expected the specific case with which they disagree to be 
given in its own specific sūtra. All of this notwithstanding, we can see clearly the disruption effected by the 
whole dialogue, which falls nicely into two halves, each introduced and concluded in similar fashion and 
possessing three examples. Thus, we should rightly regard all of 7.4.8Ð12 as an interpolation. 
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KAŚ 7.4.8 “Turning back, the enemy might swallow the king instead,” so say the teachers. 
KAŚ 7.4.9 “No,” says Kauilya. 
KAŚ 7.4.10 “Not beset by calamities, he would only weaken our king; but augmented by his 
enemy’s growth, he destroys our king. 
KAŚ 7.4.11 In this manner, the enemy’s vulnerable foe, now undestroyed, would render aid to 
our king.  




In case the reverse of the motives for staying quiet after making war, he should make 
peace and stay quiet.  
KAŚ 7.4.14 
 
When grown in power on the occasions for staying quiet after making war, he should 
make war and march, except when the enemy has mobilized all troops.  
KAŚ 7.4.15 Or, when he should see…, he should make war and march. 
KAŚ 7.4.16 Or, when he should see…, he should make war and march. 
KAŚ 7.4.17 Or, when he should see…, he should make war…and march. 
KAŚ 7.4.18 In the reverse cases, he should make peace and march. 
This stands as very clear evidence that the Kauilya dialogue at KAŚ 7.4.8Ð12 has 
been interpolated into an earlier source. We find many other examples of dialogues that 
stand outside of or break the logic of their context: KAŚ 2.9.10Ð12, 3.4.36, 3.7.3, 3.20.3Ð7, 
7.6.30Ð31, 7.15.11Ð20, 7.17.3Ð5, 9.1.2Ð16, 9.1.42-44, 9.2.22, 12.1.1Ð9, and 13.4.2Ð5. This 
indicates the frequency with which Kauilya dialogues seem to add something extra to an 
underlying discussion. 
6.4.2 Major Interpolations 
In a few important places, Kauilya dialogues account for the addition of 
substantial tracts of text. We see this most pointedly in the eighth adhikaraa, of which 
the first 4 adhyāyas are constituted almost entirely of Kauilya dialogues. 
Like a few other sections of the extant Arthaśāstra, the eighth adhikaraa is 
composed almost entirely of “either/or” debates. In this context, a question will be posed 
as to which is the better or worse of two options. Typically, an individual teacher or “the 
teachers” (ācārya) will first give the erroneous view (pūrvapaka) and Kauilya will give 
the proper view (uttarapaka):263  
                                                 
263 However, in a few cases, the uttarapaka is given first (cf. KAŚ 8.1.5; 8.3.5) 
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KAŚ 8.1.19 “Of calamities befalling the minister or the country, the calamity of the 
country is more serious,” says Viālāka. 
KAŚ 8.1.20 “The treasury, army, forest produce, laborers, means of transport, and 
stores spring from the country.” 
KAŚ 8.1.21 “In the absence of the country, there would be lack of these, and the 
[disappearance] of the king and the minister [would follow] 
immediately thereafter.” 
KAŚ 8.1.22 “No,” says Kauilya. 
KAŚ 8.1.23 “All undertakings have their origin in the ministers…” 
Here, nearly the entire adhikaraa is composed of such dialogues. The only 
exceptions to this in the first four adhyāyas of the eighth adhikaraa are the “framing” 
passages that set up the dialogues.264 However, the final adhyāya, 8.5, proceeds in a style 
similar to the preceding adhyāyas without, however, any hint of polemical dialogues. 
There is very good reason to assume that this entire adhikaraa is interpolated 
into the text. Not only are the first four adhyāyas essentially composed of Kauilya 
dialogues, but the style and topic also stand out within the greater context of the second 
half of the text. The preceding adhikaraa, the seventh, is the long discussion of foreign 
policy that anchors the second half of the text. The following adhikaraa, the ninth, picks 
up on that discussion by giving details for the king about to march. This theme is 
continued in the tenth, which discusses war tactics. As such, the discussion of the relative 
harm of calamities to the seven constituents of the state that comprises adhikaraa 8 
represents a notable digression from the focus of the seventh and ninth through tenth 
adhikaraas. 
Other examples of passages almost wholly comprised of Kauilya dialogues 
include adhyāyas 1.8, 1.17, 3.17, and the final prakaraa of 5.6 (KAŚ 5.6.23Ð32ff.). Each of 
                                                 
264 KAŚ 8.1.1Ð4, 8.1.60, 8.2.1Ð4, 8.2.19, 8.3.1Ð4, 8.3.23, 8.3.37Ð38, 8.4.1, and 8.4.8. Seeming exceptions 
to that at KAŚ 8.3.62Ð64 and 8.4.44Ð45, both seem intended to be part of the preceding Kauilya quote by 
virtue of terminal iti markers. The passage at 8.4.46Ð47, however, lacks such a marker, and is anomolous. 
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these stands at an important juncture in the text, and will be discussed in detail in Chapter 
7. 
6.4.3 Casting Prose as the Dialogic Material 
In many places in the Arthaśāstra, certain prose passages appear to have been 
converted into quotations ascribed to Kauilya or the other teachers. We saw this above, 
both at §6.2 (KAŚ 1.10.16Ð20) and at §6.4.1 (7.4.8Ð12), where the text had been converted 
into the opinion of “the teachers” (ācārya) to accommodate the inclusion of a retort from 
Kauilya. In fact, there are many clear examples of this practice in the Arthaśāstra. 
One of the best of these comes at KAŚ 3.11.44Ð49, where a dialogue has seemingly 
been constructed out of a continuous passage. The following example shows how little 
modification an underlying passage would have needed to turn it into a dialogue: 
 
KAŚ 3.11.39Ð49 sākibhede yato bahava śucayo Õnumatā vā tato niyaccheyu 
madhya vā gh	īyu  
 tad vā dravya rājā haret 
 sāki	aś ced abhiyogād ūna brūyur atiriktasyābhiyoktā bandha 
dadyāt  
 atirikta vā brūyas tad atirikta rājā haret  
 bāliśyād abhiyoktur vā duśruta durlikhita pretābhiniveśa vā 
samīkya sākipratyayam eva syāt  
 sākibāliśyev eva pthag anuyoge deśakālakāryā	ā 
pūrvamadhyamottamā da	ā ity ācāryā  
 kūtasāki	o yam artham abhūta kuryur bhūta vā nāśayeyus tad 
daśagu	a da	a dadyu iti mānavā  
 bāliśyād vā visavādayatām citro ghāta iti bārhyaspatyā  
 neti kauilya  
 dhruva hi sākibhi śrotiyam  
 aś	vatām caturviśatipa	o da	as tato Õdharmabruvā	ānām 
 
 In case of differences among witnesses, they should decide in favor of 
that party in whose favor are the majority, honest, or approved, or he 
should follow the middle course. Or, the king should take that object.  
 If witnesses testify to an amount less than the suit, the plaintiff shall 
pay a part of the excess. If, on the other hand, they testify to a larger 
amount, the king should take the excess.  
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 What was badly heard or badly written through the fault of the plaintiff, 
or the affidavit of a person deceased, shall, after investigation, be 
decided only on the testimony of witnesses.  
 If, through the fault of witnesses alone, questioning results in divergent 
information, they shall be fined the lowest, middlemost, and highest 
fines, with regard to place, time, and matter. So say the followers of 
Uśanas.  
 False witnesses who bring into being a non-existent thing or ruin an 
existing thing, shall pay ten times that as fine. So say the followers of 
Manu. 
  Or, if through their own fault they lead to a false conviction, death by 
torture. So say the followers of Bhaspati.  
 “No,” says Kauilya. “For, witnesses have to testify to what is the truth. 
For those who do not testify to the truth the fine is 24 paas, half that 
for those who do not speak out.” 
It is clear that the opinions of the three teachers, Uśanas, Manu, and Bhaspati, 
have been built out of a continuous prose passage: Manu cites “ten times the fine” 
assessed in Uśanas’ opinion. Clearly, Bhaspati is building on the same passage. The 
result is almost a comical situation in which the three different teachers are ganging up on 
Kauilya, with each adding a line to a single erroneous pūrvapaka, perhaps for effect. In 
fact, it seems most likely that all of KAŚ 3.11.44Ð46 was a single prose passage recast into 
the opinions of several teachers. 
Another excellent example comes at KAŚ 3.17.3Ð14 in the discussion of sāhasa 
(“mugging”), one of the titles of law in the Arthaśāstra’s civil code. After a brief 
introduction clarifying the distinction between sāhasa and steya (“simple theft”), the 
passage proceeds entirely through two Kauilya dialogues. The first begins as a standard 
disagreement: 
 
KAŚ 3.17.3Ð5 ratnasāraphalgukupyānā sāhase mūlyasamo da	a iti mānavā 
 mūlyadvigu	a iti auśanā 
 yathāparādha iti kauilya 
 
 “In case of the forceable seizure of jewels, articles of high value, of low 
value, and forest produce, the price shall be equal to their value,” say 
the followers of Manu. 
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 “Double the value,” say the followers of Uśanas. 
 “In accordance with the offense,” says Kauilya. 
The following discussion is, like that at KAŚ 3.11, apparently constructed out of 
an underlying prose passage. For, KAŚ 3.17.6Ð14 reads very much like any discussion of 
violent theft, except that its various parts are attributed to different teachers: 
 
KAŚ 3.17.6Ð14 “For flower, fruits, vegetables, roots, bulbous roots, cooked food, 
leather goods, wicker-baskets, earthenware, and other trifling 
articles, the fine is a minimum of 12 paas and a maximum of 24 
paas. 
 For articles of iron, wood, and ropes, small animals, cloth, and other 
big articles, the fine is from 24 to 48 paas. 
 For articles of copper, steel, bronze, glass, ivory, and other big articles, 
the fine is 48 to 96 paas. 
 For large animals, human beings, fields, houses, money, gold, fine 
cloth, and other big articles, the middle fine for violence. 
 For one who binds or causes another to bind or releases from bondage a 
woman or man by using force, the highest fine for violence, from 500 
to 1000 paas,” say the teachers. 
 “He who causes another to commit an act of force, saying, ‘I accept 
[responsibility],’ shall pay double.  
 One saying, ‘I shall give as much money as required,’ shall pay a 
fourfold fine. 
 One saying, ‘I shall give so much money,’ shall pay the money as 
stated as well as the fine,” say the followers of Bhaspati. 
 “If he were to plead anger, intoxication, or delusion, he shall impose on 
him the single fine, as prescribed,” says Kauilya. 
As before, we have what is essentially a unified passage dispersed into the 
opinions of several teachers. Ultimately, the annexing of three iti clauses has turned it 
into a conversation between various teachers. Removing these iti clauses, however, 
reveals that the passage looks like a very regular and normal discussion of sāhasa. 
Other examples of what appear to be the transformation of underlying prose 
sources into Kauilya dialogues can be found at KAŚ 3.14.6Ð9, 7.1.5, 7.1.31, 7.5.1Ð18, 
7.13.29Ð33, 7.15.11, and possibly, 7.9Ð7.12. 
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6.5 CONCLUSION: KAUILYA THE INTERLOPER 
Several things, then, are generally clear about the Kauilya material in the text. 
First, the direct ascriptions of the text to Kauilya all fall in end verses and are spurious. 
This conscious effort to link the text to Kauilya may have been simply an expression of 
an unrecorded convention, but represents, nevertheless, an innovation in the 
compositional history of the text. 
Second, the end verses are linked in this regard to the more limited ascriptions of 
the Kauilya dialogues. Despite being sporadic phenomena, they are united in function as 
the only elements within the text identifying any author by name. We find evidence of a 
discrete link between the two in the case of two end verses that possess (elements of) a 
Kauilya dialogue. We can state without reservation, then, that the adhyāya redactor 
wrote at least some of the extant dialogues. 
Can the larger body of dialogues be linked with the adhyāya redaction? For the 
same reason as the adhyāya end verses (namely that they are only a subset of a larger 
body of interpolated material), it is difficult to trace formal elements unique to the 
dialogues, and hence, consign them all to a common origin. Complicating this is the fact 
that so many of the dialogues have clearly been fashioned out of pre-existing prose 
sources. We can, however, demonstrate through close scrutiny of individual examples 
that processes of interpolation and emendation dominate the occurrence of the dialogues 
in the extant Arthaśāstra.  
What seems evident from this analysis is that not only are the Kauilya dialogues 
strongly characterized by interpolation, but that they can so frequently be demonstrated to 
fulfill this function that we might rightly regard them as uniformly interpolated. And, the 
fingerprints of the adhyāya redactor are on a few of them. It is with a high degree of 
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confidence, therefore, that we can ascribe the Kauilya dialogues to the adhyāya redaction 
as well. 
Aside from the adhyāya-length dialogues (§6.4.2), however, we cannot be certain 
in any given case whether prose sources transformed by the Kauilya dialogues were 
native to the prakaraa-text or brought along during the interpolation of the dialogues. 
Hence, as we go on to construct a more detailed sense of the extent of the adhyāya 
redaction, we will have to consider the likelihood of both possibilities in individual 
contexts where applicable. Summation of the extent of the additions can be found in the 
overview of the adhyāya redaction in Chapter 7. 
Let us finally consider the implications deriving from the possibility that the 
material directly attributed to the author himself is not original. The general thinking on 
the Arthaśāstra has tended to protect the statements attributed to Kauilya as representing 
the most authentic layers of the text.265 That is, even if some scholars admit that the text 
may have undergone some changes, the Kauilya quotes are frequently assumed to be 
relics of the original. But what would be a better way to legitimate new material 
introduced into a text than by attributing it to the “true” author of the work? This is 
especially true given the demonstrable ease with which prose can be converted into 
dialogues. Of course, the interpolation of new material may not have been as important as 
the overt ascription of the text to Kauilya, which corresponds with the witnessed 
tendency in Sanskrit literature of the classical period to attribute texts to legendary and 
mythical authorities.266  
                                                 
265 See Chapter 2. 
266 It may well also prove that the process of attributing this śāstra to Kauilya helped bring Arthaśāstra 
into the fold of ecumenical Brahmanism and, by extension, ascribe the success of the Maurya Empire to 
Brahmanical expertise. If so, the attribution of the text to Kauilya seems to provide a strong motive for the 
adhyāya redaction in the first place. 
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It is not, however, necessary to posit that the addition of the Kauilya material was 
conceived by the adhyāya redactor as the interposition of “inauthentic” material into the 
text, nor is it necessary to subscribe to any conspiracy theory. I think it is very likely that 
the source of much of this material may have been other treatises on statecraft or 
collections of Kauilya/Cā	akya maxims. The redactor may have seen himself as 
completing, updating, or perfecting the text rather than altering it per se. Given the rather 
sporadic nature of much of the Kauilya quotes, we can scarcely recognize a pattern of 
radical opportunism in its transformation of the subject matter. My sense is that the 
apparent changes probably had more to do with “contemporizing” the prakaraa-text 





Chapter 7: The Structure of the Prakaraa Text 
Building on the conclusions of the previous chapters, we are now able to delve 
deeper into the compositional history of the Arthaśāstra and examine the anatomy of the 
greater prakaraa-text. This will not only enlarge and refine our understanding of the 
adhyāya redaction, but will also demonstrate the key phases in which the prakaraa-text 
was composed. It is an injustice to treat such a large issue (larger in fact than that of the 
adhyāya redaction) in a single chapter, but a full consideration of the structure of the 
prakaraa text might itself comprise its own voluminous study. 
Having purged the text of the Arthaśāstra of the obvious additions from the 
adhyāya redaction, including (most if not all of) the adhyāya end verses, the Kauilya 
dialogues, and a number of interpolated passages,267 the question then arises as to the 
ultimate extent of that editorial intervention as well as the compositional history and 
character of the underlying prakaraa-text.268 Specifically, we want to know first what 
the prakaraa-text looked like before the adhyāya redaction, and second, how it evolved 
to reach that form.  
Regarding the ultimate extent of the adhyāya redaction, we need to determine 
what segments of the text other than those indicated by the preceding studies are 
implicated. And, regarding the prakaraa-text, we want to know whether this text was 
authored entirely by a single individual, is itself composite, or resulted from some 
                                                 
267 Also including certain more substantial passages likely dated also the the adhyāya redaction, including 
but not limited to part or all of adhyāyas 1.1, 1.2Ð1.7, 1.8, 1.17Ð18, 2.33, 3.16Ð7, 3.20, 5.6, 9.7, 10.6, and 
15.1, as well as most or all of adhikaraa 8. 
268 This is the term I am using to refer to the hypothetical text as it existed before the additions of the 
adhyāya redactor. In extent, it comprises 1.2-13.4 of Kangle’s edition. 
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combination of these processes.269 Given the character of the Arthaśāstra,270 such 
questions are best answered by taking the image of the prakaraa-text that emerges after 
purging the elements of the adhyāya redaction, reading that text closely, analyzing its 
structure, and identifying such lexical, stylistic, and idiomatic evidence as can support 
well a theory of its composition.271 
It is characteristic of the extant Arthaśāstra that some parts of the text display a 
great deal of conceptual cohesiveness as well as consistent structural principles.272 In 
such passages can be demonstrated an orderly and sustained progression of conceptually-
united topics, bearing evidence of authorial intent. The conciseness and transparency of 
these sections contrast vividly with the confusion and opacity of some sections and the 
isolation and disjointedness of others.273 As a result the prakaraa-text as a whole 
possesses a somewhat schizophrenic character, and there is a decided lack of firm 
                                                 
269 The idea of a “composite text” embraces both the synchronic aggregation of different sources in a single 
compositional moment (horizontally composite) as well as the diachronic aggregation of layers brought 
about by a series of editorial additions over time (vertically composite). These are, however, only 
conceptual tools: a single compositional moment can exhibit both characteristics.  
270 In the previous chapters we were able to compare two divergent second-order segmentation systems 
(prakaraas & adhyāyas) and determine the relative priority of one (the prakaraas) over against the other 
(the adhyāyas). Reduced to a single segmentation system (prakaraas/adhikaraas), there is no second 
global attribute that can examined diachronically. Further, the prakaraa text obviates the need for such 
methods, and allows, instead the content of the text to be analyzed more clearly. 
271 See Chapter 3 for a full discussion of compositional theories. Trautmann (1971) has famously used the 
statistical method to answer the same questions. This study reinforces many of his conclusions; these 
agreements are noted as they arise in the present discussion and in the following chapters. 
272 One calls to mind in this regard especially the sections on the testing of ministers, appointment of spies, 
and espionage (KAŚ 1.9Ð1.15), the greater part of the description of the officials called adhyakas and their 
duties (2.11Ð2.34), most of the first 15 titles of law or vyavahārapadas in adhikaraa 3 (3.2Ð3.16), the 
explicit discussion of ‘the clearing of thorns’ or kaakaśodhana in adhikaraa 4 (4.4Ð4.6), and the entirety 
of the short 8th and 13th adhikaraas (on calamities and siege tactics, respectively). The prevailing style is, 
however, unique to each: among them only between 1.9Ð1.15 and 4.4Ð4.6 can resemblance in style be 
found. 
273 The most noticeably-confused parts of the Arthaśāstra are undoubtedly the 7th and 9th adhikaraas (on 
foreign policy and war, respectively), both of which proceed according to no discernable plan. 
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evidence that it or even the greater part of it was authored ex nihilo by a single 
individual.274 The presence of a series of internally homogeneous yet extrinsically 
dissimilar passages, often punctuated by the digression of detailed “miniÐśāstras”275 and 
generally connected by relatively more disjointed and opaque passages, suggests that we 
are dealing with a deeply, perhaps originally, composite text.276  
In a text as extensive, heterogeneous, and disjointed as the Arthaśāstra there is no 
end to the evidence that might be summoned to bear witness to its ultimate composition. I 
will, therefore, rely in this chapter primarily on an examination of the topical structure of 
the text without regard to its formal division into prakaraa, adhyāya, or adhikaraa. 
The result is a topical outline of the text that casts much light on its compositional 
history. 
7.1 MAJOR CONCEPTUAL DIVISIONS & THEIR RELATIONSHIPS 
The broadest meaningful division of the text is found between the topics of 
internal administration (KAŚ 1.2Ð5.6) and those of foreign affairs (6.2Ð13.5).277 Later 
arthaśāstrins refer to these sections as tantra and āvāpa respectively (Kangle 1965, 20). 
                                                 
274 Such as Olivelle (2005) has found in the Manusm
ti. So striking are the constant shifts in style and the 
frequent conceptual confusion that it is surprising that any scholar, much less some of the text’s most 
notable editors and translators, could assume the extant Arthaśāstra to be the work of a single hand. Yet, a 
great number of scholars have made just such a claim. 
275 I am thinking here, for example, of brief but focused discussions such as that on the layout of the city 
(2.4), the activity of elephants (2.32), sex crimes (4.12) and so forth. Many short discussions in the text 
such as these seem to hint at some kind of independent history. 
276 While we cannot pretend to comprehend fully the prevalent norms of Sanskrit prose composition in this 
remote time (and whether what we experience as stylistic disjunctures necessarily seemed so to the readers 
of that time), we can expect that a single author could not be responsible for certain kinds of conceptual 
unevenness. For example, we can surmise that an author would not immediately argue against a position 
just presented, misapprehend the intention or meaning of a preceding passage, randomly shift lexical 
registers, idiosyncratically misuse technical terms, or advocate mutually opposed concepts without 
comment. The presence of such difficulties in a text like the Arthaśāstra would tend to lend validity to the 
surmise that its structural unevenness is rooted in heterogeneous sources and/or successive redactions. 
277 See §1.4. 
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At their juncture falls KAŚ 6.1, which bridges these two areas with a theory of the state as 
composed of both foreign and domestic constituents (the seven prak
tis).278 Finally, an 
introductory table of contents (KAŚ 1.1) and two independent appendices, one on magic 
and secret formulas (14.1) and another on the rhetorical elements of the text (15.1), 
bookend the treatise.  
 Fig. 5: The Major Structural Elements of the Arthaśāstra 
Although the Arthaśāstra does not itself formally recognize a division of the text 
into tantra and āvāpa, we do find close adherence to the topic of internal administration 
among the material comprising KAŚ 1.2Ð5.6 and to foreign policy in 6.2Ð13..5. This 
thoroughgoing topical division into domestic and external affairs, although undoubtedly 
intentional, is matched neither by any discrete conceptual organization nor by any 
thoroughgoing structural elements unifying each half.279 Instead, a looser conceptual 
affiliation prevails through the succession of topics within each half,280 reinforcing the 
composite character of both.281  
                                                 
278 The location of this discussion in adhyāya 6 belies its relative closer semantic connection with the 
āvāpa section, which makes use of its theory of the seven prak
tis in several places (as opposed to the first 
half). Nevertheless, a purely topical analysis must first note its supersession of the broad distinciton 
between internal and external politics prevailing in the two halves. 
279 We can compare in this regard Olivelle’s discovery of a global structure to the text of the Manusm
ti, 
built of lattice of standardized transitional passages and topic markers. Such passages comprise a discursive 
structure through which the conceptual structure of the text as a whole can be ascertained. It is any markers 
of these kind that are absent in the tantra and āvāpa sections as well as the prakaraa-text as a whole.  
280 The division into tantra and āvāpa does not account for three passages: KAŚ 1.1, KAŚ 14.1Ð3, and 
KAŚ 15.1. The first and third of these have already been identified as belonging to the adhyāya redaction. 
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Despite the lack of any formal internal structure, we do find certain symmetries 
prevailing between the two halves of the text. These would seem to suggest that we can 
identify a plan underlying the organization of the greater text. The first significant 
symmetry lies between two very similar passages near or at the beginning of each half. If 
we remove the Kauilya dialogues from both passages and also the adhyāya emendations 
I have suggested (§6.4.1), we find a parallel passages near the beginning of each half. We 
begin with the opening of the tantra section: 
 
KAŚ 1.2.1 ānvīkikī trayī vārttā da	anītiś ceti vidyā 
KAŚ 1.2.10 sākhya yogo lokāyata cetyānvīkikī 
KAŚ 1.3.1 sāmargyajurvedās trayas trayī 
KAŚ 1.4.1a kipāśupālye va	ijyā ca vārttā 
KAŚ 1.4.3a ānvīkikītrayīvārttānā yogakemasādhano da	a tasya nitir 
da	anīti 
 
 Philosophy, the Triple Veda, Economics and Political Science are the 
Sciences. 
 Sākhya, Yoga, and Lokāyata are Philosophy. 
 The three Vedas, Sāma, g, and Yajur, are the Triple Veda. 
 Agriculture, animal husbandry, and trade are Economics. 
 The means of ensuring the welfare of Philosophy, the Triple Veda, and 
Economics is the Staff (daa), and its use (nīti) is Political Science 
(daanīti). 
Compare this with the KAŚ 7.1.2Ð12, with the adhyāya interpolations removed: 
 
*KAŚ 7.1.1 sadhivigrahāsanayānasaśrayadvaidhībhāvā āgu	yam 
KAŚ 7.1.6 tantra pa	abandha sadhi 
KAŚ 7.1.7 apakāro vigraha 
KAŚ 7.1.8 upeka	am āsanam 
KAŚ 7.1.9 abhyuccayo yānam 
KAŚ 7.1.10 parārpa	a saśraya 
                                                                                                                                                 
The second, which represents the entirety of the 14th adhikaraa indicates that this section finds no place in 
the greater logic of the text and, from a topical perspective, is purely appendectical. It will be considered 
separate below, where we will have occasion to demonstrate its origin in the adhyāya redaction. 
281 Though lacking any such unifying edifice, the section on tantra displays a more orderly progression of 
general topic areas (as suggested by it segmentation into adhikaraas dealing loosely with king state 
law enforcement/peacekeeping miscellanea) than the section on āvāpa. 
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KAŚ 7.1.11 sadhivigrahopādāna dvadhībāva 
KAŚ 7.1.12 iti agu	ā 
 
 Peace, war, staying quiet, marching, seeking shelter, and dual policy 
are the Six Measures. 
 Among them, entering into a treaty is peace. 
 Doing injury is war. 
 Remaining indifferent is staying quiet. 
 Augmentation is marching. 
 Submitting to another is seeking shelter. 
 Resorting to peace and war is dual policy. 
 These are the six measures. 
While these two passages are not perfectly symmetrical, they possess a similar 
format. What is more, each is used to inaugurate the substantive discussions of their 
respective halves (the material at KAŚ 6.2.1Ð7.1.1 representing more of a preamble to the 
actual discussion of foreign policy).  
A second parallel between the two halves is that each possesses one adhikaraa 
that is considerably longer than the rest. This raises the suspicion that each half was 
constructed around a single, long passage. Finally, an analysis of the structure of each 
half reveals that both appear to possess appendices. In the case of the first half, the 
appendices are represented by the adhyāyas of the 5th adhikaraa, which represent 
miscellanous addenda. In the case of the second half, we might see the 14th adhikaraa as 
its appendix, with the 15th serving to frame the the greater text. 
While these features are not sufficiently symmetrical to establish a template from 
which can be deduced clear deviation or adherence, they do suggest that the extant 
Arthaśāstra’s division into two halves is intentional and that each possesses an 
independent organization. I will proceed in the next two sections (§7.2 and 7.3) to look at 
the structure of each half. 
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7.2 THE TANTRA SECTION (1.2Ð5.6) 
The adhikaraa titles and boundaries282 of this section provide a relatively 
straightforward framework to the discussion of tantra: 
 
Fig. 6: The Tantra Section of the Arthaśāstra 
  
  title translation topics covered 
 
 1. vinayādhikārika “On Training” The King and His Political Activities 
 2. adhyakapracāra “The Duty of Officials” Settlement & Administration 
 3. dharmasthīya “On Judges”  Jurisprudence and Transactional Law 
 4. kaakaśodhana “Clearing Thorns” Law Enforcement & Policing 
 5. yogavtta “Secret Practices”  Miscellaneous Appendices 
Although the subdivision of tantra into these five general areas fits the material of 
the text tolerably well, it also obscures the complex relationships prevailing between non-
adhikaraa text segments.  
7.2.1 Topical Outline  
A topical analysis of the tantra section, undertaken with a few guiding principles, 
reveals the following structure:  
                                                 
282 These are both relics of the prakaraa-adhikaraa list and the adhikaraa colophons. The provenance 
of both is discussed below. 
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1 “On Training” I.    The King 
2 “Duties of Officials” 
II.  Officials283 
       A.    Administrative 
       B.    Legal 
                1.    Law Enforcement Ia (rules I) 
3 “On Judges”                        a.    Transactional Law 
4 “Clearing Thorns” 
                2.    Law Enforcement Ib (rules II) 
                3.    Law Enforcement II (policing) 
                4.    Law Enforcement III (rules for officials) 
                       a.    Criminal Law284 
5 “Secret Practices” III. Miscellaneous 
This outline emerges clearly if we follow two interpretive principles, one general 
and one specific. The first requires that we take finite optative verbs without a stated 
subject to refer to the last state grammatical subject (even if falling in a previous 
discussion). This principle is required to counteract the frequently unwarranted injection 
of the king into these lacunae as the unspoken agent of any agentless verb (defended 
below). The second principle is rather more of a critical interprtation (also defended 
below): the subject of the first three topics of adhikaraa 2 cannot be the king, as 
demonstrated in the well protected passage at KAŚ 2.2.3. The passage at KAŚ 2.1.15Ð18 
implying the contrary (and to a lesser extent at 2.1.25Ð29) is, of the two, the more likely 
interpolation. 
There are several important conclusions to be drawn from this interpretation, but 
the most important contribution of this analysis lies in demonstrating that the majority of 
the tantra section is presented through the idiom of state officials and their duties (IIA 
                                                 
283 The division of these officials into “administrative” and “legal” classifications is a result of higher 
textual criticism, and could be stated in a number of ways. The important distinction between these two sets 
of officials is that the former are administrative posts concerned with the management of a given 
department, while the latter work in the public sphere in the specific capacity of public safety, policing, and 
protecting the king’s rule. This is not to suggest that their presentation is structurally similar. 
284 The only element of the general outline requiring any special explanation in this regard is the criminal 
code presented at 4.9Ð12. This undoubtedly is intended to fall under the duties of the samāhart in the same 
way that the discussion of the civil code falls under the duties of the dharmastha. 
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and IIB in the outline) with a discussion of the king (I) preceding and a miscellaneous set 
of appendices (III) following. In rhetorical terms, the presentation of most of the material 
in the tantra section comes through the (mostly) uninterrupted presentation of one official 
after another.  
When we expand this outline to include the subtopics of each of these major 
sections (appendix A), we see clearly how the idiom of officials and their duties 
dominates the tantra section. Another point revealed in the detailed topic outline 
(appendix A) is that otherwise well integrated discussions in the tantra section give way 
to more appendectical addenda. We see this first of all at the conclusion of part I, where 
well integrated discussions of the king’s training (IA) and activity (IB) give way to 
independent treatments of princes (IC), the king’s daily schedule (ID), and regulations for 
the palace and king’s safety (IE).285 So also in part II of the outline, we see strong topical 
integration throughout (particularly in the face of several subsequent iterations on the 
topic of law enforcement; see §7.2.4), which devolves in the discussion of criminal justice 
(KAŚ 4.9Ð13; outline IIB4a) into a series of similar but unconnected adhyāyas. Finally, 
the general integration at the heart of parts I and II are set off against the miscellaneous 
character of part III, which is composed of a set of disconnected independent discussions. 
What is not shown as clearly in the outline is the relationship between at least one 
of these appendectical tracts and the adhyāya redaction. So, in part I, the discussion of 
princes (IC), which inaugurates a chain of appendices, comprises two adhyāyas (KAS 
1.17Ð18) linked to the adhyāya redaction. It is not unlikely, therefore, that the subsequent 
                                                 
285 In fact, the discussion of princes (IC) covers KAŚ 1.17Ð18 and the discussion of the construction of the 
palace and the protection of the king (IE) occur also in two adhyāyas: 1.20Ð21. 
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appendectical adhyāyas (KAŚ 1.19Ð21) date to or after the adhyāya redaction.286 Finally, 
if we look more closely at the discussion of transactional law in the outline, we see that 
the final five topics in the outline are introduced by an interpolated adhyāya discussing 
forceable seizure (KAŚ 3.16) and conclude with another interpolated section on various 
topics (3.20.14Ð23). These intervening adhyāyas, which follow a formulaic introduction 
established in KAŚ 3.16, must date also to the adhyāya redaction.287 Hence the 
identification of these appendices expands our sense of the extent of the adhyāya 
redaction somewhat and indicates a proclivity on the part of the adhyāya redactor to add 
material at junctures revealed by the topical outline. 
The final major point that becomes clear in the extended outline at this point is the 
presence of the official called samāhart
, “the Collector,” at the head of each of the major 
subdivisions of legal officials. And, even in the discussion of administrative officials, 
where he is preceded by two other officials, his duties reveal that he oversees all of the 
subsequent administrative offices (KAŚ 2.6.1ff.; 2.7.3ff.288). This reccurrence of the 
                                                 
286 The only difficulty here lies in KAŚ 1.20, which details the construction of the king’s palace and very 
much resembles a similar discussion on the construction of fortresses at 2.3. Although there are no formal 
indicators, it seems somewhat topically linked with the following. As such, its provenance is less certain. 
287 This is further reinforced by the inclusion of the dyūtādhyaka in the legal code at KAŚ 3.20.1Ð13. This 
official presumably should have come with the discussion of other officials in the 2nd adhikaraa. His 
transplanting to the legal code reflects the relatively less tolerant attitude of the adhyāya redactor toward 
alcohol. For, he seems to be merely another officer of the state, and it is difficult to understand otherwise 
why he appears in the legal code. This move was almost certainly influenced by the draconian stance 
against alcohol that typifies the dharma literature. 
288 This analysis regards the use of the generic term adhyaka, “the official,” at KAŚ 2.7.1 as referring to 
the samāhart
 in the previous adhyāya, which is justified not only by the failure of the passage to identify 
any given adhyaka discretely, as is universally the case elsewhere, but also because the dufies of that 
official, overseeing income, coincide precisely with the duties of the samāhart
 given in KAŚ 2.6. Even if 
the adhyaka be interpreted as a second official, his duties replicate the interests of the samāhart
 so 
closely that one has to suspect some kind of emendation to the text. Moreover, the use of the generic title 
adhyaka in second position in the opening sentence seems to indicate that we are not talking about a new 
official. It is certainly not the minor official called kāraika, “Accounts Officer,” mentioned at KAŚ 2.7.34. 
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samāhart
 will become crucial below as we discuss the iterative steps in which the text 
seems to have been expanded from a core source. 
7.2.2 Integrated Passages 
We can now apply our identification of certain stylistic patterns and shifts to this 
detailed outline. Despite the general heterogeneity of the text, we find a few important 
segments that appear to follow clear stylistic and rhetorical principles, strongly 
suggesting that they were the product of a single author or strong editor: 
 
1: King: Training (KAŚ 1.2Ð1.7, less the adhyāya additions outlined at §6.4.1Ð2) 
2: King: King’s Political Activities (1.10Ð1.16) 
3: Administrative Officials: Duties of the Directors (2.11Ð32) 
4: Law Enforcement III: Policing (4.4Ð4.6) 
The most important of these is the long integrated passage at KAŚ 2.11Ð32. 
7.2.3 The Core of the Tantra Section: KAŚ 2.11Ð32 
The combination of the topical outline with the identification of integrated 
passages shows that at the heart of the discussion of administrative officials lies the 
strongly-integrated segment KAŚ 2.11Ð32. This passage is unified by the invariable use of 
a simple, standard formula to introduce each successive official. Each official is 
presented in a prakaraa-initial sūtra that gives the official’s title as a sentence-initial 
nominative and names his primary responsibilities using a finite optative verb. So, the 
first four adhyakas in KAŚ 2.11Ð32 are introduced as follows: 
 
KAŚ 2.11.1 kośādhyaka kośapraveśya ratna sāra phalgu kupya vā 
tajjātakara	ādhihita pratigh	īyāt 
 
 The Director of the Treasury should receive jewels, expensive items, 
inexpensive items, or forest produce bound for the treasury, aided by 
assistants skilled in those kinds of goods. 
 
KAŚ 2.12.1 ākarādhyaka śulbadhātuśāstrarasapākama	irāgaj–as tajj–asakho vā 
tajjātakarmakaropakara	asampanna kiamuāgārabhasmaliga 
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vākara bhūtapūrvam abhutapūrva vā bhūmiprastararasadhātum 
athyarthavar	agauravam ugragandharasa parīketa 
 
 The Director of Deposits, knowledgeable about the science of metal 
veins, smelting ore, and the color of gems or furnished with 
assistants knowledgeable of the same and furnished with workers in 
those areas and tools, should inspect an old mine bearing marks of 
dross, crucibles, coal, and ashes of a possible new mine where there 
are ores in the earth with excessive color and heaviness and with a 
strong color and taste. 
 
KAŚ 2.12.23 lohādhyakas tāmrasīsatrapuvaikntakārakūavttakasatāla-
lohakarmāntān kārayet lohabhā	avyavahāra ca 
 
 The Director of Metals should have built copper, lead, tin, vaik
ntaka, 
brass, steel, bronze, bell-metal, and iron factories and start 
transactions in metal implements. 
 
KAŚ 2.12.24 laka	ādhyakaś caturbhāgatāmra rūpyarūpa 
tīk	atrapusīsā–janānām anyatamamāabījayukta kārayet… 
 
 The Director of the Mint should have made silver coins, ¼ copper and 
alloyed with one māa of any of these: iron, tin, lead, and 
antimony… 
This unassuming formula becomes more remarkable as the next 21 officers are 
introduced serially in an identical fashion. It is the strongest structural feature in the 
entire text. We can situate this core within the greater portion of the second adhikaraa 
as follows: 
Fig. 7: The Core within the Second Adhikaraa 
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The uninterupted use of the formula outlined above unites the core, but if we cast 
about more broadly for other passages beginning with the same formula, we find it 
employed to introduce officials outside of this core passage.289 Of these uses of the 
formula, several falling in parts of the second adhikaraa adjacent to the core passage 
(i.e., KAŚ 2.1Ð10 and 2.33Ð36) suggest that the integrated core at KAŚ 2.11Ð32 is only the 
most visible part of a larger underlying passage stretching from KAŚ 2.1Ð34,290 with 
interpolations at least at 2.4,291 2.9,292 and 2.10.293 
                                                 
289 See, for example, the following officials: KAŚ 2.2.10 (nāgavanādhyaka, “Director of Elephant 
Forests”), 2.4.1 (samnidhāt
, “the Depositor”), 2.5.1 (samāhart
, “the Collector”), 2.34.1 (mudrādhyaka, 
“Director of Passports”), 2.34.5 (vivītādhyaka, “Director of Pasturelands”), 2.35.1 (samāhart
), 3.1.1 
(dharmasthīyas, “Judges”), 3.20.1 (dyūtādhyaka, “Director of Gambling”), 4.1.1 (prade
s, 
“Magistrates”), 4.2.1 (sa	sthādhyaka, “the Director of Markets”), 4.4.3 (samāhart




290 Examining the latter material we can see that the presentation at KAŚ 2.34 of the mudrādhyaka 
(Director of Passports; 2.34.1Ð4) and vivītādhyaka (Director of Pasturelands; 2.34.5Ð11) conforms exactly 
to the idiom of 2.11Ð32. The intervening passage, KAŚ 2.33, diverges from the idiom slightly and is 
evidently an interpolation intended to add a rathādhyaka (Director of Chariots; KAŚ 2.33.1Ð6), 
pattyadhyaka (Director of Infantry; 2.33.7Ð8), and Army Commander (senāpati; 2.33.9Ð10) to the 
presentations in the core passage of the āśvādhyaka (Director of Horses; KAŚ 2.30) and hastyadhyaka 
(Director of Elephants; KAŚ 2.31Ð32). This was obviously done in imitation of the four-fold division of the 
army into foot soldiers (patti), cavalry (aśva), chariots (ratha), and elephants (hasti) under a senāpati 
described in the latter half of the text (KAŚ 10.4.13Ð5.47). Moreover, this passage has been connected to 
the adhyāya redaction above (§4.2) by virtue of connective syntax among its constituent prakaraas. Sure, 
then, of its interpolation, we can speak of a single core source from KAŚ 2.11Ð34 with an interpolation at 
2.33 (and other potential minor interpolations throughout). 
 There is good reason to suppose that much of the earlier material in the second adhikaraa (i.e., KAŚ 
2.1Ð10) belongs originally to the same core source. On the surface, this passage is divided into a discussion 
of the settlement and construction of the kingdom (KAŚ 2.1Ð4), the description of two or three powerful 
officials (2.5Ð9), and an excursus on kingly edicts (KAŚ 2.10).  
The initial discussion of settlement and construction (KAŚ 2.1Ð4) possesses one clear interpolation at 
KAŚ 2.4; the remainder (2.1Ð3) probably originally described the duties of an official whose name has 
been elided. The assumption that the king is the subject of these instructions regarding settlement and 
construction derives both from the preceding adhikaraa, which is concerned wholly with the king, as well 
as kingly directives given within it in two excursi in KAŚ 2.1 on land grants (KAŚ 2.1.16ff) and rulership 
(KAŚ 2.1.25Ð26). But these excursi are contradicted by a passage from KAŚ 2.2 that must be directed at an 
official other than the king: 
KAŚ 2.2.3 tāvanmātram…mgavana	 vihārārtha	 rāj–a kārayet 
 He should have constructed…an animal forest for the king’s sport of identical 
size. 
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Among this greater “core passage,” the discussion of three officials of a higher 
order than the rest at KAŚ 2.5Ð8 (the samnidhāt
, “Depositor,”294 samāhart
, “Collector,” 
and adhyaka, a generic “Director”) stands out against the rest of the core section. The 
                                                                                                                                                 
It is unlikely that this passage was intended for a king. The identity of its original subject, however, remains 
a mystery; possibly he is an official known to us from elsewhere in the text. It is not unlikely, then, that 
KAŚ 2.1Ð4 originally belonged to the same source as KAŚ 2.11Ð34, but such cannot be discretely 
demonstrated. As such, it is safest to relegated this passage to the “middle layers” of the text as discussed in 
the conclusion (§7.6). 
The potential obfuscation of this feature appears to have been prompted by the need to integrate this 
preexisting passage on construction and settlement with the foregoing discussion of kingship in adhikaraa 
1. There is some evidence to suggest that further changes were wrought upon the original passage. 
Directions for the construction of the antapura (Royal Residence) within the first adhikaraa (1.20.2Ð3; 
10Ð13) strongly resemble the settlement directions in 2.1Ð4 (less the vāstu section). Moreover, these 
instructions are explicitly referred to at 2.4.7. As the construction of the antapura provides the central 
concept of 1.20Ð21, the final two prakaraas of the first adhikaraa, it becomes even more plausible that 
an underlying discussion of bureaucratic duties was recast at 1.20Ð2.4 to link the rest of adhikaraa 2 to the 
discussion of the king 1.2Ð19. This discussion, it should be noted, shows good integration from 1.2Ð16, 
with appendectical discussions of princes (1.17Ð18) and the king’s daily routine (1.19) before the 
construction theme begins at 1.20, foreshadowing 2.1Ð4. If 1.20Ð2.4 is the result of the modfication of an 
underlying text, then those sections preceding it would seem to be the logical locus for later appendices to 
the discussion of the king’s duties. It should also be noted that, given the shift in voice, the discussion of 
the capital’s vāstu design in 2.4 is probably interpolated. The most important features of 2.1Ð4 remain its 
likely adherence to the idiom of 2.11Ð34 and the fact that its transformation from a passage giving the 
duties of an administrative official to a passage giving the duties of the king probably occurred as a result if 
its being adapted to fit more smoothly with a preceding discussion of kingship. 
291 This passage, detailing the layout of the city within the fortification is marked as an interpolation by its 
shift from the ever-present finite optative to suppressed verbs and nominal sentence structure. A few 
passages in this adhyāya are likely original: the latter part of KAŚ 2.4.7, 2.4.24Ð31. 
292 The discussion of “The Inspection of the Work of Officers” at KAŚ 2.9 appears to represent an even 
higher-order awareness of the core, as it, alone among the elements now found within the core, integrates 
the various officials into a bureaucratic hierarchy and links them to other parts of the text through important 
terms within the greater text not otherwise found in the core source: amātya (minister), uttarādhyaka 
(supervisor), and sampad (archetypal quality). In doing so, it demonstrates its dependence on the discussion 
of the sampads of amātyas at KAŚ 1.9, an element well outside the core source. 
293 The discussion of edicts at KAŚ 2.10 appears to depend logically on the preceding discussion 2.9, but is 
otherwise entirely out of place. 
294 There is some overlap between the duties of the samnidhāt
 and an official from the core called the 
kośādhyaka, “Director of the Treasury.” See Kangle 1971, 97n. The implication of this for the greater text 
is not clear. The samnidhāt
 is, interestingly, somewhat of a transition figure in the text. The passages 
preceding his introduction have all dealt with settlement and construction, and the duty of the samnidhāt
 is 
to construct and staff the various depositories used by the state. Hence, he straddles construction and 
administration. But, several other officials are also instructed to construct their venues, which makes this 
official seem less exceptional. His status in regard to the core source is not clear. 
 170 
first two are introduced according to the idiom of the greater passage, while the 
introduction of the third deviates slightly,295 suggesting it was not written by the 
composer of the core passage. This official, the adhyaka, presents other problems, 
particularly in possessing a generic title296 and duplicating the activities of the preceding 
samāhart
,297 that indicate the reference at KAŚ 2.7.1 to the adhyaka is actually meant to 
refer back to the samāhart
 at KAŚ 2.6.1 (or should be considered, at the least, his 
subordinate). Hence, we have two high officials heading the remaining discussion of the 
core passage, the samnidhāt
 and the samāhart
.298 
These two higher order officials stand somewhat above the profile of the 
remaining officials of the core passage, and the samāhart
 appears to be given a 
supervisory role (KAŚ 2.7.3; 2.7.16Ð20), integrating the subsequent admininstrative 
                                                 
295 This passage opens with the object of its verb and relegating the official to second position: 
KAŚ 2.7.1 akapaalam adhyaka…kārayet 
   The Director should have a Records Office constructed… 
296 The identity of this official: “adhyaka” is a generic term and its use here defies our understanding of 
the presentation of officials. This adhyaka either represents a subsidiary official to the samāhart
, who 
was introduced in the previous adhyāya at KAŚ 2.6.1, or, more likely, is actually a reference back to the 
samāhart
 hismself. 
297 The evidence in favor of equating these two officials comes primarily because of the close overlap of 
their duties. We are told in the introduction of the samāhart
 that: 
KAŚ 2.6.1 The samāhart
 should oversee (aveketa) the fort, the country, the mines, 
irrigation works, forests, herds, and trade routes. 
The subsequent passage (KAŚ 2.6.2Ð8) enumerates the contents of each of these categoreis and then 
interprets each of these as areas of income, stating at KAŚ 2.6.9: ity āyaśarīram, “This is the corpus of 
income.” This tells us that the samāhart
 is responsible for tracking the income of the various productive 
activities of the state. The economic responsibilities of the samāhart
 are further demonstrated by 
subsequent discussions of income (KAŚ 2.6.10, 17Ð22), expenditure (2.6.11, 23Ð26), time (2.6.12), revenue 
(2.6.13Ð17), and balance (2.6.27). Clearly, the samāhart
 is the chief financial officer of the state. These 
areas overseen by the samāhart
 are then ascribed in the following adhyāya to activity of the adhyaka 
(KAŚ 2.7.3; 2.7.16Ð20). It is possible, therefore, that the adhyaka is a functionary of the samāhart
, but 
the overlap in responsibilities suggests, more likely, that they are the same official. 
298 As recognized, perhaps at KAŚ 1.10.13, which mentions that, “those [officials] proved upright by the 




officials in a hierarchical organization beneath him. The higher-order organization of 
administrative officials here prompts the suspicion that this part of the core passage has 
undergone some amount of expansion and/or interpolation, a suspicion borne out by the 
presence in KAŚ 2.5Ð8 (as also the yet later 2.9) of key terms conceptually important to 
the following core passage that are, nevertheless, not found there: adhikaraa, 
“department”299 and (upa-)yukta,300 “officer.” 
It seems likely, then, that we have a first-order expansion of the core passage 
(KAŚ 2.1Ð34) at 2.5Ð8 (with subsequent expansions at 2.9 and 2.10, discussed below). This 
expansion is characterized by the introduction or foregrounding301 of two powerful 
officials, the samnidhāt
 and the samāhart
, the latter of which appears to have authority 
over the remaining officials of the core passage. Hence, it looks as the though the core 
passage was here modified to create some notion of hierarchical bureaucracy out of what 
was initially simply a flat list of state officials. We note that it is in the expansion of the 
duties of the samāhart
 that the major function of this emendation occurs. 
7.2.4 Iterations of the Core  
Thus, the expansion of the duty of the samāhart
 as a figure integrating the core 
section (KAŚ 2.1Ð34) into a bureaucratic hierarch appears to be the first emendation of the 
core source (with subsequent emendations coming at KAŚ 2.9 and 2.10). We have noted 
above that the repetition of the office of the samāhart
 marks the beginning of each major 
                                                 
299 KAŚ 2.5.16; 2.7.2, 3 [2.9.19, 31] 
300 KAŚ 2.5.16; 2.6.20; 2.8.3, 22, 23 [2.9.30?], with a single exception at 2.13.32 
301 The question remains whether, in this emendation, these two officials were newly introduced or merely 
had their duties expanded. I favor the latter interpretation, as the samāhart
 seems to have always been a 
financial officer. His subsequent use as a law enforcement officer (at KAŚ 2.35.1, 4.4.3, and 4.9.1) 
demonstrates explicitly this transformation. If the samāhart
 had been newly introduced, there would not 
be such a clear transformation of the office of the “Collector.” 
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subdivision of officers: of public safety officers at KAŚ 2.35.1; of police officers at 
4.4.1Ð3; and of officers investigating state officials at 4.9.1. I believe that we are seeing in 
these iterations successive expansions of the Arthaśāstra from its initial compilation of 
the core source in the first iteration at KAŚ 2.35.1ff., through a second major expansion 
reflected by the material at 4.4.1Ð3ff., and a final major expansion beginning at 4.9.1ff., 
itself probably reflecting the adhyāya redaction itself. 
The volume of evidence potentially speaking to this theory is truly massive, and 
consideration of it is beyond the scope of the present study. I present below what I think 
to be the crucial evidence, and I will refer to the wider picture in the footnotes. 
The First Iteration: KAŚ 2.35Ð4.3 
We saw above that an early redactor took the core source (KAŚ 2.11Ð32/34) and 
emended the duties of the samāhart
, turning that financial officer into a general 
supervisor of the administrative bureaucracy. We can link this expansion, I would argue, 
to the first iteration of the samāhart
’s duties into law enforcement (public safety), 
represented by KAŚ 2.35Ð4.3 in the extant text. 
After his initial mention at KAŚ 2.6Ð2.8, the samāhart
 is transformed at KAŚ 2.35 
from a financial officer (2.35.1), to an official using a network of spies to gather data 
(2.35.8Ð12), to an official responsible for investigating the probity of high officers and 
protecting the people from thieves and agents of the enemy (2.35.13Ð14). Hence, we see 
the chief financial officer converted in one adhyāya into the chief public safety officer. 
These legal aspects newly ascribed to the samāhart
’s office subsequently serve 
as a model for the other public safety officers: the nāgarika, “City Superintendent” (KAŚ 
2.36.1), and sthānika, “Divisional Warden” (2.36.4), both of whom are told to discharge 
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their duties samāhart
vat, “like the samāhart
,” and evam, “in the same manner,” 
respectively.  
The recasting of the office of the samāhart
 in this new context relies on the 
expansion of his office already at KAŚ 2.6Ð8 (evident as a new layer of the text not only 
in its second-order awareness of the core section but also in the introduction of new 
critical vocabulary). I would argue, therefore, that his use to head the discussion of public 
safety at KAŚ 2.35Ð4.3 provides the motive for the earlier expansion of the office. Thus, 
the first iteration at KAŚ 2.35 was probably carried out by the same individual who 
emended the text at KAŚ 2.5Ð8. We can think of the aggregation of these two sections, 
KAŚ 2.1Ð34 and 2.35Ð4.3 as the “core compilation” or “logical core” of the Arthaśāstra. 
We cannot, however, be sure of the extent of the first iteration beyond what we 
have identified in the core compilation, nor can we be certain that it has not been 
distorted by subsequent emendations. As it stands, the first iteration begins with the re-
introduction of the samāhart
 at KAŚ 2.35.1 and concludes with the appendix on 
calamities in 4.3 that abutts the second iteration and its re-introduction of the samāhart
 
at 4.4.1Ð3.  
The first iteration is broadly concerned with public safety, understood to comprise 
protection of the kingdom’s subjects, civic order, prevention of disasters (KAŚ 2.35Ð36, 
4.3), dispute resolution (KAŚ 3.1Ð20), and policing the business practices of merchants 
(4.1Ð2).302 The aggregation of these topics is what I believe is meant when the following 
                                                 
302 The first iteration, like the core passage, discusses its topics through the duties of officials, in particular 
the samāhart
 (KAŚ 2.35), nāgarika (2.36), dharmastha (3.1Ð20), prade
 (4.1), and sa	sthādhyaka 
(4.2), some of which cleave closely enough to the format of the core passage to wonder they might not have 
been taken from there. This is particularly true of the sa	sthādhyaka, who would find a ready place in the 
core passage. The samāhart
 also conforms to this idiom, although we suspect this to be an iteration. The 
dharmastha and prade
 are mentioned as three officials, but we have some reason to believe that the 
introduction to these passages may have been altered. See below. 
 174 
section on police activity at KAŚ 4.4.1 appears to conclude a discussion of janapadarakaa, 
“protecting the kingdom.” 
The majority of this section is taken up by a lengthy description of jurisprudence 
and the civil legal code at KAŚ 3.1Ð20, falling under the rubric of the duties of the 
dharmastha, “Judge.” Given that such discussions of the civil legal code, known as 
vyavahārapada, “the titles of law,” represent a kind of sub-genre within Sanskrit 
literature, it is not unlikely that the first iteration was motivated in part by the desire to 
introduce just such a discussion into the text. If so, however, that source would have been 
significantly smaller than it appears in the extant Arthaśāstra.303 In particular, however, 
the present adhikaraa divisions of the Arthaśāstra, which segment the discussion of 
civil jurisprudence into its own adhikaraa (the third) cannot yet have prevailed during 
the composition of the first iteration, whose boundaries run from KAŚ 2.35Ð4.3. Hence, 
we can surmise that the discussion of the duties of the dharmastha were likely much 
more modest than they are in the extant Arthaśāstra, as that official seems to have been 
only one of several discussed in the first iteration’s presentation of public safety officials. 
The Second Iteration: KAŚ 4.4Ð4.8 
The second iteration begins at KAŚ 4.1.1Ð3:  
 
KAŚ 4.4.1Ð2 In “Rules for the Administrator” (samāhart
praidhi) the protection of 
the country (janapadarakaa) was explained. We shall now explain 
the weeding of thorns (kaakaśodhana) in it. 
 
                                                 
303 We know already that the last several topics, comprehending KAŚ 3.16Ð20, were added by the adhyāya 
redactor (§7.3.1). We find, moreover, that this discussion itself seems to have been built from different 
sources and expanded through successive interpolations. So, the original discussion of inheritance at 
3.5.1Ð27 seems to have been expanded to include the material at 3.5.1.28Ð3.7.39. The beginning of the 
discussion of property law (vāstukam) at KAŚ 3.8.1Ð21 is written in a different idiom from the remainder 
of that section (KAŚ 3.8.22Ð10.45. Two discussions of witnesses (KAŚ 3.11.28Ð33 and 3.11.34Ð49) have 
been appended to the discussion of debts at KAŚ 3.11.1Ð27, and so forth. The history of the 3rd adhikaraa 
deserves independent study. 
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KAŚ 4.4.3 The samāhart
 should station in the country tāpasavya–jana… 
This passage, I would argue, is marking the boundary between a discussion of 
janapadarakaa and kaakaśodhana.304 This adhyāya discusses investigating officials, 
presumably those introduced in the preceding discussions. The next two adhyāyas are 
linked by connective opening passages: 
 
KAŚ 4.5.1 After the employment of spies (sattriprayogād ūrdhvam), agents 
appearing as holy men should entice criminals by means of… 
 
KAŚ 4.6.1 After the practices of holy men (siddhiprayogād ūrdhvam) comes the 
topic of arrest on suspicion, with the articles, and because of the act. 
The rest of the second iteration comprises two disconnected discussions, one on 
autopsies (KAŚ 4.7) and another on interrogation (4.8). Both pertain to the kind of pro-
active police activity in KAŚ 4.4Ð4.6, but neither is directly connected and both appear to 
be independent discussions. 
It is difficult to surmise whether the composer of the first iteration was also 
responsible for these passages.305 At the present, then, we cannot assign this iteration 
either to an independent layer or to the preceding. 
                                                 
304 This tells us that the composition recognizes a shift in topic between an earlier passage called 
samāhart
praidhi to the present topic of kaakaśodha. The term samāhart
pranidhi does not correspond 
to any prakaraa or adhikaraa title in the text. The closest is samāhart
pracāra, which refers to the 
prakaraa at KAŚ 2.35.1Ð7, which, according to the topical outline, begins the discussion of public safety 
(i.e the first iteration at KAŚ 2.35Ð4.3). I would argue that this passage is not refering back merely to the 
last discussion of the samāhart
 at KAŚ 2.35, but to the entire discussion of 2.35Ð4.3, which deals 
collectively with the protection of the country in various ways. This passage is, instead, marking the 
junction between two sections: samāhart
praidhi and kaakaśodhana, which corresponds to the 
boundary in the topical outline between public safety and police work. The term samāhart
praidhi, 
however, has been lost from the text except in this passage. 
305 We have mention here again of spies, only this time the standard triad of tāpasavya–jana, 
g
hapatikavya–jana, and siddhavya–jana have been dramatically expanded (KAŚ 4.4.3). Moreover, we 
read that these spies are to “learn the purity or impurity (śaucāśauca	)” of the “village heads and directors 
(grāmāām adhyakāā	),” which echoes the command at KAŚ 1.10.1 that the king “should ascertain the 
purity (śodhayet)” of his ministers (amātya). 
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The Third Iteration: KAŚ 4.9Ð4.13 
The third iteration begins with KAŚ 4.9.1: 
 





s should first restrain the Directors and 
their subordinates. 
This adhyāya does not deal with specific instructions to either the samāhart
 or 
the prade
, but enumerates instead rules reminiscent of parts of the civil legal code.306  
This passage, I would argue, was composed after the division of the tantra section 
into adhikaraas. The reason for this is that when the discussion of janapadarakaa was 
divided by the transformation of the civil code into its own adhikaraa (3), two small 
segments were left: KAŚ 2.35Ð36 and 4.1Ð4.3. The former was absorbed into the preceding 
adhikaraa (2), and the latter became the beginning of the subsequent adhikaraa (4), 
which was identified as kaakaśodhana based on KAŚ 4.4.1Ð2 (see above). Hence, an 
interpolation to KAŚ 4.1 was necessary in order to mark the beginning of the newly-
created adhikaraa: 
 
KAŚ 4.1.1 Three prade
s, all three ministers (amātya), shall carry out 
kaakaśodhana. 
Here, the creator of the adhikaraa has ascribed KAŚ 4.1Ð4.3 to the topic of 
kaakaśodhana, and placed that duty under the responsibility of the prade
. This, of 
course, produces all kinds of disjunctures in the text.307 But, when the third iteration 
opens by saying 
                                                 
306 This disjunction is quite similar to the other introductory passage featuring the prades, KAŚ 4.1.1, 
where the remainder of 4.1 is simply a code that neither needs nor requires the prades at all. 
307 The disjuncture with the following passage is clear, however, when not only is the prade
 not named 
again, but explict instructions are given directly to different groups (employers of artisans, weavers, 
washermen, etc.). Moreover, the only instructions to any official in the adhyāya come in the last prose 
sentence and refer to a singular subject (as opposed to the three prade
s). Note, in this regard, how the 
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s should first restrain the Directors and 
their subordinates. 
We see that this passage appears to be trying to harmonize the original start of 
kaakaśodhana at KAŚ 4.4.1 (addressed to the samāhart
) and the new start at 4.1.1 
(addressed to the prade
). Indications from within adhyāya 4.9 also indicate that it was 
written after the division of the text into adhikaraas.308 
This passage is followed by four more independent adhyāyas (KAŚ 4.10Ð13) 
which seem clearly to have been derived from a different source, as they each possess 
their own clear internal organization and prescribe, in several cases, different 
punishments for crimes discussed already in the text. Hence, these likely belong to the 
third iteration or later. 
7.2.5 The First Adhikaraa and the Layers of the Tantra Section  
We can surmise that the composer of the first iteration likely included some 
discussion of kingship before what we have called the “core compilation” (KAŚ 2.1Ð4.3). 
Formal indication of this comes from references at KAŚ 2.35.8, 2.35.11, and 2.35.13 to 
three secret agents: the g
hapatikavya–jana (“Seeming-Householder”); the 
vaidehakavya–jana (“Seeming-Merchant”); and the tāpasavya–jana (“Seeming-
Ascetic”). These are agents of the king introduced in the first adhikaraa at KAŚ 
1.11.5Ð12. Because it is certain the composer of the first iteration composed this passage 
at KAŚ 2.35 (it representing the iterative adaptation of the samāhart
), we can be certain, 
                                                                                                                                                 
parallel mention of three dharmasthīyas in KAŚ 3.1.1 is retained in plural verbs at 3.1.2 (not however, in 
the second prakaraa of the adhyāya at 3.1.30). 
308 See KAŚ 4.9.18 where the dharmastha and prade
 are considered to have parallel functions, reflecting 
the manner in which the third and fourth adhikaraa mirror one another. 
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at least, that the introduction of these spies at KAŚ 1.11 must also have existed at that 
time. 
If we turn, then, to the composition of the first adhikaraa, we are able to get a 
sense of the chronological relationship of different iterations of the tantra section. I have 
noted already that the initial discussion of the four sciences (vidyās; 1.2.1Ð1.5.1) was 
greatly enlarged during the adhyāya redaction (§6.4.1). If we remove these 
interpolations309 we find a core text covering the first three prakaraas and written in a 
uniformly terse sūtra style,310 in comparison with which most of the rest of the 
Arthaśāstra seems excessively verbose: 
 
KAŚ 1.2.1 ānvīkikī trayī vārttā daanītiś ceti vidyā 
KAŚ 1.2.10 sā	khyā yogo lokāyata	 cety ānvīkikī 
KAŚ 1.3.1 sāmargyajurvedās trayas trayī 
KAŚ 1.4.1a k
ipāśupālye vaijyā ca vārttā 
KAŚ 1.4.3a ānvīkikītrayīvārttānā	 yogakemasādhano daa tasya nītir daanīti 
KAŚ 1.5.1 tasmād daamūlās tisro vidyā 
KAŚ 1.5.2 vinayamūlo daa prāabh
tā	 yogakemāvaha 
KAŚ 1.5.6 vidyānā	 tu yathāsvam ācāryaprāmānyād vinayo niyamaś ca 
KAŚ 1.5.10 nityaś ca vidyāv
ddhasa	yogo vinayav
ddhyartha	 tanmūlatvād vinayasya 
KAŚ 1.6.1 vidyāvinayahetur indriyajaya kāmakrodhalobhamānamadaharatyāgāt kārya 
KAŚ 1.6.2a karatvagakijihvāghrāendriyāā	 śabdasparśarūparasagandhev 
avipratipattir indriyajaya 
 
   Philosophy, the Triple Veda, Economics, and Political Science are the Sciences. 
   Sākya, Yoga, and Lokāyata are Philosophy. 
   The three Vedas: Sāma-, g-, and Yajur-; are the Triple Veda. 
   Agriculture, animal husbandry, and trade are Economics. 
                                                 
309 And a few other suspected passages. What I have presented here are the minimum sūtras required for 
the underlying prakaraa to make sense. The extent to which it resembles the original source is unclear. 
One notes also the tendency for certain lines of this passage to scan in śloka meter.  
310 I have been guided in the identification of these passages by following the main points of the 
prakaraas. Thus, while the first half of this passage results merely from removing the interpolated 
material, the latter half (KAŚ 1.5.6Ð1.6.2) has been aggregated by tracing the main points of the argument. 
As such, while all of the excised material from the first half was removed on strength of evidence favoring 
its interpolation (§6.4.1Ð2), this is only partly true of the second half. In particular, the passages KAŚ 
1.5.3Ð5, 7Ð10, 12Ð16, 1.6.3, and 1.7.1Ð2 have been removed as secondary to the main argument. They do, 
however, also deviate in point of style, reinforcing that at the root of this extended passage is the simple, 
sūtra style passage recorded above. 
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The means of ensuring the welfare of Philosophy, the Triple Veda, and 
Economics is the Staff (daa), and its use (nīti) constitutes Political Science 
(daanīti). 
   Therefore, the three sciences are rooted in the Staff. 
   The Staff, rooted in training, brings welfare to living beings. 
 But, training and discipline in the sciences arise from the authoritativeness of 
teachers in their respective sciences. 
 And there should always be association with elders in the sciences for the sake 
of developing one’s training, as training has its root in that. 
 Control over the senses, which is the result of training in the sciences, should be 
secured by abandoning lust, anger, greed, pride, arrogance and foolhardiness. 
 Absence of improper indulgence in sound, touch, color, taste, and smell by the 
respective senses is the controling of the senses. 
It seems we have here, then, the original introduction to the Arthaśāstra (or 
something near it).  
This passage is connected with the next topic, the appointment of ministers 
(amātya), by a prose sūtra:311 
 
KAŚ 1.7.8 maryādā	 stāpayed ācāryān amātyān vā… 
 
 [The king] should set teachers or ministers as the bounds of good 
conduct… 
As we have already deduced that the next adhyāya (KAŚ 1.8) is part of the 
adhyāya redaction, the conversation of amātyas picks up at KAŚ 1.9.1 with a long 
description of the “excellences of a minister” (amātyasampat), directions to appoint 
ministers (1.9.8) and a prime minister (mantripurohita; 1.9.9Ð10). At the beginning of the 
next adhyāya we read: 
 
KAŚ 1.10.1 mantripurohitasakha sāmayev adhikaraeu sthāpayitvāmātyān 
upahābhi śodhayet 
 
 After appointing ministers to ordinary offices in consultation with his 
prime minister, he should test their integrity by means of secret tests. 
                                                 
311 This sūtra is problematic and features very clumsy syntax. It nevertheless links previous discussions of 
teachers (ācārya; KĀŚ 1.5.6) with the next subject of ministers (amātya; KAŚ 1.9.1ff.) 
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Then follows descriptions of the four tests by which the “purity” (śuci) of each 
minister is proven. 
Finally, after this point, we arrive at two adhyāyas (KAŚ 1.11Ð12) that describe 
two sets of spies: sa	sthās, “stationary spies” (KAŚ 1.11.2Ð21); and sa	caras “mobile 
spies” (KAŚ 1.12.1Ð5). By looking at these spies, who bear unique names, we are able to 
discern something of the chronology of the text. 
The first group of spies, the sa	sthās, includes the kāpaika, udāsthita, 
g
hapatikavya–jana, vaidehakavya–jana, and tāpasavya–jana. The second group, the 
sa	caras, includes the sattrin, tīka, rasada, and bhikukī. Of these, the term sattrin is a 
generic term for spy and, as such, I will not consider it in this analysis. 
Of the sa	sthās, the former two occur only in the first and fifth adhikaraas, but 
these three and other -vya–jana spies also occur at KAŚ 2.21, 2.35, and importantly, in the 
second iteration at 4.4.3, 4.5.1, and 4.5.12. Of the latter group, the sa	caras, none of the 
agents (aside from the generic sattrin) appear anywhere except for KAŚ 1.11Ð1.14 and 5.1 
onward. Hence, we can say that the composers of the core compilation and the second as 
well as the third iteration were aware of the -vya–jana spies, while only the composer of 
1.12Ð14 and the fifth adhikaraa are aware of the sa	cara spies.  
What this demonstrates, I would argue, is that adhyāyas 1.12Ð14 date to the 
adhyāya redaction, and, because it is aware of the agents discussed there, so must the 
fifth adhikaraa. Hence, we have a relatively clear picture of the extent of the adhyāya 
redaction.  
KAŚ 2.9 and 2.10 
The final minor issue to be resolved is the status of these two adhyāyas falling 
amidst the older tract of the core source. It is clear from certain points of terminology 
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(amātya, “minister”; sampad, “ideal quality”) that KAŚ 2.9 must post date at least the first 
expansion of the source text. That places it at least, then, sometime later than the core 
compilation without ruling out that it might be part of the adhyāya redaction. The same 
must be true for KAŚ 2.10, which, as a discussion on edicts, only makes sense if 2.9 
already existed. Although KAŚ 2.10 appears itself to have been constructed from different 
sources,312 I am inclined to date it to the adhyāya redaction on the strength of its clear 
subsidiary dependence on the already secondary KAŚ 2.9. It does, however, remain 
possible that it dates only to the prakaraa-text. 
7.2.6 Conclusion 
We have been able in the foregoing paragraphs to isolate the extent of the 
adhyāya redaction a great deal. We have seen first of all that the adhyāya redactor 
dramatically expanded the core text at KAŚ 1.2Ð1.7, added KAŚ 1.8, 1.12Ð14, and 1.17Ð21. 
He was also responsible for the inclusion of KAŚ 2.33 and 3.16Ð20, as well as the entire 
fifth adhikaraa. Because the fifth adhikaraa (as a set of unrelated appendices) 
presupposes the adhikaraa division, we can also assign KAŚ 4.9Ð13 to the adhyāya 
redaction. 
 
Fig. 8: Proposed Adhyāya Redaction to the Tantra section 
                                                 
312 Scharfe (1993, 60ff.) undertakes a full analysis of this adhyāya and theorizes that it was compiled from 
independent sources. 
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Hence, the prakaraa-text, in the tantra section, comprised the old core of KAŚ 
1.2Ð1.7, 1.10Ð11, 1.15Ð16, 2.1Ð3, 2.5Ð2.9, 2.11Ð32, 2.34Ð4.8. The oldest parts of this are 
likely the core passages underlying 1.2Ð1.7, 2.1Ð2.34, and parts of the third adhikaraa. 
7.3 THE ĀVĀPA SECTION (6.2Ð13.5) 
The latter half of the extant Arthaśāstra deals with matters falling generally under 
the rubric of “foreign policy,” or āvāpa. It is characterized by a greater number of shorter 
adhikaraas than the tantra section, with the exception of the long seventh adhikaraa: 
 
Fig. 9: The Āvāpa Section of the Arthaśāstra 
 
  title translation topics covered 
 
 6.  maalayoni “The Circle as Source” Central Concepts for the Following  
 7.  āguyam “The Sixfold Policy” Foreign Policy Strategy 
 8.  vyasanādhikārikam “On the Topic of Calamities” Calamities of the State 
 9.  abhiyāsyatkarma “Preparing to March” Marching with the Army 
 10. sā	grāmikam “On War”  Fighting War 
 11. sa	ghav
ttam “Practices against Sa	ghas” Undermining Oligarchies 
 12. ābaliyasam “On the Weaker King” Tactics for the Weak King 
 13. durgalambhopāya  “Means of Taking a Fort” Strategies of Taking Fortresses 
These adhikaraa subdivisions seem to match the content of the text relatively, 
well, although, as we have already seen (§6.4.2), we can link adhikaraas 8 and 11 to the 
adhyāya redaction. 
7.3.1 Topical Outline 
The adhikaraas of the āvāpa section do not resolve into a structure nearly as 
clear as that with the tantra section. But, we do find traces of a loose structure to the 
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arrangement of topics, particularly if we remove two of the adhikaraas (8 and 11) 
already associated with the adhyāya redaction: 
  
 I.   Considerations of Foreign Policy 
6  “Circle as Source”       A.  Technical Preamble 
7  “The Sixfold Policy”       B.  Determinations of Foreign Policy 
 II.  Military Strategy 
9  “Preparing to March”       A. Marching with the Army 
10 “On War”       B. Field Combat Strategy 
12 “On the Weak King”            a.  Non-Combat Strategies of Weak Kings313 
13 “Means to Take a Fort”       C. Conquering a Fort 
We can see in this basic outline the division into rather more academic 
considerations of foreign policy (adhikaraas 6Ð7) and detailed preparations and tactics 
for war (9Ð10, 13). Unfortunately, a more detailed outline reveals nothing about the 
composition of the āvāpa section. As such, we are unable to penetrate deeper into the 
origins of the prakaraa-text in the second half to the same extent possible in the first 
half. As such, we must rely more on the formal elements and informal tendencies 
observed in the adhyāya redaction in the tantra section to determine the extent, at least, 
of that intervention. 
7.3.2 Integrated Passages 
We find much less in the āvāpa section by way of integrated passages. KAŚ 6.2 
establishes a series of theoretical concepts used primarily in the subsequent seventh 
adhikaraa, which may be said to be the conceptual heart of the adhikaraa, as it 
demonstrates the archetypal uses of the basic vocabulary of the second half (as presented 
in KAŚ 6.2 and 7.1). Nevertheless, the seventh adhikaraa does not show any clear 
                                                 
313 It should be noted here that the 12th adhikaraa does not deal, as might be suggested by the outline with 
combat strategies, but a variety of non-combat strategies, and does, therefore, break with the major 
organization of the outline. 
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structural organization except in a long discussion of treaties (KAŚ 7.9Ð12) that may be 
linked to the adhyāya redaction (§6.4.2) 
The ninth adhikaraa, however, does possess an independent structure, which is 
laid out in its first sūtra: 
 
KAŚ 9.1.1 vijigīur ātmana parasya ca balābala 
śaktideśakālayātrākālabalasamuddhānakālapaścātkopakyavyayalābh
āpadā j–ātvā viśiabalo yāyāt anyathā Õsīta 
 
 After ascertaining the (relative) strength and weakness of powers, 
place, time, seasons for marching, time for raising armies, revolts in 
the rear, losses, expenses, gains and troubles, of himself and the 
enemy, the conqueror should march if superior in strength, otherwise 
stay quiet. 
This sūtra lays out precisely the topics covered in the following adhikaraa (see 
§4.2): 
 
KAŚ 9.1.1 prakaraa adhyāya 
1. Power śaktideśakālabalābalaj–ānam 9.1.2Ð16 
2. Place  9.1.17Ð21 
3. Time  9.1.22Ð24 
4. Seasons for Marching yātrākālā 9.1.25Ð52 










7. Loss, Expenses, and Gains kayavyayalābhaviparimarśa 9.4.1Ð27 






tāsām upāyavikalpajā siddhaya 9.7.67Ð84 
It was noted above (§4.2) that the adhyāyas redactor was likely responsible for the 
addition of the material in KAŚ 9.7. Internal indications also link KAŚ 9.6 to the adhyāya 
redaction.314 Hence, this glimpse of structure in the āvāpa section reveals again the 
                                                 
314 KAŚ 9.6.51 refers to oligarchies, which have been linked to the adhyāya redaction. 
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addition of material by the adhyāya redactor. We note also that despite the lack of clear 
structural principles, we find a Kauilya dialogue also indicating interpolations of the 
adhyāya redactor at the end of KAŚ 10.315 
Adhikaraa 12 is a collection of secret strategies to help a king who is outmatched 
by an opponent. We can seen above that it breaks the general outline of the second half. 
We note now that the adhikaraa itself is introduced by a Kauilya dialogue at KAŚ 
12.1.1Ð9. The organization of this adhikaraa is the most confused in the entire treatise. 
Its disruption of the general outline along with the introduction of its major topic by a 
Kauilya dialogue mark it as a likely candidate for interpolation, although little more can 
be said of it at the present. 
Finally, the thirteenth adhikaraa once again shows good internal organization, 
but as with the ninth, it appears that an extra adhyāya has been added at the end. This 
adhikaraa discusses the durgalambhopāya, “Means of Taking a Fort,” in five parts: 
instigation to sedition, drawing the enemy out, the use of secret agents, laying siege, and 
storming the fort. These are discussed in five prakaraas and conclude at KAŚ 13.4.53:316  
 
KAŚ 13.4.53 paradurgam avāpya viśuddhaśatrupaka ktopāśuda	apratīkāram 
antarbahiś ca praviśet 
 
 After obtaining the enemy’s fort, he should enter it after it is cleared of 
the enemy’s party and after precautions against silent punishment are 
taken inside and outside. 




KAŚ 13.4.54Ð60 eva vijigīur amitrabhūmi labdhvā madhyama lipseta 
tatsiddhāvugāsīnam 
                                                 
315 See §4.2. 
316 Kangle recognizes that the prakaraa concludes at this point (1971, 485n) 
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 ea prathamo mārga pthivī jetum 
 madhyamodāsīnayor abhāve gu	ātiśayenāripraktī sādhayet tat uttarā 
praktī 
 ea dvitīyo mārga 
 ma	alasyābhāve śatru	ā mitra mitre	a vā śatrum 
ubhayatasapīanena sādhayet 
 ea ttīyo mārga 
 śakyam eka vā sāmanta sādhayet tena dvigu	o dvitīyam trigu	as 
ttīyam 
 ea caturtho mārga ptivhī jetum 
 
 After thus conquering the enemy’s territory, the conqueror should seek 
to seize the middle king, and after succeeding over him, the neutral 
king. This is the first method of conquering the world (p
thivī	 
jetum). 
 In absence of the middle and neutral kings, he should overcome the 
enemy constituents by superiority of policy, then the other 
constituents. This is the second method. 
 In the absence of the circle he should overcome by squeezing from both 
sides the ally through the enemy or the enemy through the ally. This 
is the third method. 
 He should first overcome the weak or a single neighboring prince; 
becoming doubly powerful through him a second prince; three times 
powerful, a third. This is the fourth method of conquering the world.  
And then the states that: 
 
KAŚ 13.4.62 jitvā ca pthivī vibhaktavar	āśramā svadharme	a bhu–jīta 
 
 Having conquered the world, he should enjoy it divided into varas and 
āśramas according to his svadharma. 
We recognize here that the plan of the greater adhikaraa has ended at KAŚ 
13.4.53, and that what follows uses a term (p
thivīm) that characterizes the interpolations 
of the adhyāya redactor in the framing chapters (§3.3).317 Thus, we should rightly regard 
KAŚ 13.4.54Ð62 as well as the following adhyāya to be interpolations of the adhyāya 
redactor. 
                                                 
317 Moreover, this term is only found once outside of these passages, end verses, and Kauilya dialogues, 
where it appears as a gloss (unncessary?) for the term deśa: KAŚ 9.1.17. 
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Moreover, the discussions interpolated here by the adhyāya redactor, on the four 
means of conquering the world (KAŚ 13.4.54ff.) and the conduct of the king toward his 
conquered subjects (KAŚ 13.5) indicate that this was probably the end of the prakaraa-
text as he found it. Thus, we can ascertain that the general outline above (probably less 
adhikaraa 12) gives a reasonable sense of the extent of the āvāpa section in the 
prakaraa-text. 
7.3.3 The Adhyāya Redaction and the Āvāpa Text 
It would appear, then, that the āvāpa section has undergone significant redaction, 
of which little clear trace can be established. We do, however, see a basic division 
between rather more theoretical discussions of various foreign policies (KAŚ 6.2Ð7.18) 
and practical advice for organizing the marching, combat, and siege tactics of the army 
itself (adhikaraas 9, 10, and 13). We have already relegated adhikaraas 8 and 11 to the 
adhyāya redaction. This is likely also the case with the twelfth adhikaraa, which not 
only breaks the general outline presented above, but is generally inaugurated by a 
Kauilya dialogue. Further, if we take the serial presentation of options for the use of 
secret agents as consistent with the style of the adhyāya redactor (as suggested by 
adhikaraa 5), then the 12th adhikaraa gives the strong appearance of having been 
added during the adhyāya redaction. 
Moreover, analysis of adhyāya boundaries (§4.2) have indicated the likelihood of 
the addition of prose material at the end of adhikaraas 9 and 10, a probability that finds 
strong support in the case of the former through an analysis of its underlying structure. 
Finally, then, we are able to determine that the end of adhikaraa 13 has likely been 
expanded during the adhyāya redaction, as well.  
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Fig. 10: Proposed Adhyāya Redaction of the Āvāpa Section 
Collectively, these give us a tolerably precise sense of the extent of the adhyāya 
redaction with regard to the interpolation of discrete tracts, although there is also some 
indication that the adhikaraas of the prakaraa-text in the second half have been 
expanded throughout. 
7.4 THE BRIDGE AND THE FOURTEENTH ADHIKARAA 
This brief passage at KAŚ 6.1.1 presents the saptāga theory; namely, that the state 
comprises seven “constituent elements” (prak
tis): the king (svāmi), the minister 
(amātya), the country (janapada), the fort (durga), the treasury (kośa), the army (daa), 
and the ally (mitra).318 This theory raises an interesting problem, as the term prak
ti also 
means in the text “subjects” or “people” of the realm.319 Nevertheless, the saptāga 
theory is integrated not only into the following passage at KAŚ 6.2.13ff., as well as in key 
passages throughout the remainder of the āvāpa section. Thus, it would seem that the 
bridge must date to the time when the āvāpa section took on the general form as 
witnessed in the presently theorized shape of the prakaraa text.  
Finally, I think we can conclude that the fourteenth adhikaraa was also part of 
the adhyāya redaction. Its singular character and style within the greater context of the 
                                                 
318 An eighth prak
ti, the enemy (amitra) is added in the prose (KAŚ 6.1.13Ð14), although the end verse 
(6.1.15) is quick to note that the enemy (ari) is not one of the prak
tis. It is not clear whether the 8th is an 
addition. 
319 See also its use to describe the constituents of the “Circle of Kings” (maala) at KAŚ 7.2.13Ð23. 
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Arthaśāstra, in concert with its clearly appendectical character, has marked it as a clear 
interpolation from the beginning. The only question remains where it should be put in the 
compositional history. I think we can now solve this problem with reference to the 
specific nature of the material included by the adhyāya redactor at the end of the 
thirteenth prakaraa, which indicates to me that KAŚ 13.4.53 was the original conclusion 
of the prakaraa-text. This original closing has prompted the adhyāya redactor to add a 
section on the four ways to conquer the world (p
thivī) and a subsequent adhyāya on the 
conduct of the conquiering king (which, however, has already been discussed at KAŚ 
7.16). The appendectical character of the fourteenth adhikaraa in addition to its 
conspicuous introduction with reference to the four varas and āśramas (KAŚ 14.1.1) 
support this notion. 
7.5 CONCLUSION: THE PRAKARAA-TEXT 
We have arrived, then, at a reasonably well-supported idea of the extent of the 
adhyāya redaction. I must here restate the provisional character of this theory, limited, as 
it is, by the need to select only key pieces of evidence; certainly many more 
considerations, particularly examination of shifts in terminology and concepts, will 
refine, contradict, and, perhaps, ultimately overturn this theory. Nevertheless, it has its 
validity in presenting an articulate and detailed map of the text that is of potential use to 
the study of the history of the period.  
7.5.1 The Extent of the Adhyāya Redaction 
Based on the above, we can posit that, in addition to the end verses and Kauilya 
dialogues, the adhyāya redaction involved the following emendations of the prakaraa 
text: 
 
1. The addition of KAŚ 1.1 
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2. The enlargement of the discussion of vidyāvinayaindriyajaya at KAŚ 1.2Ð7 
3. The addition of the discussion of appointing ministers KAŚ 1.8 
4. The addition of the discussion of princes at KAŚ 1.17Ð18 [probably 19Ð21] 
5. The addition of KAŚ 2.33 
6. The addition of KAŚ 3.16Ð20 
7. The addition of KAŚ 4.9Ð13 
8. The addition of the fifth adhikaraa 
9. The addition of the eighth adhikaraa 
10. The addition of KAŚ 9.6Ð9.7 
11. The addition of KAŚ 10.6 
12. The addition of KAS 11 
13. The addition of the twelfth adhikaraa [?] 
14. The addition of KAŚ 13.4.53ff. and 13.5 
15. The addition of the fourteenth adhikaraa 
16. The addition of KAŚ 15.1 
Additional interpolations that are identifiable but not discretely dateable to the 
adhyāya redaction include: 
 
1. The addition of KAŚ 2.4 
2. The addition of KAŚ 2.10 
3. The addition of KAŚ 3.6Ð3.8 
These changes measure out the probable extent of the prakaraa-text, a text that 
we have concluded was probably composed entirely in prose.  
7.5.2 Corroboration of the Prakaraa-Text 
It is difficult to find any independent corroboration of my proposed theory, but I 
believe that I have found just such a thing. For, my reading of the Manusm
ti suggests 
that its composer used the Kauilīya Arthaśāstra to produce the sections on Rājadharma 
(Book 7) and Vyavahāra (Books 8Ð9). What is interesting, however, is that I believe I can 
demonstrate that the Manusm
ti was not using the extant Arthaśāstra, but was in fact 
looking at the prakaraa-text as I have just outlined it. 
The Manusm
ti deals with statecraft (rājadharma) in Books 7Ð9. Of these, the 
discussion of governance itself is covered in Book 7, while Books 8 and 9 deal with civil 
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and criminal law. As such, it is in Book 7 that we see the direct influence of our 
Arthaśāstra on the Manusm
ti.  
The discussion of governance is divided into two main sections in the Manusm
ti, 
MS 7.37Ð144 and 7.145Ð226, corresponding precisely to the division of the Arthaśāstra 
into tantra and āvāpa. Each of these sections is formally demarcated with a frame 
provided by the trope of the king’s daily routine. The first section begins at MS 7.37 with 
“After getting up in the morning…,” and the second section begins at MS 7.145 with “He 
should rise in the last watch of the night…”320 As mentioned, the first of these introduces 
a passage corresponding to the tantra section and the latter to the āvāpa section. The 
material preceding the first section (MS 7.1Ð35) is a rather more abstract and theoretical 
preamble; the first major section is formally introduced at MS 7.36: 
 
MS 7.36 I will explain to you precisely and in their proper order all that he, 
along with his deputies, should do as he protects his subjects. 
The manner of their correspondence is somewhat complicated and is probably 
best demonstrated through a visual depiction. The correspondences for the tantra section 
follow below: 
  
                                                 
320 Only the latter of these two examples actually concludes its frame with the afternoon (MS 7.216Ð222) 





ti Arthaśāstra (prakaraa-text) 
7.1Ð35 [Introduction]   
7.1.36 [transitional verse]   
7.1.37 [morning routine]   
7.1.38Ð39 Training from elders    
7.1.40Ð42 [old kings]   
7.1.43 Four Sciences Four Sciences 1.2Ð1.4 
  Training from elders 1.5 
7.1.44 Conquering the Senses Conquering the Senses 1.6Ð1.7 
7.1.45-55 [vices]   
7.1.54Ð55 Appointing Advisors Appointing Ministers 1.9 
7.1.56Ð57 Seeking Counsel   






  Seeking Counsel 1.15 
7.1.63Ð68 Appointing the Envoy Appointing the Envoy 1.16 
7.1.69 Settling the Countryside Settling the Countryside 2.1Ð2 
7.1.70Ð75 Constructing Forts Constructing Forts 2.3 
7.1.76 Constructing the Palace Constructing the Palace 2.4.7 
7.1.77 [marriage]   
7.1.78Ð79 [purohita and 
tvig]   
7.1.80 Employing collectors samnidhāt
 & samāhart
 2.5Ð2.9 
7.1.81 Employing adhyakas Employing adhyakas 2.11Ð32/4 
7.82Ð95 [praise of Brahmins]   
7.96Ð98 [war booty]   
7.99Ð113 [advice on governance]   
7.114Ð119 Appointment of Regional 
Officers 
samāhart
 II (public safety) 2.35.1Ð8 
7.120 Overseeing village activity Spying on villages 2.35.9Ð14 
7.121 Appointing City Officers Appointing nāgarika 2.36 
7.122Ð124 [king inspects officers]   
7.125Ð126 [wages]   
7.127Ð139 [taxes]   
7.140Ð141 Trying lawsuits Jurisprudence 3.1Ð5, 8Ð16 
7.142Ð144 Protecting subjects Policing; kaakaśodhana 4.1Ð4.8 
If we allow for the inclusion of several long digressions in the Manusm
ti, the 
progression of topics is nearly perfect. The only differences are, on one hand, the order in 
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which training from elders and the sciences are discussed, and, on the other hand, the 
position in which the topic of counsel is discussed.  
The former is explained, I believe, by the fact that the composer of the Manusm
ti 
found a convenient link between his frame narrative of the king’s daily activity and the 
worship of Brahmins, a trope common from the dharma literature, where the king is 
supposed to worship Brahmins when he awakes. Manu follows this convention, but then 
specifies that these are elders (v
ddha) from whom he should receive training (vinaya) in 
the sciences (vidyā). Hence, we have a reversal of the order discussed in the Arthaśāstra 
(vidyā, then vinaya).  
The movement of the section on counsel can, I think, be explained because Manu 
has made the same error the adhyāya redactor made. Namely, he has misinterpreted the 
phrase mantripurohita as “counselors and purohita,” and, not finding a discussion of 
counselors, places one here, but refering to them as saciva.321 He has, I would argue, 
moved the discussion on seeking counsel in the Arthaśāstra to what seemed a more 
logical place, after the putative introduction of the ministers. 
There are a few other difficulties,322 but none sufficient to overshadow the clear 
concordance of the two texts.323 In fact, the strongest evidence certainly favors that the 
                                                 
321 We note, interestingly, that the term saciva is used only once in the Arthaśāstra, just prior to the 
interpolated discussion of ministers at KAŚ 1.8, which was introduced by the adhyāya redactor precisely 
because he also could not find a discussion of mantrins. 
322 There are two parts of this passage that look very similar to elements that I have assigned to the 
adhyāya redaction: 1) the examples set by former kings (MS 7.40Ð42); and, 2) the discussion of vices or 
causes of grief that stand in opposition to the control of the senses (MS 7.45-53). But, Manu’s discussion 
discusses them separately and in different contexts. In the Arthaśāstra, they are combined into a single 
discussion of the ariavarga (the “group of six enemies,” i.e., vices), in which the former kings are given 
as warnings to those who might succumb to one of the six vices. Thus, the Arthaśāstra’s discussion shows 
a high degree of integration over that of the Manusm
ti. It is the first but not last indication that the adhyāya 
redaction may have been influenced by the Manusm
ti. 
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version of the prakaraa-text posited above agrees with the source used by the 
Manusm
ti. We have, first of all, a concise discussion of the sciences (vidyā), training 
(vinaya), and control of the senses (indriyavijaya), with none of the later adhyāya 
expansions. Second, the Manusm
ti passes over the passages linked to the adhyāya 
redaction, KAŚ 12Ð14 on mobile spies and investigating seducible parties, KAŚ 1.17Ð21 on 
princes, the king’s schedule, and the construction of the palace,324 KAŚ 2.4 on the layout 
of the capital city, KAŚ 2.10 on edicts, and most importantly, all of adhikaraa 5. We 
could not have clearer evidence that the theory outlined above regarding the extent of the 
adhyāya redaction is generally accurate for the tantra section.  
The discussion of āvāpa resets the narrative of the king’s daily schedule. Its 
agreement with the prakaraa-text is also quite close, although it tends only to follow the 
broader divisions of the latter half: 
  
                                                                                                                                                 
323 I am also not able to account for the failure of the Manusm
ti to discuss the spies at KAŚ 1.11. Perhaps 
the composer felt that they were included in the discussion of testing officials at 1.10. Likewise, they may 
not have been in the prakaraa-text, or he may simply have failed to mention them. 
324 He does mention the construction of the palace, but only in agreement the minor reference at KAŚ 
2.4.7, which I think is original to the passage (it is written in the consistent optative idiom of the greater 





7.145Ð146 [morning routine ]   
7.147Ð150 [conferring with councilors]   
7.1.51Ð154a [reflecting on different matters]   
  The Seven Prak
tis 6.1 
  Miscellaneous 6.2.1Ð12 
7.154bÐ156 The Circle of Kings I The Circle of Kings 6.2.13Ð23 
7.157a The Seven Prak
tis   
7.157b The 72 Constituents The 72 Constituents 6.2.24Ð29 
7.158 The Circle of Kings II   
7.159 Prevailing over Enemies Power 6.2.30Ð38 
7.160-161 The Sixfold Strategy The Sixfold Strategy 7.1Ð7.2.5 
7.162Ð180 Application of Sixfold Strategy Application of Sixfold Strategy 7.2.6Ð7.18 
7.181 March to the Enemy’s Fort   
7.182Ð187 Considerations for Marching Considerations for Marching 9.1Ð9.5 
7.188Ð194 Combat Tactics Combat Tactics 10.1Ð10.5 
7.195Ð197 Sieging the Fort Sieging the Fort 13.1Ð4 
7.198Ð205 Conduct in Victory Conduct in Victory 13.5 
7.206Ð215 [secondary strategy]325   
7.216Ð222  [afternoon routine]   
7.223Ð225 [evening routine]   
7.226 [abdication of duties]   
The correlations in the second half are clear, although they are not nearly as 
striking as in the first. I think this is for two reasons. First, the discussions in the second 
half are far less organized than in the first, and it appears that the composer of the 
Manusm
ti is digesting complex tracts in simple ways. Second, the extent of the adhyāya 
redaction in the second half is far less certain, since there is no apparent underlying 
structure as found in the first half. 
Nevertheless, the comparison shows that the major features of the āvāpa section 
that I have identified, consideration of six-fold policy and the march to the enemy’s fort, 
are, indeed, the way the Manusm
ti has structured its discussion. Critically, then, the 
                                                 
325 This long passage appears to draw on elements scattered throughout the second half of the text. As it 
breaks the discussion in the Manusm
ti it does not seem to militate against the identification of the 
prakaraa-text as the source for the discussion of statecraft in Book 7. More research is needed here as 
well. 
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model proposed above correctly predicts the absence of the eighth adhikaraa (on 
calamities) as well as the eleventh (on oligarchies), twelfth (on the weaker king), and 
fourteenth (on secret practices). This stands as strong indication not only that the adhyāya 
theory is correct, but that it has led to the correct conclusion about the general shape of 
the prakaraa-text. Of course, the situation is not entirely perfect:  I have posited that 
KAŚ 13.5 is a later addition, although Manu shows a parallel passage. Moreover, the 
passages show only a general agreement in broad topics, but it is enough to demonstrate 
the major elements of the prakaraa-text. This demonstrable corroboration is, I think, 
extremely strong evidence not only that the composer of the Manusm
ti used the 
Kauilīya Arthaśāstra as his source for Book 7, but also that he was looking at the 
prakaraa-text.  
Undoubtedly, there is much more work to be done on the relationship between 
these two texts, but it is sufficient here to note that the Manusm
ti testifies to the shape of 
the prakaraa-text, and there are some indications that the adhyāya redaction may itself 
have been influenced by the Manusm
ti. Nevertheless, this allows us to date the adhyāya 
redaction to sometime after the composition of the Manusm
ti, which Olivelle (2005, 25) 
has dated to the first to second centuries CE. 
7.5.3 Origins of the Prakaraa-Text 
The corroboration of the Manusm
ti has the effect of firming the deductions 
drawn above regarding the provenance of the Arthaśāstra’s end verses and Kauilya 
dialogues. We can, then, more strongly suggest that the prakaraa-text was a prose 
composition. Moreover, it appears to have been the result of successive emendations, and 
ultimately, composed from at least one, if not more, autonomous prose source. I agree 
with Trautmann’s argument (1971) that (most of) the second adhikaraa is a single 
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source. As for the third adhikaraa, its composite nature makes any assessment of its 
origins very difficult and requiring independent study. The seventh adhikaraa, for its 
part, is so horribly confused that it is as yet impossible to ascertain how it took its present 
form. 
The provenance of the prakaraa-text, however, is a matter that requires further 
explication. The purpose of this study has been primarily to isolate the adhyāya 
redaction, but, in doing so, I have come to believe that the evolution of the prakaraa-
text can be articulated with a greater degree of specificity through intensive word study 
and increased intimacy with the text itself.  
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PART II: THE POLITICS OF BRAHMANISM 
The first half of this dissertation (Part One) furnishes for the Arthaśāstra a 
compositional history by identifying relationships of dependency and disjunction that 
collectively illustrate the various processes through which the extant text was formed. 
The results of that study show that the Arthaśāstra was, in its earliest recoverable 
recension, already a composite text, assembled from both preexisting sources and new 
material.326 Upon this prose327 recension, which I have called the prakaraa-text, was 
wrought a final major redaction, which I have called the adhyāya redaction, in which the 
text was reapportioned into new textual units called adhyāyas, verse stanzas were added 
at the conclusion of each, substantial prose and verse segments were added, and the text 
was overtly ascribed to Kauilya, the legendary prime minister of the founder of the 
Mauryan dynasty, Candragupta Maurya (c. 321-297 BCE). 
Every text is a witness to the cultural context from which it was produced. As 
such, texts reflect, each in their own ways, the complex social realities from which they 
emerged. It is the work of the textual historian to elicit from these sources, through novel, 
text-specific critical strategies, observations about the text’s home culture. In this, the 
second half of the dissertation (Part Two), I will use the chronological and sequential 
distinctions between the prakaraa-text and the adhyāya redaction to demonstrate that 
certain concepts and perspectives widely considered to be fundamental features of the 
                                                 
326 The extent to which this earliest version of the Arthaśāstra resembled the extant text is not entirely 
clear. While some material from the extant Arthaśāstra can be identified with a high degree of confidence 
as belonging to this earliest layer, much of the text belongs to an indeterminate compositional layer 
between the earliest material and the final major redaction (discussed below). Nevertheless, the 
identification of a major final redaction to the text indicates that there existed, prior to the adhyāya 
redaction a version of the Arthaśāstra, written mainly, if not wholly, in prose and resembling to a great 
extent the extant text. 
327 Or largely in prose; see §4.2. 
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expert tradition of political science in classical South Asia are, in fact, absent from the 
prakaraa-text of the Arthaśāstra.  
As an example of the kind of historical work that the foregoing textual study 
makes possible, I will be tracing in Part Two the relatively late appearance in the text of 
attitudes and prescriptions favorable to Brahmins, the hereditary sacerdotal class of the 
classical period. This will contradict the prevailing notion that pro-Brahmanical 
sentiment and religious bias favoring Brahmins were standard features of state policy in 
classical South Asia. Most importantly, the isolation of pro-Brahmanical sentiments in 
the adhyāya redaction of the Arthaśāstra provides us with an excellent opportunity to 
investigate how and when Brahmanical ideology began to inflect political discourse in 
the classical period. I refer to all of these various means through which political interests 
were pursued as “political Brahmanism.” 
The five chapters of Part Two will accomplish three primary goals. First, I will 
discuss the history of pro-Brahmanical sentiments under the rubric of “Brahmanical 
exceptionalism” and look at how that ideology inflects our understanding of South Asian 
political and religious history. Second, I will show how these sentiments are native 
primarily to the adhyāya redaction of the Arthaśāstra. Finally, I will argue that the late 
occurrence of pro-Brahmanical ideology in the Arthaśāstra should prompt a reevaluation 
of the role of religion in statecraft during the classical period of South Asian history. 
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Chapter 8: Varadharma and Political Brahmanism 
We can detect in the later layers of the extant Arthaśāstra a purposeful and 
comprehensive, if not entirely systematic, effort to integrate the political interests of the 
orthodox Brahmanical community into a text on statecraft previously devoid of such 
biases. Through the introduction of key passages during the adhyāya redaction, the 
underlying text was brought into agreement with the texts of the dharma literature and 
other orthodox Sanskrit sources regarding those elements of Brahmanical social thought 
most directly supporting the political advancement of the Brahmanical community. The 
interests pursued through the introduction of this ideology into the Arthaśāstra can be 
characterized generally as comprising a variety of economic, social, and political 
advantages devolving from the introduction of a self-interested view of society and the 
codification of favorable treatment for Brahmins within state policy itself.  
8.1 THE ROLE OF VARADHARMA IN POLITICAL BRAHMANISM 
The primary strategy through which Brahmanical interests are pursued in the 
Arthaśāstra lies in the emigration into the text of the ideology of varadharma, a theory 
that claims that society is natively organized into a hierarchy of four social groups 
(varas) and that the activities appropriate for the members of each vara are established 
by a sacred and universal law (dharma). The classification of society into these four 
social groups had begun already at the end of the early Vedic period, evidence for which 
comes from a late hymn in the gveda, the celebrated puruasūkta (V 10.90). In this 
hymn, which reflects on the creation of the cosmos, the four social classes are said to 
emerge from different parts of the body of the cosmic man (purua). We witness herein 
already the basic features of the system, in particular its hierarchy and exaltation of 
Brahmins. The system takes on a more definite form in the subsequent era, the middle 
 201 
Vedic period, when the term “vara” (lit. “color”) is applied to each of the classes. From 
the texts of this period forward, the exaltation of Brahmins through the idiom of vara 
becomes a regular feature of Brahmanical literature. 
In addition to exalting the position of Brahmins in society (above even the ruling 
classes), the theory of varadharma also establishes a theoretical basis for the 
subordination of the king’s royal functions to the sacred law of dharma. This 
subordination is expressed by the characterization of the king’s official duties as his 
divinely-ordained individual duty (svadharma).328 The equation of the activities of the 
king (rāja) with the tenets of sacred law (dharma) is expressed also in the term 
rājadharma, which is used in the Brahmanical literature as a synonym for other terms 
denoting “statecraft” or “governance.”329 As such, the emergence of the ideology of 
varadharma in the later layers of the Arthaśāstra represents the theoretical undermining 
of the king’s authority by the authority of dharma. 
This chapter is the first of four that will examine the concept of varadharma and 
its emergence in the later layers of the Arthaśāstra. We will examine the system of 
varadharma and its history in Brahmanical thought first (§8.2). Next, I will argue that 
varadharma is best understood as a political ideology, an interested worldview that 
makes claims about power and is itself a tool for the pursuit of political advantage (§8.3). 
Finally, the chapter will conclude with an examination of how varadharma works as an 
ideology within the discourse on statecraft and how best to analyze and make use of the 
                                                 
328 Two approaches can be found in the Brahmanical literature to explain the origin of the king’s 
svadharma. The first seems to hold that the king’s svadharma exists outside of the vara system, as a 
svadharma particular to the king alone (ĀDS 2.25.1). The second casts the king’s svadharma as established 
by or standing in for the general svadharma of the ruling Katriya vara, one of the four varas in the 
system (GDS 10.1Ð66; MS e.g. 9.325ff). There does not seem to have been much tension between these 
two perspectives in the Brahmanical literature, as both continue to appear throughout the dharma literature. 
329 nītiśāstra, daanīti, arthaśāstra, rājanīti, etc. 
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data in the Arthaśāstra to illuminate the confluence of religious ideology, statecraft, 
power, and discourse in classical South Asia (§8.4). 
8.2 VARADHARMA IN INDIAN THOUGHT 
As a theology, varadharma represents the expression of the omnipresent sacred 
order within society through the division of the world into a hierarchy of four varas. 
When this theology is viewed as a feature of discourse in South Asian history and the 
claims made by the hierarchy embedded within the varas are ramified through the 
matrix of social power relations, the ideological aspects of varadharma emerge. Viewed 
as an ideology, varadharma appears as a putatively descriptive but thoroughly 
normative social theory (and related set of injunctions) that seeks to propagate and 
naturalize a lived set of social relations, relations built upon a specific hierarchical social 
principle operating within a segmented society for the ultimate benefit of a Brahmin 
class.330 
The relationship between varadharma ideology and the perspectives and policies 
of historical polities in South Asian history is not entirely clear. More generally, given the 
lack of historical detail available to students of classical South Asia, we do not know how 
or the extent to which this theory was accepted by the diverse elements of the classical 
social milieu as an accurate or meaningful depiction of the existing social order.331 And, 
because we do not understand sufficiently the social dimensions of the groups who wrote 
                                                 
330 See §8.2.3. On the composition of the Brahmin class and the role of vara in its establishment, see 
Chapter 10. 
331 Such corroboration could only come from non-Brahmanical texts or epigraphical records such as the 
reported account of the Greek ambassador Megasthenes who is said to have resided for several years at the 
Mauryan capital of Pataliputra. His account, refracted through the writings of later historians, record the 
division of society into 7 groups, which system does not closely resemble the vara system in toto. The 
epigraphical record of the Mauryan period is similarly silent on vara, recording only the term brahmaa 
(like Megasthenes account). See McCrindle 1979. 
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and read our texts or how the ideas in these texts circulated throughout the greater 
cultural milieu we do not know who propagated the theory, its intended audience and 
effect, or how it influenced social relations. As such, the investigation of the ideological 
character of varadharma is also an investigation into basic questions of social 
organization and power relations in the period of the Arthaśāstra, albeit one applicable to 
and limited by the non-local and atemporal discourses of our textual sources. 
And yet, there are a few things about the relationship between varadharma and 
society in the classical period that we can establish at the outset. The demonstrably 
ideological character of varadharma discourages any positivist temptation to accept the 
system uncritically as descriptive. As such, it is inappropriate, though common, to assert 
without qualification that the society of the period (or any part of it) was, in fact, divided 
into the classes and groups claimed in the theory.332 Such a claim would require not only 
corroboration from evidence external to the ideological world of orthodox Brahmanical 
sources, evidence that is not forthcoming, but also a thoughtful analysis of what precisely 
is implied by the term “descriptive.”  
Moreover, given what must have been the radical diversity of cultures in the 
different regions and eras of classical South Asia as well as the dynamic and 
transformational capacity of urban centers situated in transregional networks in the 
classical period, it seems very unlikely that a theory as simple as varadharma would be 
                                                 
332 This includes, most importantly, the ongoing use of the terms defined by the system. In particular, I am 
referring to the uncritical use of the varas to describe the social milieu of the period. This is, 
unfortunately, still quite common. A more transparent and increasingly less common example would also 
be the resort to dharma to explain the motives of historical actors and the shape and destiny of social 
institutions. Even in hermeneutical analyses we must guard against passively appropriating ideological 
elements into our own analyses. 
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able to provide a reasonably accurate, baseline model for the most prominent and/or 
noteworthy features of what was certainly an enormously complex society.333  
At the same time, however, it is not sufficient to cast varadharma as pure fancy, 
for it clearly represents a powerful and relevant perspective developed and deployed over 
a long period of time that both reflected and sought to influence how some people lived 
their social experience. Moreover, Althusser’s analysis of ideology pointedly reminds us 
that ideologies such as varadharma are, to their adherents, less ideational systems than 
actual lived relations (Eagleton 2007, 141). As such, varadharma is as much an 
expression of wishful thinking as a perception of social reality, operating all the time as 
an active tactic in a greater effort to promote political and material advantage for 
Brahmins.334 Given this and the other limitations on such a study, an analysis of vara 
must focus primarily on its ideological effects within the discourse of statecraft and only 
secondarily on the truth or falsity of its empirical claims. As with much in the study of 
ancient South Asia, we must begin with analyses of text and discourse before we can use 
them as evidence for material conditions. 
                                                 
333 It is the present use of vara as just such a “baseline” model that I am scrutinizing here. It cannot be 
reiterated enough that the one of the greatest distortions visited by the varāśramadharma theory upon the 
study of this period of Indian history is the homogenization of the culture. The lack of historical and 
geographical information in most of our texts from this period renders the imagined geography of these 
texts in no greater detail than “the northern half of South Asia.” The prevalence of varāśramadharma in 
these sources gives the appearance, then, of a homogeneous underlying social structure across a vast area 
over vast periods of time and, hence, of a historical “unit.” Given the upheavals we know to have occurred 
through the period as well as the dynamic interaction of different cultures, we must constantly reassert the 
multiplicity of social experiences in the area under study. The culturally-homogenizing ideology of 
Brahmanical texts must be understood as having been exerted against this actual multiplicity. 
334 Eagleton addresses the question of the true or falsity of ideologies thus: “A world view will tend to 
exhibit a certain ‘style’ of perception, which cannot in itself be said to be either true or false…But it will 
also typically contain other sorts of component, both normative and empirical, which may indeed 
sometimes be inspected for their truth or falsity” (1991, 23). The question, then, is not of the “truth” of such 
a system, but of its relationship both with other views of society as well as with empirical evidence. 
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Our concern with the ideology of varadharma is limited in the present chapter to 
looking at how it operated within and inflected the discourse on statecraft within the 
Arthaśāstra with regard to its implications for how one conceives the sources, function, 
and proper use of power in society. We will begin with a description of the varadharma 
theory as it appears in the Arthaśāstra and then look briefly at how it operates as an 
ideology. We will then consider the development of varadharma in the Brahmanical 
literature before analyzing its emergence in the later layers of the Arthaśāstra.  
8.2.1 The Varadharma System in the Arthaśāstra 
Membership within a vara is determined by birth,335 but also requires the 
fulfillment of the vara obligations.336 Within the logic of the system, migration of an 
individual from one vara to another is generally only possible in the fall from a higher 
vara to a lower, although some texts provide a limited mechanism for the upward 
migration of certain families over time.337 Despite occasional allowances for 
intermarriage and vara migration, the varas are conceived in the Brahmanical literature 
as discrete and stable hereditary social groups set within a systematic unity. The system 
of varadharma claims that society’s primary sociological feature is its division into 
varas.338 
                                                 
335 This is true, despite disagreement within the Brahmanical literature regarding the precise mechanism. 
The extant Arthaśāstra (KAŚ 3.7.20), for example allows that a person is a member of the father’s vara if 
his mother is a member of the same vara or the next lower. Manu (MS 10.5) allows only children from a 
union between parents of the same varna to be of that vara. 
336 It can generally be asserted that ritual and vocational obligations are assumed requisite for full 
membership within a vara. 
337 The reality of upward and downward migration through the vara system is a different matter. We are 
speaking here only of how movement between the varas is conceived within the idiom of varadharma. 
338 This is the descriptive character of the system. It might be more appropriate to thing of vara as 
society’s native organization, as the texts possess a clear anxiety about the collapse of vara distinctions 
and record instances of the non-observance of vara in certain places and times. It is perhaps most accurate 
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In the system of varadharma, the varas are governed and defined by sets of 
obligations specific to each. The obligations of each vara are referred to collectively as 
the svadharma (individual duty) of the members of that vara. The imperatives of 
svadharma cover ritual, vocational, and moral obligations,339 and it is through the 
observance of svadharma that the varas are materially realized within the world. A 
passage near the beginning of the extant Arthaśāstra gives a succinct exposition of the 
varadharma system: 
 
KAŚ 1.3.5  svadharmo brāhma	asyādhyayanam adhyāpana yajana yājana 
dānam pratigrahaś ca 
KAŚ 1.3.6 katriyasyādhyaya yajana dāna śastrājīvo bhūtaraka	a ca 
KAŚ 1.3.7 vaiśyasyādhyayana yajana dāna kipāśupālye va	ijyā ca 
KAŚ 1.3.8 śūdrasya dvijātiśuśrūā vārttā kārukuśīlavakarma ca 
 
 The special duty [svadharma] of a Brahmin is: studying, teaching, 
performing sacrifices for himself, officiating at other people’s 
sacrifices, making gifts and receiving gifts.  
 That of the Katriya is: studying, performing sacrifices for himself, 
making gifts, living by (the profession of) arms and protecting 
beings.  
 That of the Vaiśya is: studying, performing sacrifices for himself, 
making gifts, agriculture, cattle-rearing and trade.  
 That of the Śūdra is: service to the twice-born, engaging in an 
economic calling, and the profession of artisan and actor. 
The simplicity and abstraction of the core system is in marked contrast to the 
detailed prescriptions of other areas theoretically peripheral to the core (marriage, 
inheritance, commensality, and a variety of other social practices), where more direct 
                                                                                                                                                 
to say that vara is society’s inherent organization, but that it requires the vigilance and effort of human 
agents, particularly the king, to maintain. 
339 The ritual and vocational obligations of svadharma are reflected in the duties of the three upper varas; 
the Śūdras lack any ritual obligations within the system. A set of moral obligations (abstaining from injury, 
truthfulness, uprightness, freedom from malice, compassionateness, and forbearance) is recorded in the 
KAŚ as being “common to all” (KAŚ 1.3.13). 
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claims are made about vara and its bearing on social practices and where we find a more 
robust and combative disagreements among our sources.  
8.2.2 Excursus on Varāśramadharma 
In the Arthaśāstra, the idiom of varadharma is integrated into the larger theory 
of varāśramadharma: “the law (dharma) of the social classes (vara) and ways of life 
(āśrama).” The theory of varāśramadharma resulted historically from the addition of 
the four āśramas or “ways of life” to the concept of the varas.340 The āśramas are 
different modes of life that overlap, to some extent, with the varas: householder 
(g
hastha), student (brahmacārin), forest dweller (vānaprastha), and wandering ascetic 
(pravrajita).341 They are given in the Arthaśāstra along with the varas: 
 
KAŚ 1.3.10  ghasthasya svadharmājīvas tulyair asamānaribhir vaivāhyam 
tugāmitva devapitratithipūjā bhtyeu tyāga śeabhojana ca 
KAŚ 1.3.11 bhramacāri	a svādhyāyo Õgnikāryābhiekau bhaiavratitvam ācārye 
prā	āntikī vttis tadabhāve guruputre sabrahmacāri	i vā 
KAŚ 1.3.12 vānaprasthasya brahmacarya bhūmau śayyā jaājinadhāra	am 
agnihotrābhiekau devatāpitratithipūjā vanyaś cāhāra 
KAŚ 1.3.13 parivrājakasya jitendriyatvam anārambho nikicanatva sagatyāgo 
bhaikavratam anekatrāra	ye ca vāso bāhyābnyantara 
 
 [The svadharma] of the householder is: earning his living in 
accordance with his own special duty [svadharma], marrying into 
families of the same caste but not of the same gotra, approaching the 
wife during her period, worship of the gods, manes, and guests, 
making gifts to dependants, and eating what is left over.  
 That of the student is: studying the Veda, tending the fires and bathing, 
keeping the vow of living on alms only, residing till the end of his 
life with the preceptor or, in his absence, with the preceptor’s son or 
with a fellow student.  
                                                 
340 The vara system appears in the later Sahitās and Brāhma	as (i.e., the middle Vedic period), while 
the āśrama system appears for the first time in the Dharmasūtras, following the late Vedic period (Olivelle 
1993, 30, 73Ð74). 
341 These are the terms used for the āśramas in the KAŚ. There is some variation in the names applied to 
the āśramas in the dharma literature, but the modes of life themselves remain consistent. 
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 That of the forest dweller is: observing celibacy, sleeping on bare 
ground, wearing matted locks and an antelope skin, worship of the 
fires and bathing, worshipping the gods, manes, and guests, and 
living on forest produce.  
 That of the wandering ascetic is: having full control over the senses, 
refraining from all active life, being without any possessions, giving 
up all attachment to worldly ties, keeping the vow of begging alms, 
not residing in one place, staying in the forest, and observing external 
and internal cleanliness.  
The concept of varāśramadharma is used in the dharma literature to refer to the 
teachings of the dharma texts themselves, and so becomes roughly synonymous with the 
constituent genres. By extension, then, varāśramadharma is also conceived as the 
expression of dharma (in its more abstract sense as the universal sacred principle) within 
society. But, despite the eventual development of varāśramadharma as the complete 
social expression of dharma, āśrama itself is always a peripheral concern to the dharma 
literature; moreover, the concept is functionally absent from the Arthaśāstra. As such, we 
take account of āśrama itself here only in passing. It should be noted, however, that the 
references to the system of varadharma in the Arthaśāstra at which we will be looking 
below are frequently embedded in the larger concept of varāśramadharma. 
 
8.3 VARADHARMA AS IDEOLOGY 
I have chosen to refer to varadharma as “ideology” so that we might think first 
about how the theory of varadharma operates within discourse in regard to power 
relations. Thinking about varadharma as a feature of discourse used in the interest of 
power allows us to avoid the trap into which scholars have traditionally fallen when 
thinking about South Asian history in terms of vara, namely the reification (intentional 
or not) of the varas themselves.342 Thinking of varadharma as ideology situates the 
                                                 
342 The political dimension of varāśramadharma is diminished when, for example, it is referred to as 
“ancient India’s version of sociology” (Smith 1994, 26). While all discourses about society are ideological, 
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concept in such a way that we are immediately aware of its coercive potential. The term 
“ideology,” as I use it, does not prejudge the empirical validity of the claims made by the 
system; we are free to examine them subsequently on their merits. But, it does imply that 
the claims of the system are both politically interested and contested (or contestable). 
Ultimately, we must begin by recognizing that, whatever else it might be, varadharma is 
a version of reality, the ascription to which held political benefits for some.343 
We can think of ideology broadly as the politically-interested344 aspect(s) of a 
discourse or worldview. As an idiom, varadharma makes claims and assumptions about 
society that have political implications. This is the sense in which varadharma is 
ideological. Ideology does not, however, reside in explicit argumentation alone, for we 
find it at work also in the systematic inflection of the production of reality within a 
discursive field of conflict, where the interests of an individual or community are 
interwoven with affirmations and denials, generally implicit, about the nature of reality. 
                                                                                                                                                 
the analogy here is misleading. What is more, it is misleading in a familiar direction: the projection of 
modern scholastic values (such as transparency and empiricism) on Brahmanical texts, with its attendant 
distortion of the source material. 
343 Eagleton argues that “ideology is a matter of ‘discourse’ rather than ‘language’. It concerns the actual 
uses of language between particular human subjects for the purpose of specific effects. You could not 
decide whether a statement was ideological or not by inspecting it in isolation from its discursive context, 
any more than you could decide in this way whether a piece of writing was a work of literary art” (1991, 9). 
Thus, to have identified varadharma as an ideology, we must make some appeal to the discourse that 
reveals its political interests. There are few reasons why I feel comfortable calling varadharma an 
ideology without explicit reference to any discourse. First is its claim about hierarchy, which, far from 
being a natural phenomenon, seems always to represent political interest. Second, as suggested above, the 
concept of varadharma is too simple and rigid to represent a believable social model for the period. Third 
would be the clear promotion of Brahmanical interests elsewhere in Sanskrit literature. Fourth, and perhaps 
most important, is the prima facie sense that in monarchical societies, the king and martial elements have 
the greatest and highest consolidation of power, and that such power is the primary determinate of 
hierarchy as traditional understood (in socioeconomic terms).  
344 While using the term “politically-interested” to differentiate certain kinds of interest may seem not only 
redundant but also potentially misleading to those who subscribe to a Foucaldian notion of power as an 
inherent quality of all interactions, I mean to signify here interests that are broadly shared or pursued and 
reflect the perspective of social groups. There is something in the shared character of ideology that flushes 
it out and attunes it to other social realities, preventing it from being idiosyncracy or megalomania. 
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The content of an ideology, its politically-interested claims, can cycle in various dialectic 
circuits between explicit locutions and implicit assumptions, but it is the integration of 
such claims into the apprehension of reality that makes something properly ideological. 
This is the alienation of mental products in the theory of Berger (1967), with the 
important recognition that, in the case of ideology, these misapprehensions follow the 
contour of specific political interests. 
This is not to say that the content of ideologies are necessarily “false” (at least any 
more so than other types of cognition). Eagleton argues instead that “[a] world-view will 
tend to exhibit a ‘style’ of perception, which cannot itself be said to be either true or 
false” (1991, 23). It is less a matter of an ideology being “true” than of being non-
falsifiable. Specific claims made by an ideology about the nature of things may, however, 
still be subject to validation or falsification. Says Eagleton, “[i]t is possible, then, to think 
of ideological discourse as a complex network of empirical and normative elements, 
within which the nature and organization of the former is ultimately determined by the 
requirements of the latter” (23). Thus, we may talk of the truth of specific claims, but not 
of the ideology itself. I contend, however, that we cannot address the question of 
empirical validity until we have satisfactorily addressed the coercive potential of 
varadharma. 
I have used above the rather bland term “political interest.” I choose to think of 
this idea in the simplest possible terms: “political interest” refers generically to the 
pursuit of power in its many manifestations. Power is itself a characteristic of the 
relationship between two social entities, ranging from naked force to subtle forms of 
manipulation but always marking the ability of one party to exert their will over against 
the interests and will of other parties. It is, simply, coercive capacity. The pursuit of 
“political interests,” then, can take nearly any form within any context, existing, as it 
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does, in the dense and irreducibly complex matrix of social power relations. Ideology 
accomplishes its goal when its version of reality, attuned as it is to specific interests, is 
appropriated. At this point, the individual’s perception of the world reinforces, 
naturalizes, or promotes the interests of certain groups. 
By claiming that ideology is the politically-interested aspect(s) of a discourse, we 
are calling attention to one way in which language is used to pursue power. The present 
study focuses on evidence to be found in the Arthaśāstra that speaks to that pursuit of 
power. Thinking of varadharma as an ideology, and one that has been introduced to the 
text at a relatively late period, tells us that we can trace this pursuit of power within the 
pages of the Arthaśāstra itself. When we examine varadharma in the discourse of the 
Arthaśāstra we can identify the specific interests embedded in the vara system as well 
as how it pursues these interests ideologically. This is the primary purpose of the 
following chapters: to call attention to the presence of political interests in the text; to 
expose the ideological influence they exert within the text; to demonstrate their 
posteriority and their revisionist character; and to resurrect other worldviews and 
perspectives (i.e., ideologies) whose presence has been lost, subsumed, or diminished. 
Recognizing the ideological character of varadharma allows us to see the system as in 
competition with other ideologies and worldviews and suggests, as mentioned above, that 
the proper manner of investigation of these ideologies is not exhausted by confirmation 
or rejection of their empirical claims, nor by elucidations of their theories, but requires 
also that we understand how social reality was constituted by them.345 
                                                 
345 There are number of other parameters implied by “ideology” that are not discussed here. This analysis is 
limited to the effect of this ideology within the Arthaśāstra. On competition among ideologies see Walford, 
1979. 
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In an important sense, ideology is the trace left in discourse by the broader pursuit 
of power by specific groups. In a subsequent phase, we can look beyond the operation of 
the ideology in the text to the broader social conflicts to which it bears witness. 
As a subset of ideology, it is characteristic of a political ideology that it present an 
ideal social and political order, rooted by some reference to absolute principles and in 
contrast to perceived existing conditions, and posit the absence of that ideal as the 
primary social problem in need of solution. It is also a critical component of a political 
ideology that it provides a solution to that problem. In this light, we recognize in 
discussions of vara in the Arthaśāstra a polemical and suasive tone. Within the ideology 
of vara, it is the destruction of the vara system that leads to the ultimate nightmare of 
social disintegration, the collapse of the political endeavor, and the death of civilization 
(KAŚ 1.3.15Ð17).346 With the death of society as its great fear, existing social problems are 
easily cast as preliminary stages of the destruction caused by mixture of varas. The 
solution to the problem is, of course, the observance of vara through the enforcement of 
svadharma as well as rules on intermarriage. As such, the political purpose of the 
varadharma theory can be seen not as the (re-)establishment of the vara hierarchy 
within society per se, but in casting the exaltation of Brahmins and protection of 
Brahmanical interests as the mechanism for addressing society’s fundamental underlying 
problem. 
The state is politically integrated into this dilemma by virtue of the king’s role as 
protector of his subjects. In the narrative that the failure to observe varadharma will 
lead to the destruction of his subjects, the king is obligated to avail himself of the remedy 
provided: the “protection” of varadharma through the enforcement of the principle of 
                                                 
346 The narrative of the Kali Yuga is instructive in this regard: society is sunk low and only the exertions of 
Brahmins and righteous kings save it from utter depravity. 
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endogamy, as well as through the protection and patronage of Brahmanical orthopraxis 
and its ordering of the world. The threat and the solution represent the central power of 
varadharma as an ideology, and the structure of the system provides for the 
advancement of Brahmanical interests.  
These are the more overt claims made about varadharma itself. And we can 
certainly imagine how this rhetoric may have inflected the manner in which kings related 
to and reacted to efforts on the part of Brahmins to secure political advantage. But, as an 
ideology, the system also works in “invisible” ways to promote its interests by organizing 
how the world is perceived. Thus, simply by establishing the varas as valid units of 
social analysis, this ideology continually leads to specific ways of thinking about society 
and its problems implied by the social order of the varas as well as to the claims that the 
system made overtly. Simply by analyzing society in terms of vara, one invokes the 
question of their proper organization, relative position in social hierarchy, and the 
promise of harmony or the specter of disorder in terms of the proper arrangement of 
hereditary social groups divided by function. As such, the use of vara in the analysis of 
society in the period has the effect of returning the inquirer to the “reality” of 
Brahmanical claims of superiority.347 
8.3.1 The Politics of Varadharma 
The vara system is a view of the world, including an illustration of its main 
groups and their relationship to one another. This worldview can be called political 
because it makes claims about hierarchy. And, although the logic underlying vara 
hierarchy is not made explicit in the general formulation of the system witnessed above, 
                                                 
347 One could argue that we see this happen again in the colonial period, when British scholars were 
initiated into the ideology of the Sanskrit sources and effectively restored the position of the Brahmin. This 
would have been in many ways a predictable outcome of reasoning made based on the textual sources. 
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its potential impact of its claims can be interpreted within the matrix of social power 
relations. Because an ideology pursues political interests (i.e., power) through implicit 
and explicit claims within discourse, we can track these claims as rhetorical efforts to 
establish, consolidate, or protect power. 
The core of the varadharma system, as given above (§8.2), makes three implicit 
claims about the organization of society: 1) society is segmented into (hereditary) groups 
based on social function; 2) these segments are arranged in a hierarchy; and 3) this 
arrangement functions dynamically as a greater unity. Of these, it is the claim of 
hierarchy that does the most to support the political interests embedded in the system; 
segmentation and systematicity work in the ideological realm only to support or 
naturalize the hierarchical claims. 
The exposition given at §8.2 only implies the existence of an abstract hierarchy. 
No political or social implications of this hierarchy are articulated: even as the system 
asserts the primacy of Brahmins, it makes no discrete claims about how this superiority is 
expressed in the field of power relations. That is to say, the exposition of the core vara 
idiom dictates no specific political structure between the Brahmin and the vara endowed 
with military and political power, the Katriya. Although we can find elsewhere in the 
Brahmanical literature direct political claims based on the notion of Brahmanical 
supremacy, such as in the Gautama Dharmasūtra (rājā sarvasyee brāhmaavarjam, 
“The king rules all except Brahmins”; 11.1) it remains that vara hierarchy fails to find 
expression in terms of an unambiguous political structure.348 Ultimately, vara hierarchy 
makes only an inarticulate claim about the superiority of Brahmins. It clearly has political 
intent, insofar as it marks hierarchy as a general feature of society, but avoids overtly 
                                                 
348 This may say as much about the lack of any ecumenical structure in Brahmanism as any other factor. It 
remains a feature of the system, however, that it does not provide a political basis for its hierarchy.  
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structuring the relationship. I believe this is not accidental, as varadharma thereby 
makes no direct theoretical challenge to the temporal power holders, but can nevertheless 
find ready use in hermeneutical exercises aimed at political interests more tactical and 
refined than absolute rulership. 
The assertion of hierarchy while avoiding direct confrontation with temporal 
power holders through the positing of a specific political structure is made possible by the 
promotion of a value system tangential to and comprehensive of coercive force, the most 
basic and important expression of political will. The vara system introduces proximity 
to the Vedic ritual (and the Veda) as the ultimate value (superceding coercive force) in 
the determination of social hierarchy. Access to the Vedic ritual is seen, in the worldview 
of the vara system, as another social value and superceding determinant of social status 
and power.  
Despite the absence of any express political structure through which the principles 
of vara might be expressed, the core idiom of the vara system does dictate certain 
social relations, through which the varas themselves are replicated in the material world 
to some extent. Looking at the larger structural features of the system, we see that the 
three upper varas share a set of common obligations: education (adhyayana), sacrificing 
(yajana), and gifting (dāna): 
 
KAŚ 1.3.5  svadharmo brāhma	asyādhyayanam adhyāpana yajana yājana 
dānam pratigrahaś ca 
KAŚ 1.3.6 katriyasyādhyaya yajana dāna śastrājīvo bhūtaraka	a ca 
KAŚ 1.3.7 vaiśyasyādhyayana yajana dāna kipāśupālye va	ijyā ca 
 
 The svadharma of the Brahmin is: studying, teaching, sacrificing, 
officiating at sacrifices, gifting, and receiving gifts.  
 That of the Katriya is: studying, sacrificing, gifting, living by the 
profession of arms, and protecting creatures. 
 That of the Vaiśya is: studying, sacrificing, gifting, agriculture, 
husbandry, and trade. 
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These three upper varas are, in this regard, set off against the Śūdra who is 
denied access to these institutionalized exchanges and to some extent defined by this 
denial: 
 
KAŚ 1.3.8 śūdrasya dvijātiśuśrūā vārttā kārukuśīlavakarma ca 
 
 That of the Śūdra is: serving the twice-born, business [i.e., agriculture, 
husbandry, and trade] and the work of the artisan and actor. 
A division, then, is drawn within the system between those with access to 
education, sacrificing, and gifting (we will look into the specifics of these activities 
below) and those who lack access. The former group is called the “twice-born,”349 and 
the latter stand in a relation of subservience (śuśrūā) to them. According to the vara 
theory presented here, then, access to these institutions parallels the division of society 
into upper and lower segments as between master and servant. This divide, between the 
“twice-born” (dvijāti) and Śūdra, also marks the traditional divide in Brahmanical 
literature between ārya and anārya (non-ārya).350 And so we have then the expression of 
this aspect of vara hierarchy in specific social relations, indicating the political 
implications of these activities.351 
                                                 
349 This is based on their right to undertake rebirth in the initiation ceremony (upanayana) before the 
beginning of studentship. 
350 See Kane II.1, 35ff. He cites in this regard TB 5.5.14; ĀDS 1.3.40Ð41; 2.3.1, 4; GDS 10.69; 12.3; PMS 
6.1.25Ð38. The idea that the Śūdra was anārya is not stated in the KAŚ, which juxtaposes the ārya with the 
cāala (3.20.16) or śvapāka (4.13.35), but here only in late passages. In fact, the KAŚ holds the position, 
against most of the Brahmanical literature, that the Śūdra was an ārya (3.13.1).  This flies in the face of the 
mainstream assertion of the Brahmanical literature. The passage at KAŚ 3.13.1, which is by all appearances 
original to the text, seems to controvert the division established here between dvijāti and Śūdra, although it 
is not made explicit anywhere in the KAŚ that āryahood is equated with access to the institutions of 
education, sacrifice, and gifting. This adds circumstantial evidence to the contention, argued below (KAŚ 
8.3.1.2.1), that the passage enumerating the varas, āśramas, and svadharmas of both (1.3.5Ð14ff) has been 
interpolated. 
351 Particularly when we consider that the Śūdra class is often conceived as filled not only by those born 
into it, but also be twice-borns who have failed in some regard to follow their dharma. 
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Another expression of vara hierarchy in the realm of social relations is found in 
the duties specific to the Brahmin. These duties set the Brahmin in the powerful role of 
mediator of the exchanges discussed above by virtue of a set obligations complementary 
to those that mark membership among the twice-born: teaching (adhyāpana), officiating 
at sacrifices (yājana), and receiving gifts (pratigraha): 
 
KAŚ 1.3.5 svadharmo brāhma	asyādhyayanam adhyāpana yajana yājana 
dānam pratigrahaś ca  
 
 The svadharma of the Brahmin is: studying, teaching, sacrificing, 
officiating at sacrifices, gifting, and receiving gifts. 
Within the greater nexus of obligation and mediation, Brahmins and 
Brahmanically-mediated exchanges (educational, ritual, and economic) are central to the 
concept of vara and to the social distinctions established by and reflected in the system. 
Through these exchanges, vara segmentation, at least with regard to the divide between 
the twice-born and the Śūdra as well as between the Brahmin and the other twice-born 
varas, is reproduced in the social sphere. Indeed, by setting these exchanges as a major 
operative mechanism through which classes are materially re-produced in the world has 
also the effect of inscribing class implications upon those exchanges themselves and, by 
extension, the very identity of the Brahmin as defined by svadharma. In this manner the 
concept of “Brahmin” shares an intimacy with the concept of vara beyond those of the 
other varas as the linchpin of the greater system.  
The Katriya, in addition to the shared obligations of the three upper varas, is 
given the obligations of “living by arms” (śastrājīva) and the “protection of beings” 
(bhūtarakaa) (KAŚ 1.3.6). This likely denotes little more than a martial vocation and 
indicates no specific obligations for the king as the primary practitioner of statecraft 
beyond that of his putative vara. It is important to note, however, that the vara system 
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recognizes this class as the temporal power holders and grants them a monopoly on the 
use of force.  
We have seen above that access to certain exchange institutions marked key 
boundaries within the vara system, but the social boundary within the system that it 
does not mark clearly is that between the Katriya and the Vaiśya. I would suggest that 
this boundary did not need marking by the vara system, as it reflects the basic 
relationship within society between ruler and ruled. If we take the distinction between the 
Katriya and the Vaiśya (as well as the Śūdra) as a self-evident hierarchy based on 
material conditions (i.e., threat of force), we note that the vara system, via the 
mechanisms of Brahmanically-mediated exchange, creates two distinctions not implied in 
the basic relationship between ruler and ruled.  
The first of these is the establishment of Brahmanical priority over the ruling class 
(Katriya). The second is the division of the commoners into a forward class (with access 
to the exchanges) and a backward class (excluded from the exchange). This creates a 
division between the “cultured” and the “uncultured” that is broader than the class 
identity based simply on membership in the ruling class, thereby allowing room for the 
Brahmins among the cultured. At the nadir of the social order, the Śūdra is enjoined to 
the dvijātiśuśrūā “service of the twice-born” (i.e., the three upper varas) as well as 
vārttā, “business,” which entail the same occupations ascribed to the Vaiśya above, and 
also the work of the artisan and actor (kārukuśīlavakarma) (KAŚ 1.3.8). Given the overlap 
between the occupations of the Vaiśya and Śūdra, we can see that access to Brahmanical 
institutions would have been the only difference between the two in many cases. As such, 
the former would seem in this theory to represent a kind of forward or privileged 
commoner, differing from the latter only in point of ritual practice. In both of these cases, 
the Brahmanical monopoly on education, ritual, and gifting combines with the use of 
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these to establish a kind of broad class consciousness to present an articulation or 
embellishment of what must be seen as more fundamental determinants of social 
hierarchy.  
The linear hierarchy among the varas is clear within the exposition of the system 
although not explicitly stated.352 A structuralist study of the vara hierarchy, however, 
suggests that the greater system can be conceived as thoroughly constituted of a number 
of binary oppositions: 
 
As many scholars have pointed out, the tripartite or quadripartite social hierarchy is really 
formed out of a series of binary oppositions which creates divisions of several sorts 
between the three or four classes. First, Brahmins are in various ways separated from and 
placed above everyone else… Next, Brahmins and Katriyas united are together regarded 
as the ruling classes, with all others becoming the ruled in relation to them. Third, 
Brahmins, Katriyas, and Vaiśyas, as “twice-born” or “initiated” full members of Āryan 
society are sometimes distinguished from the lowly Shūdra servants, especially when it 
comes to the Vedic sacrifice, from which the latter are excluded (Smith 1994, 28Ð29). 
Smith, in this passage, establishes the framework for understanding the vara 
system a set of “overlapping, hierarchically ordered domains over which each vara 
exerts mastery. Each domain and each social class is encompassed within the realm of the 
higher, and each domain is assigned to a particular social class because of the inherent 
traits that class reputedly possesses” (1994, 29). This is certainly true to the internal logic 
                                                 
352 The presence of a linear hierarchy within the system is reflected in the minutiae of law and statecraft in 
various ways, such as rules that prescribe successively greater penalties for offenses against successively 
higher varas. As it is, for example, at ĀDS 1.1.5: “Among these, each preceding class is superior by birth 
to each subsequent” (teā	 pūrva pūrvo janmata ś
eyān). Nevertheless, the hierarchy is implicit in the 
order of their presentation as elsewhere in the text where differential treatment based on vara is observed. 
As the present study is concerned with vara as an ideology rather than as a feature of South Asian society, 
it is possible to limit our analysis in this regard to those elements upon which the distinguishing features of 
the Brahmanical vara theory depend. If we examine vara as an ideology, that is, as a self-interested set 
of claims about society meant to promote specific political interests, but which was nevertheless 
experienced as “real,” we become interested not so much in the justifications for the system but in the 
mechanisms through which it is replicated and promulgated in society. Eagleton (1991, 26): “ideology is no 
baseless illusion but a solid reality, an active material force which must have at least enough cognitive 
content to help organize the practical lives of human beings.” 
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of the vara system, but we should emphasize that, as an ideology, the tensions within 
the vara hierarchy are not equally expressed at every level. The primary areas of tension 
in the system lie in the exaltation of the Brahmin above the ruling classes (Katriyas)353 
and in the division between the dvijātis and Śūdras (āryas and non-āryas), for these are 
the points of the system that defy the prima facie sensibility that social hierarchy in 
monarchical societies flows from the king downward and that the divide between 
“cultured” and “uncultured” classes was a cultural phenomenon based on broader 
material realities than simply access to orthodox exchanges.  
Structuralist reduction of the vara system into elemental binaries threatens to 
obscure the “work” of vara as an ideology. And, it is one of the effects that the type of 
systematic thinking found in vara ideology has on discourse that it not only obscures the 
constituent oppositions of which the more abstract linear hierarchy is composed, but also 
attempts to equalize all internal tensions within the system and encourage us to think of 
vara hierarchy as emerging from and explained by structural patterns of thought. 
Claims about the function and structure of power in society in the varadharma 
system are applied to the individual through the mechanism of dharma. In the worldview 
of the vara system, vara hierarchy, with its implicit and explicit claims, is inherent in 
                                                 
353 Smith (1994) distills the proclamations of the Vedic sources and arrives at “four principal reasons” 
given there for the preeminence of the Brahmin: “(1) they were created prior to the others and therefore 
take precedence; (2) they are the most complete and perfect instance of the human being; (3) they are 
learned in the Veda; and (4) they had a monopoly on the priesthood and control of the powerful sacrifice.” 
All of these concepts point to social distinctions through which vara segmentation and hierarchy were 
actualized. All of these reasons are justifications, but the latter two, and particularly the fourth, give also a 
mechanism for the replication of vara ideology in the composition of the social sphere. Notwithstanding 
claims to a monopoly on sacrifice, we can nevertheless infer from the system of varāśramadharma itself 
that ritual exchanges, Brahmanical orthopraxis, represents the social activity through which vara is 
reproduced in society. And it is at the points of greatest tension in the vara system, precisely those points 
where its hierarchy diverges from the expectation, particularly in point of the king’s preeminence and the 
nature of the cultural divide between elites and commoners, we find distinctions marked by inclusion or 
exclusion from the ritual community both in point of teaching and learning, officiating and offering. 
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the sacred obligations of every individual. Falling toward the normative end of the 
discursive spectrum, dharma possesses an imperative reality of its own, fully endowed in 
Brahmanical literature with soteriological consequences. In addition to vara identity, 
hierarchy, vocational, ritual, and moral obligations, and the hybrid value system, the 
personal imperative of dharma is the last major component of the world according to 
varadharma. 
8.3.2 Rājadharma: the King’s Svadharma  
The central tenet of the varadharma system, that society is divided into four 
social groups each possessed of an individual duty (svadharma), argues in favor of a 
divinely-ordained order within the world subject to the specific prescriptions of dharma. 
Theoretically, then, the dharma as sacred law attains primacy over the activities of all 
people. This includes, most importantly for this analysis, the activity of the king (rāja), 
potentially covering all of the facets of governance that fall to his caveat as monarch. The 
the idea of rājadharma, however, may have been only one interpretive scheme among 
many and not all individuals who set their minds to the contemplation of statecraft 
perceived the project as one of rājadharma per se. One of the goals of this analysis is to 
understand how this universalizing concept of rājadharma relates to the greater content 
of the Arthaśāstra. 
The presentation of statecraft as rājadharma, or the dharma of the king emerges 
from the paradigm of universal dharma.354 The relationship between svadharma of the 
king is treated in some texts (GDS, MS) as an extension of the svadharma of Katriyas, 
while in others (ĀDS, ŚP, YS) the king’s svadharma is treated outside of the system:  
 
                                                 
354 We are safe, in this regard, in asserting that dharma as used here retains fully the sense of sacred order 
rather than merely its mundane sense of “law.” 
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ĀDS 2.25.1–2 vyākhyātā sarvar	ānā sādhāra	avaiśeikā dharmā | rāj–as tu 
viśeād vakyāma 
 
 We have explained the general and specific laws [dharmas] of all the 
classes. We will now present specifically the laws [dharmas] 
pertaining to the king. 
The extant Arthaśāstra, to the extent that it can be determined from a handful of 
passages, follows the latter position. It refers to the king’s svadharma, but also considers 
him subject to the more general strictures of katriyadharma. It is likely, however, that 
the distinction is purely academic, as both approaches ultimately subject the entire 
practice of kingship to the imperatives of dharma as sacred order.  
The comprehensive and preemptive nature of this idiom allows for the wholesale 
subjugation of the discourse on statecraft, since the concept of svadharma is easily 
appended to existing advice for kings, thereby transforming mundane political advice into 
sacred decree. As such, we should be cautious to separate the abstract theological concept 
of rājadharma from the body of writing about statecraft and should recognize that, to a 
critical degree, the emerging literary tradition of statecraft may well have developed 
according to its own imperatives and not necessarily as a subsidiary to the expert tradition 
on dharma.355  
It is important to recognize that the idea of rājadharma, as also the notion of 
vara, has penetrated the interpretive models of modern scholars. Certainly, some of the 
most important secondary sources on statecraft present this Brahmanical theory as 
something close to historical reality, either using the notion of rājadharma to explain the 
general mindset of the period or failing to take sufficient account of its primary role as an 
ideology. So Kane can say without qualification that “[t]he fulfillment of their duties and 
responsibilities by rulers was of paramount importance to the stability and orderly 
                                                 
355 As argued by Kane 1974, 158. 
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development of society and to the happiness of individuals to the State…” (1997, 3). In 
fact we do not as yet know who believed this or even to what extent; in particular we do 
not know the extent to which this idea was held by the variety of individuals and 
institutions involved in the actual practice of statecraft in the classical period or how it 
may have exerted itself upon that practice. 
In fact, we know very little about the pertinence of the rājadharma and 
varadharma theories to the practice of kingship in the classical period. This is primarily 
because we have little understanding of the relationship between our source texts and the 
varied practices of governance throughout the period. We have, on one hand, a very 
powerful ideology of kingship that subjects the king to the prerogatives of sacred 
dharma, and, on the other hand, the actual project of governance. The former is lavishly 
imagined and illustrated not only in the texts of the dharma literature, but, perhaps most 
importantly, in the great Sanskrit epics.356 The latter, properly dependent primarily on 
material evidence, we cannot as yet clearly perceive through the lens of our Brahmanical 
literature. But, to apply the ideology of varadharma and the implication of rājadharma 
too freely to the latter misses the crucial point that the ideology itself worked in the arena 
of political power, actively seeking to limit the power of the king. And if we are to 
understand the relationship between religious and royal authority in the period, we must 
examine the ideology of varadharma as it operated within the contested realm of social 
authority rather than taking its perspective completely, and, in doing so, denying the fact 
of the king as a separate locus of power and denying any possibility of a dynamic 
relationship between the two as well as the ongoing need to defend the interests of a 
Brahmin class within the mundane world.  
                                                 
356 See, e.g. Fitzgerald 2004, 100ff. 
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8.4 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter I have attempted to demonstrate not only that varadharma is best 
understood as an ideology, but also the specific claims made by the system and its 
manner of pursuing its interests. In the following chapters I will illustrate the full extent 
of the ideology of varadharma and demonstrate that it is indeed a late import into the 
Arthaśāstra.  
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Chapter 9: Varadharma and Svadharma in the Arthaśāstra 
We come, finally, to a consideration of Brahmanical exceptionalism in the 
Arthaśāstra. The present chapter looks at the invocation of varadharma itself within the 
text and how it inflects local discourse. It is also the job of this and the following chapters 
to demonstrate the posteriority of those passages through which this ideology colors the 
text.  
The varadharma theory, as mentioned above and in consonance with all extant 
texts of the dharma literature, is found in the extant Arthaśāstra. In fact, the extant 
Arthaśāstra presents perhaps the most concise formulation of the theory in all of the 
classical literature. In addition to these explicit references, we also find implicit uses of 
the theory in the Arthaśāstra, which are discussed in subsequent chapters. As such, we 
can assert without reservation that the extant Arthaśāstra is in full consonance with the 
tenets of Brahmanical exceptionalism and political Brahmanism more generally as 
encapsulated and expressed in the ideology of varadharma. We look in this chapter first 
at discrete references to the system itself (§9.2), and then at references to svadharma 
(§9.3), which implies the greater system. 
9.1 VARADHARMA 
We have already looked (§8.2) at the direct explication of the varadharma 
system in the Arthaśāstra. It occurs in the first prakaraa of the text: 
 
KAŚ 1.3.5–13  The special duties [svadharma] of the Brahmin are: studying, teaching, 
performing sacrifices for himself, officiating at other people’s 
sacrifices, making gifts, and receiving gifts.  
 Those of the Katriya are: studying, performing sacrifices for himself, 
making gifts, living by (the profession of) arms and protecting 
beings.  
 Those of the Vaiśya are: studying, performing sacrifices for himself, 
making gifts, agriculture, cattle-rearing and trade.  
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 Those of the Śūdra are: service to the twice-born, engaging in an 
economic calling, and the profession of artisan and actor.  
Presented prominently at the outset of the text, the ideology of varadharma 
seems to fulfill here the constitutional role it plays in the dharma literature as providing 
the elementary framework through which the analysis and discussion of society will 
continue.  
Two of the five direct references to varadharma in the Arthaśāstra357 are found 
in the context of this passage: introducing it and providing the end verse to its adhyāya, 
respectively. Both have already been implicated in the adhyāya redaction:  
 
KAŚ 1.3.4 ea trayīdharmaś catur	ā var	ānām āśramā	ā ca 
svadharmasthāpanād aupakārika 
 
 This Vedic dharma is useful because it establishes the svadharma of the 
four varas and āśramas. 
 
KAŚ 1.3.17 vyavasthitāryamaryāda ktavar	āśramasthiti 
 trayyābhirakito loka prasīdati na sīdati  
 
 The world, its āryan boundaries established, observant of the 
institutions of vara and āśrama, and protected by the Veda, 
becomes tranquil and does not sink. 
A third reference comes in the end verse of the following adhyāya, and has been 
implicated in the adhyāya redaction as an end verse, as part of the expansion of the first 
prakaraa, and by virtue of missing the underlying prakaraa boundary: 
 
KAŚ 1.4.16 caturvar	āśramo loko rāj–ā da	ena pālita 
  svadharmakarmābhirato vartate sveu vartmasu 
 
 The world, possessed of four varas and āśramas, protected by force 
by the king, and devoted to its individual occupations and 
svadharma, rolls along in its own wheel tracks. 
                                                 
357 KAŚ 1.3.4; 1.3.17; 1.4.16; 3.1.38; 13.4.62 
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As noted above, all of these passages come from modifications made to the text 
during the adhyāya redaction (§7.5.1). Hence, we find that the constitutional enunciation 
of varadharma in the Arthaśāstra was the work of the adhyāya redactor. 
The remaining direct references to varadharma are also linked to the adhyāya 
redaction. The first comes in an adhyāya end verse: 
 
KAŚ 3.1.38 caturvar	āśramasyāya lokasyācāraraka	āt 
 naśyatā sarvadharmā	ā rājā dharmapravartaka  
 
 This king, by virtue of guarding the conduct of the world possessed of 
four varas and āśramas, becomes the promulgator of dharma when 
all dharmas are perishing. 
The final direct mention of varadharma comes near the end of the āvāpa section, 
where we read: 
 
KAŚ 13.4.62 jitvā ca pthivī vibhaktavar	āśramā svadharme	a bhu–jīta 
 
 Having conquered the world, he should enjoy it divided into varas and 
āśramas according to his svadharma. 
The probability that this passage belongs to the adhyāya redaction is very high. In order 
to understand this, we must understand the structure of the thirteenth adhikaraa in 
which it falls. 
The thirteenth adhikaraa is given the name dūrgalambhopāya, “Strategy for 
Taking a Fort,” and is composed of six prakaraas and five adhyāyas. The different 
strategies for taking the fort (sedition, drawing out, secret agents, sieging, and storming) 
are discussed in the first five prakaraas (171Ð175). The fifth of these, avamarda, 
“Storming,” concludes at KAŚ 13.4.53, as noted by Kangle (1971, 485n): 
 
KAŚ 13.4.53 After obtaining the enemy’s fort, he should enter it after it is cleared of 
the enemy’s party and after precautions against silent punishment are 
taken inside and outside. 
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This sūtra ends the discussion of storming the fort. A subsequent passage, 
however, goes on to discuss the four ways of conquering the world (p
thivī	 jetum): 
 
KAŚ 13.4.54Ð60 After thus conquering the enemy’s territory, the conqueror should seek 
to seize the middle king, after succeeding over him, the neutral king. 
This is the first method of conquering the world.  
 In absence of the middle and neutral kings, he should overcome the 
enemy constituents by superiority of policy, then the other 
constituents. This is the second method. 
 In the absence of the circle he should overcome by squeezing from both 
sides the ally through the enemy or the enemy through the ally. This 
is the third method. 
 He should first overcome the weak or a single neighboring prince; 
becoming doubly powerful through him a second prince; three times 
powerful, a third. This is the fourth method of conquering the world.  
It is after this passage, which (along with the following prakaraa) departs from 
the subject of taking a fort, that we find our fifth citation: 
 
KAŚ 13.4.62 jitvā ca pthivī vibhaktavar	āśramā svadharme	a bhu–jīta 
 
 Having conquered the world, he should enjoy it divided into varas and 
āśramas according to his svadharma. 
The phrase jitvā…p
thivī	 in this passage (KAŚ 13.4.62) clearly echoes the 
p
thivī	 jetum of the preceding passage (13.4.54Ð61). There can be little doubt that it is 
dependent on the foregoing, if not an integral part. 
Both this discussion of conquering the world and the next prakaraa (176) depart 
from the main topic of the adhikaraa, a tendency displayed by the adhyāya redactor in 
the first, third, and fourth adhikaraas. What is more, we find used in this passage the 
term p
thivīm, “earth,” which aside from a single usage,358 is restricted only to this 
passage (KAŚ 13.4.54Ð65), one Kauilya dialogue,359 six adhyāya end verses,360 and the 
                                                 
358 KAŚ 9.1.17, where it is used to gloss the term deśa in commentarial fashion. 
359 KAŚ 9.1.9 
360 KAŚ 1.5.17; 2.12.37; 2.15.64; 5.4.15; 6.1.18; 7.10.38;  
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first361 and last adhyāyas:362 all elements of the adhyāya redaction. Concurring in form 
and content with emblematic features of the adhyāya redaction, there can be little doubt 
that this passage was inserted under influence of one of the major tropes of the adhyāya 
redaction. 
Although these five passages do not represent all of the points at which we can 
detect the varadharma theory at work in the Arthaśāstra, they are some of the most 
explicit arguments in favor of this ideology. It is, of course, extremely poignant that all 
five can be connected with the adhyāya redaction. 
Collectively, these five passages tell us a few interesting details about how their 
composers felt varadharma to be related to statecraft. Most clear is the claim that the 
division of society into varas is a potential quality of the world (loka or p
thivī), and 
that this division, although desirable, is yet dependent on the efforts of the king who must 
“protect” that world so ordered.  
Another major characteristic of this group of scattered passages is a clearly 
persuasive intent meant to compel the king to enforce varadharma. Both KAŚ 1.3.17 and 
1.4.16 make the pragmatic argument that the vara system will benefit the king by 
delivering tranquility and stability. The last passage (KAŚ 13.4.62) implies that the king 
has a sacred duty to rule a world divided into varas and āśramas. Underlying the 
suasive tone of these passages is the clear recognition that the power to enforce 
varadharma ultimately lay with the king. This is significant because it tells us that even 
promoters of the varadharma theory understood that the real political power of the king 
                                                 
361 KAŚ 1.1.1 
362 KAŚ 15.1.2 (15.1.5) 
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(with its own implicit hierarchies) need not be consonant with the values of the vara 
system.  
The promotion of varadharma is, however, an ambiguous concept. The passages 
tell us that this has to do with guarding conduct (ācāra) (KAŚ 3.1.38) and dividing the 
world into varas (KAŚ 13.4.62), a set of mutually reinforcing activities. We can surmise 
that these amounted both to the enforcement of the svadharma of each vara (although 
what that meant specifically is unclear), as well as the prevention either of any 
intermarriage between varas (as implied at KAŚ 1.3.15) or only of “against the grain” 
(pratiloma) marriages, where a man of a lower vara marries a woman of a higher vara 
and is said elsewhere in the text to represent a transgression of the king’s svadharma 
(KAŚ 3.7.30). 
Most interesting, perhaps, is how the removal of these passages changes the 
underlying discussion of statecraft. We are told at KAŚ 1.4.3 and 1.5.1 that all the 
sciences, including the Veda, from which varadharma is said to come (1.3.4), depend on 
proper training in the use of the king’s staff (daa), a symbol of his coercive force and 
monopoly on the use of physical violence. Clearly, then, the underlying text takes the 
study of politics to be that most capable of insuring the kinds of public order promised by 
vara.  
Thus, we can argue on the whole that explicit reference to the varāśrama theory 
in the Arthaśāstra is a feature of the adhyāya redaction or later. This is significant, 
because it means that the prakaraa-text was constructed without direct reference to this 
key ideology of the dharma literature and other Brahmanical writings. This, in turn, 
suggests that the Arthaśāstra evolved in a tradition of statecraft that was neither heavily 
influenced by nor drew upon vara ideology, which would presumably place it outside of 
the fold of orthodox Brahmanical social thought. But these conclusions pertain only to 
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direct references to the system. We have yet to look at references to other concepts 
derived from the system, such as svadharma, and more generally, to dharma itself. 
9.2 SVADHARMA 
The larger theory of varadharma is also invoked in discussions of svadharma. 
The notion of svadharma is, of course, intimately connected with the idea of 
varadharma, the prefix “sva-” (one’s own) referring to the specific dharma prescribed 
to one’s vara in the varadharma system. I will consider the possibility that some 
general references to dharma also invoke this principle, although it seems likely that 
many uses of dharma may invoke a more general sense of sacred order and duty. We will 
look first at specific prescriptions of the king’s svadharma in this section and then at his 
dharma. A general discussion of the concept of dharma in its relation to statecraft 
concludes this section. 
9.2.1 The King’s Svadharma 
The term svadharma occurs 15 times in the extant Arthaśāstra.363 Eight of these 
references occur in the context of the king’s duties, and among them we find a few 
different characterizations of svadharma.364 Our first example comes also from the 
general introduction of the varadharma theory dating to the adhyāya redaction and 
promises soteriological benefit to the enforcement of varadharma:365 
 
                                                 
363 KAŚ 1.3.4; 1.3.5; 1.3.9; 1.3.14; 1.3.16; 1.7.1; 1.14.12; 3.1.41; 3.7.30; 3.7.37; 8.2.14; 11.1.12; 12.1.5; 
13.4.62; 13.5.4 
364 KAŚ 1.3.16; 1.7.1; 3.1.41; 3.7.30; 3.7.37; 8.2.14; 13.4.62; 13.5.4 
365 Here the king is enjoined to insure that all beings adhere to their svadharma; the promised reward is 
happiness now as well as in the afterlife. Reference to the svadharma of beings invokes the greater 
varāśramadharma system according to which svadharma is determined. We find here another strategy, 
this time soteriological, to persuade the king to protect the varāśramadharma system, for observance of it 
is said leads to happiness in this life as well as in the afterlife. 
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KAŚ 1.3.16 tasmāt svadharma bhūtānā rājā na vyabhicārayet  
 svadharma sadadhāno hi pretya ceha ca nandati  
 
 Therefore the king should not let creatures neglect their svadharma.  
 For, supporting svadharma, he becomes happy in the afterworld as well 
as in the present. 
Another end verse records a similar promise to the king who follows his 
svadharma of protecting his subjects “according to dharma”:366 
 
KAŚ 3.1.41 rāj–a svadharma svargāya prajā dharme	a rakitu 
 arakitur vā keptur vā mithyāda	am ato 'nyathā 
 
 The svadharma of a king who protects his subjects according to 
dharma leads to heaven, 
 That of one who does not protect or who inflicts unjust punishment is 
the opposite of this. 
That it is the king’s svadharma to enforce the svadharma of his subjects is 
implied in KAŚ 13.4.62, cited above. 
As mentioned above, one of the ways in which the king was supposed to 
accomplish his duty was in the prohibition of certain kinds of marriages between varas. 
As much is stated at KAŚ 3.7.30, after a discussion of pratiloma sons (those born from a 
man of a lower vara and wife of a higher vara): 
 
KAŚ 3.7.30 ta ete pratilomā svadharmātikramād rāj–a sabhavanti 
 
 These are the pratiloma sons that arise from the king’s transgression of 
his svadharma. 
This passage falls in a discussion of mixed varas, itself a fourth iteration within 
the treatment of inheritance, the original discussion being complete at KAŚ 3.5.1Ð22 and 
subsequent iterations occurring at 3.6.1Ð22, 3.7.1Ð19, and 3.7.20Ð39. Although not directly 
                                                 
366 In contrast to the previous verse, though, the svadharma spoken of in KAŚ 3.1.41 is the king’s. We 
have read above that the king receives happiness in the next life by enforcing the svadharma of his 
subjects; here we see that he goes to heaven by following his own svadharma, namely, the protection of his 
subjects. 
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linked to the adhyāya redaction, it is clearly a very late addition to the prakaraa-text. 
Nevertheless, we find the enforcement of hierarchical marriage367 to be stated policy 
implications of adherence to the varadharma system, as enjoined at KAŚ 3.7.30. 
In one instance (not included in the eight mentioned above) we find Katriya 
dharma applied to the king. An opponent argues in the pūrvapaka of the Kauilya 
dialogue at KAŚ 12.1.1Ð9 that a king should fight even a more powerful opponent because 
“this is the svadharma of a Katriya, whether there be victory or defeat in war” (12.1.5). 
Such an argument tells us that the logic of katriyadharma could be also be applied to the 
activities of the king.  
The only passage in the text that discusses the mechanism by which the king 
should enforce svadharma comes at KAŚ 1.7.1. Here, in a discussion of the king’s proper 
behavior, we read: 
 
KAŚ 1.7.1 Therefore, by casting out the group of six enemies [i.e., vices], he 
should acquire control over the senses, cultivate his intellect by 
association with elders, keep a watchful eye by means  of spies, bring 
about security and well-being by activity, maintain the observance of 
svadharma by decreeing what should be done [kāryānuśāsanena],  
acquiring discipline by instruction in the sciences, attain popularity 
by association with artha, and maintain proper behavior by doing 
what is meet.  
This passage emphasizes the role of kingly edicts as an instrument of statecraft.368 
In the difficult area of enforcing customary obligations, the king is instructed to do so by 
the issuance of decree. This not only enforces certain vara-friendly policies, but also 
                                                 
367 See also KAŚ 3.7.36–38 which concludes the discussion of mixed castes: “Among them, marriage is to 
be in their group of  origin, there  is to be the observance of precedence and the pursuit of  hereditary 
occupation. Or, they are to have the same svadharma as the Śūdra, excepting the Ca	āla. Only the king 
who behaves in this manner will obtain heaven, otherwise, hell.” 
368 Kangle mistranslates anuśāsana as “carrying out.” Other examples of anuśāsana as decree can be 
found. 
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makes public his support for the varadharma system, which in turn would not only lend 
the king’s punitive authority to varadharma but also presumably empower proponents 
to pressure their communities toward its observance. This passage has been connected in 
the adhyāya redaction above at §6.3. 
Finally, we have two passages that discuss the performance of king’s svadharma 
from the perspective of a third party. The first comes in a Kauilya dialogue in Book 8: 
 
KAŚ 8.2.13–18 As between a sick king and a new king: “The sick king meets with the 
overthrow of his rule caused by ministers or danger to his own life 
caused by rule; the new king busies himself with acts such as his 
svadharma, showing favors, granting exemptions, bestowing gifts, 
and conferring honor, which please and benefit the subjects,” say the 
teachers. 
 
 “No,” says Kauilya. “The sick king carries on the kingly duties as they 
were going on before. The new king, however, thinking the kingdom 
won by force to be his, behaves as he likes without restraint. Or, 
being in the power of his associates in revolt, he tolerates the ruin of 
the kingdom. Not being rooted among his subjects he becomes easy 
to uproot.” 
This exchange is very telling because it illustrates the kind of reasoning each side 
believes might be persuasive. Despite the fact that the same author probably wrote both 
positions, we can assume that he endowed even the inferior position (pūrvapaka) with 
some good reasoning. The “teachers” here argue that a new king would use the 
observance of svadharma as a means to endear himself to his subjects. On the face, then, 
it might seen that the observance of svadharma is being cast as an activity generally 
praised by his subjects. But, we note also that svadharma is here listed among other 
activities that are clearly palliatives to restive or potentially disruptive elements in his 
kingdom: showing favor, giving gifts, granting exemptions, and conferring honor. We 
can safely assume that such strategies were wisely aimed at those elements of the 
kingdom that might cause problems to a new and vulnerable king. If we think of 
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svadharma in this regard, it seems likely that the king’s adherence to svadharma was 
another kind of gift to powerful and potentially subversive elements in the kingdom. 
Given the inherent biases of the vara system, we can assume that adherence to 
svadharma was a palliative for restive Brahmins or certain elements of the orthodox 
Brahmanical community. We are able to surmise as much because we can read a bit here 
“between the lines.” 
Kauilya’s response seems to reinforce and extend this logic. He argues that if the 
king feels he has attained his position purely with force (balāvarjita), he will conduct 
himself only according to his own desires. The passage is not entirely clear in relating the 
precise danger such behavior will precipitate, but we can assume it is referred to in the 
final passage of the statement: “Not being rooted among the subjects, he becomes easy to 
uproot.” While falling short of a threat, one gets the sense that Kauilya is arguing that the 
king’s position isn’t secure without the support of his subjects. But, as in the pūrvapaka, 
we can see that the term “subjects” (prak
ti) probably refers to a limited number of 
potentially disruptive power holders rather than to the generality of the collective masses. 
The foundation of Kauilya’s argument is not so different from that of the teachers 
(although they come to opposite conclusions). Both regard the support of the “subjects” 
as fundamental to the security of the king’s rule. The position of the teachers implies that 
the king is able to gain their support by adherence to svadharma. We can see something 
of the power dynamic between king and the orthodox Brahmins here, although we do not 
see clearly the leverage held by Brahmins with which they might threaten the king’s rule. 
Likely this leverage came from many different sources from economic to political to 
ideological. 
The last reference to svadharma in the context of the king comes in the final 
adhyāya of Book 13 (KAŚ 13.5). It echoes very closely the passage just examined. Here 
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are given the strategies for pacifying a newly-conquered territory. Among the various 
strategies for pacification, we read: 
 
KAŚ 13.5.4 svadharmakarmānugrahaparihaāradānamānakarmabhiś ca 
prktipriyahitāny anuvarteta 
 
 He should carry out what is agreeable and beneficial to the subjects by 
doing his svadharma as laid down, granting favors, giving 
exemptions, making gifts and showing honor. 
We can see immediately the parallel of the long noun compound svadharma-
karmānugrahaparihāradānamānakarmabhiś with svadharmānugrahaparihāradāna-
mānakarmabhi in KAŚ 8.2.13. This sūtra reinforces the argument of the former that the 
adherence to svadharma is agreeable to the “subjects,” but also casts it as part of a set of 
activities most likely directed toward powerful individuals and institutions. A broader 
sentiment is expressed a few sūtras later when we read that the king should “cause the 
honoring of all temples and hermitages, and make grants of land, money, and exemptions 
to men distinguished in learning, speech, and  dharma, order the release of all prisoners 
and render help to the distressed, helpless, and the diseased” (KAŚ 13.5.11). This latter 
passage illustrates also how some of the favorable behavior could be expressed toward 
the more general public, but its specific mention of gifts and exemptions to “men 
distinguished in learning, speech, and dharma” is very suggestive. Are these the orthodox 
Brahmanical teachers, the authors of such sentiments as we have seen expressed above in 
the adhyāya redaction and in the dharma literature more generally? 
We note here that adhyāya 13.5 was linked to the adhyāya redactor above, its 
nearly verbatim repetition of a line from the eighth adhikaraa, which was clearly the 
work of the adhyāya redactor, only reinforces that it was produced during or after the 
adhyāya redaction. 
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Ultimately, then we can assert with some confidence that explicit articulation of a 
direct relationship between the king’s activities and the imperatives of svadharma all date 
to the adhyāya redaction. The underlying prakaraa-text, therefore, did not use this 
theory directly as a way to compel or justify certain practices, particularly those aimed at 
protecting the interests of orthodox Brahmins.  
9.2.2 General Uses 
The term svadharma is used in seven places in the Arthaśāstra in reference to 
individuals other than the king.369 As explicit extensions of the theory of varadharma 
we can examine these to see whether varadharma may have existed in the prakaraa-
text as a discrete ideology even if it was not applied directly to the king. 
Four of the seven references come in adhyāya 1.3 in the presentation of the 
varadharma system mentioned above and are thereby linked to the adhyāya redaction. 
The fifth example (KAŚ 12.1.5) has already been discussed above. It comes in the 
pūrvapaka of a Kauilya dialogue and dates also to the adhyāya redaction.370 
The last two examples are quite interesting and appear to demonstrate tactical 
uses of svadharma in the carrying out of governmental activity. The first passage (KAŚ 
11.1.22) falls in a discussion that outlines a strategy for sowing dissent among states run 
by oligarchies. It comes in the eleventh adhikaraa, which has been independently linked 
to the adhyāya redaction. The passage is somewhat unclear, but the intent seems to be 
that by appointing someone considered unworthy by the “righteous chiefs of the 
oligarchy” (saghamukhya dharmiha) to the position of crown prince, these righteous 
chiefs might be instigated to rebellion by secret agents who encourage them to “observe 
                                                 
369 KAŚ 1.3.4; 1.3.5; 1.3.9; 1.3.14; 1.14.12; 11.1.12; 12.1.5 
370 It seems somewhat possible that this passage has been interpolated into the Kauilya dialogue itself. 
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your svadharma towards the son or brother of the king.” It is unclear in exactly what 
respect svadharma is invoked here. It would seem to refer to an obligation shared among 
nobles to protect the interests of those members in good standing. It is a strange usage 
and falls outside of our common understanding of svadharma. It is possible, ultimately, 
that the appointment of the undesirable individual to the position of crown prince implies 
a contravention of the vara system, but as much is not said. More likely is that the term 
svadharma is used here as a broader moral imperative in the sense of dharma. 
The next comes in a long list of characteristics (KAŚ 1.14.2), also dated to the 
adhyāya redaction, by which the king’s agents are able to determine which individuals in 
his own realm or in the enemy’s realm are capable of being turned to treason. The 
passage in question details the “group of the enraged” (kruddhavarga), and includes inter 
alia a person who has been blocked from his svadharma or his inheritance (svadharmād 
dāyādyād voparuddha). Frustration of svadharma, then, might indicate an individual 
ready to turn against his lord. This usage would seem to recognize that some individuals 
considered the observance of svadharma to be extremely important. This is very different 
from the ideological prescription of svadharma, but may indicate that the composer of 
this passage was aware of the concept that he himself did not advise for the king.  
We know from other examples that adherence to dharma was seen as a potential 
liability to both kings and ministers (KAŚ 1.10.2Ð4).371 This, I think, reflects the position 
of the prakaraa-text vis-à-vis such matters, more generally: the text seems to promote a 
general sense of righteousness under the rubric of dharma, although it does occasionally 
advise against pursuit of dharma, broadly understood, in contravention of political aims.  
                                                 
371 We note in this regard a passage from the latter half of the book wherein among the obstacles to 
achieving a gain, we find listed “dharmika,” being too righteous (KAŚ 9.4.25). This is not the only 
example to be found of cases in which adherence dharma was seen as a weakness. Compare especially in 
this regard the “test of dharma” in 1.10. 
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9.3 CONCLUSION 
The foregoing analysis has examined direct references to varadharma and 
svadharma, the latter devolving from the same logic informing the former. It has revealed 
that all direct references to varadharma occur only in or after the adhyāya redaction. 
This is true also for the occurrences of the term svadharma. As it is, the presentation of 
varadharma here appears to consider the svadharma of the king, which falls outside the 
general system of varadharma, to pertain primarily, if not exclusively, to the 
preservation of the varas and āsramas. The king safeguards the system via decree by 
preventing pratiloma marriages, watching the “conduct” (ācāra) of his subjects, and 
ensuring adherence to ascribed svadharma, all of which serve to promote Brahmanical 
exceptionalism. This appears to be the shape of the system as it has been introduced via 
the adhyāya redaction. The prakaraa-text of the Arthaśāstra did not advocate 
varadharma, a ubiquitous sentiment in the dharma literature. 
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Chapter 10: Dharma in the Arthaśāstra 
The system of varadharma has been treated here as separate from general claims 
and uses of the term dharma, which is more widespread in the Arthaśāstra. We look now 
at the use of the term dharma in the text in order to determine its relationship there to 
Brahmanical exceptionalism. 
The need to treat dharma separately from svadharma has been prompted by the 
recognition that the notion of dharma circulated more generally in classical South Asia 
than in the narrow ideology of orthodox Brahmanical thought. Moreover, it is 
immediately apparent how advocacy of varadharma directly benefitted Brahmins. The 
mechanism by which adherence to dharma benefits Brahmins is less definite, although 
perhaps no less real. It is true that there is overlap between the concept of dharma and the 
idiom of varadharma; it is also true that just as the dharma texts were referred to as 
providing the rules of varadharma, their contents are also thought of more generally as 
“dharma.” Nevertheless, the term dharma bore a much wider semantic range than its 
parochial usage within the pedagogical circles of orthodox Brahmanism. I will look in 
this chapter at such uses of the term dharma that relate it to the king or the state in order 
to define the relationship expressed in the prakaraa-text of the Arthaśāstra between the 
principle of dharma and the practice of statecraft. 
10.1 DHARMA AS SVADHARMA 
It is of great importance to note that, despite occurring some 135 times in various 
forms, the term dharma and its derivatives seem to refer to something like the svadharma 
only once in reference to the king.  
At KAŚ 5.1.4, we read that “against those treasonable principal officers, who 
cause harm to the kingdom and who, being favorites or being united, cannot be 
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suppressed openly, [the king] should employ silent punishment, finding pleasure in his 
dharma.” The sense here would seem to be that the king was enjoying his duty to quash 
treasonous officers. This seems, however, to be a bit of an extension of the other 
references to svadharma. Regardless, the fifth adhikaraa is certainly one of the latest 
parts of the text and is clearly linked to the adhyāya redaction. 
It is notable, however, that even here, the specific compulsion provided by the 
varadharma system, namely that the institutes of kingship devolve specifically from the 
prescriptive evolutes of a divinely-ordered world, is not strongly present in any uses of 
the term dharma in the context of kingship. This is not to say that there is not some 
discussion of dharma as it pertains to kingship and statecraft. There is, of course, and we 
shall examine a few of these below. The term dharma, however, is used most generally to 
refer to what is “righteous,” “proper,” or “legal.”  
There seems to be a clear distinction, then, between dharma and svadharma as 
they pertain to the king. The latter directly invokes the greater cosmic order and seems 
more properly “royal” in its application, as it prescribes specific vocational 
responsibilities for the king. The former is a more general assessment of the 
righteousness of the king’s actions. In the Brahmanical universe, dharma and svadharma 
ultimately prove to have their worldly basis in the texts of the dharma literature, but the 
ideologies informing each and its bearing on the practice of statecraft are, as we shall see, 
markedly distinct. 
10.2 TRIVARGA 
We do find a few cases in which the concept of dharma is discussed directly in 
the text. These come in several considerations of the three aims of man, called the 
trivarga (“Group of Three”), which consists of dharma (“law,” “duty”), artha (“wealth,” 
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“power”), and kāma (“love,” “desire”). The Arthaśāstra argues that artha, or material 
considerations, are more important than the others. We read such a statement early in the 
text when Kauilya himself is attributed as saying, “artha alone is primary; for dharma 
and kāma are based in artha”(KAŚ 1.7.6–7). This means that the pursuit of sacred duty or 
physical pleasure depend ultimately on the security provided by attending to material 
needs first. This argument is again forwarded in the pūrvapaka of a Kauilya dialogue 
(KAŚ 8.3.31-33), where Parāśara uses it to justify the position that injury to property is 
worse than physical harm: “dharma and kāma are rooted in artha. And the world is tied 
up with artha. Its destruction is a greater evil.” Kauilya holds that the preservation of 
one’s life trumps even artha (KAŚ 8.3.34Ð36). 
In an extension of the concept of artha, the trivarga idiom is applied to elements 
of the state in another Kauilya dialogue (KAŚ 8.1.49), where Kauilya rejects the claim 
that a calamity befalling the army (daa) is more severe than a calamity befalling the 
treasury (kośa): “‘No,’ says Kauilya, ‘The army, indeed, is rooted in the treasury. In the 
absence of a treasury, the army goes over to the enemy or kills the king. And the treasury, 
ensuring the success of all endeavors (sarvābhiyogakara372), is the cause (hetu) of 
dharma and kāma.’” The parallel between kośa and artha is here quite clear. Elsewhere, 
Kauilya, arguing that coercive institutions of the state support all three members of the 
trivarga,373 states at KAŚ 1.4.11 that “The Staff, thoughtfully wielded, endows the people 
with dharma, artha, and kāma.” Both of these appear to represent rather loose uses of 
trivarga in the service of specific claims. 
                                                 
372 Cf. 1.4.3, where daa (the Staff) is said to ensure the pursuits of the other sciences. 
373 That the passage at KAŚ 1.4.11–15 is part of the preceding Kauilya dialogue is demonstrated both by 
the use of the connective (and dependent) particle “hi” in 1.4.11 as well as the otherwise anomalous “iti” at 
the end of 1.4.15. 
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In two subsidiary discussions in adhyāyas at the end of the ninth adhikaraa 
linked to the adhyāya redaction, we also find use of the trivarga in the discussion of 
types of gains and their relative value (KAŚ 9.7.60Ð64; 9.7.81). The first comes in a 
discussion of “Gain, Loss, and Uncertainty,” where artha, dharma, and kāma are given as 
the triad of gains, anartha, adharma, and śoka (“grief”) as the triad of losses, and 
inability to decide between each pair (e.g. dharma vs. adharma) as the triad of 
uncertainty. In the discussion of gains we are told that the earlier gain is better than the 
latter, as also among losses, the earlier must be addressed before the latter. These both 
firmly reinforce the general notion that artha is superior to dharma and kāma.  
In the second example, after a discussion of the different types of success based 
on which means are used to achieve them (conciliation, gifts, dissent, and force), we read 
that: 
 
KAŚ 9.7.80 Of [the four means of overcoming calamities], success with one means 
is single success, with two, two-way success, with three, three-way 
success, with four, four-way success. 
 
KAŚ 9.7.81 And, since material wealth has dharma as its root and kāma as its fruit, 
that attainment of artha which continually results in dharma, artha, 
and kāma is the attainment of all successes. 
This pronouncement has every appearance itself of a secondary interpolation, as it 
clearly exists to tack the trivarga onto an already complete discussion.374  
                                                 
374 Moreover, Kangle advises translating dharmamūla as a tatpurua compound (“the root of dharma”) 
rather than a bahuvrīhi compound (“dharma as its root”), despite the fact that the parallel compound 
arthamūla is always translated as the latter (“artha as its root”). He justifies this based on the argument 
from the preceding discussion at KAŚ 9.7.60Ð64 that a gain of artha is better than a gain in dharma. But is 
this warranted? I would suggest that it is not, specifically because the passage is clearly using the metaphor 
of a plant. The plant itself is artha, with dharma as its root (dharmamūla) and kāma as its fruit 
(kāmaphala). This may be inconsistent with the rest of the discussion of trivarga in the Arthaśāstra, but I 
do not believe that it is inconsistent with the ultimate goal of the trivarga idiom, which is not so much the 
promotion of artha above dharma, but the inclusion of dharma within the goals of statecraft. In this 
analogy, artha is still the primary goal in the quest for a gain, but it is said to be rooted in dharma, 
presumably referring to the rooting of the practice of kingship in observance of orthodox Brahmanical law. 
I would argue that the trivarga formula makes a similar argument in its own way: it recognizes the ultimate 
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While the supremacy granted to artha in the Arthaśāstra is certainly intended to 
establish a precedent for the contravention of dharma on the part of the king, it must be 
recognized that these formulations in the adhyāya redaction do not dismiss dharma and 
kāma (and the extant text is unanimous on this point), but see them only as lesser though 
still valid (and perhaps necessary) goals. Ultimately, one must ask whether these 
pronouncements on the relative importance of the trivarga are generally accurate 
regarding the attitudes in the text.  
That Kauilya is cast as valuing artha above dharma is consonant with the portrait 
of this legendary figure in the literature. It should not, however, be seen as dissonant with 
the proclamations of the king’s duty to follow his svadharma. Based on the conclusions 
drawn above, even the statements in favor of dharma implicitly or explicitly recognize 
that the ultimate power holder was the state; dharma depends on the king. This trivarga 
formulation breaks no new ground, then, and as I have argued above, actually serves to 
define and elevate dharma as a goal of kingship.  
Ultimately, we can confirm that the prakaraa-text of the Arthaśāstra was devoid 
of any sense that the project of statecraft was meaningfully engaged in a balance among 
the three goals of life. It is true that these ideas may have been held in the background, 
but they certainly don’t seem to have merited much if any inclusion in a discussion of 
statecraft. This tells us that statecraft was not perceived in the prakaraa-text to be linked 
closely with considerations of the trivarga. 
                                                                                                                                                 
superiority of the interests of artha, but actually burdens it with a responsibility ultimately to uphold 
dharma. And, given the encompassing nature of dharma, its inclusion has systemic repercussions for the 
practice of statecraft. 
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10.3 DHARMA AND ARTHA 
We find dharma discussed also in the context of artha. For example, the opening 
discussion on the sciences (vidyāsamuddeśa) tells us that “Since with their help one can 
learn dharma and artha, therefore the sciences are so-called” (KAŚ 1.2.8). But, this 
statement is almost certainly intended to form part of Kauilya’s uttarapaka from KAŚ 
1.2.7. Moreover, the capacity to learn what is dharma and what is artha actually only 
applied to the first of the sciences, ānvīkikī, and seems poorly suited to the last three (the 
Veda, Economics, and Statecraft).  
In another passage on the comportment of kings, we read: 
 
KAŚ 1.7.2 eva vaśyendriya parastrīdravyahisāś ca varjayet svapna laulyam 
antam uddhataveatvam adharmasayuktam anarthasayuktam ca 
vyavahāram 
 
 With his senses thus under control he should avoid the wife or property 
of another man, as also sleepiness, capriciousness, falsehood, 
wearing extravagant dress, association with harmful persons, and any 
transaction associated with unrighteousness or harm.  
The provenance of this sentence is unclear: the last list seems to have been 
appended, as it breaks the expected verb final word order of the prose.375  
In a discussion of princes in adhyāya 1.17, Kauilya tells us that a prince should 
be instructed “in what conduces to spiritual and material good (dharmyam arthyam)” 
(KAŚ 1.17.33) and princes are divided into “one possessed of sagacity” (buddhimant), 
who “understands spiritual and material good (dharmārthān)” (1.17.45) and “one of evil 
intellect (durbuddhi), who “is ever full of harm and hates spiritual and material good 
(dharmārthadveī)” (1.17.47). 
                                                 
375 Moreover, this passage was almost certainly not part of the underlying discussion of indriyajaya. It 
seems designed to set up the Kauilya dialogue in the next line: “He should enjoy kāma…” (KAŚ 1.7.3).  
 246 
To these we can add a passage from the fifth adhikaraa. Here, in a discussion of 
fixing salaries for state employees, the text advises that “He should pay regard to the 
body [of income], not causing harm to spiritual good and material advantage (na 
dharmārthau pīayet)” (KAŚ 5.3.2).  
Much like the invocation of svadharma in attempting to influence a king seen 
above, we read at KAŚ 12.2.2 that a king who is unable to induce a more powerful rival to 
accept a peace treaty should admonish him:  
 
KAŚ 12.2.1Ð4 If he were not to accept a peace treaty, he should say to him, “Such and 
such kings, under the influence of the group of six enemies, have 
perished; it does not behoove you to follow in the footsteps of those 
who were without self-control. You should pay regard to spiritual 
and material well-being (dharmam artham ca). For those are the real 
enemies, wearing the masks of friends, who make you undertake a 
rash deed, an impious act, and the foregoing of material good. To 
fight with brave men who have given up all hope of life is a rash 
deed, to bring about loss of men on both sides is an impious act, to 
give up a good in hand, and to forsake a blameless ally is foregoing 
of material good.” 
This passage clearly refers back to the discussion at 1.6.6Ð1.7.1 of the 
ariavarga (“the group of six enemies,” i.e., vices), which was determined to belong to 
the adhyāya redaction (§6.3; 7.5). We have already seen that the 12th adhikaraa also 
belongs to the adhyāya redaction or later.  
Despite the connection of these passages with the adhyāya redaction, how do they 
collectively use the concept of dharma? First, we note the pairing of dharma with artha, 
which suggests that the king’s judgment ought to be subject to the dual consideration of 
morality and expediency. This pairing of dharma and artha seems to me to have been 
affected for the sake of dharma. For, it would be rather redundant for a text on statecraft 
to implore the king to observe sound policy regarding artha. In fact, the purpose of the 
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formulation of dharmārtha is to add the imperative of dharma to more purely material 
considerations in statecraft.  
That this is so is born out by the fact that in the Arthaśāstra we never read of a 
passage imploring the king observe artha that does not also praise dharma in a parallel 
manner. As such, the dharmārtha formula examined here bears what I would argue is the 
same purpose as the general trivarga formulation, namely the legitimation not of artha 
and kāma as aims of life (greed and desire being universal human drives), but instead the 
legitimation of dharma as an area of interest to be considered on par with the drive 
toward artha implicit in all striving for power. Hence, the creation of the notion of artha 
really serves to imply the coexistence of a parallel concept of dharma. It is, therefore, not 
surprising that artha is never considered independently in this (or any?) text. Moreover, 
the very naming of the text Arthaśāstra (when it was likely called daanīti originally), 
suggests an attempt to subjugate it to the trivarga ideology, whose ultimate purpose is the 
promotion of dharma in the context of the king’s power. 
Second, it would seem that term dharma is used in these examples in a much 
broader sense of “righteousness.” For example, we do not know how causing the loss of 
life is considered adharma for a king, especially given that his svadharma is given at 
KAŚ 1.3.5 as “living by the profession of arms.” There is, I think, an appeal here to a 
broader sense of morality than implied by the narrow constraints of the varadharma 
system. This probably reflects a wider sense that the term current in the general cultural 
milieu of the classical period. The sense is not so much of the abrogation of rules but of 
generally uncommendable behavior. This is precisely how the adjective dharmya is 
defined in the text itself: praśastopādānād dharmya, “Because [a gain] is obtained in a 
praiseworthy manner, it is dharmya” (KAŚ 9.4.22). In fact, we see this broader usage in 
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much of the middle and later portions of the text. It remains to be seen whether any more 
can be said about this more general sense of dharma as it applies to kingship. 
10.4 DHARMA: RELIGIOUS GOOD AND LEGAL GOOD  
Several uses of the term dharma give us some insight into its specific injunctive 
moral character in the prakaraa-text. Most poignantly, the citation given above (KAŚ 
9.4.22: “Because [a gain] is obtained in a praiseworthy manner, it is dharmya.”) reflects a 
broader sense of dharma that operates in much of the text, where it seems to invoke not a 
formal code of behavior but instead a general sensibility of righteousness.  
Clearly, the term dharma was itself contested in this period, and all traditions 
drew on the ethical dimensions of the term as “that which is moral.” It only makes sense 
that the concept of dharma must have had general currency if we see kings and religious 
leaders attempting to use it to characterize their own behavior and teachings. The 
question for the Arthaśāstra is the extent to which specifically Brahmanical dharma is 
invoked in uses of the term.  
There is a clearly legal sense in which the term dharma is used to justify certain 
elements of the legal code. Although it is almost certain that the king was not compelled 
to follow the legal code as we have it in the Arthaśāstra, the argument is made 
nevertheless that certain activities are dharmya, as when in an end verse we are told that 
death by torture is “dharmya” because the methods have been “laid down in the śāstras 
of high-souled authors (śāstrev anugatā…mahātmanām)” (KAŚ 4.11.26). Certainly this 
passage is trying to justify the morality of death by torture with its reference to the 
mahātmans, but the authority of the practice is its legal basis in śāstra. As such, the 
argument is made that this aspect of statecraft, capital punishment, is allowable because it 
is supported by the śāstras.  
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It is also likely that an appeal to canonical law is also implied when in another end 
verse an added impost and surcharge are called adharmiha, and only a “basic fine is 
known as dharmya (dharmyā tu prak
ti sm
tā)” (KAŚ 3.17.16). The term sm
ta here 
suggests that the acceptability of the practice is based on the recognized body of 
authoritative customs and laws circulated within the expert tradition on dharma. 
Importantly, both of these direct appeals to dharma genres associated with the orthodox 
Brahmanical expert tradition on dharma are found in end verses.376 
We are told at KAŚ 3.11.1 that 1 māsa per 100 is the dharmya monthly interest 
rate (3.11.1). No hint can here be found of reference to the dharma tradition itself, 
although the sense is certainly that of “legal,” “proper,” or “fair.” For, the context alone 
suggests that judges should disallow higher interest rates, rendering this a legal opinion. 
The question then arises as to the relationship between the term dharmya and what we 
now think of as “the expert tradition on dharma.” In other words, on whose authority 
does this verse deign to instruct the king on the proper amount of interest? Likely, the 
authority comes from a customary consensus of what constitutes a “just” interest rate. 
The question is whether that consensus has its basis in the orthodox Brahmanical circles 
or in other circles, more specifically mercantile, economic, or political circles. It is not 
entirely clear, and it is somewhat beyond the scope of this chapter to launch into a full 
investigation of dharma in the text.  
The confusion in this regard stems not only from the realization that dharma was 
a widespread concept with currency outside of the orthodox Brahmanical experts, but 
also because we see the term used generically with regard to what can only be thought of 
as authoritative and settled custom. Thus, we read in both the adhyāya redaction as well 
                                                 
376 There is some overlap here, as with the next example, of the generic sense of dharmya as “just” or 
“fair.” 
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as the prakaraa-text of dūtadharma (messenger-dharma),377 pālanadharma (herding-
dharma),378 nikepadharma (deposit-dharma).379 It is clear that dharma here is both more 
and less than “law.” It seems that the sense lies somewhere between “custom” and “rule,” 
probably splitting the difference.380 This is the sense I also take from an end verse that, 
despite its lateness, seems to collapse any distinction between custom and dharma: 
 
KAŚ 3.7.40 Whatever be the customary law of a region, a caste, a corporation, or a 
village, in accordance with that alone shall he administer the law of 
inheritance. 
Thus, without further contextualization, the authority for some references to 
dharmya are unclear. If we follow the pronouncement seen above that “What is dharmya 
is what is praised by all,” we come close to the sense of approved custom, inculcating 
notions of both morality and legality.  
As such, it is not immediately clear that the use of the term dharmya invokes 
Brahmanical law or even Brahmanical authority. Undoubtedly, Brahmins played a large 
role in the character of public opinion and the sense of which customs were moral and 
which immoral. What we are looking for, however, is a sense of whether the use of the 
dharma and its derivatives in the text betrays any ideological attempt to promote the 
interests of Brahmanical exceptionalism. 
                                                 
377 KAŚ 1.16.17 
378 KAŚ 2.29.7 
379 KAŚ 3.12.37 
380 This makes the distinction drawn at KAŚ 2.7.2, 2.7.29, 3.1.39, and 3.1.40 between dharma and caritra 
and at 3.1.43 between dharma and sa	sthā somewhat problematic. My sense is that, as part of the 
additions to the second book and end verses, this use of dharma refers more specifically to canonical codes 
of behavior, Brahmanical or otherwise. Even broader is the use in the end verse at KAŚ 3.1.45 that 
discusses conflict between śāstra and edict “in a matter of dharma.” Here dharma can only mean law writ 
large. 
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It is clear that dharma appeals to a sense of right or propriety, even when the 
question is not one of legality. Thus we read that one of the characteristics of an excellent 
treasury (KAŚ 6.1.10) or an excellent gain for the king (KAŚ 9.4.4) is that it is dharmya, 
while the possibility that a rival might be forced into achieving an adharmya object 
provided an opportunity for the king to exploit his rival (KAŚ 7.6.10). What is implied in 
these, and stated explicitly at KAŚ 9.4.7, is that this quality meant the activity was 
considered praiseworthy and good by observers.  
But here the concern is tactical and has more to do with the management of public 
opinion than of any direct coercion. That concern with dharma was wrapped up with 
public perception is also clear at KAŚ 12.2.25Ð30, dated to the adhyāya redaction, where 
secret agents create the perception that the adminstrator called samāhart
 is plotting 
against the king and robbing the citizens and slaying their chiefs. When they have turned 
the people against the samāhart
, they are to slay his subordinates in the middle of the 
village and proclaim, “Those who oppress the countryside unrighteously (adharmea) are 
dealt with thus” (KAŚ 12.2.30). 
This sentiment is explained precisely in a passage that discusses who is better to 
attack, a just or unjust king: 
 
KAŚ 7.5.16Ð18 Between a strong king unjustly behaved (anyāyav
tti) and a weak king 
just behaved (nyāyav
tti), he should march against the strong king 
unjustly behaved. The subjects do not help the strong unjust king 
when he is attacked, they drive him out or resort to his enemy. But 
the subjects support in every way the weak but just king when he is 
attacked or follow him if he has to flee. 
It is enormously important to note here the use of the term nyāyav
tti, “just 
behavior,” rather than the notion of dharma, for the use of the former frees us from the 
question of whether dharma invokes Brahmanical exceptionalism or even a dominant 
Brahmanical ethos. I would argue that this passage makes clear that the sense of 
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righteousness and justness being discussed generally with the term dharma above is 
much broader than the Brahmanical notion that equates dharma with either 
varadharma/svadharma or the content of the dharma literature.  
A long interpolated passage (KAŚ 7.5.19Ð26)381 immediately following this 
citation and likely dating to the adhyāya redaction interprets nyāyav
tti in terms of 
dharma, but it is clear that it is making pains to define anyāyav
tti in a context more 
familiar to the dharma literature. But, the citation stands on its own merits, and we are 
safe to assume that the citizens would have been able to judge by their own standards 
whether the king was just or unjust based on his exercise of statecraft. 
At the very least, the passage at KAŚ 7.5.16Ð18 indicates a more general sense of 
righteousness in which the notion of dharma shared than is typically assumed when the 
latter is thought of solely as the province of orthodox Brahmanical thought in the science 
of statecraft. It is in this context that we can understand the discussion in the text (KAŚ 
12.1.11) of “the righteous conqueror,” dharmavijayin. He is opposed to the “greedy 
conqueror” (lobhavijayin) and the “demoniacal conqueror” (asuravijayin). Here, the 
dharmavijayin is defined not by his religious practices, but by the fact that, when he has 
conquered, he “is satisfied with submission” (KAŚ 12.1.11). The other two are satisfied 
only with the seizure of land and goods or land, goods, sons, and wife, respectively. 
Thus, the dharmavijayin is defined by his behavior in conquest.  
I would summarize this phenomenon as follows: The prakaraa-text of the 
Arthaśāstra show a familiarity with dharma as a normative set of customs specific to 
certain groups, activities, and so forth. There seems to be a potentially endless plurality of 
dharmas. But, at the same time, we see evidence of the normative sense of dharma native 
                                                 
381 The supposition that this passage is interpolated has been suggested independently at §4.3. 
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to the Brahmanical literature, but typically confined to activities having directly to do 
with some kinds of Brahmanical rites. Finally, we have a general and seemingly non-
ideological use of dharma as something that is generally “just.” Thus, I would estimate 
that earlier parts of the Arthaśāstra were generally not aware of and/or concerned with 
any ideological dimension of Brahmanical dharma rising to the level of that always 
implicit in the concepts of rājadharma and varadharma, or of its specific relation to the 
ideological world of the dharma literature. 
In the later layers of the text, we find the introduction of the notion of dharma as 
deriving from śāstra as well as a more directly evaluative term based not on public 
commendation, but on some other sense of absolute referent: “For the sake of protecting 
the four varas, he should use secret practices against the unrighteous (adharmiha)” 
(KAŚ 14.1.1). This opens the real possibility that ideological moral evaluations (and 
perhaps also the term dharmiha) is a marker of general lateness in the text, as we see 
also in KAŚ 13.5: “[a]nd discontinuing whatever custom he may regard as harmful to the 
treasury and army or as unrighteous (adharmiha), he should establish a righteous course 
of conduct (dharmyavyavahāra).”382 
10.5 CONCLUSION 
We can draw several firm conclusions from the foregoing analyses. Regarding 
varadharma, we can assert with some certainty that the prakaraa-text bore little or no 
sense that the king’s behavior was or ought to be governed by svadharma or 
varadharma. This conceit seems to be wholly part of the adhyāya redaction. The same 
can generally be said to be true for discussions of the trivarga and comparisons between 
                                                 
382 The latter half of this sentence is effectively repeated in the end verse (KAŚ 13.5.24). 
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artha and dharma, both formulations that invoke and promote Brahmanical ideology to 
greater or lesser degrees.  
In the early text, we get some sense of dharma as referring to something generally 
righteous or praiseworthy, without, however, any invocation of varadharma or 
Brahmanical exceptionalism. Interestingly, some usages also discuss dharma as it relates 
specifically to Brahmanical rites. The idea of dharma, however, becomes more 
pronounced in the adhyāya redaction, and in certain places we find uses of the term that 
appear to be based not in abstract notions of righteousness, but in the narrow strictures of 
Brahmanical law or ideology. 
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Chapter 11: Vara and Society 
We have just looked at how the varadharma ideology was used in the adhyāya 
redaction to argue in favor of specific and general policies from the king. We have also 
seen that the term dharma in the prakaraa-text identifies something generally 
commendable or righteous, rather than refering to ideological aspects of Brahmanical 
orthodoxy. But, as noted before, ideologies also influence by controlling the terms 
through which the discourse is carried out. The present chapter will trace the use of key 
terms within the vara ideology (cāturvarya, Brahmin, Katriya, Vaiśya, Śūdra, vara, 
and so forth) in an attempt to understand the extent to which the use of these terms also 
invoked the political amibitions of Brahmanical exceptionalism and whether, perhaps, the 
concept of vara also possessed a broader sense less tied to the ideology of political 
Brahmanism. 
When an ideology becomes productive of socially constructed reality, it begins to 
exercise control over the kinds of conclusions that anyone analyzing that society may 
reach. It does this by embedding in its terms a certain kind of logic, while denying 
typologies and constructs that contest this logic. The former is accomplished by the telos 
embedded in the ideology itself, and the latter by creating the appearance of illogic, 
irrelevance, and incompatibility. Crucial to these, however, is the control of the meaning 
of such terms. Like any ideology, the influence exerted by varadharma is of both types; 
it is in the nature of ideology that it can only exist in an admixture of both, for no explicit 
argument can be persuasive if the categories it uses are not to some extent seen as 
accurate or meaningful to the object under scrutiny.  
 256 
11.1 VARA AND CĀTURVARYA IN THE ADHYĀYA REDACTION 
We find in the extant text many uses of the term vara itself. Most of these are 
restricted to discussions we have already identified as interpolations or part of the 
adhyāya redaction: the discussion of vāstuśāstra at (KAŚ 2.4);383 the interpolations on 
inheritance (KAŚ 3.5.28Ð3.8);384 an addendum385 to the discussion of witnesses (KAŚ 
3.11.34Ð49),386 magic (KAŚ 14.1Ð14.4);387 violence against Brahmins (KAŚ 3.16Ð3.20; 
                                                 
383 The greater passage on vāstuśāstra makes other notable uses of vara, prescribing different quadrants 
of the city for the residences of each of the four varas (KAŚ 2.4.9, 2.4.11, 2.4.13, 2.4.15), as also for the 
mixed vara and most despised Ca	āla (2.4.23). The northern or eastern part of the cremation ground 
should be for those of the highest vara, to the south the cremation ground for the low vara” (KAŚ 
2.4.21). The distinction drawn here is presumably between Brahmins (the highest of the varas) and Śūdras 
(the lowest vara).  The passage also assesses a fine for abrogation of this rule (KAŚ 2.4.22). 
384 The original discussion of inheritance appears to conclude at KAŚ 3.5.27 with the phrase “They shall 
divide again what is wrongly divided, what is robbed by one from the other, what is hidden, or what, being 
unknown, comes to light later” or possibly at 3.5.28 with “The king shall take that to which there are no 
heirs, excluding maintenance for the wife and what is needed for the funeral right” excluding the clearly 
spurious addendum “except for the property of a śrotriya [i.e., a Brahmin learned in the Vedas].” Up to this 
point, i.e., through the entirety of the original passage, the discussion of inheritance makes no mention of 
vara, even stating unambiguously that: “There is to be an equal division of debts and properties [among 
brothers]” (KAŚ 3.5.22). It appears, then, that KAŚ 3.5.29Ð30 and the subsequent extensions of the 
discussion of inheritance at KAŚ 3.6 and 3.7 are additions, as they fall outside of the proper discussion and 
miss their logical points of inclusion therein.  
385 The discussion on witnesses seems itself to be out of place, being discussed well into the legal code 
after the topic of debt repayment. A more appropriate location for the this would have been in the latter half 
of adhyāya 3.1, where rules for procedure are laid down. It might be argued that the previous sections do 
not pertain to transactions to which witnesses are required. In fact, there are discussions of such 
transactions. I would argue that such a developed discourse as is found generally in 3.11 is not original to 
the code. It must always be remembered, however, that the code has undergone perhaps greater changes 
than any other part of the text (7th Book excluded). As such, when changes cannot be linked to the adhyāya 
redaction, we must not always assume that they belong to the later layers. 
386 This passage maintains that Brahmin witnesses are not subject to the threats made to witnesses of other 
varas (KAŚ 3.11.35Ð37). 
387 The style and outlook of the material is completely different from the text, and its inclusion has been 
rather obviously carried out by the inclusion of an introductory sūtra (KAŚ 14.1.1, quoted above) and two 
end verses (KAŚ 14.2.45 & 14.3.88). So, in one of the spells we read that “After pressing in a camel-
shaped vessel the aborted fetuses of all the varas or dead infants in the cemetery-the fat from that [enables 
one to walk untired] for one hundred yojanas” (KAŚ 14.2.44). This citation is not only late (possibly part of 
the adhyāya redaction, but certainly after the composition of the original text), but also based on a 
convention of the passage’s home genre. 
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4.10Ð13);388 sexual crimes (KAŚ 4.12);389 and proper behavior for a courtier (KAŚ 
5.4Ð5.5).390 
We also find the term cāturvarya, a word meaning collectively “the four varas” 
and a nominal derivative of the compound caturvara, used some seven times.391 This is, 
of course, a reference to the vara system as we have discussed, and its use frequently 
suggests the broader meaning of “the world as divided into four varas,” echoing the 
division into vara as a potential quality of the world. Four of its occurrences clearly 
reflect this meaning, and all can be traced to directly to the adhyāya redaction.392 In at 
                                                 
388 It is in this section that we find a provision for cutting of the hand of one striking a Brahmin (KAŚ 
4.10.12), a crime that has already been addressed under the discussion of daapāruya at 3.19. There, we 
find a provision for the cutting off of a Śūdra’s limb should he strike a Brahmin (KAŚ 3.19.8Ð10). That 
passage has been identified as spurious by both Meyer and Kangle. The following passage, KAŚ 4.10.13, 
calls for the blinding of a Śūdra who impersonates a Brahmin. Not only are both KAŚ 4.10.12 and 13 much 
more draconian than the general attitude of adhikaraa 3 (meriting an alternative punishment of exorbitant 
700 and 800 paa fines respectively), but they are not integrated where applicable into earlier discussions. 
Fines for verbal assault are dependent on the relative position of those involved in the vara system ,with a 
Brahmin insulting a Śūdra paying the least and, in the reverse situation, the Śūdra paying the most (KAŚ 
3.18.7). Finally, KAŚ 4.13.1 allows the highest fine for making a Brahmin drink something unfit to be 
consumed, the penalty decreasing for such an offense against the respective varas. 
389 Another set of references to vara, also found in the later adhyāyas of the 4th adhikaraa, concern 
crimes against women. The discussion of vara in this context highlights the areas in the text where 
consideration of vara is greatest: marriage, sex, procreation, and inheritance. KAŚ 4.12 deals with sex 
crimes against women, and consideration of vara figures largely into the determination of punishments for 
sexual crimes in this chapter. Thus, the punishments for certain crimes depend on the relative varas of the 
individuals (KAŚ 4.12.1; 4.12.14; 4.12.20Ð21) as also in determining the appropriate amount of time before 
a menstruating woman (presumably unmarried) may approach a man (4.10.10). 
390 We read that a servant of the king should recognize as a sign of the king’s anger an incident when the 
king inter alia maligns the servant’s education, vara, or country (KAŚ 5.5.9). This comes in a set of 
adhyāyas KAŚ 5.4Ð6 that give advice directly to the king’s minister rather than the king.  
391 KAŚ 1.6.7; 2.4.6; 2.35.4; 3.6.17; 5.6.35; 7.11.21; 14.1.1 
392 So, we read in a passage that tells of legendary kings who succumbed to one of the Six Vices (the so-
called “Group of Six Enemies,” ariādvarga) that the king Aila, “extorting money from the cāturvarya 
out of greed [perished], as also Ajabindu of the Sauvīras” (KAŚ 1.6.7). In the third adhikaraa, in an 
interpolated passage on inheritance, a distinction in shares received by the son of a Brahmin is carried out 
with references to wives of the cāturvarya, i.e., of each of the four varas (KAŚ 3.6.17).  So also in the 5th 
adhikaraa, secret agents build support for a proposed heir to the throne during a succession crisis by 
whispering among the high officers: “Who else but this king, with you to guide him, would be able to 
protect cāturvarya?” (KAŚ 5.6.35). Finally, in the prose sūtra that has been used to link the appendectical 
14th adhikaraa to the body of the text, we read that “for the purpose of protecting the four varas, he 
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least one case, cāturvarya seemingly refers to a more restricted part of society, 
designating those within the vara system over against those outside of the vara 
system.393 Thus, in the interpolated passage on vāstuśāstra394 (KAŚ 2.4.1Ð6, 8Ð16, 21Ð23), 
we read that “on an excellent building site, fit for the cāturvarya to live on, the royal 
residence [should be constructed]” (KAŚ 2.4.6). Here, the term cāturvarya seems more 
restrictive than its usage above; the mention later in the passage of the exclusion of 
Ca	ālas and Pāa	as, two groups traditionally considered to be outside of the four 
varas, from the city itself reinforces this sense.395 These examples are also confined to 
clearly interpolated passages. 
11.2 VARA AND CĀTURVARYA OUTSIDE OF THE ADHYĀYA REDACTION 
A number of uses of the term vara fall in more scattered occurences in the text, 
however, and cannnot be dismissed out of hand as additions of the adhyāya redactor. 
Two of these occur in the legal code of the third adhikaraa. The first we find in a 
discussion of disaffected husbands and wives a passage informing that “[o]ne who speaks 
                                                                                                                                                 
should employ secret practices against the unrighteous” (KAŚ 14.1.1). We note in all of these that the 
cāturvarya is used as a synonym or synecdoche for the world and is deployed in relation to the king. We 
note also that each of these passages has been ascribed to the adhyāya redaction. 
393 The heavily interpolated discussion of inheritance at KAŚ 3.5Ð3.7 also seems to adhere to this more 
restrictive usage: we are told there that the issue of inheritance among sons of different varas should be 
resolved thus: “Among a Brahmin’s sons from wives of the four varas (cāturvaryaputrāām), the son of 
a Brahmin wife shall receive four shares, the son of a Katriya wife three shares, the son of a Vaiśya wife 
two shares, the son of a Śūdra wife one” (KAŚ 3.6.17). This latter case is unclear, however, as the union 
between a Brahmin male and mixed vara female is never mentioned. Both of these passages, like those 
mentioned above, fall in clearly interpolated passages that, have not, however, been directly linked to the 
adhyāya redaction. 
394 The principles of vāstuśāstra call for the division of space according to systemic principles, usually for 
the sake of construction, such as those found in the vara theory.  
395 This comes at 2.4.23, although I am not firmly convinced of this passage’s authenticity. After the 
discussion of how the cremation ground should be divided according to its use by different castes, the 
passage in questions adds that Ca	ālas and Pāa	as should dwell outside of the cremation grounds. It is 
derivative, therefore, of the discussion of the cremation grounds and not part of the discussion of dwelling 
places. 
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a falsehood, when indications are clear, when there is refusal of intercourse or when an 
approach is made to a person of the same vara through a secret emissary, shall give 12 
paas” (KAŚ 3.3.14). A second occurrence, this one found within discussion of 
“Rescission of Sale and Purchase” (KAŚ 3.15), is an excursus on the revocation of 
marriage (3.15.11Ð13) that gives different lengths of time, based on vara, up to which a 
marriage can be revoked. The greater discussion is concerned only with the buying and 
selling of trade goods (paya). This passage would seem a better fit had it been given in 
the discussion of marriage. (KAŚ 3.2Ð4). Regarding such occurrences in the legal code, 
we should keep in mind that the third adhikaraa shows signs of heavy emendation, and 
that this is the subject most intimately shared between the genres of Arthaśāstra and 
Dharmaśāstra. Hence, the presence of small interpolations and addenda should not be 
surprising, given the density of discourse in Sanskrit literature on this subgenre. Given 
the trans-textual life of the subgenre of vyavahāra, its compositional history is more 
complex than the rest of the text to a degree. 
Another occurrence of vara is found in the enumeration of the duties of the 
samāhart
, where we read that this powerful official should ascertain “the number of 
fields, houses, and families in those villages in which they are stationedÐÐfields with 
respect to their size and total produce, houses with respect to taxes and exemptions, and 
families with respect to their vara and occupation” (KAŚ 2.35.8). There is little doubt 
that this passage is interpolated, since it clearly breaks the structure of the passage:  
 
KAŚ 2.35.8 samāhartpradiāśca ghapatikavya–janā yeu grāmeu pra	ihitās 
teā grāmā	ā ketraghakulāgra vidyu ÐÐ mānasajātābhyām 
ketrā	i bhogaparihārābhyā ghā	i var	akarmabhyā kulāni ca 
KAŚ 2.35.9 teā jaghāgramāyavyayau ca vidyu 
KAŚ 2.35.10 prasthitāgatānā ca pravāsāvāsakāra	amanartyānā ca strīpuruā	ā 
cārapracāra ca vidyu  
KAŚ 2.35.11 evam vaidehakavya–janā svabhūmijānā rājapa	yānā 
khanisetuvanakarmāntaketrajānā pramā	amardha ca vidyu 
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KAŚ 2.35.13 eva samāhartpradiāstāpasavya–janā 
karśakagorakakavaidehakānām adhyakā	ā ca śaucāśauca 
vidyu 
We have here six consecutive sūtras that end with the verb vidyu (“they should 
learn”); the reference to vara comes in a line appended after the verb at KAŚ 2.35.8. 
Here, vara is listed next to karma (“work,” “occupation”) as two elements by which a 
family (kula) can be identified. Hence, we see vara and karma working as parallel ways 
to index the identity of families. The provenance of this interpolation is not clear, but the 
greater passage belongs to the posited core compilation. 
A second usage from earlier in the same adhyāya draws out this parallel indexing 
between vara and occupation. The passage also concerns the duties of the samāhart
, 
and the passage in which we find the term vara (cāturvarya) also appears to be 
interpolated. There we read: 
 
KAŚ 2.35.3Ð4 sīmāvarodhena grāmāgra 
kākasthalakedārārāmaśa	avāavanavāstuvaithyadevaghasetu-
bandhaśmaśānasattraprapāpu	yasthānavivītapathisakhyānena 
ketrāgra tena sīmnā	 ketrā	ā ca maryādāra	yapathi-
pramā	asapradānavikrayānugrahaparihāranibandhān kārayet 
ghā	ā ca karadākaradasakyānena 
 teu caitavac cāturvar	yam etāvanta 
karakagorakakavaidehakakārukarmakaradāsāś ca etāvac ca 
dvipadacatupadam ida caiu hira	yaviiśulkada	a 
samuttihatīti 
 
 He should record the number of villages by fixing their boundaries, the 
number of lands by an enumeration of plowed and unplowed, dry and 
wet, parks, vegetable gardens, enclosures, forests, structures, 
sanctuaries, temples, water-works, cremation grounds, rest-houses, 
sheds for drinking water, holy places, pastures, and roads, and in 
conformity with that he should keep records of the extent of 
boundaries, forests, and roads, and of grants, sales, favors, and 
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exemptions, concerning village boundaries and lands, and of houses 
by an enumeration of tax-payers and non-tax-payers.  
 And in them, so many people are cāturvar	ya, so many are farmers, 
cowherds, traders, artisans, laborers, and slaves, so many are two-
footed and four footed creatures, and so much money, labor, duty, 
and fines arise from them.  
The passage in question, KAŚ 2.35.4, is syntactically dependent (teu, “among 
them”) to the reference to houses (g
hāām), which begins the phrase that has been 
appended to KAŚ 2.35.3 after the finite verb kārayet. But here we see again a relationship 
between vara and karma, as a kind of parallel indexing between social class and 
occupation: farmer (karaka), cowherd (gorakaka), merchant (vaidehaka), aristan 
(kāru), laborer (karmakara), and slave (dāsa).396 Regarding this and the previous 
passage, the most we can say is that they probably do not date to the prakaraa-text. 
In this context, i.e., the relationship between work and vara, we can examine a 
few other occurrences of the term vara. The first comes in the sixth adhikaraa, which I 
take to be from one of the prakaraa-text. There, in the explication of the sevenfold 
(saptāga) state, one of the ideal qualities (sa	pad) the constituent called janapada (the 
“country”) is given as avaravaraprāya, “possessed primarily of the lower/lowest vara” 
(KAŚ 6.1.8). This echoes a sentiment found elsewhere in the text. For example, at KAŚ 
2.1.2, we read that, in the settlement of new country, one should “cause villages to be 
settled consisting mostly of Śūdra farmers (or Śūdras and farmers; śūdrakarśakaprāya).” 
This is a somewhat curious compound, but it seems to be making a point to tell us which 
kind of Śūdras are to be preferred. It also provides a link between vara and karma. I date 
this passage also to the prakaraa-text, although an interpolation in the case of this 
compound would be difficult to ascertain, given that it falls in a simple list. 
                                                 
396 That these are exclusive categories is confirmed by the mention in the next compound of “two and four 
footed creatures.” 
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A seeming connection between the sentiments of these two passages comes at 
KAŚ 7.11.21, appended to a discussion on the relative merits of different types of land. 
The provenance of this passage is difficult to ascertain, as it breaks the structure of the 
greater passage (KAŚ 7.11), but in discussing the relative merits of land with “disunited 
inhabitants” versus land with “people in bands,” we read: 
 
KAŚ 7.11.18Ð20 As between land with people disunited and one with people in bands, 
that with people disunited is preferable. One with people disunited 
becomes easy to enjoy and is not susceptible to the instigation of 
others, yet it is unable to bear difficulties. One with people in bands 
is the reverse of this, full of danger during revolt. 
 
KAŚ 7.11.21 tasyā cāturvar	aniveśe sarvabhogsahatvād avaravar	aprāyā śreyasī 
bāhulgyād dhruvatvāc ca kyā karakavatī kyāś cānyeā 
cārambhā	ā prayojakatvād gorakakavatī pa	yanicayar	ānugrahād 
āhyava	igvatī 
 
 In the matter of settlement of the cāturvarya on that, one consisting 
mostly of the low vara(s) (avaravara) is best because it yields all 
gains, one with farmers because of the plentifulness and reliability of 
agriculture, andone with cowherds because of its starting agriculture 
and other undertakings, one with rich traders because of the benefit 
of stores of goods and loans. 
This passage first claims that the avaravara/s (low vara) is/are better in the 
settlement of land and then goes on to describe the benefits accruing from settling 
different types of groups: agriculturalists (karaka), cowherds (goraka), and rich 
merchants (āhyavaik). 
It is not entirely clear in this regard whether we can draw in this passage a discrete 
correlation between avaravara and śūdra. That is certainly suggested by the seeming 
parallel between these three passages which extol the virtues of land settled with either 
avaravaras or śūdrakarakas. My sense is that the identification of vara and karma is 
not felt to be exactly precise, and in all of these cases specific correlation (i.e., 
śūdrakaraka) or ambiguity (avaravara) are being used to address what is 
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fundamentally the recognized insufficiency of vara terminology to the practical task at 
hand, to which considerations of occupation speak more usefully. 
The most interesting passage in this regard, however, comes in the discussion of 
“Rescission of Sale and Purchase” just mentioned. There, we read that  
 
KAŚ 3.15.5Ð6 vaidehakānām ekarātram anuśaya karakā	ā trirātram gorakakā	ā 
pa–carātram 
 vyāmiśrā	ām uttamānā ca var	ānā vttivikraye saptaratram 
 
 For traders (vaidehaka) a period of retraction of one day [may be 
allowed], for agriculturalists (karaka) three days, and for cowherds 
(goraka) five days. In the case of sale of the means of livelihood by 
mixed and the highest vara (vyāmiśrāām uttamānā	 ca 
varānā	) [the period of allowed retraction shall be] seven days. 
Here we have separate time alotted to vaidehakas, karakas, and gorakakas; the 
first two of these have been seemingly identified above at KAŚ 7.11.21 as avaravara. 
But we see a clear differentiation in the law regarding them here based on occupation. 
We then read that the “mixed” (vyāmiśra) and “highest” (uttama) varas are allowed a 
longer time to rescind a sale. The latter term usually refers to the Brahmin, but the term 
vyāmiśravara, would seem to refer to the “mixed” varas that result from the union of 
two individuals from different varas.397 But, these categories are a poor fit with the 
supposed hierarchy of rescission allowed here. If we take the first three occupations to be 
the avaravara (i.e., Śūdras), then it would appear that the “mixed” and “highest” varas 
stand above them.  
It would seem possible, therefore, that we have a different notion of vara at work 
in this passage than in the formulation of the varadharma ideology we have heretofore 
encountered. The difference would apparently be between the “low classes” 
                                                 
397 The term vyāmiśra is used elsewhere in the Arthaśāśtra, but never in reference to varas or people. It 
generally means “mixed” and is used to refer to fabrics (2.11.104), strategies (9.7.70), terrain (10.3.52Ð3), 
or military divisions (10.5.31). 
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(avaravara), the “mixed classes” (vyāmiśravara), and the “highest classes” 
(uttamavara). One wonders, in this regard, if we aren’t witnessing in this passage an 
attempt to apply the logic of vara to a social reality too complex to yield to the basic 
cateogories. What we are ultimately seeing is the use of the term vara to refer to a basic 
tripartite division of society into menial laborers (avaravara), a kind of “middle class” 
(vyāmiśravara), and the elites (uttamavara). 
I would suggest that the term vara, which found application beyond social 
divisions in earlier eras, was applied in the prakaraa-text to social groups aside from the 
classical fourfold division of varadharma. Certainly, the ideology of varadharma had 
exerted an influence on this formulation (in the reference to the “highest varas”), but the 
rest of the picture appears much more muddled. While not wanting to put too much 
weight on a single obscure term (vyāmiśravara), it seems, nevertheless, that different 
notions of the subdivision of society may have informed thought about the organization 
of the state. 
11.3 VARA NAMES USED INDIVIDUALLY 
If we look at usages of the vara names outside of their collective occurrences 
and those discussed above, we note a few interesting things. First of all, we find no 
references to the Vaiśya independent of the other varas. This is not surprising, as the 
historical existence of the “Vaiśya” in classical period has long been questioned. That the 
text contains no independent reference to the class is telling at least to the extent that the 
composers had no habit or reason to directly speak of or to such a group. The classical 
economic functions of the Vaiśya instead seem to be comprehended either by mention of 
avaravara (low vara/s) or Śūdras. 
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Independent references to the Katriya vara are interesting, but few. We find 
five references to Katriyas outside of the collective enunciation of all four varas, and 
all of them date clearly to the adhyāya redaction: one end verse which uses the term 
katra (KAŚ 1.9.11), two in Kauilya dialogues (1.17.7; 12.1.5), and one in a list of 
historical oligarchies in the eleventh adhikaraa (KAŚ 11.1.4).398 
A reference in KAŚ 6.1.11 sites as an excellent quality of the army that, inter alia, 
it is “consisting mostly of Katriyas” (katraprāya). There is no reason to suspect that 
this passage from the prakaraa-text is interpolated, but it is equally difficult to tell if this 
term carries the full connotation of varadharma with it or is, as the previous uses of 
avaravara and śūdra seem to indicated, rather more descriptive of a professional 
fighting class.  
References to Brahmins are by far the most numerous and are dealt with in the 
next chapter.399  
                                                 
398 A last reference to Katriyas is most interesting. We are told in the discussion of oligarchies 
(adhikaraa 11) that “The Kāmbojas, Surāras, Katriyas, Śre	īs and others live by an economic vocation 
and the profession of arms. The Licchivikas, Vjikas, Mallakas, Madrakas, Kukuras, Kurus, Pa–cālas and 
so forth make use of the title of ‘rāja.’” It is very interesting to find the Katriyas mentioned on equal 
footing with what can only be ruling clans. It is difficult to know (and will require more research) what to 
make of this passage. But, at the least, it would seem that Katriya may have been a real identity marker for 
some clan at some point in the Classical Period. If so, this would represent quite a disruption of the vara 
system in the early text. For, how could the Katriyas be a general social class and also a specific clan 
(unless none of the others qualified as Katriyas, and that seems unlikely). Do we have a different sense 
here of Katriya than implied in the vara system. And, why are they listed as a confederation? This also 
defies our expectation that the monarch was himself a Katriya. 
399 An analysis of the mixed varas demonstrates that most of the groups identified in the single discussion 
on mixed varas (KAŚ 3.8.20ff.) are not found elsewhere in the text. The notable exception to these are the 
caālas, sūtas, māgadhas, vaidehakas, and śvapākas. Of these, the śvapāka only appears in a few rules 
from the appendices to the 4th adhikaraa dated to the adhyāya redaction. The sūtas and māgadhas are 
always mentioned together as “bards and panegyrists” in pay of the king. Only one of these, 10.3.43 falls 
outside of the adhyāya redaction, where we see these two figures in their classical role of encouraging the 
troops before battle. Any hereditary origin for the groups is absent in these passages.  
The Ca	āla is cast variously as an executioner, a forest-dweller, and general outcaste. It seems likely 
that this name actually acted as a catch-all for several different groups. They are usually juxtaposed to the 
ārya in the Arthaśāstra (as is the mleccha). We are reasonably safe in supposing that this term was an 
umbrella designation and that, because it is used twice to in analogies illustrating rhetorical arguments, it 
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11.4 REFERENCES TO THE VARAS IN THE PRAKARAA-TEXT? 
Only two references to legal distinctions based on vara seem sufficiently well-
integrated into the prakaraa-text to suggest that they are original: KAŚ 3.4.28 and 
3.13.1,400 both of which follow the unusual convention of enumerating the varas from 
lowest to highest (i.e., Śūdra, Vaiśya, Katriya, and Brahmin). And, it could be argued, 
both passages are more lenient toward Śūdras. These passages deal with absences from 
home and slavery, respectively. In the case of the former, the Śūdra wife need only wait 
one year before remarrying, while the Brahmin wife was forced to wait four. Which 
vara is actually favored in this regard is ambiguous and depends on whether we are 
discussing the interests of the wife, who benefits from a short period, or of the husband, 
who benefits from a longer required time. As for the latter, it clearly shows more leniency 
toward Śūdras, who pay only 12 paas for selling their children into servitude, while 
Brahmins pay 96 paas. It is possible that these two early uses of vara in the text have 
the opposite intention of the rest of the usages: they both hold Brahmins to higher 
standards rather than conferring special privileges on them. Why they would have made 
use of vara and not other social divisions is unclear and a little troubling. In the case of 
absence from home, it is difficult to understand why vara would be applied here of all 
places and so many more common or important points of law discussed without reference 
                                                                                                                                                 
was generally operative in the society. Interestingly, most of the occurrences of the term come in the legal 
portions of the text, and in discourses that are clear late. The Ca	āla group does seem to have existed. If 
we remove the most spurious passages in which we find them, we find little said of the group, other than 
that they guard forests and are regarded as non-āryan. 
But, the Vaidehaka is the most interesting because this group is mentioned with great frequency in the 
text. Usually, the term refers to the occupation class of “merchants”. The statement in the discussion of 
mixed varas that the Vaidehaka is the offspring of a Vaiśya man and a Brahmin woman. They are a 
despised “pratiloma” group with the status either of Śūdras or Ca	ālas. It is likely, therefore, that the 
vaidehaka was a generica occupational identifier in the prakaraa-text, whereas the interpolation of the 
discussion on mixed varas added an ideological interpretation to the same. 
400 We note here again the particularly complex compositional history likely attending these discussions of 
civil law. 
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to vara.401 Whatever concession must be made to these two passages appearing to 
belong to the prakaraa-text, it is clear that, for the most part, special treatment for 
Brahmins using the logic of vara is generally a late feature in the text. It should, 
however, be noted that these sentiments find parallels in the dharma literature and, given 
the particularly complex history of the third adhikaraa, stand out as odd among 
passages otherwise dating to the prakaraa-text. It is possible, although unproven, that 
they may, in fact, date to the adhyāya redaction as well. 
11.5 CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the prakaraa-text demonstrates a much less intensive concern 
with vara than found in the adhyāya redaction. References to specific varas are 
sufficiently uncommon to question whether they might not be latter additions. Better 
attested in the prakaraa-text is discussion of avaravaras. Seemingly, these are in 
ideological agreement with the fourfold division of the varadharma system, but it seems 
also that more general and/or dissonant conceptualizations of “vara” may have informed 
some of their usages (as at KAŚ 3.15.5Ð6).  
What accounts, then, for this limited use of vara in the prakaraa-text? This is 
difficult to say without a better understanding of the social history of the period, but it is 
not unlikely that the concept of vara may have possessed a broader sensibility than 
implied in the varadharma system, while yet sharing certain features with the more 
discretely formulated understanding of vara found in Brahmanical sources.  
                                                 
401 Perhaps it is because this section discusses discrete time periods, which lent themselves to vara like 
gradation. It is, of course, possible that these passages reflect an unspoken sense of hierarchy informing the 
whole text. This is unlikely, however, because it is difficult to imagine that the conscious pursuit of 
Brahmanical interest would fail to make itself generally overt in the established legal code. As such, the 
other likelihood, that of interpolation, must be considered as well. 
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It would seem likely then, that the presence of vara here cannot be explained by 
a dawning recongition of observed social facts, but of the gradually-expressed influence 
of broad ideological formations, perhaps broader than the comparatively narrow system 
of Brahmanical varadharma. I think that the efforts seen in the adhyāya redaction of the 
Arthaśāstra reflect what is going on in the dharma literature: a renewed effort to impose 
a Brahmanical version of vara ideology on the king’s (and hence the state’s) view of the 
world.  
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Chapter 12: Brahmanical ExceptionalismÑSpecific Privileges  
At the root of varadharma is political bias. The present chapter considers 
examples of the specific kinds of rights and privileges directly pursued by Brahmins in 
the Arthaśāstra. These examples are uniquely situated to help us in this regard, since, 
divorced from the ideological work of varadharma, they do not hide their 
presuppositions or goals. We will see in the present chapter the articulation of the 
inchoate privileges generally claimed in the ideology of varadharma. In particular, we 
will note in the present chapter how the prakaraa-text of the Arthaśāstra did not grant 
to Brahmins the immunity from corporal punishment that they sought ubiquitously in the 
dharma texts. 
We have just reviewed the influence of certain orthodox Brahmanical ideologies 
on the Arthaśāstra and determined that the related notions of varadharma and 
svadharma seem to have been included in the text very late in its compositional history. 
We looked there at how the introduction of these ideas inflected the underlying text 
regarding issues of the origin of the king’s authority, the guiding tenets of statecraft, and 
the organization of society. Finally, we were able to track a few key areas, namely 
kingship and family law, wherein emphasis on vara tends to be the greatest.  
We also noted, however, traces of thought from the prakaraa-text that 
demonstrate less ideological uses of the term dharma and potentially vara. These give 
us pause to consider what historical processes might account for the increasing 
ideological burden placed on such terms throughout the compositional history of the text.  
There is, however, a more direct manner in which Brahmanical interests are 
pursued in the extant text. These include the direct introduction of special prerogatives 
into state policy and the legal code: we have, on one hand, the ascription to “Brahmins” 
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of special privileges and exemptions, and on the other hand, the appointment of Brahmins 
to key governmental posts and the use of Vedic ritual and other Brahmanical practices in 
the operation of the government.  
12.1 PRAISE OF BRAHMINS 
Some of the most interesting evidence of the character of Brahmanical 
exceptionalism in the Arthaśāstra come from passages that do not prescribe special 
treatment, but rather reflect or invoke the high social standing of the Brahmin. In these 
examples we see how status is assigned to Brahmins as well as the context in which that 
status was discussed and recognized. By analyzing the targeted audience for these 
passages, we can get a sense of how the composers of the text understood and acted upon 
notions of Brahmanical superiority. 
Most of these come, interestingly, in cases of reported speech, where the status of 
the Brahmin is somehow supposed to motivate the audience. Two of these, at KAŚ 1. 
14.9402 and 11.1.38,403 come in passages assigned to the adhyāya redaction, but an 
interesting mention in rules for the envoy is of less clear provenance: 
                                                 
402 In KAŚ 1.14, the text divides individuals ripe for treason into four categories: the enraged (kruddha), 
the frightened (bhīta), the greedy (lubdha), and the proud (māni). The purpose of this division is for the 
sake of refining the tactics to be used by spies in instigating treasonable parties in the enemy’s kingdom. As 
such, the spies attempting to turn these individuals take tailored approaches. Our reference comes in the 
strategy for enticing members of the “group of the greedy (lubhdavarga)”: 
 KAŚ 1.14.9 yathā śvagainā	 dhenu svebhyo duhyate na brāhmaebhya evam aya	 rājā 
sattvapraj–āvākyaśaktihīnebhyo duhyate nātmaguasa	pannebhya asau 
rājā puruaviśeaj–a tatra gamyatām iti lubdhavargam upajāpayet 
 “Just as the cow of the dog masters is milked for dogs, not for Brahmins, so this 
king is milked for those devoid of spirit, intelligence, and eloquence, not for 
those endowed with qualities of the self; the other king recognizes men of 
distinction; go to him” Ðin this way he should cause the group of the greedy to 
be instigated. 
This argument appeals to the pride of the individual by using the dichotomy between a Brahmin and a dog. 
Clearly, these two are meant to stand in absolute opposition to each other, one the highest and the other the 
lowest on the scale of purity and cleanliness. This analogy is meant naturally to appeal to the ego of its 
audience. Yet, it is the promise of rewards, the “milk” in the analogy, that is considered the fundamental 
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KAŚ 1.16.5 ta brūyāt dūtamukhā hi rājāna tva cānye ca  
 tasmād udyatev api śastreu yathokta vaktāro dūtā  
 teā antāvasāyino py avadhyā kimaga punar brāhma	ā 
 purasyaitad vākyam ea dūtadharma iti 
 
 To him he should say, “For kings have envoys as their mouths: both 
you and others. Therefore, envoys speak as instructed even when 
weapons are raised against them. Among them, even outcastes 
(antāvasāyin) are not to be slain, how much less so a Brahmin! These 
are someone else’s words: this is the duty of an envoy.” 
I am doubtful about this passage, or at least the reference to outcastes 
(antāvasayin) and Brahmins, owing to the use of the term antāvasayin, which is found 
only one other time in the text (KAŚ 3.18.7) in a passage from the adhyāya redaction.404 
The passage in question also seems to provide a secondary reason. Nevertheless, this 
passage clearly implies that the speaker is a Brahmin. And yet it also allows for the 
possibility of antāvasayin envoys. We nowhere read that the office of the envoy (nor any 
office; we can assume as much, however, for the 
tvij, ācārya, and, presumably, 
purohita) is restricted to Brahmins. And yet, here we have a direct implication that the 
envoy is a Brahmin. This can only be so, however, if we consider this passage to have 
been directed at a Brahmin audience in a world with non-Brahmins also fulfilling the role 
of envoys. That would conform to the teaching of this text in a Brahmanical curriculum. 
                                                                                                                                                 
attraction. This passage relies on the effectiveness of the Brahmin/dog analogy, and we can assume that the 
specific character of the distinction between the two was immediately understood.  
403 This passage outlines an elaborate attempt to sow dissent between chiefs in a confederacy. The relevant 
passage comes at the end, where the king’s assassins have slain one of the king’s spies who was pretending 
to be a Brahmanical siddha, or holy man. In a particularly mandarin turn, yet other agents dressed as 
siddhas appear on the seen and attempt to pin the murder on one of the chiefs of the confederacy, saying 
“that one is a Brahmin-slayer and a keeper of Brahmin women!”(11.1.48). The text does not tell us, but 
presumably this is sufficient to create dissent among the confederates.  
404 The presumption that the passage is interpolated is strengthened by the prohibition against an envoy 
drinking while being detained by the foreign king. Given that drinking was a great sin in the orthodox 
tradition, the specific injunction to avoid drink during this dangerous detention would be redundant. Of 
course, if the Brahmin is not orthodox after the fashion of the dharma texts, there is no problem. 
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This passage is the only in the text that implies a Brahmanical audience and, absent any 
other implied or direct evidence of the same elsewhere in the text, it is difficult to support 
an entire theory of context on one passage regarding which some doubt can be expressed. 
We will look, then, to further examples. 
Nevertheless, these passages attest to the general recognition of the high status of 
Brahmins (KAŚ 1.14.9) as well as the particular opprobrium adhering to the murder of a 
Brahmin or sex with a Brahmin woman (by a non Brahmin) (KAŚ 1.16.5 & 11.1.38). Both 
of these crimes are referred to in a passage that is certainly part of the adhyāya redaction 
(KAŚ 1.6.4Ð1.7.1), where kings committing these acts are said to have perished thereby. 
They tell us little more directly, but the passage at KAŚ 1.16.5 certainly suggests that the 
envoy in question is a Brahmin. If this passage is early, then we have strong but limited 
support for the notion that the original Arthaśāstra was written in awareness of a certain 
opprobrium against the killing of a Brahmin. The citations at KAŚ 1.14.9, 11.1.38, and 
1.6.4Ð1.7.1 have all been dated to the adhyāya redaction. Given the emerging conclusion 
that decidedly pro-Brahmanical passages are strongly characteristic of the later parts of 
the text, we should revisit the date of KAŚ 1.16.5 in light of the remaining evidence in 
order to see if they remain consistent with their putative layers. 
Two other passages from the adhyāya redaction speak of the honoring of 
Brahmins. In the first, KAŚ 1.12.4405 a female Brahmin renunciate is spoken of as honored 
                                                 
405 Here, the agent called parivrājikā has the following qualities: “seeking a livelihood, poor, widowed, 
bold, Brahmin, and treated with honor in the palace” (v
ttikāmā daridrā vidhavā pragalbhā brāhmay 
antapure k
tasatkārā). We read also that “by her are explained shaven low (muā v
alya) 
ascetics”(1.12.5). The juxtaposition seems to be between Brahmin renouncers and shaven “low” 
renouncers. The display of disdain for the mua seen here through the use of the pejorative v
ala is not 
common in the text, confined to two other late uses: KAŚ 3.14.37 & 3.20.16. The first, an endverse, states 
that someone with a vala wife can, inter alia, be abandoned despite having a contract for work; it is clear 
from the context that this is an abrogation of Dharmaśāstric customs. The second also comes from an 
orthodox context and states that someone should be fined 100 pa	as for feeding Śakya, Ājivaka, and other 
heretical ascetics (valapravrajita) at a Śrāddha ceremony. The character of these other citations puts the 
use of the term vala in the company of only late and clearly Dharmaśāstric conventions. Otherwise, 
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in the palace. In the second, we receive the advice that calamities can be overcome by 
“prostration before gods and Brahmins” (daivatabrāhmaapraipatata) at KAŚ 9.7.83. 
Finally, in a digression from the discussion of encouraging the troops, we read at KAŚ 
10.3.34Ð37) that “[w]hen ‘the battle is tomorrow’ he should observe a fast and sleep 
beside his weapons and vehicles. He should offer oblations with Atharva-mantras. He 
should make blessings to be recited invoking victory and insuring rebirth in heaven. And 
he should give himself to Brahmins (brāmaebhyaś cātmānam atis
jet). This has little 
to do with the other strategies for encouraging the troops, which involve issuing 
challenges, arranging the best troops at the center of the battle array, distributing bards 
and panegyrists among the ranks, and so forth. It is clear that a preceding interpolation, 
which integrates verses to be recited from the Veda (KAŚ 10.3.28Ð31),406 has attracted the 
passage being discussed here.407 
The next citation, also coming from the adhyāya redaction, is in the abbreviated 
vāstuśāstra at KAŚ 2.4 by which the city is organized. In this, the Brahmin is settled in 
the same part of the city as the deities of the city as well as the king, metalworkers, and 
jewelers (2.4.15). Passages indicating the high status of Brahmins definitely reflect the 
high social rank accorded to that group, and one of these (KAŚ 1.16.5) potentially 
predates the adhyāya redaction, although it is not above suspicion. If, as we have some 
reason to believe, vara considerations were beginning to emerge in the prakaraa-text, 
it might not be surprising to find some recognition of the high standing of Brahmins, 
something reported both by Megasthenes and Aśoka. Moreover, the use of Brahmins as 
                                                                                                                                                 
mua (“shaven”) ascetics are spoken of in the context of jailas (dreadlocked ascetics), and without 
particular opprobrium, for the king uses these frequently as spies 
406 Kangle 1972, 440n 
407 While the second of these passages, KAŚ 10.3.34Ð37, cannot be directly linked to the adhyāya 
redaction, it seems at least to be later than the prakaraa-text. 
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envoys may have been an established practice owing to a general opprobrium against 
killing them or the perception that they were above political maneuvering. Such 
exploitations of the general esteem of the class would be of a different order than 
demands for special privileges based on class identity. 
12.2 PRIVILEGES 
Privileges afforded Brahmins are piecemeal and most are demonstrably later.408 
Several can be assigned to the adhyāya redaction, such as a provision for cutting off the 
hand of a Śūdra striking a Brahmin (KAŚ 3.19.8), a fine for forcing Brahmins to pay at 
ferry crossings (3.20.14: a passage which continues the misunderstanding first seen in an 
interpolation at 2.28.18 that presumes a fee for use of ferries when none is mentioned), 
and the settling of the Brahmin in the same part of the city as the deities of the city as 
well as the king, metalworkers, and jewelers (2.4.15). Also dating to the adhyāya 
redaction is a passage making a traditional assertion that judges should look into the 
affairs of Brahmins inter alia (3.20.22).409 Finally, we have the draconian measures of 
blinding a Śūdra who calls himself a Brahmin (4.11.13), as well as tearing out the tongue 
of anyone who licks something in a Brahmin’s kitchen (4.12.21).410 
Based on the frequency with which pro-Brahmanical sentiments can be linked 
directly to the adhyāya redaction, we might also consider as an interpolation a strange 
passage in the third adhikaraa during a discussion of the “The Non-Observance of 
                                                 
408 Not mentioned here are the handful of privileges granted to śrotriyas and other subgroups of Brahmins. 
I have left them out primarily because they distended the argument too greatly. But, the evidence adduced 
from such passages does not change the conclusions drawn above. 
409 This recalls a passage at KAŚ 1.19.29,  replacing, however, Brahmins for Śrotriyas, whose affairs that 
passage enjoins the king to look into 
410 Meyer and Kangle both think the particular extention of crimes warranting the tearing out of the tongue 
to this offense against Brahmins is even an interpolation to this late section. 
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Conventions,” which not only refers to Brahmins as the “best” (jyeha) (3.10.43), but 
also grants them the right to participate in festivals to which they have not contributed 
(3.10.44). Both of these passages are oddly out of place, and Kangle suggests the latter 
might be a gloss of the former (1972, 225n). This is a case of a passage rendered obscure 
by its failure to connect to the overall passage requiring further explication. 
Indication of esteem for the role of Brahmins in the successful running of the 
state, a common sentiment in the dharma literature, is found in an end verse (KAŚ 
1.9.11).411 We find, moreover, no mention of the role of Brahmins specifically in the 
office of the judge, another convention of the dharma literature. 
The role of the mantripurohita is, however, an exception to this. Although he is 
never called a Brahmin, he is said to be of a very exalted family and schooled in the Veda 
as well as a variety of divinatory and magical specialties. Here we see, perhaps, the actual 
use of this high social position for political purposes without insinuating any special 
privileges for the class as a whole. 
12.3 EXEMPTION FROM CORPORAL PUNISHMENT 
The exemption of Brahmins from corporal punishment is, perhaps, the premier 
consideration motivating the ideology of Brahmanical exceptionalism. The king’s 
coercive authority, as represented by his Staff, came through the right to dole out 
punishment. We see in the dharma literature a thoroughgoing opprobrium against the 
king killing Brahmins (or even hurting them). This is the central issue undergirding 
claims of Brahmanical exceptionalism. Whether or not Brahmins stood above or outside 
                                                 
411 “Katra, made to prosper by a Brahmin, sanctified (abhimantra) by spells (mantra) in the form of the 
counsel of ministers (mantrin), possessed of weapons (śastra) in the form of śāstra, triumphs, remaining 
ever unconquered” (KAŚ 1.9.11). 
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the law depends entirely, in a sense, on whether they are subject to the punitive authority 
of the king.  
The texts of the early dharma literature display a two-fold strategy in prohibiting 
the corporal punishment of Brahmins at the hands of the king. The first aspect of this 
strategy, as exemplified by the Āpastamba Dharmasūtra,412 is to judge offending 
Brahmins according to the quasi-judicial apparatus of prescriptions and penances 
(prāyaścitta) found in the text,413 rather than subjecting them to the criminal 
jurisprudence of the king.414 This includes, most importantly, those grievous offenses that 
might be considered capital crimes by the king. This also seems to be the path followed 
in the later Vasiha Dharmasūtra, which neither directly prohibits the corporal 
punishment of brāhma	as nor discusses any concrete punishments to be doled out by the 
king in his discussion of statecraft.415 
The second aspect of this strategy comes in the form of overt prohibitions against 
the corporal punishment of brāhmaas. This aspect is operative in the Gautama 
Dharmasūtra416 and the Baudhāyana Dharmasūtra.417 What is less clear in these two 
                                                 
412 ĀDS 2.10.12Ð16, 2.27.17Ð20. Interestingly, as discussed in the previous chapter, the ĀDS still grants to 
the king his traditional role as the executioner of Brahmin thieves (1.25.4Ð8). Also, there is some ambiguity 
as to whether the king was further responsible for castrating young Brahmin rapists (2.26.20). 
413 In this, I follow the general perspective of E.W. Hopkins (1924), who sees in the penances of the 
Dharmasūtras a kind of legal code: “the horrible penances…are really legal punishments, only they are still 
called penances”(248). I differ with his estimation, however, that regarding these penances, “the punisher is 
the king himself, either in person or as authority” (247), except, of course, in the case of the penance for 
theft. 
414 The extent of which, I would argue, is ignored in the Dharmasūtras. 
415 Importantly, however, Vasiha does expunge the king’s traditional punitive role from the prāyaścitta 
for theft (20.42): …tena ātmāna	 pramāpayet,  “With that [the thief] should kill himself.” 
416  GDS 12.46 na śārīro brāhma	ada	a  
   There shall be no corporal punishment of brāhma	as. 
417  BDS 1.18.17 avadhyo vai brāhma	a sarvāparādheu  
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texts is the status of the penances as a system of criminal jurisprudence. I have argued 
that both texts fundamentally agree with the ĀDS in implying that Brahmins fall under 
the jurisdiction of their own customary prāyaścittas rather than that of the king’s system 
of criminal justice.418 This does, however, generate an odd disjuncture in the BDS, which 
prescribes both exile and branding as well as the traditional penances for the 
mahāpātakas, leaving the exact jurisdiction of each option unresolved.419 
The Manusmti uses both of these strategies in its approach to the corporal 
punishment of brāhmaas. Unlike the Dharmasūtras, the Manusm
ti possesses a fully-
developed system of civil and criminal laws420 that does not appear in its specific 
injunctions to make any distinction between the varas with regard specifically to 
corporal punishment.421 The Manusm
ti does, however, prohibit the corporal punishment 
of brāhmaas altogether at the beginning of the vyavahāra section422 and further 
prohibits their capital punishment after enumerating those vyavahārapādas covering 
crimes warranting corporal and capital punishment.423 Finally, at the end of the 
vyavahāra section, the Manusm
ti resolves the disjuncture in the BDS by prescribing that 
                                                                                                                                                 
   A brāhma	a, clearly, is not subject to capital punishment for any crime. 
418 In the case of the GDS, I have argued that the prohibition against corporal punishment is rendered only 
in connection with theft. Otherwise, I think that the GDS agrees with the position of the ĀDS that 
brāhma	as are subject only to the system of penances. Both texts enumerate the penances as though they 
operate in this legal capacity. 
419 The later Smtis seem to offer rectification this disjuncture, as the Manu Smti (9.236) offers royal 
punishment as an alternative to those who have not performed the penances for the mahāpātakas. The same 
seems implied in the Nāradasmti (15.19). 
420 The vyavahārapādas (MS 8.1Ð9.251). 
421 This is supported by my reading of the text. More is said of it in the previous chapter. 
422 MS 8.124Ð125 
423 MS 8.379Ð381 
 278 
anyone424 guilty of one of the mahāpātakas may avoid the king’s corporal punishment by 
performing the prescribed penance and paying a monetary fine.425 
It is clear that the Brahmanical exemptions from corporal punishment in the texts 
of the early dharma literature are directed solely at the king,426 indicating that these 
exemptions were motivated not so much by a sense of indignation at taking a Brahmins’s 
life (which is allowed as punishment in the system of traditional penances), but rather by 
an antagonism toward the inclusion of Brahmins under the penal jurisdiction of the king.  
As we examine this issue in the context of the Arthaśāstra, a few important 
differences from the early dharma literature emerge. The first of these is that the 
Arthaśāstra nowhere discusses a system of penances corresponding to the prāyaścittas of 
the dharma texts.427 We do have one mention of the practice of exile and branding for 
Brahmins guilty of one of the four mahāpātakas, which amounts to a limited exemption 
from certain types of torture (examined below).428 But, this single instance can be 
demonstrated to be an interpolation and only serves to highlight the absence of any 
                                                 
424  MS 9.240 prāyaścitta tu kurvā	ā sarvavar	ā yathoditam 
   nākyā rāj–ā lalāte syur dāpyās tūttamasāhasam  
   
   But men of all castes who perform the prescribed penances, 
   Should not be branded by the king, but should give the highest fine for violence. 
425 MS 9.235Ð242 
426 A single exception to this is BDS 2.4.1. I have argued, however, that this cited smti verse comes 
originally from a context directed toward the king. 
427 The Arthaśāstra only mentions the term prāyaścitta twice, both times referring to prāyaścittaśānti 
(KAŚ 4.3.13) or śānti prāyaścitta (13.2.33). These seem to be “pacificatory rites” to be performed by 
magicians or siddhatāpasas. Other technical terms related to prāyaścitta, such as mahāpātaka and patanīya 
are also missing. I expect to do a more thorough study of this if it seems necessary. 
428 KAŚ 4.8.27Ð29. Three of the mahāpātakas are also given in a chapter end verse (KAŚ 3.14.37), which 
is likely spurious. 
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alternate system of criminal jurisprudence for Brahmins based on penances. Moreover, 
no indication is to be found in the text that Brahmins are uniquely subject to any system 
of criminal justice outside of the general code expounded in the text (adhikaraas three 
and four).  
The second major difference from the dharma literature is that in the context of a 
fully-developed civil and criminal code,429 the Arthaśāstra does not replicate the strategy 
of the Manusm
ti to amend unambiguously that code with carefully-placed prohibitions. 
The few exemptions found in the Arthaśāstra are very limited in nature and can in no 
sense be construed to amend the civil and criminal codes in their entirety. 
Finally, with regard to offenses warranting corporal punishment, the Arthaśāstra 
does not tend to draw distinctions based on vara. Rather, it more frequently looks at sex, 
age, intentionality, and other universal human distinctions. This is in accord with the 
more general perspective of the law code, which seems to be more directed at individuals 
as vyavahārins, authorized legal transactors, than at members of specific varas.430 
Exceptions to the code are made based on occupation and, possibly, by extension on jāti 
or sagha. These are, however, always made with reference to the variety of unique 
practices prevailing among different vocational sectors of society. 
With these differences in mind let us now turn to the Brahmanical exemptions 
from corporal punishment found in the text. Altogether, we have only three exemptions 
pertaining generally to Brahmins. Generally speaking, we find an exemption from certain 
                                                 
429 By this phrase I mean (at the present time) to indicate the entire third adhikaraa as well as those parts 
of the fourth that prescribe punishments for anyone other than state employees (KAŚ 4.1Ð2, 4.5, 4.8, 
4.10Ð13). 
430 Exceptions to this are to be found in the discussions of marriage, inheritance and possibly elsewhere. 
See Chapter 4. 
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kinds of forced labor,431 an exemption from torture during interrogation,432 and an 
exemption from execution for certain treasonous activities.433 As mentioned above, the 
exemptions are extremely limited and require an examination of their local context in 
order to understand the extent of the exemption. This will also give us opportunity in the 
first two cases to attend to certain difficulties in the general sections of the Arthaśāstra in 
which they are found.434 
12.3.1 Exemption from Forced Labor: KAŚ 3.1.37 
The first exemption comes in the final prose sūtra of the first chapter on 
vyavahāra in the Arthaśāstra. The context of the exemption is somewhat unclear, but it is 
possible to summarize it generally: it is an exemption for Brahmins from laboring as a 
pledge in order to repay someone else’s damages and legal expenses: 
 
KAŚ 3.1.36Ð37 ādhi vā sa kāma praveśayet  
 rakoghnarakita vā karma	ā pratipādayed anyatra brāhma	āt 
  
 Alternatively, [the defeated defendant] may, if he wishes, provide a 
pledge. 
 Or, he may give one protected by the rakoghna mantra, with labor,435 
except for a Brahmin.  
It is not readily apparent how this exemption should be interpreted, for neither the 
meaning nor the language of the sūtra is especially clear. Specifically, it is not clear 
                                                 
431 KAŚ 3.1.37 
432 KAŚ 4.8.27Ð29 
433 KAŚ 4.11.12 
434 I would like to sustain a program throughout the dissertation of treating certain textual issues in the 
midst of more general discussions. I hope to produce in the end a helpful index directing the reader to 
discussions of certain problematic parts of the text. 
435 It is not entirely clear that the instrument karmaā signifies accompaniment. It is also possible that the 
instrumental here denotes the agent productive of the past passive participle, rakitam. 
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whether KAŚ 3.1.37 presents a second option to that given in the preceding sūtra or 
presents a gloss of it. Moreover, the passage preceding these two sūtras is somewhat 
problematic. More clarity is provided by looking at the larger context.  
The third book of the Arthaśāstra, entitled dharmasthīya, deals with 
jurisprudence, including rules for transactions between private parties, rules for court 
procedure, private lawsuits, criminal law, and monetary and corporal penalties. The first 
chapter of this book, at the end of which this exemption is found, enumerates the proper 
conditions for executing a legal transaction between private parties (vyavahāra), 
discusses the procedure under which a plaint may be brought before a judge 
(dharmastha), and establishes procedural rules for both the plaintiff (abhiyokt) and 
defendant (abhiyukta). 
The prose body of the chapter closes (KAŚ 3.1.29Ð37) with the establishment of 
guidelines regarding the length of time allowed for a defendant to respond to a plaint as 
well as the penalties for exceeding the allotted time. The earlier part of this subsection is 
clear: 
 
KAŚ 3.1.29Ð33 tasyāpratibruvatas trirātra saptarātram iti 
 ata ūrdhva tripa	āvarārdhya dvādaśapa	apara da	a kuryāt  
 tripakād ūrdvham apratibruvata paroktada	a krtvā yāny asya 
dravyā	i syus tato Õbhiyoktāra pratipādayed anyatra 
vttyupakara	ebhya  
 tad eva nipatato Õbhiyuktasya kuryāt  
 abhiyoktur nipātasamakāla paroktabhāva  
 
 A defendant has three nights to respond436 to a plaint; some say seven 
nights.  
                                                 
436 pratibruvatas: Although this verb can mean “to contest,” it is clear from its use at 3.1.27, where the 
plaintiff is called upon to reply to the answer rendered by the defendant (cet…na pratibrūyāt), that it means 
rather in this context “to reply.” It is unclear, however, whether prati + brū might have the extended 
meaning of “to reply without capitulating.” As KAŚ 3.1.21 allows for a confession of guilt, it seems likely 
that some replies were admissions of guilt. As the court’s fine for a guilty plea is less (1/10 of damages 
sought) than failure to reply (1/5 of damages, which is the same as the penalty for loss of suit), it seems 
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 After that, the judge should fine the defendant a minimum of three and 
a maximum of twelve pa	as.  
 If a defendant has not replied to the plaint after three fortnights, the 
judge should assess the penalty for loss of suit and should have the 
damages due the plaintiff repaid out of any things of value that the 
defendant might possess with the exception of the tools of his trade.  
 The judge should do the same if the defendant absconds.  
 A plaintiff immediately loses his suit the very moment he absconds. 
The passage is clearly a coherent whole, with only the final sentence (KAŚ 3.1.33) 
diverging somewhat from the topic. Rather than continuing the thread of failure to reply, 
KAŚ 3.1.33 continues the theme of absconding (nipāta) from the previous sūtra. 
Moreover, it has already been established in an earlier sūtra (KAŚ 3.1.27) that “If a 
plaintiff to whom a response has been given fails to reply that very day, he loses the suit.” 
It seems rather superfluous to provide an additional rule covering the disappearance of 
the plaintiff, as the effect would be largely the same.437 
Moreover, KAŚ 3.1.33 appears to have misunderstood the preceding sentence. 
KAŚ 3.1.32 reads: tad eva nipatato Õbhiyuktasya kuryāt, “The judge should do the same 
with regard to a defendant who absconds.” The idea is that the same penalty (i.e., loss of 
suit: KAŚ 3.1.31) should be applied to a defendant who runs away (nipatato 
Õbhiyuktasya) as to one who fails to reply after three fortnights (tripakād ūrdhvam 
apratibruvata438 [abhiyuktasya]). Thus, for a defendant, absconding at any point 
immediately triggers the same penalty as failure to reply within an acceptable timeframe: 
loss of suit. It is clear, however, that KAŚ 3.1.33 is contrasting samakāla, “at that very 
                                                                                                                                                 
unlikely that non-response was equal in all respects to a guilty plea. That is to say, it does not seem that the 
losing party would just as readily have not responded as entered a guilty plea. Therefore, it seems unlikely 
that prati + brū only refers to instances wherein the accused planned to contest the charge. 
437 Without a better understanding of court procedure, it is difficult to understand the import of the rule on 
the absconding plaintiff given in KAŚ 3.1.33.  
438 This phrase is clearly a syntactical unit representing an introductory genitive denoting the subject of the 
rule: “Regarding one who fails to respond after three fortnights.”  
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moment,” with tripakād ūrdhvam from the preceding sentence, implying that it 
understands the previous two sentences to indicate that a judge should only declare loss 
of suit against an absconding defendant after three fortnights and not also in case of 
absconding. This does not seem to be what is meant in KAŚ 3.1.31Ð32, and it is unlikely 
that the author of the larger passage would have misunderstood his own intention. 
At any rate, KAŚ 3.1.33 would have better retained the organizational scheme had 
it occurred between 3.1.27 (“If a plaintiff to whom a response has been given fails to 
respond that very day, he loses the suit”) and 3.1.28, which states: “For, it is the plaintiff 
who makes the decision to go to court, not the defendant.” In that case, KAŚ 3.1.27Ð28 
(plus the current 3.1.33) would discuss conditions resulting in loss of suit for the plaintiff, 
and KAŚ 3.1.29Ð32 would have discussed conditions resulting in loss of suit for the 
defendant. 
If KAŚ 3.1.33 seems slightly out of place, the next sentence in the passage seems 
to be completely lost. For, in the midst of a discussion on judicial procedure with regard 
to the plaintiff and defendant we find the quizzical remark that: 
 
KAŚ 3.1.34 pretasya vyasanino vā sākivacanam asāram  
 
 The testimony of a dead or sick individual is invalid. 
The previous thread is picked up, however, in the following sentence: 
 
KAŚ 3.1.35 abhiyoktā da	a dattvā karma kārayet  
 
 The plaintiff may/should pay the defendant’s fine and make him work 
to pay off the damages due. 
How then does a sentence on the validity of witnesses’ testimony find its way into 
this passage? The discussion of valid witnesses in the Arthaśāstra comes only later at 
KAŚ 3.11. It is, at best, a strange place to find this statement. I believe that the answer to 
this puzzle lies in an examination of the following sūtra. 
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The sentence KAŚ 3.1.35 also presents some small difficulty. It reads: abhiyoktā 
daa	 dattvā karma kārayet. It is difficult to understand whether the passage is 
intended to present an option to KAŚ 3.1.31, or whether it relies on some different, though 
unstated, set of conditions, such as if the defendant is insolvent and unable to pay his fine 
and damages due. If we believe that the optative sense of kārayet is intended to present 
an option,439 then we must accept that the plaintiff could exercise a choice to force the 
defendant to work in order to pay the damages, even if the latter were capable of 
paying.440 If, instead, we assume that KAŚ 3.1.35 refers to a new set of conditions, we are 
left searching for any indication in the text of the new conditions. The clear choice is 
certainly the latter, i.e., that the text is referring to a situation in which the defendant is 
insolvent, unable to pay either the fine or his damages. In that case, the plaintiff should 
pay the fine due the court and demand satisfaction for that and his own damages due 
through forced labor. 
Thus, the discussion (KAŚ 3.1.29Ð35) that immediately precedes our exemption 
exhibits a few textual difficulties. I believe that these can be explained, however, by a 
single intrusion into the otherwise completely coherent discussion. I have already pointed 
out that KAŚ 3.1.33 seems to be something of a digression from the thematic thrust of the 
passage. This is certainly true of KAŚ 3.1.34, which is completely out of place. Moreover, 
KAŚ 3.1.35 seems to lack some qualifying statement indicating a new set of conditions. 
Let us look at these sentences, along with KAŚ 3.1.32 as a unit: 
 
                                                 
439 In which case we might reasonable expect to see a vā, athavā, or, as in KAŚ 3.1.36, kāmam. 
440 It is also possible that the passage refers only the court fine (daa), but that leaves us either with the 
conclusion that the plaintiff could choose to pay the fine and demand work or that the sentence is referring 
only to situations where the defendant is able to pay the damages but not able to pay the smaller sum of the 
court fine. This also requires us to accept that the court put the return of damages to the plaintiff about the 
recuperation of its own fines. 
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KAŚ 3.1.32Ð35 tad eva nipatato Õbhiyuktasya kuryāt  
 abhiyoktur nipātasamakāla paroktabhāva  
 pretasya vyasanino vā sākivacanam asāram  
 abhiyoktrā da	a dattvā karma kārayet  
Looking first at 3.1.35, we note again that it lacks any indication that it deals with 
a different set of conditions than those prevailing in the original rule (KAŚ 3.1.31). We 
can infer that the different set of conditions is precisely that the defendant is insolvent. If 
we refer to the last word of the preceding sentence, we find asāram. In its present context 
it means “without merit.” The term sāra is a noun referring to the “pith” or “core” of an 
object. By extension it can mean “strength,” “essence,” “value,” or even “wealth.”441 
Thus, asāra can be used in the sense of “without value,” “unprofitable,” or, I am 
suggesting, in this context “insolvent.” If we append this term to KAŚ 3.1.35 we have our 
discrete indication of the new state of affairs: the defendant is without wealth. Certainly, 
it would be preferable to have the noun in a different case, i.e., asāre,442 but as we shall 
see, we have some reason to believe that the ending on the noun may have been altered. 
The appending of asāram to KAŚ 3.1.35 leaves us with a sentence fragment at 
3.1.34: pretasya vyasanino vā sākivacanam. Attempting to append this to the previous 
sentence, 3.1.33, yields nonsense.443 Even appending merely the first part, pretasya 
vyasanino vā, yields nothing. But, if we append that same first part to 3.1.32, then we get 
the interesting possibility: 
 
*KAŚ 3.1.32 tad eva nipatato Õbhiyuktasya kuryāt pretasya vyasanino vā 
                                                 
441 This meaning is supported elsewhere in the Arthaśāstra. Cf. 4.9.2. 
442 In accordance with the well attested convention of applying a previous rule to a new condition by 
opening the sūtra with a locative, “If….” 
443 These two genitives clearly cannot be in agreement with abhiyoktur. Nor can they agree grammatically 
with the most sensible term: nipāta (absconding). Although nipāta is presumably in a genitive 
relationship with samakāla, it would lead us not to expect personal nouns such as preta and vyasanin, but 
abstract nouns such as “death” and “illness.” Thus there seems no good manner in which to render this 
fragment with 3.1.34. 
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The judge should do the same with regard to a defendant who has absconded, or 
for one who has died or been taken ill. 
The solution I have offered here suggests that KAŚ 3.1.33 be viewed as a marginal 
or commentarial gloss on 3.1.32 that was inserted into the text in such a way as to break 
3.1.32 into a sentence and a fragment.444 I have already suggested that whoever inserted 
KAŚ 3.1.33 had misread 3.1.31, and this only increases the likelihood that he may have 
misread the remainder of the passage, believing 3.1.32 to end with kuryāt.445 This left 
future copyists and editors with the difficult position of interpreting the truncated passage 
after the interpolated 3.1.33. Reading then: pretasya vyasanino vā asār(-e?) abhiyuktā 
daa	 dattvā…and forced to make sense of the mess, the copyist assumed asāra must 
have gone with pretasya vyasanino vā. And what, to the mind of a political or legal 
scholar belongs to a dead or sick man that is without value (asāra) in the context of legal 
proceedings? The answer, of course, is his testimony: sākivacanam. Similar sentiments 
are expressed elsewhere in the dharma literature.446 In order to get asāra to act as the 
predicate of the inserted neuter noun -vacanam it was necessary to change it from its 
previous form to asāram. 
                                                 
444 Many manuscripts, of course, do not discretely demarcate individual sentences. Thus, such a misreading 
is not at all improbable. 
445 Certainly the gloss in 3.1.33 refers only to the condition of absconding and not the reconstructed 
breadth of the original 3.1.32, which refers also to dead and sick individuals. 
446 Cf. MS 8.64, 71. Specifically, see the rule at 8.108: 
MS 8.108 yasya dśyeta saptāhād uktavākyasya sāki	a  
 rogo ‘gnir j–ātimara	am 	a dāpyo dama ca sa  
 
 The witness to whom, within seven days after he has given evidence,  
 happens a misfortune through sickness, fire, or the death of a relative, 
shall be made to pay the debt and a fine. 
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This single explanation has the merit of most easily explaining all of the textual 
difficulties presented in KAŚ 3.1.33Ð35. Moreover, it renders a cohesive flow to the 
passage and makes explicit the intention of 3.1.35: 
 
*KAŚ 3.1.32Ð35 tripakād ūrdvham apratibruvata paroktada	a krtvā yāny asya 
dravyā	i syus tato Õbhiyoktāra pratipādayed anyatra 
vttyupakara	ebhya 
 *tad eva nipatato Õbhiyuktasya kuryāt pretasya vyasanino vā  
 asāre Õbhiyoktā da	a dattvā karma kārayet  
 
 If the defendant fails to reply after three fortnights, the judge should 
assess the penalty for loss of suit and give to the plaintiff the 
damages due him out of the defendant’s possessions. 
 The judge should do the same in the case of a defendant who absconds, 
or for a dead man or ill man. 
 If the defendant is insolvent, the plaintiff should pay the fine and force 
the defendant to work off the damages due. 
By eliminating the confusion in KAŚ 3.1.35, which can no longer be considered to 
present an option to 3.1.31, this emendation renders us an appropriate context within 
which to analyze the Brahmanical exemption. The passage continues: 
 
KAŚ 3.1.36 ādhi vā sa kāmam praveśayet  
 
 Alternatively, if he wishes, the defendant may render a pledge.  
This sentence provides an option for the defendant447 to present in his place some 
kind of pledge as a substitute. It implies that the pledge will perform the work due the 
plaintiff in his stead.448 There is little reason, from a lexical, grammatical, or thematic 
viewpoint, to support that this statement is anything but original to the passage. 
                                                 
447 That the subject has changed from the previous sentence is indicated by the use of the pronoun sa. 
448 While it remains possible that this passage was added after the insertion of 3.1.34 in order to rectify the 
confusing possibility that even a wealthy defendant could be forced to work, such a judgment is not 
necessary. 
 288 
We come then, finally, to the first of our Brahmanical exemptions from corporal 
punishment. For, the final prose sentence of this chapter reads:  
 
KAŚ 3.1.37 rakoghnarakitam vā karma	ā pratipādayed anyatra brāhma	āt  
We seem to have two basic choices in our interpretation of this rather difficult 
sentence. Either it provides an alternative to the alternative given at KAŚ 3.1.36 or it is an 
explanation of the latter. If it provides an alternative to the alternative, it is difficult to get 
at its meaning. KAŚ 3.1.36 indicates that the defendant may choose (kāma	) to produce a 
pledge, presumably a person to work in his stead. If KAŚ 3.1.37 presents an option to that, 
then we have only a few choices. First, it seems that pratipādayet is synonymous with 
praveśayet. Although there is some lexical distinction between the two, both seem here 
only to mean “should cause to give.” Thus, it seems unlikely that the alternative lies in 
the action denoted by the respective verbs. If the alternative lies in the object given, then 
KAŚ 3.1.37 presents us with a problem: it does not discretely name the object given, only 
a quality of it: protected by the rakoghna mantra. The karmadhārya compound, ending 
as it does in a participle, can hardly be construed as anything more than a substantive: 
“something/someone protected by the rakoghna mantra.” It seems unlikely that 
difference lies in the object given, as rakoghnarakita	 presents rather more of a 
specification than a real alternative. 
There is the outside possibility that rakoghnarakita	 refers not to the ādhi but 
to some unnamed referent. If so, we have no hope of recovering that referent. This leaves 
us only with karmaā, which, on the surface seems to make explicit what seems to be 
implied by KAŚ 3.1.36, namely that the defendant may present a pledge “with labor.” If 
all of this is true, then KAŚ 3.1.37 hardly seems to offer any true alternative to 3.1.36. 
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That KAŚ 3.1.37 is an explanatory gloss on 3.1.36 seems greatly preferable. As 
such it serves to clarify that the pledge should be protected by spells, that he pays the debt 
with labor, and that praveśayet is synonymous with pratipādayet, which has already been 
used in this passage (KAŚ 3.1.31). We can be nearly certain that 3.1.36 is a marginal 
gloss, not original to the text.  
Even so, the actual exemption, anyatra brāhmaāt, is rather clumsily appended to 
KAŚ 3.1.37. The meaning is clear enough: a Brahmin cannot be rendered in such cases as 
a pledge to labor for someone else’s debt. But, if we assume that rakoghnarakita	 is a 
gloss for ādhi	, then the fact that brāhmaāt is in the ablative as required by anyatra 
results in the same subject in the sentence being rendered in two different cases, the 
accusative and ablative. We would much prefer brāhmaavarjam. This seems an 
unhappy situation and only serves to cast further doubt on the veracity of this exemption. 
Moreover, throughout the prose of the first chapter, no previous reference has been made 
to vara or any of the four varas themselves. In all of these respects, then, the 
exemption of Brahmin from being made to labor for someone else’s debt seems of very 
dubious authenticity. 
Even so, we can see that this immunity from forced labor would, in fact, be 
limited only to cases wherein a Brahmin is asked or demanded to work as a pledge on 
behalf of someone who is unable to pay his legal costs. This hardly amounts to a major 
privilege. But, we have every indication that the Arthaśāstra conceived of not only the 
matter of remuneration through work, but also of the entire undertaking of the legal 
apparatus with reference to vara whatsoever. 
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12.3.2 Immunity from Torture (during interrogation): KAŚ 4.8.27Ð29 
The second and third Brahmanical exemptions in the Arthaśāstra come both from 
the fourth adhikaraa, entitled kaakaśodhana, “The Clearing of Thorns.” Broadly 
speaking, this adhikaraa concerns itself with instruction on how certain ministers should 
deal with a wide variety of malevolent and potentially malevolent forces affecting the 
state. This adhikaraa does not display the same tight internal integration seen in the first 
three books of the Arthaśāstra, and presents some confusing changes of topic that 
challenge both the concept of the book as a coherent whole, as well as local 
understandings of the specific subjects (or agents) of some of its chapters.449 Thus, the 
precise context, and therefore, the full purview of these Brahmanical exemptions is 
somewhat unclear, but a closer examination of each of them can reveal the extant 
exemptions and their relation to their immediate context. 
The eighth chapter of the fourth book mirrors exactly the topic entitled 
vākyakarmānuyoga:450 “Examination through Interrogation and Torture.” This chapter 
forms, with the two preceding chapters, the subsection of the fourth book dealing with 
methods of criminal investigation (KAŚ 4.6Ð4.8). Here we read about the procedure for 
ascertaining the guilt or innocence of someone accused of theft.451 
                                                 
449 The opening sūtra of the adhikaraa which directs groups of three prades to undertake 
kaakaśodhana is belied by the fact that individual chapters in this book are directed to many different 
agents, chief among them the samāhart. In fact, the prade seems (aside from this sūtra), appears in a 
much-diminished roles, acting as a functionary of superior(s). 
450 The provenance of this title is unclear, for the compound does not appear as such in the text. The 
chapter does explicitly mention vākyānuyoga, however, as an alternative to torturing women during 
interrogation (4.8.18). Moreover, it is characterized by the use of anu + yuj meaning, “to examine 
(verbally)” (4.8.1, 4.8.4) and the term karma to denote torture (4.8.4, 14, 17Ð21, 23, 25Ð26). On the whole, 
the prakaraa title seems to represent a conceptual integration of the chapter’s topics rather than a direct 
extraction from the text of the passage. 
451 While it is certain that this investigation pertains directly to crimes of theft, it is less clear whether it is 
intended as a model for the investigations of other types of crime. Given the iconic place of theft as the 
crime par excellence in much of Sanskrit literature, the latter seems at least possible. 
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The investigation begins by gathering information on the suspect (4.8.1).452 The 
investigator453 then convenes all the involved parties (victim, witnesses, and accused) and 
questions the witness (KAŚ 4.8.2Ð3). This seems to comprise the vākyānuyoga mentioned 
in the title. If the suspect’s alibi is sound, he is considered innocent of the crime; if not, 
he is to be tortured (KAŚ 4.8.4). After three nights, we are told, he should be released 
under suspicion if the inquiry has proven fruitless until such time as additional evidence 
arises (KAŚ 4.8.5).  
The chapter then enters into a discussion of the penalties for false accusation,454 
harboring a thief, and harboring an innocent suspect (KAŚ 4.8.6Ð8). Following this are 
instructions for how to entrap a suspected thief (KAŚ 4.8.9Ð11), a warning against 
assuming someone is a thief simply because he looks like one (4.8.12), and a concomitant 
injunction to adduce only firm evidence (samāptakaraa	) (4.8.13). 
Then comes a discussion of torture proper, including persons who should and 
should not be tortured or fully tortured (KAŚ 4.8.14Ð20455); the eighteen types of torture 
(4.8.21Ð23); a reference to a text from which they may be learned (4.8.24); and further 
instructions on who should receive how much torture (4.8.25Ð26). 
                                                 
452 It seems that the chapter intends the victim or, more likely, witnesses, to provide to the investigator a 
suspect (4.8.1). That is, unless we translate anuyu–jīta more broadly, in the sense of “he should ascertain”, 
rather than “he should inquire.” If so, it is oddly discontinuous with chapter 4.6 which has provided an 
investigator means of narrowing his pool of suspects in order to identify the culprit. 
453 As has been examined in the first part of the dissertation, the official intended to carry out this work is 
somewhat unclear. For the purpose of this discussion, however, such concerns are immaterial. 
454 Here, the thief (cora) seems to be a particular type of career criminal, rather than someone who simply 
steals. More inquiry would be welcome. 
455 KAŚ 4.8.19Ð20, which provides an exemption for brāhma	a śrutavat-s engaged in long sacrifices and 
ascetics as well as penalties for those who do so, is almost certainly an interpolation, as it interrupts a 
discussion of torture to recommend secreate agents for these individuals instead. Both the mention of 
horizontal social distinctions and the provision of penalties for professional misconduct (for those torturing 
the śrutavat or tapasvin) are completely alien to this chapter and its larger sub-group of chapter (4.6Ð8). 
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As in the previous example, the Brahmanical exemption comes in the final prose 
sūtras of the adhyāya (KAŚ 4.8.27Ð28), only this time the end verse (KAŚ 4.8.29) 
reinforces the preceding prose. 
 
KAŚ 4.8.27Ð29 sarvāparādev apīanīyo brāhma	a 
 tasyābhiśastāko lalāe syād vyavahārapatanāya steyo śvā 
manuyavadhe kabandha gurutalpe bhaga surāpāne madyadhvaja  
 brāhma	am pāpakarmā	am udghuyākaktavra	a  
 kuryān nirviaya rājā vāsayed ākareu vā  
 
 Regardless of the offense a Brahmin is not to be oppressed. 
 Instead, for the purpose of preventing him from taking part in legal 
transactions he should have the symbol of his crime branded on his 
forehead: a dog for theft, a headless and limbless trunk for murder, a 
vagina for sexual transgressions, and a vintner’s flag for drinking 
alcohol. 
 Having declared a Brahmin guilty of an evil deed and fixing him with 
the symbol of his crime, 
 The king should exile him or force him to live in the mines. 
We can recognize this passage immediately as parallel with both BDS 1.18.17Ð18 
as well as MS 9.235Ð239. Nevertheless, it seems very much out of place in the 
Arthaśāstra, which lacks any contextualizing discussion of mahāpātakas or the system of 
punitive penances. Read narrowly, as the style of this book would lead us to expect, the 
passage would only exempt Brahmins from torture during interrogations for crimes of 
theft. Even then we would have expected it to come after the preceding discussion of 
persons partially or completely exempt from torture (KAŚ 4.8.14Ð20).456 Clearly, however, 
the passage intends itself to have a wider effect, as in both the BDS and MS. In that case, 
we would expect it to occupy a more prominent position vis-à-vis the criminal code in the 
text, such as at the beginning or end of the third or fourth book, such as we find in the 
                                                 
456 Perhaps it was excluded from inclusion there because of another exemption to brāhma	a śrutavat-s, an 
almost certainly spurious passage we will discuss later. 
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MS. Based on its vast divergence from the topic at hand, it is impossible to assume that 
this passage was inserted by the same person who authored the chapter.  
Indeed, this passage (KAŚ 4.8.27Ð29) appears to be a moralizing gloss prompted 
by some commentator’s or redactor’s horror at the idea of torturing Brahmins. It is 
clearly an iteration of the rule from Baudhāyana regarding the mahāpātakas: 
 
BDS 1.18.17Ð18 avadhyo vai brāhma	a sarvāparadheū  
 brāhma	asya āgurutalpagamanasuvar	asteyasurāpāneu 
kusindhabhagasgālasurādhvajās taptenāyasā lalāe Õkayitvā 
viśayān nirdhamanam  
 
 A Brahmin, indeed, is not to be executed for any offense. 
 When a Brahmin kills another Brahmin, commits gurutalpa, steals 
gold, or drinks alcohol [the king] should brand on his forehead with a 
heated iron a trunk, a vagina, a jackal, or a tavern banner and cast 
him out of the realm. 
The first sūtra (BDS 1.18.7) is likely the source of KAŚ 4.8.27. The interpolator has 
placed the locative compound sarvāparādheu in the first position at KAŚ 4.8.27 in 
imitation of the Arthaśāstra’s well-attested convention of placing a locative in sentence-
initial position in order to adapt a previous rules to new conditions (although this is not, 
strictly speaking, a new condition). The gerundive avadhya has been replaced with the 
more generic term apīanīya457 to reflect that the passage is about torture for 
interrogation and not corporal punishment per se. Finally, the archaic vai has been 
dropped. 
The correlation between KAŚ 4.8.28Ð29 and BDS 1.18.18 is less direct, but I think 
it can be demonstrated to have been the ultimate source of this passage. For, among the 
dharma authors Baudhāyana has the distinction of being the first (and only among the 
Dharmasūtras) to link these four mahāpātaka-s with branding and to specify these four 
                                                 
457 This is the only occurrence of apīanīya in the KAŚ, although we do find its positive form. 
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symbols on the forehead. Manu’s discussion of the same is almost certainly based on 
Baudhāyana’s (or one very similar).458  
It appears that the interpolater reserved the final component of this formula, exile, 
for the adhyāya’s end verse. He states brāhmaa	 pāpakarmāam udghuya-, “having 
announced the Brahmin to be an evil-doer.” This serves to establish that the king, as in 
the Baudhāyana Dharmasūtra, is the one in charge of the punishment. Once again, 
however, a term found nowhere else in the Arthaśāstra, ud + gu, is introduced. Then we 
are told the king should wound him with the symbol and banish him or send him to the 
mines. Finally, direct orders to the king in this adhikaraa are very rare, occurring only 
in two other places. The rare issuance of a directive to the king seems further indication 
that the form of this passage derives from a different context.459 Thus we see that the 
                                                 
458 A few things require explanation. The switching of positions between brahmahatyā and steya would 
have been necessitated by placing this passage at the end a chapter on interrogation for crimes of theft 
alone. Thus, moving steya to the first position helps connect the two passages. The substitution of 
manuyavadhe for brahmahatyā would have been necessary, as the Arthaśāstra nowhere outside of this 
passage considers the murder of a brāhma	a to be a separate offense from murder in general. But here the 
interpolater reveals himself, for the compound manuyavadha is unknown to the rest of the text, which 
refers to the murder of humans simply as vadha. The interpolater, feeling a need to specify that he is not 
simply talking about brāhmaas has introduced a subtly foreign concept into the text. Finally, the inclusion 
of the term abhiśasta has been necessitated by the formula “crime:symbol” generated when the long 
compounds of Baudhāyana’s passage were broken up. Here, again, however, the interpolater has left a clue: 
abhiśasta in the Arthaśāstra only refers to an accusation, and not a crime itself as in the Dharmasūtras 
(ĀpDS 1.24.6, et al). The latter usage is native to the dharma literature. The alien term kusindha is 
rendered with kubandha, which we find elsewhere in the Arthaśāstra. The change from surādhvaja to 
madyadhvaja is less clear. Finally, the inclusion of the compound vyavahārapatanāya shows that the 
offenses still cause a “falling,” but now it is not from caste, as in the dharma literature, but from the right to 
conduct legal transactions, as made explicit in MS 9.238Ð239 (although this was almost always the logic 
behind branding). Again, the term patana elsewhere in the Arthaśāstra always denotes a literal rather than 
a metaphorical fall. 
459 This conclusion, if accurate, has great importance to our larger understanding of the text. Here we have 
an example of interpolated material being used to generate an adhyāya end verse. This supports the theory 
that the adhyāya end verses are, in fact, products of the redaction of the text into adhyāyas and not relics 
from the earlier Arthaśāstra. For clearly here we have a passage with an alien provenance, the last portion 
of which is conspicuously rendered into an adhyāya end verse. Unless we posit that it has overwritten or 
otherwise obscured an earlier verse, we have clear evidence the transformation of this prakaraa into an 
adhyāya involved the inclusion of new material, including the end verse itself. 
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second of our Brahmanical exemptions, also falling at the end of the adhyāya, is spurious 
as well.  
12.3.3 Immunity from Death for Treasonous Activities: KAŚ 4.11.12 
The final Brahmanical exemption comes also from the adhyāya redaction, in the 
eleventh adhyāya of the fourth adhikaraa, entitled śuddhaś citraś ca daakalpa, 
“Guidelines for Execution, Simple and with Torture.” It discusses, primarily, penalties 
for murder and manslaughter (KAŚ 4.11.1Ð8), violent theft (4.11.9Ð10), and crimes against 
the state as well as damage to state and/or public property (4.11.11Ð17, 20Ð23). 
Interspersed are various individual rules on other crimes (KAŚ 4.11.18Ð20, 24Ð25). The 
end verse (KAŚ 4.11.26) claims that these violent punishments “follow the śāstra-s 
written by great men”, and allow simple execution in the case of crimes without violence. 
At KAŚ 4.11.11Ð12 we find the following sūtras: 
 
KAŚ 4.11.11Ð12 rājyakāmukam antapurapradharakam atavyamitrautsāhaka 
durgarārada	akopaka vā śirohastapradīpika ghātayet  
 brāhma	a tama praveśayet  
 
 He should execute by burning his head and hands anyone who desires 
the kingdom, who harms the palace, who renders comfort unto a 
forest chieftain or an enemy, or who reviles the fort, region, or army. 
 He should cause a Brahmin to enter darkness.460 
This passage is out of place here, even in material dateable to the adhyāya 
redaction, for several reasons. The phrase tama praveśayet is unclear and unknown 
elsewhere in the Arthaśāstra. The term tamas is only used one other time, and then only 
in the curious 14th adhikaraa,461 which functions as the upaniad of the text and 
contains many unusual and probably later usages. What is more, KAŚ 4.11.12 is entirely 
                                                 
460 Altekar (2005[1949], 69) takes this as a reference to drowning. 
461 KAŚ 14.3.2 
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out of keeping with the rest of the chapter, which makes few distinctions between 
different kinds of persons when listing offenses and punishments. Aside from this 
passage and one other in KAŚ 4.11,462 the only distinct social sub-sets in this section are: 
pregnant women, new mothers, children, fetuses, and parents.463 
Once again, the sūtra in question seems an odd and narrow limitation given the 
breadth of tortures mentioned in the chapter. It is not clear why a Brahmin should be 
exempt only from punishment for treasonous activities and not many of the other crimes 
listed here. Perhaps not coincidentally, a similar injunction is found in the Dharmasūtras 
albeit in a different context: 
ĀDS 2.27.17 cakunirodhas tv eteu brāhmaasya 
The immediate context of this exemption is regarding a more comprehensive set 
of crimes, including murder, theft, and appropriation of land (ĀDS 2.27.16). 
12.4 CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing analysis, not only can it not be maintained that the 
Arthaśāstra generally prohibits the torture of Brahmins as a class, the only three 
examples of such exemptions to be found therein either date clearly to the adhyāya 
redaction or are spurious. Thus, it can be stated that the Arthaśāstra originally made no 
provision for the exemption of Brahmins from corporal punishment. 
We are thus left in the interesting position that our only extant text from the 
expert tradition of statecraft in the classical period does not prohibit the corporal 
punishment of Brahmins. This puts it at direct odds with the texts of the early dharma 
literature. It also suggests that we can reappraise the claims of the dharma literature in 
                                                 
462 KAŚ 4.11.22Ð23 discusses thefts from the armory by both soldiers and non-soldiers. Clearly the 
drawing of this distinction is necessitated by the context. 
463 References to ācārya-s and tapasvin-s (KAŚ 4.11.13 and 4.11.19) are most likely spurious. 
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light of a parallel tradition that did not recognize their assertion of exemption from 
corporal punishment.  
Despite the clearly later character of these pro-Brahmanical sentiments, I believe 
that its would be erroneous to draw the conclusion that the prakaraa-text of the 
Arthaśāstra is somehow anti-Brahmanical or non-Brahmanical. At least one reference 
favorable to Brahmins (KAŚ 1.16.5) and several discussing varas according to some kind 
of hierarchy (KAŚ 3.15.5Ð6; 6.1.8; 7.11.21 et al) may well date to the prakaraa-text. And, 
even though there is a hint that early references to Brahmins may have been to expect 
greater responsibilities from that group, there is no real anti-Brahmanical sentiment. 
There is a definite cynicism about all religious practices and an undoubted willingness to 
use religious pretexts to gain political advantage, to flaunt religious convention, and 
generally bend religious entities to political advantage. But this does not seem to amount 
to any kind of criticism or alienation from Brahmanical religion.  
On the contrary, the text seems to assume a privileged social position for 
Brahmins, even though it does not address it in its policy or law. Moreover, the king’s 
prime minister, the mantripurohita, his astrologers, diviners, and many other 
functionaries were almost certainly Brahmins. As such, we can assume that many of his 
counselors may also be conceived of as such in the Arthaśāstra. The presence, however, 
of Brahmins in the text has not resulted in the presence of the Brahmanical ideology of 
the dharma literature. Why? 
The picture of society that emerges is one where Brahmins held an elevated 
position, but wherein ascetics were not debased or disdained. And the distinction between 
different ascetic movements does not seem to have been particularly important to the 
state. Nonetheless, we see the presence of traditional Brahmanical institutions, but always 
in the service of the state. There is no indication of the kind of religious control of the 
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king implied by the Vedic sources and the dharma literature. As such, we may well be 
dealing with a text written by Brahmins and possibly also for Brahmins, at least in part. 
But what is missing from the equation are the orthodox ideologies of the dharma 
literature. If Brahmins wrote the Arthaśāstra, they would certainly be elites, but not 
necessarily coming from the same class of orthodox specialists that composed the 
dharma literature. Moreover, no special distinctions of vara or jāti are evident with 
regard to employment by the state, and so on. We can be certain that some social 
pressures existed to exert pressure on outsider groups and prevent their entry into power, 
but the text tells us little of that. We do read of the need to be from a “good family.” And 
perhaps, then, it is best to think of a general divide between forward families and 
backward families, using the notion of ārya as a kind of shorthand for the former. Even 
so, this does not make much of an impression on the text. 
Much is assumed in the Arthaśāstra, and we can be certain that those eligible for 
high positions in government comprised a small, elite part of the greater whole. There is 
little said of this, however. Moreover, the appointment of governmental positions would 
have been carried out according to the interests of those authorized to make such 
appointments, meaning that the composition of the governmental elite would have 
followed other flows of power in society.  
Ultimately, I don’t believe that the ideological assumptions and implications of 
the vara system, evident in the treatment of statecraft in the dharma literature, were 
operative in the prakaraa-text of the Arthaśāstra. Certainly, it would have been a well 
known theory. Moreover, it is a certainty that Brahmins received different treatment from 
other members of society, were esteemed by many, and operated from their own base of 
power. If the prakaraa-text can be taken as any indication, however, it doesn’t appear 
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that varadharma had made a very large impression on kings and states in the period in 
which it was composed.  
Finally, however, we can expect great differences in the operation of states in the 
period, given the variety of regional influences affecting the practice of governance. As a 
technical treatise, the prakaraa-text of the Arthaśāstra need not be assumed to have 
been authoritative everywhere. It does represent, however, how statecraft was thought 
about during the period, and we can see in it that the kind of Brahmanized kingship 
evident in the dharma literature and the epics had made little imprint on the early text.  
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CONCLUSION 
It has been proposed here that the Arthaśāstra developed over some centuries 
through a seminal period in Indian history. It is further proposed that the Arthaśāstra was 
witness to some of the major shifts in the political discourse of that time. With its origins 
lost sometime in the late centuries of the first millennium BCE and its final form have 
taken shape by the 3rd – 4th century, the Arthaśāstra comprises in itself many political 
worlds of that axial age.  
I stated at the beginning of this dissertation that I wanted to increase the 
usefulness of the Arthaśāstra as a source for the reconstruction of society and, in 
particular, religion, in the classical period. There is no doubt that the most important 
efforts toward that end lie in textual criticism, even if only to demand attention to the 
complex and composite character of this text. I think that I have, in small and large ways, 
helped to move forward our understanding of the text. Of the occurrence of an adhyāya 
redaction, I am quite certain; of the precise extent of that transformation, I still have 
questions. But I stress the latter qualifier, for it is my conviction that this text can be 
teased apart with increasingly sophisticated approaches. The majority of the work 
remains to be done on the underlying prakaraa-text. I am convinced here, also, that 
rigorous application of the methods of philology can contribute greatly to our 
understanding of the formation of that text. 
13.1 READING THE ARTHAŚĀSTRA 
Source criticism undoubtedly represents the most important tool for historicizing 
the text and helping it to speak to questions about the past. But, such efforts only get us 
so far. For, once we know what we are reading, which is to say, how the passages of the 
text stand in chronological and logical relation to one another, we must as a separate 
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concern figure out how to read the Arthaśāstra. I wrote briefly about the dangers of 
positivist interpretations of the text and the distortions they have wrought upon retellings 
of Indian history. Something more fundamental, however, must be understood about the 
nature of the Arthaśāstra. 
Neither the Arthaśāstra as a whole nor any of its parts is in any way a description 
of any state at any time. To be certain, empirical data can be extracted from the text. But, 
the world within which all of the facts and personages of the Arthaśāstra are cast is a 
fiction. What is more, it is not sufficient to call it normative, imaginary, idealized, or 
archetypal. It is not a manual of statecraft, as it is often called.464 It is a śāstra, and that 
means that the content of this treatise is, first and foremost, knowledge. It is not so much 
a “blueprint for the state,”465 but a tool for the production of expertise, less as a source for 
practical action than as a sign of erudition.466 
To say that a śāstra is a field of discourse is perhaps the most generic set into 
which it can be reduced. When we begin to populate that space with the priorities that 
shaped this śāstra we must count, purely in the realm of epistemology, values such as 
comprehensiveness, detail, prior consideration of opposing positions, and so forth. And 
that is what I believe we see in the Arthaśāstra, an attempt to think of everything that 
could pertain to statecraft, to achieve authoritativeness through a kind of intellectual 
                                                 
464 Note Scharfe’s use of the term “Manual” in the English translation of his 1968 work; much more could 
be said in this regard. 
465 This is the estimation of Thapar (2002, 185). 
466 Pollock states that “We may in fact characterize the ideological effects of śāstra as follows: First, all 
contradiction between the model of cultural knowledge and actual cultural change is thereby at once 
trasmuted and denied…Second, the living, social, historical, contigent tradition is naturalized, becoming as 
much a part of the order of things as the laws of nature themselves…The theoretical discourse becomes in 
essence the practical discourse of power.”  
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domination of the topic. I say all of this in order to explain how I think this text should be 
read, or rather, why I think the state appears the way that it does in pages of this text.467 
This is evident, as D.N. Lielkhune (2001) has argued, already in the earliest layers 
of the text: the discussion of the adhyakas. Here we have a vision of the state 
bureaucracy as parceled out into departments (called adhikaraas in a later layer of the 
text), each overseen by an official called an adhyaka. And so the business of the state is 
divided into its elementary subdivisions and each is given an advisor. We have, then, 
what is certainly a theoretical distillation of state functions organized into a symmetrical 
typology.468 Like a trip through the funhouse, we recognize certain features in the 
reflection, but distorted, sometimes beyond recognition. It is a perfect illustration of the 
influence of śāstric priorities on the textual reproduction of the state. 
And this represents a portion of the text most clearly representing one of the 
independent sources from which the prakaraa-text was composed. Whereas we might 
once have hoped to find the most “accurate” presentation, the most essential 
                                                 
467 This, I think, explains more than anything, why attempts to link the Arthaśāstra (even in its various 
parts) to historical polities and other ancient sources have failed so completely. It isn’t that we haven’t 
found the state or text that resembled the Arthaśāstra (even in part) because our evidence is too meager, but 
because what we have in the Arthaśāstra is not a description, nor even an idealization, of any given 
historical state. It is a set of intertwined, exhaustive refractions of the state within the contours of śāstric 
priorities. 
468 Samozvantsev (2001) argues, regarding the “meaning” of the term adhyaka (I will not note 
grammatical errors): “There are no bases to give therm “adhyaka” (as well as to information about them) 
special “bureaucratic” meaning in KA and being based on it to judge about reliability of the treatise. Major 
importances of the termÑsupervisorÑi.e., the head, the governor, the ruler, are quite comprehensible both 
for KA and to other texts. “Adhyakas” representatives of authority (instead of “officials”), governors from 
various levels, big peoples were called, mainly in connection with execution of corresponding functions by 
them (first of all, gathering up taxes and fill up of treasury). Similar artificial divisions when the same 
person depending on a context is called as various terms, is quite comprehensible both to the traditional 
literature and for shastras. “Activity of Adhyakas (adhyakapracāra),”  equally, as well as “mandala,” 
follows, more likely to examine as a complex of ideas on the describing of an Ancient Indian state. And 
reocmmendations of the treatise, thus, equally it is possible to correlated the “ideal” state KA both with 
large and little states of ancient times.” I would add to this only the above consideration, as shown by 
Pollock, of the ideological dimensions of śāstra, through which such idealizations become distorted by the 
priorities of the genre and its bearers. 
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characterizations, of the state in its earliest passages, we find instead that the core of the 
text is already in its earliest form, in a word, a śāstra. What, then, of the subsequent 
evolution of the text? While no doubt these expansions of the text represent, to the 
composers, the inclusion of important overlooked material, they too are śāstra. And what 
is more, all of these śāstric refractions must be brought together into some kind of unity. 
This is accomplished in many ways within the text: the subsuming of adhyakapracāra 
by the role of the samāhart
, the greater organization of the state into seven prak
tis 
(“constituents”), and so forth, until finally, the ultimate unification of chronologically and 
ideationally diverse material comes through the formal structure of the adhyāya 
redaction. The “state” in the text takes its ultimate shape through a combination of 
idealization, śāstric priorities, and redactorial exigencies. 
So how do we read this text as a historical source, particularly on religion? As 
mentioned above, there is certainly empirical data to be retrieved from the Arthaśāstra: 
likely this is the material that will ultimately serve to give us a durable absolute 
chronology. Misguided, then, are attempts to find a comparison between the states as 
described by, for example, Megasthenes and Kauilya. The ironic element here is that if 
one were to find a good connection between the two, we would likely have to attribute it 
more to similarities in formal elements of discourse than in the objects “described.” 
But what of the other types of information that are sought, such as opinions, 
habits, ways of seeing the world, cultural tensions, and so forth? The answer, as will 
already have suggested itself, lies in understanding the priorities that are expressed in the 
depiction of the state in the Arthaśāstra and the influence that depiction of the state in the 
Arthaśāstra had on its society. The latter is difficult to recover and will no doubt require 
inspired new approaches retrieve it. The former, however, is what I have attempted in the 
second part of this dissertation. 
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13.2 THE ARTHAŚĀSTRA BEFORE POLITICAL BRAHMINISM 
From the perspective of cultural and religious history, the most significant 
dimension of the compositional history of the Arthaśāstra is the “moment” in which 
political Brahmanism emerged with full force into the śāstra. We have what appears by 
all accounts to be a fully-realized daanīti that is ideologically transformed by the 
emergence of a new set of political priorities. Pursuant to the preceding conversation, this 
means that we had, sometime around the turn of the millennium, a comprehensive 
articulation of the state (within śāstric convention) that displayed little, if any, evidence 
of the political interests of the Brahmanical community (the so-called “prakaraa-text”). 
And, in one major overhaul (the adhyāya redaction), a religious ideology had been 
inserted into the text sufficient to recast the entire project of statecraft as being carried out 
within a greater religious order. Also resulting from this was the ideological co-opting of 
the Arthaśāstra as representative of its genre. 
Before considering the character of this change, we should examine the 
implications of the prakaraa-text before its transformation. In all, we have a 
representation of the state that is not entirely devoid of religious considerations (consider 
here the role of the mantripurohita, the use of ascetics dressed as spies, some degree of 
the recognition of the status of Brahmins, and so forth), but which aggregated all of these 
within a fundamentally political outlook. This is not to say that the prakaraa-text (or its 
predecessors) was secular, but that the political interests of the state completely 
dominated the discourse. And, what is more, there is a general absence of claims to 
political advantages on the part of Brahmins. 
Now, if we imagine that the prakaraa-text evolved during roughly the same 
period as the Dharmasūtras (c. 300 BCEÐ100 CE), then we have a strong counterpoint to 
this Arthaśāstra in the treatments of statecraft in the Dharmasūtras, which are unanimous, 
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in concert with preceding Vedic tradition, in ascribing specific rights to Brahmins, from 
freedom from punishment to (claimed) autonomy from the king. Moreover, these aren’t 
just the conceits of an isolated text or two, but the culmination of centuries of political 
thought expressed with a great deal of uniformity in the new sub-genre of statecraft 
within the dharma tradition. 
Chronologically parallel to this, however, we have the prakaraa-text of the 
Arthaśāstra, which represents a treatment of statecraft several orders of magnitude 
greater than the comparatively meager expositions in the Dharmasūtras (with the 
attendant differential in detail suggested thereby) and, what is more, an ongoing and 
independent expert tradition in political science. And yet, barely a whisper of this 
Brahmanical ideology is to be found in the text. To compound matters, it appears that we 
have evidence of the role of Brahmins in some positions (mantripurohita and, perhaps, 
the dūta) and possible indications of limited considerations of vara. What explains the 
disparity? 
13.3 ARTHA AND DHARMA 
We have entered, then, into the consideration of the respective historical contexts 
of the production of these treatises. There can be little doubt that a number of factors are 
required to explain this discrepancy: geography, community, genre, political intent, and 
so forth. 
Foremost among these, I would argue, is the distinction in genre. Now, as a 
deeply composite text that took its final form through successive iterations, it does not 
appear that the Arthaśāstra was composed after any kind of formal genre template. This 
would speak against any kind of densely populated and discretely articulated formal 
genre of Arthaśāstra. We also know, however, that it drew on at least one independent 
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source and probably more. What is more, we have no real way of telling whether its 
broad arrangement of topics (kingadministrationlaw enforcementforeign 
policywar) might not itself represent a guiding convention shared with lost text from a 
shared genre. (Certainly we cannot take the invented polemical dialogues in the text as 
evidence of an earlier genre.)  
Nevertheless, when we compare the prakaraa-text of the Arthaśāstra to the 
contemporaneous genre of the Dharmasūtras, we find that, despite similarities, we are 
looking at two very distinct kinds of texts. In fact, if we assume that the prakaraa-text 
of the Arthaśāstra possessed a discussion of civil law (vyavahāra) significantly less 
developed in certain areas than that found in the extant text, a major point of contact 
between the two traditions is greatly diminished. I would say that, on the one hand, we 
have a genre representing the full, independent, and singleÐminded treatment of 
statecraft, and on the other, we have a genre of texts apparently written by Brahmanical 
savants, highly educated in the traditional learning of their orthodox communities and 
writing primarily as instructors of young Brahmins (and experts more generally) on the 
proper customs, conduct, ritual observations, and penances of their hermetic community. 
The intended audience of the two texts, it would seem, are importantly different. 
The Dharmasūtras are written as complete expositions of the dharma of the Brahmanical 
community (with subsidiary consideration for the dharma of other communitiesÑas 
inculcated within Brahmanical orthodoxy). The authors are probably the most 
conservative intellectual elites in the orthodox communities, men authorized by learning 
(in the Vedas) and their exemplary conduct to hold forth on authoritative tradition. 
Moreover, these texts are meant for other such individuals and for the education of the 
young in the proper practices and behavior of the orthodox community. The audience, to 
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be specific, are other orthodox Brahmins, men whose reputation and prestige are based 
on their knowledge and demonstration of Brahmanical custom. 
What, then, is the purpose of including discussions of statecraft in these texts? 
The answer to this lies, I would argue, in the specific interest these texts take in statecraft. 
We read nowhere in the Dharmasūtras of state bureaucracy, envoys, the constituents of 
the state, foreign policy, and so forth. Instead we read of two major topics: the king’s 
conduct and law (in a nascent form). Is it possible, then, that these treatments of statecraft 
and law in the Dharmasūtras are not artifacts of the emerging intellectual and literary 
tradition on governance per se, but only reflections of that, digested and pared down to 
the interests of Brahmins who might seek work with a king either in the role of purohita 
or as a judge? 
This, I think, is very likely. It can be put differently by saying that, from a 
standpoint of textual sources, the history of law and statecraft in ancient India is not well 
reflected by the evolution of these subjects in the Dharmasūtras, which, in this model, 
only reflect those aspects of polity of interest to the orthodox Brahmanical community. 
The juxtaposition of their meager treatment of the topic with the fulsomeness of the 
prakaraa-text of the Arthaśāstra suggests as much. This is further reinforced, I would 
argue, by the possibility that the Gautama Dharmasūtra may have been aware of the 
prakaraa-text469 and that the Manusm
ti, which was fully aware of the same, only 
represented it in a highly-compressed form (with the exception of the legal code, which 
the composer appears to have developed into a formal science). 
Such considerations might begin to explain the difference between these two 
visions of the state, one represented by the early dharma literature, the other by the early 
                                                 
469 Compare GDS 11.2Ð4, which appears, much like the passages of Manu explored below, to follow the 
precise order of topics introducing the Arthaśāstra in the source underlying KAŚ 1.2Ð1.7, 1.9. 
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Arthaśāstra. To this potential difference in genre (and the contexts of production implied 
thereby), we might certainly also add certain geographical and historical components. 
Although we have not yet determined the date of the prakaraa-text, nor its earliest 
sources, we know that the center of the political world in ancient India beginning at least 
in the third century BCE lay in the northeast of the subcontinent. Bronkhorst (2007, 4Ð9) 
posited a cultural zone in this area called “Greater Magadha” and suggested that it is 
represented by a culture markedly distinct from that represented in Vedic sources. We 
need not posit much of a difference to imagine that the fortunes of Brahmanical ideology, 
with regard to royal patronage, may well have been very different in the Mauryan 
Imperium and any subsequent polities for which it served as an exemplar of governance 
(even if allowing for the traditional roles of Brahmins in government such as the purohita 
or, potentially, envoy). It is not out of the question that the Dharmasūtras were composed 
closer to the traditional Vedic heartland in the middle and lower Gangetic valley, and that 
the Arthaśāstra was composed farther east, although this is not necessary, and is as yet 
unsupported by any evidence. It is also not impossible that the texts of the Dharmasūtras 
represent a more rural (or at least hermetic) reality over against the undoubtedly urban 
and cosmpolitan Arthaśāstra. In fact, we have several possible explanations based on 
geography, but as yet no real leads. 
There are a number of possible differences in the context of production (such as 
suggested above) that might be better suited to explain the variation we see between the 
two genres on the point of Brahmanical exceptionalism. But what is most interesting 
about the divide is that our only existing representative from the expert tradition on 
statecraft was so utterly devoid of a sentiment so central to the Brahmanical descriptions 
of the political order within Vedic and classical literature. Much work remains in this 
area. 
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13.4 CONTEXT OF PRODUCTION 
So who wrote the Arthaśāstra? The Arthaśāstra was composed in Sanskrit; there 
is no evidence that it is a transcription of a Prakrit text. Typically, this has implied 
Brahmanical authorship, although the transformation of Sanskrit to a scholastic language 
may have implied greater access to the language.470 But the early text attests to the role of 
Brahmins, particularly the mantripurohita, in the government. The early test of dharma 
(which, however, is meant to insure that the ministers are more loyal to the king than the 
dictates of orthodox Brahmanism) turns on the assumption that many ministers would be 
outraged by the king forcing his purohita to sacrifice for one not authorized by Vedic 
tradition (KAŚ 1.10.2Ð4). Moreover, despite such disregard for religious sentiments, we 
find no hostility toward Brahmins in the text. Brahmanism appears rather as a feature of 
the broader culture within which the state operated, but not one possessed of the strong 
political rhetoric we have traced throughout the Vedic and Sūtra literature in an earlier 
chapter.  
The answer, I think, is that the Arthaśāstra was written by Brahmins (or, at the 
least, Brahmanically-educated individuals), but Brahmins who either did not feel that 
political Brahmanism applied to the topics of their śāstra or who were not influenced by 
the political Brahmanism of Vedic sources. 
The latter, I think, is very unlikely. Even a rudimentary traditional education 
would likely have inculcated any Brahmin of the period with the basic ideology of 
Brahmanical exceptionalism and varadharma. What seems more likely to me is that the 
context of production and the expected audience for the text were dominated by 
individuals who would not have been receptive to these elements of Brahmanical 
                                                 
470 On this transformation, see Deshpande 1979, 11 
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ideology. I have pointed out before the directly confrontational character of Brahmanical 
exceptionalism as a conflict between Brahmin and king over power. We can imagine that 
most of the functionaries and powerful officials of any state were drawn from the 
nobility, that kings and dynasties would look first to patronize their own relatives and 
other nobles in strategic alliance. The patronage of Brahmins, as Lariviere has argued, 
would only have been a necessity for weaker kings.471  
The world of the Arthaśāstra undoubtedly takes Brahmanical religion to be the 
norm. The “Test of Dharma” from the prakaraa-text mentioned above is an interesting 
example. It tells us that generally, Vedic orthopraxy was respectfully observed, but that it 
existed within a power framework whereby the king actually asserted his control over the 
religious system himself by occasionally flaunting deeply-held convictions. 
Hence, I think we have good reason to believe that the lack of Brahmanical 
exceptionalism in the prakaraa-text can be explained by a certain culture of 
containment of political Brahmanism within the state. This may not simply refer to 
Brahmins eager to sermonize on varadharma, but potentially of a generational culture 
where such claims were taken with a grain of salt.  
We have noted several times now that Brahmanical exceptionalism is not 
enunciated in our texts over against other religious claimants, but against the temporal 
power of the king. Thus, the ideological elements of Brahmanical exceptionalism cannot 
have been exceedingly popular in the halls of the palace. It is not surprising, therefore, 
that we might find a limited use of vara nomenclature without, however, much in the 
                                                 
471 “A strong king with the proper political alliances and a strong treasury and army would have been 
immune from the concerns of a priestly class. A king in a less advantagous position may well have needed 
the public endorsment, perhaps even the repeated public endorsement [through state ritual] of the keepers 
of Vedic tradition. Yet once a man occupied the throne he was endowed with authority. The office 
demanded it” (1997, 326). 
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way of direct enunciations of its hierarchy; moreover we seem to see a broader view of 
vara in the prakaraa-text than is to be expected within the rigorous confines of dharma 
literature. 
13.5 THE EMERGENCE OF POLITICAL BRAHMANISM IN THE ARTHAŚĀSTRA 
What is more interesting, perhaps, is the sudden emergence of Brahmanical 
exceptionalism within the text during the adhyāya redaction. If the above conditions 
explain why we don’t see it in earlier layers of the Arthaśāstra, what changed? We might 
first appeal to a rather mundane and unexciting conclusion: the text simply entered the 
orthodox Brahmanical curriculum. It is very likely that the reapportioning of the 
Arthaśāstra into adhyāyas represents its adaptation to an educational curriculum (see 
Chapter 3). The transformations wrought on the text in that moment suggest, moreover, 
that this was a curriculum dominated by the same kind of political Brahmanism that is 
evident in the dharma literature. What is more, we almost certainly owe the existence of 
the extant Arthaśāstra to its transmission through a stable educational tradition over the 
centuries. Only the robust and distributed tradition of Brahmanical education would have 
been sufficiently durable to have preserved the text. Hence, we are almost certainly 
witnessing in the adhyāya redaction the adoption of the prakaraa-text into the fold of 
Brahmanical pedagogy.  
The integration of the prakaraa-text into orthodox Brahmanical culture is also 
likely reflected in the ascription of the name “Arthaśāstra” to the text. All such 
occurrences of this term within the text can be dated to the adhyāya redaction.472 The 
older name for the expert tradition, if not also the text itself, appears to be daanīti, 
                                                 
472 Occurrences are found at KAŚ 1.1.1; 1.5.14; 5.6.47 (end verse); 7.10.38 (end verse); 7.18.42 (end 
verse); 15.1.2; 15.1.5. See §7.6 for a full exposition of the extent of the adhyāya redaction: none of these 
occurrences is controversial. 
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“The Use of the Staff,” which occurs in several passages clearly dating to the prakaraa-
text473 and is the only candidate for an earlier name found in the text. The transformation 
of daanīti to arthaśāstra would seem to accomplish the same conceptual project as the 
introduction of discussions of the trivarga in the adhyāya redaction (§10.2): to cast the 
project of statecraft as falling within a world organized into dharma, artha, and kāma. As 
mentioned above, the purpose of this strategy seems not to have been necessarily to 
subordinate statecraft (as artha) to dharma per se, but to promote dharma as a 
consideration equal to that of statecraft, whose importance would have been self-evident. 
However, the appropriation of the prakaraa-text into the fold of orthodox 
Brahmanism is not an isolated incident within this era of Sanskrit textual production. I 
have posited that the adhyāya redaction took place sometime after the composition of the 
Manusm
ti. This is significant because the Manusm
ti represents a quantum leap in the 
integration of political Brahmanism into thinking about statecraft. It can be argued that 
we see in Manu, for the first time, a fully articulated vision of society according to 
political Brahmanism. The Manusm
ti seems to have abandoned the parochial character 
of the earlier dharma texts and transformed the genre into a more properly literary 
expression of revealed truth, likely appealing to the emergence (roughly) in this period of 
personal styles of religious devotion. Put differently, the Manusm
ti seems to have 
adapted to the content of the dharma literature to a broader audience. 
If we date the Manusm
ti to the early centuries of the Common Era, then we find 
that it is broadly concurrent with the emergence of the use of Sanskrit in royal 
inscriptions (which further reinforces the idea that the chapter on edicts in the 
Arthaśāstra, KAŚ 2.10, dates to the adhyāya redaction). The adhyāya redaction of the 
                                                 
473 Occurrences in the prakaraa-text include KAŚ 1.2.1; 1.4.3; 1.9.9. Occurrences that may belong to the 
adhyāya redaction include KAŚ 1.2.4; 1.2.6; 1.2.11; 1.5.8.  
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Arthaśāstra would have followed sometime shortly after this, after which time we see the 
full transformation of Sanskrit from a sacerdotal language to language of politics and 
culture.474  
Historically speaking, then, it seems that political Brahmanism was making great 
strides in the early centuries of the Common Era. But, the concrescence between 
Brahmanical and royal interests does not appear to have been the gradual and linear 
apotheosis of the dual rule between Brahmin and Katriya from the Vedic period. Instead, 
it seems to have reemerged most clearly in the historical record with a rather minor and 
relatively insignificant dynasty: the Śugas.  
While the Śugas figure largely in the histories of the Sanskrit purāas and their 
founder, Puśyamitra, is said to have claimed to be a Brahmin and to have performed the 
ancient Vedic aśvamedha, or “Horse Sacrifice” (Kulke and Rothermund 1986, 68), 
Bhandare has, based on the study of coins and inscriptions, called into question whether 
there is any historical evidence for a linear Śuga dynasty to speak of (2006, 97). Thus, 
despite its high profile in Sanskrit sources, the dynasty itself does not seem to have been 
a significant player in the greater politics of the classical period. Rising and falling in the 
shadow of more powerful empires (the Indo-Greeks and Śakas, particularly), I would 
posit that the Śugas (and other minor lineages of the east) used political Brahmanism as 
a way to bolster their own political power. Because they could not compete in resources, 
they resorted to elements of “soft-power,” such as the promotion of certain ideologies 
through text, ritual performance, patronage, and the co-opting of Brahmanical prestige. 
Again, following Lariviere’s thesis, I would posit that weak, over-matched kings first 
                                                 
474 See, in this regard, the work of Sheldon Pollock 1996 and 2006. I do not agree with Pollock, however, 
regarding the agentless operation of transculturation. I think, more properly, the spread of Sanskrit into 
epigraphy and kāvya represents a larger expansion of the “Brahmanical Cosmopolis,”  which, to be certain, 
was a material entity driven by ideological and political considerations. 
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made widespread political use of Sanskrit and Brahmanic culture in the classical 
period.475 
13.6 HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
Concurrent with the emergence of the Manusm
ti and the adhyāya redaction of 
the Arthaśastra, then, we enter a period in which political Brahmanism seems to explode, 
with the authorship of the Mahābhārata,476 the emergence of the Smti and Purā	a 
genres, the use of Sanskrit in political inscriptions (Pollock 1996, 199ff.), and so forth, 
culminating in the “golden age” of the Gupta empire in the fourth-fifth centuries CE 
(Kulke and Rothermund 1986, 81Ð91). Having for centuries taken much of the ideology 
of Sanskrit literature as broadly reflective of ancient South Asian culture, the present 
thesis suggests that the literature of the early classical period was part of a campaign of 
sorts to project political power through Brahmanism when other means for political 
success were not available. It further suggests that the production of these texts and these 
ideologies were more localized than previously suggested and that the eventual spread of 
political Brahmanism in subsequent eras has obscured the regional character of this 
phenomenon in the early centuries CE. 
13.7 DATE OF THE ARTHAŚĀSTRA 
This brings us finally to the date and authorship of the Arthaśāstra. For reasons 
outlined above pertaining to the character of śāstric composition, I find attempts to 
harmonize the data of the text with what is known of or suspected to be true for historical 
polities to be an ill-fated endeavor. The best information, therefore, will likely come from 
                                                 
475 This might explain why the adhyāya redaction adds substantial discussions on “strategies for the 
weaker king.” 
476 Hiltebeitel (2001, 18) suggests a date between 0 and 200 CE; Fitzgerald (1983, 612) suggests 200Ð300 
CE. 
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the ability to link broadly-attested features of the text either with material culture 
(coinage, architecture) or sufficiently-secure bodies of expert knowledge (astronomy). A 
detailed study of these considerations has not been undertaken here. 
The adhyāya redaction, with which this dissertation is primarily concerned, must 
have occurred sometime after the composition of the Manusm
ti, but before the 
composition of the Kāmasūtra,477 which places it likely in the second-third centuries CE, 
perhaps earlier. The date of the prakaraa-text abuts the lower range of those dates, but 
is perhaps witnessed by the Gautama Dharmasūtra (see above), a not-too-helpful fact 
considering the general lateness of that Dharmasūtra. It does seem that the prakaraa-
text is unaware of gold coins altogether (hiraya meaning “cash” more generally in the 
text), and if its directions for minting punch-marked silver coins could be linked to 
denominations from the numismatic record, we might be able to locate the earliest layers 
of the text. As it is, we have no reason to date the prakaraa-text much before the second 
century BCE, although there is little to prevent it from being older than that by a few 
centuries. Ultimately, then, I would say that we have a text that was originally composed 
between the second-first centuries BCE and may have undergone successive 
enlargements before a final major redaction in the first-second centuries CE.  
Whether any part of it may be used as a source for the Mauryan period is as yet 
unclear. Considerations for dating the prakaraa-text certainly deserve their own study 
once the character of its composition is known more clearly. 
  
                                                 




Appendix A: Topical Outline of the Tantra Section 
I.    The King 
 A. Training 
  1.  vidyā      (KAŚ 1.2Ð1.4)     
  2.  vinaya      (KAŚ 1.5)    
  3.  indriyajaya     (KAŚ 1.6Ð1.7)     
 B. King’s Activities 
  1.  Appointing Officials  
   a.   amātyas     (KAŚ 1.8Ð1.9.8)    
   b.   mantripurohita   (KAŚ 1.9.9Ð10)    
  2.   Spying 
   a.   testing amātyas  (KAŚ 1.10) 
   b. appointing spies  (KAŚ 1.11Ð1.12.4) 
   c.   spying on high officers (KAŚ 1.12.5Ð1.12.17) 
   d. spying on citizens   (KAŚ 1.13)  
   e.   spying on enemy’s people  (KAŚ 1.14)  
  3.   Counsel      (KAŚ 1.15) 
  4.   Emissaries     (KAŚ 1.16) 
 C. On Princes      (KAŚ 1.17Ð1.18) 
 D. King’s Daily Schedule    (KAŚ 1.19) 
 E.  Constructing Palace/Protecting the King  (KAŚ 1.20Ð1.21) 
II.  Officials 
 A. Administrative Offices 
  1. unnamed [Settlement & Construction] (KAŚ 2.1-2.2.9) 
   a. nāgavanādhyaka (Director of Elephant Forests) (KAŚ 2.2.10Ð14) 
   [Settlement & Construction] (KAŚ 2.3Ð2.4) 
  2. samnidhāt (Depositor)  (KAŚ 2.5) 
  3. samāhart (Collector)   
   a. income    (KAŚ 2.6) 
   b. adhyaka (generic “Director,” probably the samāhart
) (KAŚ 2.7) 
   c. treasury    (KAŚ 2.8) 
   d. overseeing “adhikara	as” (KAŚ 2.9) 
   e. edicts/kayastha (Scribe) (KAŚ 2.10) 
  5. koādhyaka (Director of the Treasury) (KAŚ 2.11) 
  6. ākārādhyaka (Director of Mines) (KAŚ 2.12.1Ð2.12.22) 
  7. lohādhyaka (Director of Metals) (KAŚ 2.12.23) 
  8. lakaādhyaka (Director of Mint) (KAŚ 2.12.24) 
  9. rupyadarśaka (Examiner of Coins) (KAŚ 2.12.25) 
  10. khanyadhaka (Director of Mining) (KAŚ 2.12.27) 
  11. lavanādhyaka (Director of Salt) (KAŚ 2.12.28Ð34) 
  12. suvarādhyaka (Director of Gold) (KAŚ 2.13) 
  13. sauvarika (Head Goldsmith) (KAŚ 2.14) 
  14. koāgārādhyaka (Director of the Granary) (KAŚ 2.15) 
  15. payādhyaka (Director of Trade) (KAŚ 2.16) 
  16. kupyādhyaka (Director of Forest Goods) (KAŚ 2.17) 
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  17. āyudhāgārādhyaka (Director of the Armory) (KAŚ 2.18) 
  18. pautavādhyaka (Director of Weights & Measures) (KAŚ 2.19) 
  19. mānādhyaka (Director of Standardization) (KAŚ 2.20) 
  20. śulkadhayka (Director of Taxes) (KAŚ 2.21Ð2.22) 
  21. sūtrādhyaka (Director of Threads) (KAŚ 2.23) 
  22. sītādhyaka (Director of Agriculture) (KAŚ 2.24) 
  23. sūrādhyaka (Director of Alcohol) (KAŚ 2.25) 
  24. sūnādhyaka (Director of Butchering) (KAŚ 2.26) 
  25. gaikādhyaka (Director of Prostitutes) (KAŚ 2.27) 
  26. nāvādhyaka (Director of Shipping) (KAŚ 2.28) 
  27. goÕdhyaka (Director of Cattle) (KAŚ 2.29 
  28. aśvādhyaka (Director of Horses) (KAŚ 2.30) 
  29. hastyadhaka (Director of Elephants) (KAŚ 2.31Ð32)  
  30. rathādhyaka (Director of Chariots) (KAŚ 2.33.1Ð2.33.6) 
  31. pattyadhyaka (Director of Foot Soldiers) (KAŚ 2.33.7Ð8) 
  32. senāpati (Army Commander) (KAŚ 2.33.9Ð10) 
  33. mudrādhyaka (Director of Passports) (KAŚ 2.34.1Ð4) 
  34. vivītādhyaka (Director of Pastures) (KAŚ 2.34.5Ð11) 
 B. Legal Offices 
  1.   Law Enforcement I (Public Safety) 
   a. samāhart (protecting the country) (KAŚ 2.35) 
   b. nāgarika (protecting the city) (KAŚ 2.36) 
   c. dharmastha [a.   Transactional Law] (KAŚ 3.1Ð19) 
   d. dyūtādhaka (Director of Gambling) (KAŚ 3.20.1Ð13) 
   e. dharmastha [b. Transactional Law] (KAŚ 3.20.14Ð23) 
  2. Law Enforcement I2 
   d. prade (?) (regulating common vocations) [4.1.1] (KAŚ 4.1) 
   e. sa	sthādhyaka (Director of Markets) (KAŚ 4.2) 
   f. appendixÑcounteracting calamities (KAŚ 4.3) 
  3.   Law Enforcement II (Policing) 
   a. samāhart [4.4.1]   
    i.  spying on illicit businesses (KAŚ 4.4) 
    ii. spying on criminals (KAŚ 4.5) 
    iii. arrest on suspicion, for possession, and in the act (KAŚ 4.6) 
    iv. autopsies   (KAŚ 4.7) 
    v. interrogation  (KAŚ 4.8) 
  4.   Law Enforcement III (Rules for Government Officials) 
   a. samāhart and prade
 [4.9.1] (KAŚ 4.9) 
  5.   Criminal Law   (KAŚ 4.10Ð13) 
III. Miscellanea 
 1.   Secret Practices 
  a.  Law Enforcement IV (Against Treason) (KAŚ 5.1) 
  b.  Filling the Treasury  (KAŚ 5.2.1-5.2.63) 
  c.  Law Enforcement IV2  (KAŚ 5.2.64Ð69) 
 2.   Salaries of Officials   (KAŚ 5.3) 
 3.   Advice for Ministers    
  a.   On Getting a Job from the King (KAŚ 5.4) 
  b.   How to Behave under the King’s Employmentc (KAŚ 5.5) 
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